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The Reformation, according to historian Scott Hendrix, can be understood 
as a movement responding to a semi-pagan Europe detached from living Christian 
piety. The failure of Christian piety in everyday life, despite its speculative 
richness, produced a situation demanding a missionary response. The theologies of 
Richard Hooker and Friedrich Schleiermacher represent two such responses in the 
turbulent wake of the institutionalisation of Protestantism. 
Is this ‘Reformation’ situation, though, exceptional, or normative for 
Christian theology? Are Christians, and Christian theologians by extension, 
committed to a permanent revolution of human values or is confessionalisation 
necessary step? In a time when Western culture evinces a level of disconnect 
similar to the Reformation situation, theology needs to understand the tactics of 
those who sought to construct appropriate missionary theologies. The tactics they 
employed remain living hypotheses for fundamental theologies deciding between 
reconstruction and confessionalisation. The hypothesis scrutinised in thesis is a 
principled scepticism and committed reconstruction responsive to the situation of 
Re-Christianisation. It will be presented as a living and momentous, but not forced, 
hypothesis in this thesis. 
This thesis uses Jamesian Pragmatism to approach this hypothesis in 
Hooker and Schleiermacher. Both pursued Re-Christianisation in terms of the 
Reformation without adopting a rigidly confessional position preferring a process 
of progressive Christianisation beginning in the affective life. For them, Re-
Christianisation begins with a pre-reflective experience of the world as an ordered 
integrity modified by the living power of Jesus Christ at that pre-thematic level of 
the desiring and feeling body.  
The thesis contributes to contemporary Re-Christiansiation by providing a clearer 
understanding of the process in terms of Pragmatism instead of Idealist 
confessionalism or reductive empiricism. The pragmatic style practised by Hooker 
and Schleiermacher emerges as a possible strategy for the renewal of the body of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The goal of this thesis is to investigate one way Christians have tried to find 
responsible speech after serious theological, philosophical, and cultural changes 
through a return to the source of Christian piety. It will accomplish this task by 
examining Richard Hooker and Friedrich Schleiermacher's attempts to produce 
meaningful accounts of Christian piety possessing integrity and responsibility as 
part of the reconstructive task of Re-Christianisation. The relation between 
doctrine, reflective accounts of Christian life, and Christian piety—‘certain  
patterns of human living and dying'—will be understood as a kind of pragmatism.1 
The goal will not be an attempted reconstruction of Christian faith under present 
conditions, but, instead, an investigation of the hermeneutic task of Re-
Christianisation practiced by Hooker and Schleiermacher as a possible resource for 
contemporary thought: a living and momentous hypothesis.  
Re-Christianisation or Reformation, taken in as wide a sense as possible, 
will be understood as an existential dynamic in the Christian life not simply as a 
historical occurrence, or, rather, an existential commitment to a form of piety 
announced powerfully in that historical occurrence so as to delimit future responses 
and developments. As an essay in hermeneutical theology, but not hermeneutics, 
the thesis is concerned with the production, personal appropriation, and 
reinterpretation of an inherited way of living, including its symbols, pieties, and 
                                                            
1. Rowan Williams 'What is Catholic Orthodoxy? in in R. D. Williams and Kenneth Leech 




reflections, in time under the pressure of the object of Christian piety, Jesus Christ.2 
The bulk of this thesis, therefore, will be concerned with mapping the modulations 
and shifts in the Christian life on display in the major theological works of Hooker 
and Schleiermacher.  
By bringing out the underlying grammar of their accounts of the experience 
of God's agency in Christ in the present, I will demonstrate a common pragmatic 
conception of Christian doctrine as a continuing process of verification and 
expression in concrete, historical Christian communities resulting from a living 
divine agency. The dynamic begins with an existentially basic and pre-reflective 
experience of the world as possessing ordered integrity apart from human 
construction that can, depending on the availability of certain cultural and linguistic 
resources, lead to a conceptualisation of God as Creator in some circumstances or 
the simple experience of individual finitude in others. The orientation to God and 
the world receives a decisive modification in the historical life of Jesus of Nazareth 
when this same ordering power is known as a purposeful agent acting for the 
salvation of creation. Communal norms emerge as Christians attempt to understand 
Jesus of Nazareth in terms of the order encountered in the world. Re-
Christianisation can become a normative concern when Christ’s modification of 
piety is taken as a constant challenge engendering a scepticism towards final 
solutions and a continuing need for the reconstruction of belief; a permanent 
revolution of the heart in the Christian believer: the ‘conversion and permanent 
revolution of our human religion through Jesus Christ…by which all religious 
truths are painfully transformed and all religious behaviour transfigured by 
                                                            
2. ‘The revealed truth of God has an identity in the world. The offer of truth to the Church and 
by the Church is not only an invitation to ecstatic vision but it also defines the way to that 
vision.’ Cornelius Ernst Multiple Echo eds. Fergus Kerr OP and Timothy Radcliffe OP (Eugene, 




repentance and new faith.’3  Locating this pragmatic dynamic in the Lawes of 
Ecclesiasticall Politie and The Christian Faith, the thesis will chart a personal 
dialectic centred on the cultivation of Christian thinking and doing in light of the 
continued language-forming force of the generative experience of God's agency in 
Christ.  
 I will now turn to Re-Christianisation as a concept and an agenda before 
looking to its pragmatic testing and application. 
 
 
I. Re-Christianisation and Reformation 
 
 The Reformation historian Scott Hendrix has proposed the rubric of Re-
Christianisation as a unitive definition of the various Protestant and Catholic 
reform movements in their common attempt to return Europe to the ground of 
Christian life in the face of a shifting symbolic world. The primary goal of the 
Reformers was to 'Re-Christianise' areas of Europe, especially rural churches, 
viewed as insufficiently Christian in their worship, belief, and daily living.4 
                                                            
3. H. Richard Niebuhr The Meaning of Revelation (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 
2006) pp. 99, 95. See also: H. Richard Niebuhr Radical Monotheism and Western Culture (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1960) p. 126. 
4. To establish this unity, he argues against two tendencies in Reformation studies. First, a 
number of scholars oppose viewing the Reformation as possessing any intrinsic unity. Instead 
they focus on its plural manifestations in order to speak of Reformations. These arguments tend 
to go one of two ways. The first group sees the Reformation as possessing an internally 
unclaimed unity projected onto it by an outside group, perhaps the contemporary opposition of 
the Counter-Reformation or later academic scholars who want to stress cultural continuity 
throughout the Reformation period in Europe. The Catholic Church's Counter-Reformation 
response ‘made the Reformation a single phenomenon, namely, a decisive and lasting break in 
Western Christianity.’ This view has also found credence with ecumenically minded scholars 
who want to see the Reformation as local reform movements within the larger church catholic. 
Second, ‘the Reformation also seems to be marginalised by recent arguments that medieval 
piety remained popular and hard to uproot in areas that officially became Protestant.’ The 
gradual nature of the Reformation and the stubborn persistence of practices of medieval piety 
call into question the extent or viability of the ‘Reformation’ in many places where it was an 
elite project.  Hendrix 'Rerooting the Faith: The Reformation as Re-Christianization' Church 




'Protestants set out to make changes to Christianity because they regarded both the 
practice and the theology behind [existing Christianity] as wrong.'5 But Reformers 
had to establish 'coherent theological reasons' for their attempts at reform: '[their] 
theologies were born in this interaction between reform and reflection; that is, they 
were driven by the agendas of the reformers.'6 The goal was not a strictly Protestant 
one—the Roman Catholic Jean Gerson, for instance, continued earlier criticisms 
of superstitions and remnant pagan practices, while a little later Johannes van Paltz 
could rebuke Christians who had recourse 'to unapproved sites, magic astrology 
and alchemy' or ran from church to church on Good Friday in hope of present 
benefits.7 The mainstream lay piety of most Christians incorporated some level of 
this 'superstition' as a holdover from a previous incomplete Christianisation of 
European society so that the God of Jesus Christ was not the principle of meaning 
in their lives and they required recourse to 'magic' to satisfy perceived needs.8 For 
this reason, existing practices  and  symbol systems destabilised when Christ was 
moved to the centre of piety, when he was made 'the centre and criterion of 
Christian faith,' by a range of Reformers.9 These problems, moreover, were not 
new. They were constant factors in the evangelisation of cultures retaining various 
levels of 'pagan' religious practices and pieties. 
The Reformation crisis of popular piety, in fact, parallels, and in some cases 
repeats, earlier crises and reforms in Europe especially the theological work of the 
via moderna and the practical reforms of the devotio moderna. Both movements 
                                                            
5. Scott Hendrix Recultivating the Vineyard (Westminster John Knox Press: Louisville, 2004) p. 
170. 
6. Hendrix Recultivating p.170. 
7. Hendrix Recultivating pp. 11-13. 
8. Hendrix Recultivating p. 17. 




pushed toward a renewal of Christian devotion through a constructive engagement 
with the early church. According to Heiko Oberman,  
'both via moderna and devotio moderna sought to transcend the scholastic and 
above all, the monastic, controversies, in pursuit of a synthesis of scientia 
and sapientia that would further a renewal of the Christian charity characteristic 
of the primitive church.'10  
 
A renewed Christian practice was pursued even if it involved the breakdown of a 
stable symbolic or 'metaphysically fool-proof causal system which [embraced] the 
whole chain of being, including God as first and final cause.'11 The appeals to 
simplicitas and experientia lead to an emphasis on moral formation and ecclesial 
reform. Carter Lindberg sums up this breakdown: ‘But the core of the crisis [of the 
late medieval period] was the tottering the symbols of security... This crisis came 
to a head in the crisis of the guarantor of those symbols—the church.’12  
As it began with church criticism, Luther's work provides a helpful example 
of this tottering. 
Luther removes the fixed authoritative character of the indulgence system 
in his ninety-five theses: 'Any truly repentant Christian has a right to full remission 
of penalty and guilt, even without indulgence letters.'13 Without reference to a 
complex set of relationships, i.e. the medieval indulgence system, the sinner was 
being offered a way to know him or herself as a creature justified before God. 
According to Luther, Christ gave the Christian more than a temporary, heightened 
experience, as was offered by miraculous shrines or enthusiastic worship, but a 
way of experiencing the world as such.14 Christ could provide a stable sense of the 
                                                            
10. Heiko Oberman Masters of the Reformation (CUP: 1981) p. 46. 
11. Heiko Oberman The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early 
Reformation Thought (W.B. Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, 1992) p. 6. 
12. Lindberg The European Reformations pp. 40-41. I am also following Lindberg's account of 
religion as a way of making meaning of the world detailed on pp. 49-50 
13. Thesis 36 in  Luther's Works 31:28. 
14. '[For Luther f]aith begins in the experience of accusatio sui, alienation from self, guilt, the 




self, even when the world order was in disarray, and could even cause the 
dissolution of conceptions of the world order. The guarantor of the symbolic world 
was moving in physics, metaphysics and theology to different parties.15  
Luther returned to Christ through an affective theology of 'simplicitas and 
experientia.' Affection and attachment in faith not only let Christians endure the 
loss of symbolic hierarchies, but called those very hierarchies into question. This 
endurance was possible as long as Christ was able to provide a fixed point or 
principle of meaning around which to orient the rest of a believer's life and thought. 
Luther saw this affective attachment in terms of God's active constitution of the 
believer in the believer's union with Christ. The knowledge of God generally 
derived from knowledge of the world cannot be the direct source of Christian 
formation. Apart from the cross: ‘that wisdom, which sees the invisible things of 
God in works as visible completely puffs up, blinds, and hardens.’16 Knowledge of 
God undertaken by humanity can never be a neutral affair but works certain moral, 
existential effects in the person. Luther's adherence to the cross as a source of 
theological wisdom mirrors his concern with the need for felt grace and forgiveness 
among the people more generally.  
 In fact, Luther seems to elide the theological task with this form of penitential 
piety. The theologian does not gain easy access or an upper hand through fine-
grained speculative distinctions about God. Instead, the simple everyday 
experiences of believers provide the basis of even elite theological knowledge. 
Theology and penance both draw upon the historical concepts God has chosen to 
                                                            
cross, standing where Christ once stood, under Law, under wrath... Nor is it a momentary or a 
transitory experience, solved and removed by justification...' Rowan Williams The Wound of 
Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Cowley Publications, 1990) p. 148. 
15. Amos Funkenstein Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the 
Seventeenth Century p. 63. 




use while allowing God to remain God in their use. God elects eternally and 
actively in grace; God remains hidden in God's visibility on the cross. The believer, 
then, does not enter into a world of seemingly obvious meanings, elaborate 
speculative reasonings, or philosophical abstractions. ‘Every deed of the law 
without the grace of God appears good outwardly, but inwardly it is sin. This in 
opposition to the scholastics.’17 Through the work of the cross, and only though it, 
the Christian knows better. 
 Armed with these and similar insights, the Reform movements saw existing 
medieval Christian cultures as former Christian missionary fields choked with 
pagan weeds. According to Hendrix: ‘[Luther's] criticism indicates that he 
understood the religion around him not as outright paganism, but as a religion that 
could still transmit the symbols of Christianity but did not instil the substance of 
the faith in many of its adherents.’18 The desired outcome of Reformation for the 
great majority of the Reformers was to ‘infuse their culture with a deeper and more 
authentic Christian piety’ by upholding ‘Christ as the exclusive object of 
veneration.’19 Christocentric piety was the goal, not simply a culture making use 
of Christian cultic symbolism  or images. Reformers, then, 'would not Christianise 
as before, i.e., convert pagans to Christian belief and ritual, but convince people 
who had already been baptised to believe and practice the faith in a way judged by 
Protestants to be more valid.'20  
                                                            
17. Disputations Against Scholastic Theology 76 Luther’s Works  31:14 ‘No syllogistic form is 
valid when applied to divine terms. This in opposition to the Cardinal.’ 47  Luther’s Works 
31:12. 
18. Hendrix 'Rerooting the Faith' p 563. 
19. Hendrix ‘Rerooting the Faith’ pp. 568, 566. Hendrix includes Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, and 
Bucer, but Bullinger, Cranmer and Vermigli could easily be added to the list. 




 The rather amorphous character of the Reform movements led to a process of 
confessionalisation in an attempt to maintain the movement's integrity as an 
evangelical force in Europe.  
‘The rise of confessions can be seen as the structural outcome of the Reformation 
agenda, which anchored new ways of being Christian in the culture. The faith could 
be rerooted, it turned out, in diverse patterns of theology and piety and in different 
sociopolitical contexts, which we call the confessional groupings of early modern 
Europe.’21  
 Renewed veneration of and dependence upon Christ determined the goals, tactics, 
and forms of this new Christocentric piety.22 The affective attachment to Jesus 
Christ grounding the Reform movements through the dissolution of previously 
existing communal structures, could now become the basis for the resumption of a 
coherent world within new confessional structures. For some parties, the 
Reformation revolution was not necessarily permanent. 
 Hendrix accounts for these substantial divergences in the programs and 
confessions of Reformation groups by attributing them to differences in tactics not 
strategy: ‘Reformers certainly differed on how it was best done, but they were 
united, even most of the radicals, in the conviction that piety had to be refocused 
on Jesus as the way of salvation.’23 Forming people into authentic Christian piety 
required more than simply topdown changes to religious practice. It required God 
given devotion. Differing versions of Christianisation came about, though, not only 
because of different cultural-political contexts. Doctrinal differences, despite 
significant areas of overlap, also determined the plan of Christianisation pursued 
in various contexts and locales. As a reform project, the Reformation project of 
Christianisation, worked from the tension between pre-existing concepts of God, 
                                                            
21. Hendrix ‘Rerooting the Faith’ p. 573. 
22. 'Reformers differed over how Jesus caused this transformation--as example, as teacher, as 
mediator, or as the Spirit--but they were convinced that recapturing a Christological centre was 
the way for their religion to change lives.' Hendix, Recultivating,p. 172. 




where God secures a structured, meaningful word, and the living reality of Jesus 
Christ as the Lord who calls for repentance, a step into a new world.  
In these various movements a basic dynamic of formation and reform 
emerges. When conventional norms or over-beliefs fail to be intelligible, fail to 
accord with the natural attunement of that culture's members, then what is required 
is either a testing of those beliefs and norms by individuals or an interrogation of 
the habitual centres of those individuals in light of the constellation of concepts in 
an over-belief. The mutual interrogation of received cultural values and the 
affective sense of the self present in the Reformation movement was undertaken to 
put an end to their estrangement. The difficulty, as Scott Hendrix maintains, came 
when their doctrinal innovations were confessionalised without reference to their 
original context. After the fact doctrinal justifications of practical changes were 
substituted for the agenda of Christianisation responsible for the original re-
orientation.24 The dislocation of the felt sense of self from its cultural and symbolic 
world began to repeat itself.  
One possible solution to this recurring problem is to take up 
Christianisation as a continuing agenda of interrogation in the service of calling for 
a form of human attunement centred on Jesus Christ. This cultivation of a sense of 
self located in an affective experience of Christ leading to a new interest in 
Christian ways of living is a Christian form of the pragmatic tendency. A continued 
commitment to this personal and communal interrogation of received norms as a 
double task of scepticism, in pursuit of a more direct relation to the reality in 
question, and reconstruction, the communication of that direct relation, is Re-
                                                            




Christianisation understood as a hermeneutic and pragmatic agenda rather than 
simply a historical phenomenon. 
The basic agenda of Re-Christianisation as the response of those caught in 
the existential situation of a disconnect between piety and the complexes of 
meaning in everyday life can be adopted and reactivated as an interpretive concept 
to remedy this disconnect by bringing piety fruitfully into the complexes of 
everyday meaning. Whatever historical connections and material overlap may or 
may not develop, Re-Christianisation remains a live hermeneutical option for those 




II.  The Problem of Reconstruction and the Necessity of Reconstruction  
 
Lecturing in 1912, Ernst Troeltsch surveyed the unique difficulties for the 
Christian faith in a time that had lost an established and assumed sense of the world:  
'Christianity from the very beginning worked out an agreement between 
biblical revelation and the "natural" revelation of ancient science, an agreement 
that lasted until well into the seventeenth century...Our era differs dramatically 
from all preceding ages, for we can no longer take it for granted that there is any 
universally accepted natural knowledge. Even Catholicism recognises this; that is 
why its priests must attend anachronistic courses of philosophy in which Aristotle 
constitutes the chief subject.'25  
 
The change handled by Troeltsch in the modern era, a shift away from an antique 
three-tiered cosmology to a materialist understanding of the universe, was 'actually 
the re-ordering  of the mind-body-world configuration' separating 'us today from 
                                                            
25. Ernst Troeltsch, The Christian Faith trans. Garrett E. Paul (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress 




the culture and thought of the pre-modern world...'26  More recently, Charles Taylor 
has described this movement as one from  
'a humanly meaningful one [where] the principle of order in the cosmos was closely 
related to, often identical with that which gave shape to our lives... Partly as a result 
of the scientific revolution, the cosmos idea faded, and we find ourselves in a 
universe [that] is no longer a hierarchy of being, and it doesn't obviously point to 
eternity as the locus of its principle of cohesion.'27 
 Cosmological revision at the popular level called into question the nature of the 
relation between revelation and 'ancient science' as well as Christ and the church.28 
God's presence became increasingly difficult to account for without the 
explanatory mechanisms of an ordered, hierarchical cosmos. Natural revelation no 
longer fit; what was practically useful became theoretically and experientially 
problematic.  
All the same, the modern world, for Troelstch, was not a 'great apostasy,' 
but a place where God's 'self-attestation' could be recognised.29 Once the 
                                                            
26. Oliver Davies Theology of Transformation (Oxford: OUP, 2013) p. 39. 
27. Charles Taylor A Secular Age (Harvard: HUP, 2009) p. 60. cf. 'What was a methodological 
sin to Aristotle became a recommended virtue in the seventeenth century... The ideal of a system 
of our entire knowledge founded on one method was born. Aristotle never entertained it; neither 
did Scholasticism. Indeed the very word 'system' stood, until the seventeenth century, not for a 
set of interdependent propositions but for a set of thing-for example, systema mundi or systema 
corporis.' Amos Funkenstein Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to 
the Seventeenth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986) p. 6 'Because the 
seventeenth century wished language to become precise and thoroughly transparent, God's 
omnipresence became a problem. If it could no longer be given a symbolic or metaphorical 
meaning, how else could the ubiquity of God be understood, God's being 'everywhere'? The 
problem was compounded by the new commitment of the seventeenth century to a view of 
nature as thoroughly homogenous and therefore nonhierarchical. God's omnipresence became an 
almost physical problem for some.' p. 10. 
28. On this point see, for instance, Douglas Farrow Ascension and Ecclesia (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1999) , Oliver Davies Theology of Transformation, and Henri de Lubac Corpus Mysticum 
trans. Gemma Simmonds CJ (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006). Charles 
Taylor's argument in A Secular Age describes the transition away from a view of human actors 
integrated in the world to a 'buffered' view of humanity. Alasdair MacIntyre makes a similar 
point in regard to Western moral reasoning in After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1984) . 
29. 'Shall we, then, treat the modern world as nothing more than a great apostasy? It is no more 
apostate than any other era. Every age has had its God-slayers, cold intellectual natures are no 
novelty, and fools like the one who said "I am convinced that God must fear me" cannot be 
taken as typical of the modern era. We can, on the contrary, clearly recognise God's continuing 
self-attestation in the modern era as well. But if we do grant the modern era access to our 
theology, we should do so not in secret, but openly, with full awareness of what we are doing. 




established cosmology no longer exerted practical influence on everyday lives, was 
not 'natural', theology was faced not only with a choice about the status of this 
specific cosmology but with cosmologies, metaphysical systems, and total schemes 
of explanation more generally.30 What is the relationship between these world-
views—cosmological or metaphysical—and the persistent life of Christian piety? 
How does Christian piety metabolise various ways of taking the world as it 
attempts to forge a relatively consistent sense of itself? How does Christian faith 
Christianise, or not, these emerging views? Troelstch gives two possible 
descriptions, which he in turn rejects, of this attempt to relate the scientific world-
picture [Weltbild] to the more comprehensive and normative worldview 
[Gesamtweltanschauung] of Christianity.31  
First, the older cosmology, philosophy, and metaphysics can be maintained 
to support the established religious position, e.g. 'anachronistic courses of 
philosophy.' This tactic makes religion dependent on a previous scientific 
worldview or cosmology that can be maintained, despite scientific developments, 
by alienating or inuring itself from any changes in contemporary ways of taking 
the world. A religious world-picture, however, stands 'independent of any such 
systematic worldview;' capable of persisting throughout massive theoretical 
upheavals.32  Remaining constant, the religious world-picture sacrifices its 
                                                            
30. 'Therefore, contemporary Christian proclamation is faced with the question whether, when it 
demands faith from men and women, it expects them to acknowledge this mythical world 
picture of the past. If this is impossible, it then has to face the question whether the New 
Testament proclamation has a truth that is independent of the mythical world picture, in which 
case it would be the task of theology to demythologise the Christian proclamation.' Rudolf 
Bultmann 'New Testament and Mythology: The Problem of Demythologizing the New 
Testament Proclamation' in New Testament & Mythology and Other Basic Writings trans. and 
ed. Schubert M. Ogden (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1984)  p. 3. 
31. Ernst Troeltsch The Christian Faith p. 11/Glaubenslehre nach Heidelberger Vorlesungen 
aus den Jahren 1911 und 1912 ed Gertrud von le Fort.(Berlin: Duncker and Humboldt, 1925) p. 
4. 




practical arm to maintain the rest of its body and to exempt itself from touching the 
stuff of human life. Detached from practical life, this rationalist tactic does not 
direct human life and is, therefore, unable to acknowledge God's production of 
effects. The worldview does not have any traction with the world-picture, or vice 
versa.33 This tactic of detachment parallels the Reformation move into rigid 
confessionalisation without reference to the practical situation productive of 
specific doctrines. It ceases to be sceptical about its own formulations. 
Second, religious and scientific or philosophical knowledge can be reduced 
to the same thing.34 A 'Christian' cosmology can be developed by fitting theological 
knowledge into scientific or philosophical single systems in contemporary use. 
This unity would equate religion with a scientific or philosophical world-picture, 
whatever philosophy was current. For Troeltsch, philosophy works out the 'basic 
laws of the spirit' in its theoretical work without worrying about their religious 
content, but this approach declares those laws religious or theological.35 The first 
approach divorced itself from concrete experience, this second approach does not 
acknowledge the controlling power of either the distinctive Christian concept of 
God or the Christianness of Christian faith. It allows for the intersection of the spirit 
of philosophy and the 'holy and gracious God' of religion, but evacuates religion's 
object to make room for the necessities of the contemporary spirit. This approach 
                                                            
33. For Troeltsch, in The Christian Faith at least, a world-picture [Weltbild] is a more restricted 
and abstract account of the world, e.g. that offered by scientific reflection, while a worldview 
[Weltanschauung] 'strives to connect, organise, and unify its diverse contents, never resting until 
it has achieved a relatively unified perspective (insofar as this is logically possible).' The 
Christian Faith 11. 
34. 'There has been no shortage of attempts to claim that religious knowledge and philosophical 
knowledge are actually the same thing. The greatest modern attempt to do so was the Hegelian 
system. For Hegel, religion is nothing other than the affective consciousness of the unity of the 
world, which theoretical knowledge apprehends as an idea. Religions grasps God poetically 
according to our imagination, while speculation grasps him scientifically as abstract form.' 
Troeltsch The Christian Faith pp. 59-60. 




more or less recapitulates the semi-pagan character of Christianity opposed by the 
Reformers, but assumes that this compromise is a good thing. God does not 
produce effects in this conception but is the speculative accompaniment of a certain 
style of philosophy. However unlike philosophy, the religious life involves a 
personal commitment rather than a drawn out process of reasoning; it is 
apprehension not comprehension.36 
Troeltsch dissents from both approaches by calling for the religious and 
philosophical or scientific approaches to connect critically in individual believers 
in the formation of a worldview.37 The new formation develops through a mutual 
'living interaction between historical influences and the immediate, though relative, 
religious productivity of the individual.'38 Thus, individual experience of the 
world—personal and sensual life— practically interacts with the abstracting 
theoretical consciousness as Christians attempt to make plain their religious life, 
their piety, insofar as possible in terms of newly emergent or regnant theoretical 
views.39 The interaction of these two aspects of Christian life is not, as in the first 
description, a deductive movement or, as in the second description, an inductive 
one, but, rather, a retroductive operation drawing on 'a variety and diversity of 
inferences' from historical, scientific, and personal life to produce a committed 
religious worldview.40 The canon for these judgments, at least in Christianity, is 
clear for Troeltsch:  
'[This alteration] is accomplished by means of a religious knowledge of God and 
by the will's formative surrender to God, who encounters us with his essence...in 
the revelation-history of the prophets through its culmination in Jesus, and from 
                                                            
36. Troeltsch The Christian Faith p. 60. 
37. Troeltsch The Christian Faith p. 27. 
38. Troeltsch The Christian Faith p. 27. 
39. Troeltsch The Christian Faith p. 56-59. 
40. Francis Schüssler Fiorenza Foundational Theology: Jesus and the Church (New York: 




Jesus down to the present. Jesus is thus the centre of the redemptive self-revelation 
of God.'41  
 
A religious worldview, a religious world of meaning, emerges when the human 
person surrenders their will to God, when God becomes a directing force by 
touching their lives in Jesus Christ, and they are elevated into a kind of freedom 
from claustrophobic circumstances.42 
Following Troeltsch, then, the specifically Modern problems of cosmology, 
science, worldview, etc., can be taken as part of the larger and longer process of 
Christianity, including individual Christians, working toward 'a normative religious 
vision of the whole' throughout time without presupposing themselves to possess a 
totalised worldview.43 For the purpose of this thesis, this continual process of 
criticism, reinterpretation, re-evaluation, and readjustment of life and thought, 
including faith, in light of the Christian principle can be named as Re-
Christianisation. The process of Re-Christianisation, as I will be engaging with it, 
is an ad hoc pragmatic process retroductively sifting the appropriate elements of 
Christian piety. For the remainder of this chapter I will sketch out this pragmatic 
approach by looking to William James. 
  
III. A Brief Description of Pragmatism 
 
Around the same time as Troeltsch, William James diagnosed the increasing 
alienation of religious life from the minds of philosophers and scientists: one either 
finds an insufficiently religious empirical philosophy or an empirically and 
practically worthless religious philosophy, and 'the conflict between science and 
                                                            
41. Troeltsch Christian Faith p. 63. Also: '...the authentic and classic source of all Christians 
beliefs is the personality and proclamation of Jesus.' 24-25. 
42. Troeltsch The Christian Faith p. 65-67. 




religion in full blast.'44 The increasing prevalence of the empirical cast of mind, 
what James called 'tough-minded' thinkers, forced a retreat of religious thought 
away from practical life, creating a problematic rationalism depriving religious 
believers of any guidance in their daily life. Despite these bifurcations, religious 
experience still provoked Christians to understand their faith amid large cultural 
transformations. The disjunction of reductive empiricism and rationalism, which 
James sought to overcome with his pragmatism, made plain the disconnect between 
scientific cosmology and inherited metaphysics in his time.45 
In Pragmatism, James speaks of his audience's desire to combine the 
solidity of lived experience with inherited cultural values:  
'You want a system that will combine both things, the scientific loyalty to facts 
and willingness to take account of them, the spirit of adaptation and 
accommodation, in short, but also the old confidence in human values and the 
resultant spontaneity, whether of the religious or romantic type.'  
 
The desire remains unfulfilled, however, because  
'[y]ou find empiricism with inhumanism and irreligion; or else you find a 
rationalistic philosophy that indeed may call itself religious, but that keeps out 
of all definite touch with concrete facts and joys and sorrows.'46   
 
One either deals with concrete realities without bringing them into a larger unifying 
scheme or one develops an abstract rationalist system detached from concrete 
realities, 'the brutal givens in the context of divine activity.'47 The desire for 
synthesis, though, is practically achieved because people eventually perform 'the 
big summarizing act, and the system stands forthwith over against one like a living 
thing.'48 Human beings necessarily possess a sense of what the world means that is 
                                                            
44. William James Writings: 1902-1910.(New York: The Library of America, 1987) p. 493. 
45. 'Empiricist writers give him [the amateur philosopher] a materialism, rationalists give him 
something religious, but to tha religion 'actual things are blank.'... [Pragmatism] remains 
religious like the rationalisms, but at the same time, like the empiricisms, it can preserve the 
richest intimacy with facts.' William James Writings: 1902-1910 pp. 500-501. 
46. William James Writings: 1902-1910 p. 495. 
47. Ernst Troeltsch The Christian Faith p. 62. 




their 'individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the 
cosmos.'49 Philosophy and theology, however, do not correspond to these 
individual ways of taking the world because philosophy and theology either defend 
an unhelpful dualist deity or deny the ultimate integrity of reality. 
In Theology and the End of Doctrine, Christine Helmer argues against a 
similar contemporary theological rationalism in post-liberal theology. For her, 
there exists a post-liberal strategy wherein theology and doctrine detach from 
reality in order to ensure the continued viability of Christian religion such that 
instead 'of describing God as norm, theology and its doctrinal formulations become 
the norms of belief and practice.'50  She refers specifically to the work of Bruce 
Marshall as the exemplar of the post-liberal 'epistemic-advantage model.' She 
intends her criticisms of Marshall to apply to the larger project of reorienting 
theology to doctrines as epistemic norms begun in George Lindbeck’s The Nature 
of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age.51 On this reading, 
'normativity is secured by assigning [doctrine] to the church-creed analytic that has 
been cut off from any divine transcendent reality. Doctrine has lost its witnessing 
capacity to the God who might call doctrine into question.'52 Without a controlling 
divine referent, doctrines work simply to support a Christian worldview supposedly 
given in and authorised by Scripture. Scripture, when interpreted in line with 
certain understandings of established creeds provides specific literary linguistic 
formulations capable of metabolising any reality or turn of events a person finds 
him or herself confronted by, even God. Helmer's description of this strategy, then, 
                                                            
49. William James Writings: 1902-1910 p. 487. 
50 Christine Helmer Theology and the End of Doctrine (Louisville, KY: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2014) p. 61. 
51. George Lindbeck The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1984) 




aligns closely with James' characterisation of rationalist or idealist philosophy of 
religion that has, in the interest of self-preservation, lost 'interest in content or 
referent' depriving itself of those dialectical relationships inherent in the trying and 
testing of human life:  
 'Within the epistemic-advantage model, doctrine has lost its dialectical 
relationship to Scripture and proclamation. Instead, it has turned into the 
dogmatism of a regula fidei by virtue of asserting its production in the analytic 
relation between church and creed... Once the church has garnered the prerogative 
of the truth of a worldview, however, it is cut off from the living possibility of being 
open to God's word.'53  
 
 At the other end of the spectrum, one can see a return to the sort of empiricism 
James describes in certain forms of religious naturalism. Naturalism, ‘in the sense 
of a negative ontological commitment to the nonexistence of anything other than 
the natural order,’ refuses to countenance the possibility of any interaction with 
God.54 This form of naturalism, like the epistemic-advantage model, does not leave 
room for religion to be a witness to an independent reality capable of judging or 
adjusting that witness. They both sequester and protect religion in different ways. 
Another option, though, is a form of naturalism that feels free to offer causal 
descriptions of religion in the same manner as descriptions of other aspects of 
human nature, that is willing to describe ‘the experience of [God’s] action, however 
that experience is obtained.’55 James’ pragmatism, then, might offer a resource to 
theology by picking a way out of this deadlock by supposing there to be room for 
God’s causal touch in human life. 
While speaking to his early 20th century audience, James describes the loss 
of integrity between the everyday life and certain totalising conceptual schemes, 
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54. Andrew Dole Schleiermacher on Religion and the Natural Order (Oxford: OUP, 2010) p. 8.  
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e.g. cosmology or metaphysics, with contemporary interest. The problem, for 
James, behind this instability in philosophy and theology is the attempt to think of 
truth as a copy of reality reproducing reality in a conceptual or semantic system, a 
world-formula.56 The solution to this problem is a way of talking about truth that 
has three characteristics: first, concepts or propositions that are capable of being 
conformed to reality; second, coherence with other conformed concepts and 
established beliefs; third, accordance with the will in its drive for integration and 
moral action.57 James offers up his pragmatism as a solution and counterproposal 
to both irreligious empiricism and detached religious rationalism:  
'if you follow the pragmatic method, you cannot look on any such word as 
closing your quest. You must bring out each word its practical cash-value, set it 
at work within the stream of your experience. It appears less as a solution, then, 
than as a program for more work, and more particularly as an indication of the 
ways in which existing realities may be changed.'58  
 
Theories, principles, categories and 'solving names' function as instruments within 
a person's orientation to the world as he or she moves towards 'last things, fruits, 
consequences, facts' in his or her response to the world.59   
James’ pragmatic approach to working out knowledge through human 
encounter with the world in large respects mirrors more recent understandings of 
the extended mind.60 The organism-environment coupling productive of meaning 
                                                            
56. In answering these questions [about the agreement of ideas with reality] the pragmatists are 
more analytic and painstaking, the intellectualists more offhand and irreflective. The popular 
nation is that a true idea must copy its reality.' William James Writings 1902-1910, pp. 572-573 
'The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make 
to you and to me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be 
the true one.' William James Writings: 1902-1910 p.  508. 
57. My summary of James' solution mirrors Eugene Rogers' description of Thomas Aquinas' 
view of faith. Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth: Sacred Doctrine and the Natural Knowledge of 
God. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995) p. 166. Rogers, in turn, is looking to 
Bruce Marshall's essay 'Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian' Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly 
Review 53.3 (July 1, 1989) 353-402. David Burrell notes a similar parallel in Aquinas: God & 
Action (Scranton, PA: University of Scranton Press, 2008) pp. 180-182.  
58. William James Writings: 1902-1910  p. 509. 
59. William James Writings: 1902-1910  p. 510. 
60. The phrase of course calls to mind Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers ‘The Extended 




involves a relationship not just between the discursive or loquacious level of the 
person and her environment but includes a ‘corporeal encounter with [her] 
environment.’61 ‘Visceral forms of information highlight affective significance of 
events… After all, it is my bodily experience, but the range of what we share 
through our common genetic and cultural background makes all the difference.’62 
By incorporating the body and the cultural world into his understanding of 
understanding, James was able to develop something like a realist phenomenology 
without bracketing or reducing the external world where objects are handled. The 
intentional aspects of human consciousness are assumed in the process of knowing 
because they are found in experience as parts of the material world; they are not 
simply made up by the ‘mind.’63 The interpretive anticipations encoded into 
inherited systems of symbols are at work in the body as it navigates the world with 
relative success, and these systems include metaphysical or religious 
commitments.64 Focussing on the body as an integral, if not the integral, participant 
in the dynamic of the formation of piety allows for a relatively naturalist 
explanation of the development of piety in non-reductive historical and cultural 
terms. Religion, as a potentially universal symbolic scheme, is a site of universal 
                                                            
61. Mark Johnson The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007) p. 25.   
62. Jay Schulkin Bodily Sensibility: Intelligent Action (Oxford: OUP, 2003) p. 129. But the 
correlation cannot be taken as complete: ‘I admire the work of William James, as should be 
clear… But he is wholly fallible, like the rest of us. A statement such as ‘Cognition is a function 
of consciousness…’ is but one of many wrong-headed statements.’ Schulkin Bodily Sensibility 
p. 121.  
63. The connection between James, realist phenomenology, and cognitive science is made by 
Aaron Massecar in ‘How Pragmatism and Realist Phenomenology Can Bring Cognitive Science 
Back into Philosophy’ William James Studies (12:1) pp. 36-46. A more fulsome argument, with 
use of other pragmatist thinkers as well, of the compatibility of non-reductive naturalism and 
realist thought in James is Michael R. Slater Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Religion 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2016) 
64. ‘The hypothesis is that bodily representations informs cortical sites in anticipating future 




cooperation between human persons in time and space as they construct the 
necessary responses to create and to handle various spaces in the world.65 
Unsurprisingly, then, James, at least in Pragmatism, does think 
metaphysical concepts can be put to practical use as instruments in such a way that 
decisions can be made about their truthfulness.66 Truthfulness is a function of the 
way ideas derived from our experience allow us to hold together the disparate 
aspects of our human experience, and new ideas are true as they allow us to accept 
novel experiences in line with our established beliefs.67 Concepts, ideas, and 
theories serve the human attempt to make sense out of reality, to have a view of the 
world, which in turn do not come from 'the loquacious level which rationalism 
inhabits' but, instead, from our 'habitual centre of [...] personal energy.'68 The 
habitual centre, one's fundamental concern and orientation, determined by 
inherited concepts and the pressure of the universe on human beings allows for the 
flux and flow of life to be handled.69 The driving force in life is negotiated in the 
course of a human life, but is not entirely under human control. 
                                                            
65. ‘Such a project [of understanding human niche construction in terms of religion] may 
potentially have value today in highlighting the creative tensions which can exist between the 
self-communicating inclusivity of ‘social place’ and ‘hyper-place’ on the one hand, and between 
both ‘social place’ and ‘hyper-place’ and the sometimes militarized territorial boundaries that 
sectorize the planet on the other. This points to a contrast between the politics of deep 
community and the politics of the nation state. We can ask the question of what we can learn 
about the formation of global solidarity from world religions, and indeed about the religious 
deformations which occur, for instance, where the claim to limitless territory entails the 
eradication of compassionate ‘social place’, in the failed production of ‘hyper-place’?’ Oliver 
Davies ‘Niche Construction, Social Cognition, and Language: Hypothesizing the Human as the 
Production of Place’ Culture and Brain (3 September 2016) p. 22.  
66. 'The pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that 
otherwise might be interminable.' William James Writings: 1902-1910  p. 506. 
67. William James Writings: 1902-1910 pp. 512-514. 'In this perspective, the reasonableness of 
a religion is largely a function of its assimilative powers, of its ability to provide an intelligible 
interpretation in its own terms of the varied situations and realities adherents encounter.' George 
Lindbeck The Nature of Doctrine 131. 
68. William James Writings: 1902-1910 pp. 73, 183. 
69. Compare with Troeltsch: 'It is the same as with an individual person: there is a general 
striving of the will, a central drive that produces a unity of life, that holds the myriad fragments 
of our existence together. In the depths of our unconscious there lies a primal and basic unity, 
which, despite all the catastrophes that threaten to tear us apart, preserves an inner direction 




'Unpicturable beings' and metaphysical concepts are able to affect human 
action and understanding in two ways: as means of interacting with objective 
reality and through effects on non-rational levels of the human person.  
For James, human experience consists of subjective and objective parts, 'the 
objective part is the sum total of whatsoever at any given time we may be thinking 
of, the subjective part is the inner 'state' in which the thinking comes to pass.'70 
Human experience perceives a 'full fact' through a combination of this inner 
conscience, a felt or thought object, an attitude towards the object, and a sense of 
self.71 The objective element interacts with the physical senses, the inner 
dispositions or habits of the human person, and their larger interpretive way of 
taking the world in general.72 The final elements in this assemblage are people's 
'over-beliefs,' intellectual ideas or dispositions affecting the possible range of 
human experience. To illustrate his point, James gives the example of a woman 
raised in a Christian household who remained unable to make sense of Christian 
life until she encountered a version of Christian belief in Spiritualism, which gave 
her an over-belief wherein sin and forgiveness became gripping, live options for 
handling her life.73  
Constraining over-beliefs, our integrative agenda or orientation, these 
unpicturable beings determine a person's attitude towards the world and the way in 
                                                            
such a unity in our own life, a life in which we have become what we are. There is such a primal 
unity in Christianity, too, and its development is nothing but the germination of this kernel. That 
is what we need to analyse.' The Christian Faith 65. 
70. William James Writings: 1902-1910 p. 446. 
71. William James Writings: 1902-1910 p.  447. 
72. 'Everything we know is 'what' it is by sharing in the nature of one of these abstractions. We 
can never look directly at them, for they are bodiless and featureless and footless, but we grasp 
all other things by their means, and in handling the real world we should be stricken with 
helplessness in just so far forth as we might lose those mental objects, these adjectives and 
adverbs and predicates and heads of classification and conception.' William James Writings: 
1902-1910 pp.  57-58. 




which objects come to us.74 These over-beliefs do not, however, lead to subjective 
solipsism; they are capable of correction. Indeed, James' entire argument in 
Pragmatism is premised on the fact that metaphysical over-beliefs can be evaluated 
by their practical application: '[t]he pragmatic method is primarily a method of 
settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable.75 'So, over-
beliefs, which are 'rules for action,' can be found either to lead to undesirable 
actions or lack coherence with the person's encounter with the world.76 Both of 
these difficulties call for revision of the over-beliefs to be more in line with other 
beliefs that provide 'greater vital benefits.'77 In other words, when faced with over-
beliefs ill-fitted to other over-beliefs, say a religious cosmology and a scientific 
one, it is possible to revise, drop, or invent an entirely new over-belief or aspects 
of one to allow for an integrated sense of the world. Judgments about what beliefs 
ought to be revised, though, will involve an interaction between the objects 
encountered and the determination of the inner conscious. 
This revision allows the sense of the world, the worldview, to exert 
reasonable influence on theoretical accounts of the world. Although much 
Christianity works at this level of over-belief, 'the prevalent attitude of the believer, 
is in general exerted by the instrumentality of pure ideas,' a person's habitual centre, 
'the hot place in a man's consciousness,' affects the drive for unification in thought 
                                                            
74. 'Unpicturable beings are realised, and realised with an intensity almost like that of an 
hallucination. They determine our vital attitude as decisively as the vital attitude of lovers are 
determined by the habitual sense, by which each is haunted, of the other being in the world.' 
William James Writings: 1902-1910 p. 72. 
75. William James Writings: 1902-1910 p. 506. 
76. 'In other words, the greatest enemy of any one of our truths may be the rest of our truths. 
Truths have once for all this desperate instinct of self-preservation and of desire to extinguish 
whatever contradicts them.' William James Writings: 1902-1910 p. 521. 
77. William James Writings: 1902-1910 p. 520. '[I]deas (which themselves are but parts of our 
experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other 
parts of our experience, to summarise them and get about among them by conceptual short-cuts 
instead of following the interminable success of particular phenomena.' William James 




from below or beyond this loquacious level.78 Regardless of how psychology or 
neurology might conceive of this experiential touch, there is a positive religious 
attunement at work in believers through 'a wider self through which saving 
experiences come, a positive content of religious experience which, it seems to me, 
is literally and objectively true so far as it goes.'79 The unseen or unpicturable can 
be communed with by the believer, and not necessarily the Christian believer for 
James, who changes as a result at the practical level of conduct and everyday life.80  
The self who communes with a higher being, reality, absolute, or whatever 
in prayer finds himself affected in such a way that his way of taking the world 
changes: his subjective encounter points towards this larger objectivity. The 
encounter with the larger objectivity pushes the person to maintain the truth of his 
personal view beyond himself. James is worth quoting in full at this point:  
'Only when this farther step of faith concerning God is taken, and remote 
objective consequences are predicted [i.e. final things], does religion...get wholly 
free from the first immediate subjective experience, and bring a real hypothesis 
into play. A good hypothesis in science must have other properties than those of the 
phenomenon it is immediately to explain, otherwise it is not prolific enough. God, 
meaning only what enters into the religious man's experience of union, falls short 
of being an hypothesis of this more useful order. He needs to enter into wider 
cosmic relations in order to justify the subject's absolute confidence and peace.'81  
 
The object effecting change in the one who worships, prays, or contemplates 
becomes objective as something related to the cosmos, as something more than the 
subjectively experienced other of religion, and beyond, above, or below the 
loquacious level. The movement into universality of a person's sense of God, 
wherever it comes from, is its claim to be true.82 
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On this reading, pragmatism can modestly be defined as the agenda of 
integrating and testing received cultural values through their practical testing in 
relation to some program of work and objective experience. Now, I will relate this 
brief characterisation of pragmatism to more specifically Christian ways of living. 
While the Reformers would not have adopted the specifics of James' method, e.g. 
over-beliefs or full facts, the basic structure of the method can be seen in their work 




IV. Pragmatism, Piety, and Doctrine 
 
James' pragmatism gives us a way to make judgments about the truthfulness 
of over-beliefs. Judgments about Christianness, the Christian character of over-
beliefs require one to understand 'what one is judging,' an understanding dependent 
on an acquaintance with the object in question.83 Truthfulness and Christianness 
have to do with the handling of certain realities in ways appropriate to their content 
and not necessarily according to certain rules, even if those inherited rules are the 
means of approach.84 A pragmatic Re-Christianisation of Christian piety effects a 
full fact in James' sense: a sense of self, a felt object, and an understanding of the 
object. 
                                                            
83. Charles M. Wood The Formation of Christian Understanding: Theological Hermeneutics 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Sotck: 1993) p. 83. 
84. '[Doctrine] has to do with the living reality of God. Doctrine presses toward knowledge and 
truth while at the same time remaining cognisant of its human origins and historical 
particularity... If theology is about the realities of personhood, of God, and of 
intersubjectivity,...then its mandate is to be concerned with historical and religious content 
rather than being preoccupied by questions of method.' Christine Helmer Theology and the End 




The 'wider self,' the self below the loquacious level, determined by the 
location of the person orients the person to the world by supplying a centre of 
action, and this centre of action pushes an engagement with the world wherein 
various over-beliefs are validated, verified, and corrected. As a unification of 
experience through over-beliefs and attention to effective forces, religion is derived 
from 'concrete facts and joys and sorrows.'85 Relating the particularities of the 
person's experience of the push and pull of reality to others and to the larger world 
is, following James, the means of ascertaining the truth of an understanding of the 
determination of the 'wider self.' The ability of reflective over-beliefs to deal with 
the wider world imposes a limitation on what concepts it can make use of. The 
requirements of the stream of human experience impose limits on what can be 
pragmatically maintained as true.  
Making sense or working out the truth does not consist in the development 
of a conceptual world-formula, an infallible metaphysics, or a semantic system, 
instead it comes about through a response to various pressures, commitments, and 
patterns of life through which the human person deals with reality. The reality of 
the experiential pressure exerted on the believer by God-in-Christ leads to the 
adoption of a certain given pattern of life wherein Christianness and truthfulness 
can be practically verified, and are the same thing. This appropriation is the task of 
Christianisation as the cultivation of a sense of self resultant from the felt object of 
Christ impinging on a person's dispositions and historical location. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I will, therefore, take Christian piety as a 
Christian's task of working out her authentic life as a response to both a 
commitment to the possibilities of transformation enacted by God in Christ and an 
                                                            




acceptance of the given state of the world as the place where this transformation 
must take place. Christian piety is a personal commitment, a committed existence, 
to the given norms made known in Jesus Christ and continued in 'the organic and 
visible expression of the life of the Spirit in the Church.'86 The commitment of 
Christian piety makes sense by accepting and working to transform the concrete 
circumstances it faces.87 Piety is a way of being a self in the real world. Christian 
piety as a way of being a person in the world, then, can be thought to operate in 
relation to three poles: a certain attitude towards the world, the Christian 
community, and everyday existence. This mirrors James way of thinking of a full 
fact as  a combination of inner conscious, a felt object, an attitude towards the 
object, and a sense of self.88  
On this way of thinking, truthfulness has to do with the 'content' of living 
realities made known, if only partially, in human conceptual schemes, structures, 
and over-beliefs. Truths, then, are not functions of their place in a structure or over-
belief. Instead, they retain a degree of freedom from these over-beliefs and 
integrative agendas. At the same time, however, these over-beliefs and agendas do 
approximate to these realities as human beings variously bring together these truths 
together in, hopefully, more harmonious schemes. The Christianness of this 
hopefully increasingly truthful agenda has to do with the integration of this content 
                                                            
86. John Meyendorff Living Tradition: Orthodox Witness in the Contemporary World 
(Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1978) p. 21. 
87. John Macquarrie describes the character of this committed existence: 'A committed 
existence is one that has in view some master possibility. In consistently directing itself on this 
master possibility, the other possibilities of life are subordinated to it and the movement is 
toward unified selfhood...Acceptance is the retrospective view of the self's unity, for it has to do 
with what has been, with the situation that already obtains and in which we find ourselves. If 
anything like unified selfhood is to be reached, the facticity of the situation has to be accepted in 
its entirety, with no loose ends rejected. Only if there is this frank and total acceptance can the 
commitment in turn be a realistic one.' John Macquarrie Principles of Christian Theology 
(London: SCM Press, 1977) pp. 77-78. 




around Jesus of Nazareth, who himself holds together the reality being dealt with 
in everyday life.89 The human process of meaning initiated in Jesus Christ, through 
all its twists and turns, holds open the possibility of uniting these various human 
instances of working out various truths in a source of meaning, God, capable of 






   
In this chapter I have shown the vectors I will be using to approach the 
major theological works of Richard Hooker, The Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie, 
and Friedrich Schleiermacher, Der Christliche Glaube: pragmatism and the Re-
Christianisation project. These approaches will allow me to see how they adjusted 
the inherited over-beliefs and symbolic structures of their time and place to a 
central source of meaning, God acting in Christ, without making use of a common 
cosmological or metaphysical system. Hooker and Schleiermacher both 
participated in the reform of their churches, as well as in the debate about this 
reform. They inherited both a set of doctrines forged in the earlier reform of the 
church and an adherence to the agenda responsible for those doctrines. Both clearly 
                                                            
89. I am here paraphrasing the point of view described by Cornelius Ernst: 'The substantive 
('ontic') answer to this question [the meaning of the historical progression of various theologies] 
we already have in Jesus Christ, and can have no other. It is the ('ontological') meaning of this 
substantive meaning we must continually search for without expecting a final answer... What 
'structure' could it [i.e. the ontological meaning] have in a single mind? In fact it could only 
exist as a total human culture, the progressive discovery of a single human identity in Christ as 
the historic process of the diverse but related processes of self-discovery going on in distinct 
cultures all over the globe in response to the challenge and threat of a uniform technological 
mass-culture.' Cornelius Ernst Multiple Echo eds. Fergus Kerr OP and Timothy Radcliffe OP 




adhered to the definite aims of this agenda, the clear goal of union with Christ 
effected by God in God's gracious priority, while remaining reserved about the 
precise practical means for obtaining this agenda and incredulous of final 
comprehensive formulations. This skepticism of a conclusive doctrinal edifice is 
theological: following from their real commitment to the reality of development 
and learning in the Christian life and their awareness of human sinfulness.  
Going forward, this thesis will show how Hooker and Schleiermacher 
produced meaningful and responsible Christian speech in their appropriation of the 
Christian faith. The existential dynamic of the pragmatic process of Re-
Christianisation, '[the] living interaction between historical influences and the 
immediate, though relative, religious productivity of the individual,' will be seen 
as the grammar of their accounts of Church reform. Four basic points will need to 
be shown in relation to each thinker. First, I will take up their own sense of their 
place in the Reformation movement of Re-Christianisation; they must have a sense 
of the task. Second, the sense of dislocation or lack of fit between over-beliefs or 
reflective worldviews and the actual God-willed order of reality will be shown; 
they must have something to go from. Third, the contours of the experiential 
pressure exerted by Jesus Christ, the edges of the felt object, on the believer's life 
must be limned; they must have a sense of the object. Fourth, the productive 
response of believers to this pressure will need to be exhibited as a practical change 
rather than a solving name; they must show the difference the object makes. 
 I will devote three chapters to Richard Hooker and four to Friedrich 
Schleiermacher. The scheme for reading them, however, will follow the same basic 
outline. First, I will position them within the Reformation movement as those 




a detached confessionalism out of touch with 'concrete facts and joys and sorrows.' 
Their major works both fall within their attempt to provide an account of church 
life against 'idealist' confessionalism and so will be my primary source for both 
theologians. Then, I will turn to the presence of the formative dynamic of piety in 
these writings. The dynamic will be shown to begin with an encounter with God at 
a pre-reflective level as a principle ordering reality in a certain way. Whether 
thematised or not, this knowledge gives inadequate direction to its human 
possessor while still constraining him or her in various ways. The orientation 
changes, however, under the new constraint of the historical person Jesus of 
Nazareth who is encountered as a directing agency in the life of the church on 
account of the specifics of his historic life. Finally, this encounter with Christ's 
agency brings the believer into a testing of received doctrine in the reading of 
Scripture as it does or does not allow for James' 'full fact.' Ingredient in both these 
approaches, despite their differing political, cultural, metaphysical, and 
cosmological commitments, is the reality of God's agency in Christ to affect the 
habitual centre of human beings, to operate on them below the loquacious level. 
Beneath the formal and terminological differences, the same material movement is 
occurring: Re-Christianisation in the present tense. Finally, I will return to the 
issues raised in this introduction to set out the hermeneutic of Re-Christianisation 







Chapter 2. Hooker as Reformer 
  
I. Hooker and Re-Christianisation  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to locate Hooker with reference to the agenda 
of Re-Christianisation. The first section of this chapter will, therefore, describe the 
historical situation of Hooker's Lawes. In turn, the second chapter will concentrate 
on Hooker's concept of law as a rule for action developed in response to divine 
agential pressure, a pragmatic conception. The third will apply this approach to the 
work of Christ in the Christian life.  
To place Hooker within the English Reformation, I will explore some 
formative tensions in his theology. My intention is not to give exhaustive 
overviews of these tensions or to relieve them. Rather, they are the necessary 
departure points for reading Hooker, who himself was insistent on the need to 
attend to the transmission of ideas and setting of human action. Contemporary 
expositors of Hooker's thought often try to place him in a ready at hand 
contemporary theological or political camp, e.g. Reformed or Thomist, to make 
those ideas normative now or to fill in the gaps in Hooker's own thoughts. Hooker's 
theological commitments, however, 'refuse to be classified once and for all as 
simple ‘conservative’ or ‘radical,’ and that aspects of what is undeniably a local 
polemic, very much of its time and place, set off chains of reflection with an 
uncomfortable contemporary edge.'90 The difficulty of his theology follows from 
his refusal to divorce the objectivity of what we know from the 'recognition of 
                                                            





responsive creativity in persons' who are morally responsible for their decisions.  
The necessity of this pragmatic connection in his account of formation requires his 
more in-depth account of the human navigation of 'law' forms human piety 
generally. My approach to this interpretive problem will be simply to locate him 
within the widespread impulse to return to Christocentric piety rather than 
attempting to assimilate him to some specific Continental version of the reform 
movement. Finally, I will turn to some of the specifics of the contest responsible 
for Hooker taking up The Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Polity.91 This argument will 
briefly illustrate Hooker's own views on the nature of Reformation and of the key 
issue of justification without attempting to assimilate them to other models. Taken 
together these factors draw out the distinctive tensions in Hooker's thought. Once 
these two factors have been explored the specifically Christian regime of the 
formation of piety in the church will be drawn out in the third chapter of this 
section. 
  
II. The Place of Richard Hooker 
 
While it is possible to reconstruct the timeline of Hooker's life with a fair 
amount of detail, it is difficult to chart the trajectory of the development of his 
theological views in biographical terms for two reasons.92 
                                                            
91. The Lawes will be cited as Lawes by book, chapter, and paragraph number followed by 
volume, page and line numbers from the critical Folger Library Edition of Hooker’s writings. 
The sermons preached by Hooker will be cited by a short form of their title and paragraph 
number followed by volume, page, and line numbers from the Folger Edition. 
92. Philip Secor highlights the twin problems with Hooker's biography as his contemporary 
obscurity and 'the paucity of hard facts about him in his own day.' Hooker is obscure to the 
popular imagination, but still plays a significant role in thinking about 'Anglicanism' today. see 
Philip Secor 'In Search of Richard Hooker' in Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian 





First, Hooker did not leave behind an extensive personal record in the form 
of correspondence or journals that might flesh out a picture of his life.93 Lacking 
definite evidence, biographies characterise Hooker through the qualities of his 
writing, especially the Lawes, the general temper of his thought, and the personal 
alliances Hooker formed throughout his career.94 Indirect characterisation of 
Hooker, through texts or friendships he maintained, does not take adequate account 
of the way in which his irenicism may be a rhetorical tactic in his attack on the 
Puritans or the complexity of his relationships with his friends and students. 'This 
friendship [with George Cranmer] was not as 'sacred,' 'blessed,' or 'spiritual' as [his 
early biographer Izaak] Walton wanted to believe. Convenience had its part.’95 The 
studied placidity of his works may be a move within a larger strategy of conformist 
clergy to oppose the Puritans96, even if his association of the Puritans with 
Anabaptists is not without merit.97 Nor can his works be straightforwardly related 
to other roughly contemporary writers in the Church of England at that time. 
Hooker's works were maintained by those he had various personal connections to 
such as Lancelot Andrewes, but he would be invoked by the Puritan John Owen 
against the conformist William Sherlock. 
Second is the question of Hooker's place in the Church of England in his 
day and his place in Anglicanism now. This hagiography can take the form of either 
                                                            
93. The most recent modern biography of Hooker by Philip Secor, for instance, explores 
Hooker's early life through official school records and typical descriptions of university life. 
See, e.g., Philip Secor Richard Hooker: Prophet of Anglicanism (Burnes and Oates: Turnbridge 
Wells, 2001). 
94. On the contrasting views of Hooker's elevation to the Temple, specifically as a move by a 
determined group of conformist clergy, see Olivier Loyer's summary of the scholarship in 
L'Anglicanisme de Richard Hooker (Paris, 1997) pp. 10-12. 
95. Olivier Loyer L'Anglicanisme p. 10. He continues: 'La "conviction religieuse", l'inclination 
vers l'étude" s'alliaient et peut-être se subordonnaient chez eux à un sens clair de l'action." 
96. On this point see W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, 'The Philosopher of the "Politic Society": 
Richard Hooker as a Political Thinker', Studies in Richard Hooker: Essays Preliminary to an 
Edition of his Work, ed. W. S. Hill (Cleveland, 1972 ) 




a stress upon the continuity of Hooker's thought with earlier English theologians 
such as Jewel and Whitgift or his genius in constituting something called 
'Anglicanism.' Peter Lake, for instance, sees Hooker's valorisation as an attempt to 
cover his originality: ' 
Walton's account served to hide the discontinuities and disjunctions between 
Hooker and previous English protestant thought and thus to suppress the striking 
originality of the Polity. Yet Hooker undoubtedly deserves his place in 'anglican' 
hagiography - not because he personified or expressed existing 'anglican' attitudes 
and values but because he, more than any one, invented them.'98  
 
The fact that Hooker's elevation to 'patron saint of 'anglicanism'' came after the 
Laudian ascendancy and the restoration argues for a later desire to take Hooker as 
a theological genius.  
Arguing today for Hooker's decisive role in the formation of Anglican 
identity involves at the same time a claim about the very nature of that identity. 
The variations on Hooker's genius contest the nature of the identity he created or 
exemplified. These permutations cover a wide range of viewpoints: mainstream 
magisterial Reformer,99 instigator of a liberal method100, a scholastic out of 
season101, a typical Elizabethan Calvinist102 and an exponent of a patristic theology 
of participation.103 The different versions of Hooker owe something to the desires 
and training of the different writers as well as the fragmentary nature of Hooker's 
own work.104  
                                                            
98. Peter Lake Anglican and Puritans?Presbeteryianism and English Conformist Thought from 
Whitgift to Hooker (London, Unwin Hyman: 1988) p. 230. 
99. Nigel Atkinson Richard Hooker and the Authority of Scripture, Reason and Tradition 
(Regent College: Vancouver, 2005) and W.J. Torrance Kirby 'Richard Hooker as an Apologist 
for the Magisterial Reformation' in RHCCC. 
100. H.R. McAdoo The Spirit of Anglicanism (Black: London, 1965). 
101. Nigel Voak Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology. 
102. Bryan Spinks Two Faces of Elizabethan Anglican Theology: Sacraments and Salvation in 
the Thought of William Perkins and Richard Hooker (Lanham, Md., 1999 ) 
103. A.M. Allchin Participation in God (Morehouse-Barlow: Wilton, Conn, 1988) 
104. 'Ainsi, on affronte un paradoxe. Les historiens au fait de la pensée médiévale et familiers 
de son langue reconnaissent sans peine la dette de Hooker envers les siècles qui le précèdent, 
tandis que les historiens des idées modernes, eux, fidèles en définitive à l'ancienne lecture, 




The incompleteness of Hooker's work, owing to occasional composition, 
unfinished final books, and actual marginality, tends to lead interpreters to supplant 
or conceptually elucidate his work with other sources who allow his identity to be 
filled out. In Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, for instance, Nigel Voak 
uses Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus to map the scholastic shape of Hooker's 
anthropology; Nigel Atkinson allies Hooker's thought just as strongly to simplified 
contemporary Protestant commitments in Richard Hooker and the Authority of 
Scripture, Reason and Tradition through a comparison to John Calvin and Martin 
Luther.105 Almost all of these figures, though, were known and used by Hooker in 
a qualified sense, which is to say he did not view himself as completely overlapping 
with any of them but as examples of views he personally holds, and it is odd to 
reduce his thought to them. The attempt to place Hooker in relation to Anglicanism 
as Luther and Calvin are to their respective traditions goes against Hooker's own 
theological methodology:  
'This in every profession hath too much authorized the judgements of a few. This 
with Germans hath caused Luther, and with many other Churches, Calvin to 
prevaile in all thinges. Yet are we not able to define, whether the wisedome of that 
God (who setteth before us in holy Scripture so many admirable paternes of vertue, 
and no one of them without somewhat noted wherin they were culpable, to the end 
that him alone it might alwayes be acknolwedged, Thou only art holy thoe onely 
art just) might not permit those worthy vessels of his glory to be in some things 
blemished with the staine of humaine frailtie, even for this cause, least we should 
esteeme of any man above that which behoveth.' (Lawes Preface.IV.8. I.26)  
 
This self-description bears out the detailed work done by A.J. Joyce on Hooker's 
qualified use of Thomas Aquinas:  
'It is clear that Hooker undoubtedly draws upon Aquinas in some significant 
respects, although he is in no sense an uncritical adherent to, or disciple of, 
Thomism: he follows Aquinas closely where he supports his wisdom and insight 
on a given subject; yet he has no compunction in disagreeing with him overtly 
                                                            
105. Others such as Peter Lake and Nicholas Tyacke find a basis of emerging Arminian 




when he believes him to be in error. In matters of scholarship, it would appear that 
Hooker is always ultimately 'his own man.''106 
 
The interpretive problem of placing Hooker in continuity or discontinuity 
with previous and contemporary theologies is precisely the problem Hooker 
himself confronts in accounting for unity of the church across time and space apart 
from an exhaustive articulate conceptual consensus. These difficulties can be 
minimised if Hooker's own account of his influences, goals in his occasional 
writing, and the nature of the church's continuity with the past are given priority in 
reconstructing his views. The seemingly paradoxical overlap with both medieval 
and Reformed sources makes sense in light of Hooker's account of church unity. 
Hooker's religious criticism takes as its rationale his defence of the lay piety 
practiced in England at that time and in previous generations.  The salvific work 
of God in Christ provides the foundation for his account of the unity of the church 
and the believer's own personal identity including his own. The Christological 
emphasis of this conception of ecclesial and personal unity prevents him from 
writing himself, or anyone else, too centrally into the Christian dogmatic system.107 
While I will place Hooker's major work in its historical location, my intention, 
unlike much contemporary work, will be to approach Hooker as 'his own man' 
assembling a theology ad hoc from an eclectic range of sources. 
                                                            
106. A.J. Joyce Richard Hooker and Anglican Moral Theology (OUP: Oxford, 2012) p. 196. I 
am here siding more with Joyce against those readings of Hooker that attempt to fill out his 
system by grafting in aspects of patristic and Thomist theology. The most impressive example 
of this approach is Charles Miller's Richard Hooker and the Vision of God. Miller matches 
Hooker much more closely than Joyce to Aquinas despite admitting that ' Aquinas' influence is 
not straightforward, as references throughout this study reveal.' Charles Miller Richard Hooker 
and the Vision of God: Exploring the Origins of 'Anglicanism' (James Clarke & Co: Cambridge, 
2013).  cf. Loyer's summary of Hooker's use of Aristotle, Plato, Neo-Platonism, and Augustine 
in describing 'la montée du désir vers Dieu': 'Bref, Hooker brode sur un lieu commun, nourri de 
sources diverses qu'il est sans doute impossible de démeler avec exactitude.' L'Anglicanisme p. 
237. 
107. If, then, he 'invents' Anglicanism it is not by creating a monolithic theological system. 
Instead, he argues for an agile form of Christian belief engaged with, not defined by, various 
human attempts to make meaning of the world throughout time capable of arguing for church 




Unlike those mentioned above, my motivation for reading Hooker is not to 
pin down his sources or to advocate his material position as normative in the 
present time. Rather, I am interested in the process whereby he attempts to return 
to the foundations and principles constraining Christian life and theology in order 
to provide a rationale for Christian practices. How does Hooker return to the 
dynamic source of Christian life, Jesus Christ, in the course of the project of Re-
Christianisation, the reconnection of the formative power of Christian belief with 
everyday life? The dynamic of this formation and reconnection will emerge as a 
pragmatic one responding to real forces, a hermeneutic reconstruction in light of 
his present day. 
III. Hooker as Reformer 
 
To approach Hooker's understanding of his place in the church reform 
movement in England, I begin with the presenting problem of his argument with 
the extreme or radical Puritans at the Temple Church. The following section will 
develop a reading of Hooker's methodological commitments to account for his 
allegiance to the Reformation, the received church order, and an understanding of 
community not premised upon straightforward conceptual consensus.  
In Hendrix's terms from the last chapter, Hooker became active as a public 
theologian at the time of confessionalisation in the Church of England. His 
contention with the Puritans centred on the confessional limits of the Church of 
England as it received the various confessional documents adopted during this 
time. For Hooker, English Re-Christianization was a part of the larger realignment 
of Christian piety in the European Reformation, but a part that possessed its own 
identity and integrity. The publicly received doctrines of the Reformation in 




rather than a foreign standard. His reply to the Puritans would include a reworking 
of the fundamental issues at stake in both elite theology and popular crises. 
Eventually, he would argue for the importance of a set of diverse, mystical, and 
non-conceptual relationships within the church over a conceptually exhaustive map 
of church life. 
 
A. 'Confession' in the Church of England 
 
The confessionalisation of the English Reformation produced the thirty-
nine Articles of Religion,108 the two books of homilies to be read in churches, and 
a series of prayer books.109 These documents in turn set the limits of belief and the 
agenda of the Reformation in England during Hooker's time. The Articles began as 
thirteen articles drafted in response to negotiations concerning England joining the 
Schmalkaldic League without assenting to the Augsburg Confession in its 
entirety.110  They 'were later influential in the development of the 'Forty-Two 
Articles' under Edward VI and the 'Thirty-Nine Articles' under Elizabeth I.'111 The 
Forty-Two Articles were edited down to thirty-nine by the archbishop of 
Canterbury Matthew Parker. In 1564 the articles came into effect in order to insist 
upon a measured, nuanced, and somewhat ambiguous set of doctrines agreeable to 
                                                            
108. The best recent account of the articles is Oliver O'Donovan On the Thirty-Nine Articles 
(SCM Press: London, 2011). An older, but still useful, history is Charles Hardwick A History of 
the Articles of Religion (F&J Rivington: London, 1851). I have made reference to Carter 
Lindberg's more recent historical work as it is more compact and easier to access. The text of 
the articles, however, are cited from the text given in Hardwick A History of the Articles of 
Religion pp. 265-323 by number. 
109. Since the Puritan faction would argue for prayer book revision from what it took to be a 
more Reformed doctrinal position, it is unclear how much the prayer books should be taken as 
indicative of the faith at the time. 
110. Lindberg The European Reformations p. 298 They were, therefore, distinct from and yet 
conciliatory to Lutheran doctrine in their approach. The articles were cast aside after the 
breakdown of negotiations, and an attack on nonconformity with the six articles. 




a wide variety of Protestant viewpoints. Historian Carter Lindberg describes this 
purposeful ambiguity:  
'The articles were designed to accommodate the major evangelical theologies 
by denying transubstantiation on the one hand and Zwinglian symbolism on the 
other hand, while remaining open to the range of Lutheran and Calvinist 
interpretations.’112 
  
The Lutheran influence on the articles is significant in the articles that follow the 
wording of the Augsburg Confession, notably those on God, Christ, justification, 
and the church, but those drafted independently take a more Reformed approach.113  
Regardless of the doctrinal positions contained in the Articles, they did not come 
to occupy the place in the Church of England that other Reformed confessions took 
up in their respective traditions, e.g. the Westminster Confession or the Augsburg 
Confession, but were one aspect of the emerging Anglican position.114 
Taking up the matter central to the various disputes in the England of 
Hooker's day, Article XI gives the teaching on justification, 'We are accompted 
righteous before God, only for the merite of our Lord and sauiour Jesus Christe, by 
faith, and not for our owne workes or deseruynges.' Being accounted righteous, viz. 
being justified, necessarily results in good works. The homilies expand this point: 
'And as the liuing bodie of a man euer exerciseth such things as belong to a 
naturall and liuing bodie, for nourishment and preseruation of the same, as it 
hath need, opportunity, and occasion: euen so the soule that hath a liuely fayth 
in it, will bee doing alway some good worke, which shall declare that it is liuing, 
and will not be vnoccupied.'115  
 
                                                            
112. Lindberg The European Reformations p.313. 
113. 'At points where Lutheranism,' Oliver O'Donovan summarises, 'distinguished itself from 
the other traditions of the Reformation, notably in its doctrine of the Eucharist, the English 
Articles show no Lutheran leanings.' O'Donovan On the Thirty-Nine Articles p.5. 
114. One important factor in the confessionalisation of the English Reformation I have omitted 
here is John Jewel's Apology for the Church of England. The semi-official status it obtained 
influenced both sides of the Puritan and Conformist arguments. 
115. Homily I.IV from Certain Sermons or Homilies 1547-1571. eds Mary Ellen Rickey and 




The good works, though, are not inherently or congruently righteous (XIII), nor are 
they voluntary works beyond what is required by God (XIV). Instead, actions are 
righteous because they are performed in Christ. The formal characteristics of an 
action, including even confessing the faith or feeding the hungry, do not determine 
their righteousness but the intention or motivating force behind them do.116 The 
force producing the acts within the Christian believer, for the articles, is Jesus 
Christ; they are an effect of Christian union with Christ.117 The union between 
Christ and the believer is, therefore, moral or ethical only on the basis of Christ’s 
own ethical performance in his self-oblation (XXXI). The re-formed habitual 
centre produces in course good works as an expression of Christ’s animating 
pressure on the redeemed. 
Corrigible church authority is the social outworking of this doctrine of 
justification. To require the beliefs of a sect or a church order beyond those 
necessary for being in Christ, the word and sacraments, is to require a righteous 
work performed apart from Christ since church order is something developed by 
Christians. The intention, not just the form, of a church determine its viability. 
Hooker inherited this agenda of Reformation and used it to defend the 
contemporary practice and principles of the Church of England. The problems of 
radical Reformation and the philosophical problems of experience created the 
space for his attempt to defend moderate Reformation and existing lay piety. The 
Radical demand for a perfect 'Genevan' church order was a demand for good deeds 
done without reference to ends, intent, or context. 
                                                            
116. 'For good deedes bee not measured by the facts themselues, and so discerned from vices, 
but by the ends and intents for the which they were done.' Homily I.V. 




Besides their teaching on justification the articles asserted two distinctive 
points for the Reformation in England: the royal prerogative and the concept of 
adiaphora. The royal right and duty to organise the church in Article XXXVII 
comes from the monarch's supreme authority within the realm,  
'The Queenes Maiestie hath the power in this Realme of England...gouerment 
of all estates in this Realme, whether they be Ecclesiasticall or Ciuile,' but 
cannot be equated with ministerial power in the church, 'we geue not to our 
princes the minstring either of God's word, or of Sacraments, the which thing 
the Iniunctions also lately set forth by Elizabeth our Queene, doth most plainlie 
testifie.'  
 
The monarch can order the church inasmuch as it is a part of the civil life of the 
realm, which by Divine command should be ordered even if the exact nature of the 
ordering is a matter of human invention. Homily four in the second book describes 
the dynamic of the various laws ordering the realm: 
For the better vnderstanding of this question, it is necessary that wee make a 
difference betweene the policies of Princes, made for the ordering of their 
common weales, in prouision of things seruing to the most sure defence of their 
subiects and countreyes, and betweene Ecclesiasticall policies, in prescribing 
such workes, by which, as secondary meanes, GODS wrath may be pacified, 
and his mercy purchased.  Positiue lawes made by Princes, for conseruation of 
their policie, not repugnant vnto GODS Law, ought of all Christian subiects 
with reuerence of the Magistrate to bee obeyed, not onely for feare of 
punishment, but also (as the Apostle saith) for conscience sake.   
   
The articles can take this position about society and the church because of the 
concept of things indifferent, adiaphora, within an ordered society. God desires for 
there to be order without requiring a certain sort of order, ie. episcopacy or 
presbyterianism, giving Christians a degree of freedom in these matters. Article 
XXXIV begins,  
'It is not necessarie that traditions and ceremonies be in al places one, or vtterly 
like, for at all times they haue been diuerse, and may be chaunged accordyng to 
the diuersitie of Countreys...' and ends, '[every national church] hath aucthoritie 
to ordaine, chaunge, and abolishe ceremonies or rites of the Churche ordeyned 




 Therefore, confessionalisation of the Reformation did not include a homogenous 
worshipping community as the basis of international or diachronic unity: other 
churches, including ancient Israel, have erred in matters of rites and ceremonies as 
well as 'matters of fayth' (XIX).  This is not only the way to interpret the Old 
Testament civil law.  
'Although the lawe geuen from God by Moyses, as touchyng ceremonies and 
rites, do not bynde Christian men, nor the ciuile preceptes therof, ought of 
necessitie to be receaued in any common wealth: yet notwithstandyng, no 
Christian man whatsoeuer, is free from the obedience of the commaundmentes, 
which are called morall.' (Article VII).  
 
 All that is necessary, if not possible, is that churches should not ordain anything 
contrary to God's word, and, further, 'out it not to enforce any thing to be beleued 
for necessitie of saluation.' (XX) General councils have erred and there 
pronouncements can only be followed as necessary for salvation when proven out 
of Scripture. (XXI).  The authority of the Bible for church polity is primarily 
negative rather than positive. Common authority in traditions of the church should, 
therefore, be relatively binding as a matter of order, and those who offer their own 
private judgment as a rule 'hurteth the aucthoritie of the Magistrate.'(XXXIV)  
The teaching of the articles did not only develop from political expedience 
or Erastian desires. They were an extension of and statement about the central 
Reformation teaching of justification.  'This 'Elizabethan Settlement' offended the 
more radical Protestants who desired to purify the church of al Roman Catholic 
vestiges.'118 The ensuing controversies Whitgift encountered are evidence of the 
lack of concord created by the articles. The teaching against the requirement of a 
certain church order was a somewhat obscure attack on reformers who would 
require the adherence to a sect as requisite for salvation. 'They are also to be 
                                                            




accursed,' that presume to require salvation by the sect a person professes or 
adheres to because 'holy scripture doth set out vnto vs onely the name of Jesus 
Christe, whereby men must be saved.' (XVIII) Justification through Christ is the 
only way the articles see a person being saved. The teaching on justification 
contained in the articles centres on Christology and the role played by Christ in the 
achievement of human salvation. Bracketing for now the teaching on 
predestination and election, the teaching on how human participation in Christ's 
righteousness is the rationale underlying the concept of adiaphora. 
If Hooker took on this broad understanding of Reformation, the specific 
sources of his own understanding of the agenda of Re-Christianisation point to 
multiple sources. If his early education and time at Corpus Christi College, Oxford 
are taken as formative, then at least two distinct streams of Re-Christianisation 
need to be taken seriously as the background for his views.  
First, as Hooker's tutor, John Rainolds, 'a notable Hellenist', represents a 
Calvinist version of Re-Christianisation conversant with humanist principles.119 
Rainolds was a member of the moderate Puritan party, serving as one of their 
representatives at the Hampton Court Conference in 1604 where he persuaded the 
king of the necessity of a new Bible translation. He was, nevertheless persuaded to 
accept episcopacy. As the 'radical conscience of the University,' Rainolds pushed 
for reform on the basis of sound scholarship while avoiding sectarian tactics.120 
Humanistic commitments to toleration, learning, and scholarship were brought 
together in Rainolds with a commitment to religious reform and conscience 
action.121 
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Second, up until his death, John Jewel was Hooker's patron, familiar with 
his uncle, John Hooker of Exeter, and responsible for sending the younger Hooker 
to Corpus Christi College. Jewel himself had been at the college as a lecturer in 
Rhetoric before going abroad to Frankfurt, Strasbourg, and Zürich with Peter 
Martyr during the Marian exile.122 Jewel sought to bring the agenda of Continental 
Reformation to England. Writing to Peter Martyr upon his return, Jewel described 
a declaration given during a disputation at Westminster with more traditional 
bishops, '...we have exhibited to the queen all our articles of religion and doctrine, 
and have not departed in the slightest degree from the confession of Zürich.'123 
Despite his closeness with these Reformers, Jewel happily drew upon other sources 
to defend and to shape the Reformation in England. The fathers and catholic 
doctors of the church were, by Jewel at least, thought to be in agreement with the 
general plan of Reformation.124 The other serious influence on Jewel was the work 
of Erasmus. Jewel gives multiple citations of Erasmus from across his work. 'At 
one point, quoting from the Enchiridon, that model of a simple, Christocentric 
piety, Jewel speaks of Erasmus as ‘a man of singular learning and talent.’'125  
From Rainolds and Jewel, Hooker learned both Reformed theology and 
Christian humanism without a clear conflict between the two: '[T]he contrast 
between Hooker...on the one hand, and Calvinism, on the other, quickly blurs at 
                                                            
fusion of the several faculties of learning into a scholar of shining conscience and commitment.' 
RHCC, p. 68. 
122. RHCC p. 66. 
123. The Zurich Letters ed. Hastings Robinson (Cambridge: CUP, 1842)  p. 21. In another letter 
to Peter Martyr, '...for as to matters of doctrine, we have pared every thing away to the very 
quick, and do not differ from your doctrine by a nail's breadth...' p. 100. 
124. One example of this is Jewel's challenge in a sermon at Paul's Cross that if any evidence 
from 'any olde catholique doctor or father,' any general council, or the Scripture could be shown 
to support private masses then he would convert. John E. Booty John Jewel as an Apologist of 
the Church of England (London: SPCK, 1963) p. 29. 
125. Booty John Jewel p. 67 J.S. Marshall has argued that the humanistic adherence to the 
literal sense of Scripture as that intended by the authors works its way down from Erasmus to 





the edges, especially with respect to the problematics of subjectivity.'126 The 
problems of subjectivity inherent in talk of justification and assurance were, in fact, 
the location of Hooker's first battle with the Puritans. It is to Hooker himself and 
his initial argument over the right strategy of Re-Christianisation in England that I 
now turn to see why such an extensive reply as the Lawes was called for by the 
extreme Puritan riposte. 
  
B. Hooker's Dispute at the Temple 
 
Hooker, to the surprise of some, was made Master of the Temple Church in 
London in March, 1585 in succession to Richard Alvey.127 Most people had 
expected Walter Travers, a reader appointed to assist an ailing Alvey, to take up 
the role of Master of the Temple. Travers, 'l'une des personnalités les plus en vue 
du mouvement presbytérien,128' had instituted a form of Presbyterian discipline 
within the church as well as a simplified liturgy on the Genevan model. Under 
Alvey and Travers, then, the Temple had become a laboratory—an exemplary 
vanguard—for Genevan discipline within England capable of recommending itself 
to the larger established church. When the Archbishop of Canterbury, John 
Whitgift, blocked Travers in order to appoint Hooker as Master, he was moving 
against this Presbyterian tendency, as well as continuing his struggle against 
Puritan elements in the church, especially Thomas Cartwright with whom he had 
engaged in a protracted polemic.129  
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In order to grasp the significance of the controversy for Hooker's own 
theology two points need to be understood: first, the larger ecclesial context of his 
views; second, the foundational nature of his difference from Travers. The 
argument  shows Hooker creating a tension for the Reformed system through his 
positive account of human judgment and stress on the actuality of the sacraments, 
especially baptism.130 Just as Luther's theoretical commitment to justification 
eventually resulted in a practical conflict with the piety of merit, so Hooker's 
theoretical allegiance to a version of justification and sanctification also brought 
about his dispute with Travers and Cartwright. 
Whitgift had already promulgated a series of three articles in his dioceses 
aimed at consolidating the Church of England. The first article affirmed the 
supremacy of the monarch; the second assent to the Biblical nature of the Book of 
Common Prayer; the third required the minister to affirm the Thirty-nine 
Articles.131 Earlier disputes about vestments and liturgy were beginning to 
intertwine with more fundamental doctrinal differences in the process of 
confessionalistion. Puritans were beginning to downplay the present efficacy of 
sacraments while bringing God's unchanging will to prominence, while 
Conformists were downplaying elaborate theories of election in order to maintain 
the efficacy of a sacramental system. Although he eventually compromised on the 
                                                            
the Gospel did not abrogate the moral civil but only the ceremonial laws of Moses; it then gave 
us in addition further moral and ecclesiastical laws... God has supplied us with a complete rule 
of life, it must be specific and detailed guide, for 'lawes...are well made to determine all things, 
and to leave us fewe things as may be to the discrection of judges.' Frederick Beiser The 
Sovereignty of Reason (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1996) pp. 54-55. 
130. Admittedly Hooker's use of reason is not entirely novel, but the degree of corrigibility in 
his account of human judgments separates him from his Reformed counterparts. On Hooker's 
use of reason in relation to the developing Reformed Orthodoxy see Nigel Voak 'Richard 
Hooker and the Principle of Sola Scriptura.' Journal of Theological Studies vol. 59 April 2008 
pp. 96-139. 
131. The sufficiency of the Articles was important because its teachings on predestination and 
perseverance of the saints was being called into question by moderate Calvinist conformists 
such as Hooker's tutor John Reynolds. Nicholas Tycake Anti-Calvinists: the Rise of English 




kind of assent given to the articles, Whitgift did not cede defeat in his long-term 
vision for the church. Whatever machinations went on to bring Hooker to the 
Temple, he was an acceptable candidate for Whitgift, who was attempting to 
further establish existing church order against continued institutional reform. From 
the nomination it can be seen that Hooker was a conformist clergyman willing to 
defend the polity of the established church against further structural reform. 
Despite being allied with a powerful state apparatus and an increasingly frustrated 
monarch, the conformist clergy, especially Hooker, began to espouse a view of the 
church as an oddly egalitarian place constituted by God's active work rather than 
theoretical unity. Rowan Williams describes this church unity:  
'Knowledge of God is not dependent upon theological exactitude of the kind the 
Puritans work for; thus the mythic and ritual life of the 'ordinary' Christian is 
defended... [Hooker's] endorsement of rituals of reciprocity and of popular non-
conceptual elements in religious practice works against both a simple divine 
command theory of visible authority in the Church and the privileging of a 
theological elite.'132   
 
Regardless of whether he was thought of as simply a suitable candidate or 
a champion about to enter the lists, Hooker was chosen to counteract the influence 
of Travers in the Temple. This fact is further supported by the accusations 
eventually brought against Hooker. In his supplication against Hooker, Travers 
describes overlooking small errors in doctrine, but confronting Hooker about his 
erroneous doctrine of predestination that was allied to that of Anthony Corro, a 
former Spanish monk and Oxford lecturer who had been attacked by Richard 
Alvey, the previous Master, for 'affirming free will and speaking not wisely of 
predestination,'133 such that perseverance was undercut and the door to Pelagianism 
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opened. While Hooker cannot be equated with Carro in his views, they were both 
in the middle of a tension developing around the issues of predestination, the 
validity of the established liturgy, and the necessity of assent to exhaustively 
articulated doctrine. The last point was especially troubling to those like Travers 
and Cartwright who had weathered earlier controversies over vestments on the 
basis of the English church's doctrinal viability.134 Arguments about the wearing of 
a surplice might be tolerated if a Genevan understanding of doctrine could be 
preached. 
Although the liturgy and governance of the Temple church were the 
presenting causes of the quarrel between Richard Hooker and Walter Travers, the 
dispute was an extension of previous skirmishes between emerging Puritans and 
Conforming clergy that would eventually erupt into the full-fledged Anti-
Calvinism of the Laudian 'Arminians.'135 The stakes included how doctrinal 
discernment occurs as well as the nature or shape of sanctification. The means and 
goals of Re-Christianising England were being worked out in the back and forth 
between these groups.136 The different disputes over predestination, vestments, 
                                                            
doctrine.' Travers' Supplication in 1850 edition of Hooker's Works p. 662. See also Tyacke Anti-
Calvinists pp. 58-59. 
134. '[I]t was basic premise of the presbyterian position that what was at stake in the puritan 
campaign was but the completion of the English reformation, a process, which, while it had 
been carried to fruition in the realm of doctrine, was still sadly lagging behind in the realm of 
discipline.' Peter Lake Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church. (Cambridge: CUP, 
1982) p. 65. 'The close connection between presbyterianism, anti-papal polemic and a rigid 
attitude to predestination and related issues - a connection which has already been noted in 
thought of William Whitaker, Thomas Cartwright, Laurence Chaderton, William Fulke and 
Walter Travers - had, as a result of a common attitude to scriptural authority and theological 
argument, a strong underlying theoretical basis.' pp. 219-220. 
135. '...the rise of English Arminianism, and the consequent outlawing of Calvinism during the 
1620s, both destablized the religious status quo and provided a cutting edge to the increasingly 
acrimonious politics of Charles I's reign. Puritans, who had been at least partially reconciled to 
the established church, were as a result driven into renewed opposition.' Nycholas Tyacke Anti-
Calvinists p. viii. 
136. As will eventually become clear, the underlying reasons for the dispute were differences in 
the sort of creaturely understanding and existence appropriate to those who had been redeemed 
by Jesus Christ. Christological commitments, which are in turn tied to soteriological 




ritual, and church government were part of a larger conflict in European thought 
over the validity of human judgment and the relation of humanity to God.137  
 Underneath the local tension, therefore, were different views about the 
nature of revelation, redemption, and community. For Travers these issues were of 
fundamental importance if the church were to be reformed and not fall into the 
error of 'Quene Maries daies' i.e. Roman Catholicism.138 In his A Learned and 
Comfortable Sermon of the Certaintie and Perpetuitie of Faith in the Elect139 and 
A Learned Discourse of Justification, Workes, and How the Foundation of Works 
is Overthrowne140, the sermons Travers stridently objected to, Hooker begins an 
account of the way in which church reform takes place that he will expand at length 
in the Lawes, but which is more or less fully formed at this point. The presenting 
doctrinal issues were the assurance of salvation and sanctification in the Christian 
life. 
  
C. The Sermons on Certainty and Justification 
 
                                                            
137. '[Hooker] tackled the Presbyterian system as a symptom of deeper, underlying issues to 
dow with sources of authority, the nature of the Church and biblical hermeneutics.' Paul Avis In 
Search of Authority: Anglican Theological Method from the Reformation to the Enlightenment 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2014) p. 105. Frederick Beiser declares Hooker's Lawes the 'birth of the 
English Enlightenment' brought on by the birth pangs of Puritanism. The Sovereignty of Reason 
p. 48. 
138. Walter Travers 'A Supplication to the Privy Counsel' in Works V.208.9 
139. This is sermon Travers describes as being upon ‘this doctrine of his, that the assurance of 
that we believe by the word is not so certain as of that we perceive by sense’ on Habakkuk 1:4, 
‘Therefore the law is slacked, and judgment doth never go forth.’ 
140. This is the sermon wherein Hooker affirms the relative validity of the Roman Church. The 
text is the second half of Habakkuk 1:4, ‘The wicked doth compass about the righteous: 
therefore the perverse judgment doth proceed.’ The most in depth guide to these sermons is 
Corneliu C. Simut The Doctrine of Salvation in the Sermons of Richard Hooker (Walter De 
Gruyter: Berlin, 2005). He ends his study: 'To conclude, Hooker's doctrine of salvation is 
unmistakably Protestant and specifically Reformed. He continues the early tradition of the first 
English Reformers which is evident in his treatment of some of the most important features of 
Lutheran and Reformed Protestantism, such as faith, justification, sanctification, glorification, 
election, reprobation, and the sovereignty of God.' p. 308. Much of the argument that follows 




The offending account of certainty in the first sermon describes the 
believer's experiential struggle. Human knowledge of God and his purposes 
remains obscure and cannot simply be equated or detached from the present 
experience of the believer. The experience of pain, poverty, and the success of 
others attacks the palpable sense of being saved in Christ, and Hooker has no 
illusions about the agony of trusting in the promises of Christ in the face of material 
problems.141 God remains hidden and different in his action in the world; his effects 
are not like a fire inflaming.  
'[B]ut the incomprehensible wisdome of god doth limit the effectes of his powre 
to such a measure as seemeth best unto him selfe. Wherefore he worketh that 
certainty in all which sufficeth abundantly to their salvation in the life to come, 
but in none so great as attaineth in this lyfe unto perfection.' (Certaintie 1 
V.72.27-31)  
 
For Hooker, the commitments of faith should not override the concrete experiences 
of the believer's everyday life. He is objecting to something like the cleavage of 
thought and life diagnosed by James. Hence, his dismay at those who think they 
are more sure of the assurance of their salvation than they are the rising of the sun. 
Such assurance is premised upon a kind of perfection that has no need of Christ's 
work.142 Even Abraham, often used as an example of certainty, still feared and even 
doubted within his faith in God. The lack of perfection, the Christian's inability to 
totally cleave to God as he or she should, is the reason why the righteousness of 
Christ is needed.  'No, god wyll have them that shall walke in light to feel now and 
then what is to sit in shadow of death.' (Certaintie 1 V.75.16-18) The obscurity of 
God's action requires interpretive activity on the part of the Christian who does so 
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without having an explicit concept of how everything fits together, but is aware of 
the relationship within which his or her life is taking place.  
Faith requires labour in order to discover the meaning of experiences of 
grief, bereavement, and abandonment. They must be placed within a larger frame 
of God's obscure action upon the Christian. The experiential outworking of faith in 
piety should not, for Hooker, exempt faith from contact with concrete pains of 
everyday life. By not removing the experience from its plain meaning, despair, 
depression, or melancholy for instance, the Christian gives the proper meaning to 
the experience within the secret operations of God. '[T]her is no doubt but that our 
faith may have and hath his privy operations, secrett to us in whom, yet knowen 
unto him by whome they are.' (Certaintie 1 V.75.28-30) Being weak in faith is still 
being weak in faith. 
 In these sermons, revelation is not the communication of timeless verities, 
but rather a call to action in light of who Christ is:  
'[Christ's] praier must not exclude oure labor. There thoughtes ar vaine who 
thinke there wachinge can preserv the citie which god him selfe is not willinge 
to keepe... The husbandman may not therefor burne his plow nor the marchant 
forsake his trade, because God haith promised I wyll not faile the.' (Certaintie 5 
V.81.11-17)  
 
God's action does not do away with human action and God's promises do not 
exempt believers from sensible decision making. Thought takes work in order to 
discover the truth of a matter. The comparison between perseverance and material 
stability make it clear that Hooker is not thinking of those promises within a 
restricted religious sphere but is engaged pastorally in all of human life. Unlike 
those Puritans trying to sequester religious knowledge, Hooker contentedly speaks 
of theological learning along the lines of other forms of knowledge requiring work, 




human knowledge. Human stability in the faith is not, though, a matter of human 
security since it can coexist with tribulation, anguish, persecution, famine, 
nakedness, peril, and the sword, and these things can be endured and worked 
through 'through the gratious mediation of [Christ's] praier...'143(Certaintie 5 
V.82.18)  
The struggle of the Christian life, the sheer labour involved in belief, has a 
reality in Hooker's thought Travers will object to, especially when he extends this 
line of reasoning to think about churches rather than individual lives. The 
presenting problem in the justification sermons is whether previous generations of 
English people who were members of the Catholic church ignorantly ‘living in 
popish superstitions’ could be saved. Hooker holds open the possibility of salvation 
for Roman Catholics while fully acknowledging that their teaching is for him 
mixed with heresies and innovations. The argument in the sermon has two parts. 
First, Hooker clarifies the nature of the disagreement with the 'Church of Rome;' 
second, he shows how some could be within the Church of Rome without denying 
the foundation of faith.  
The primary point of disagreement between the English and Roman 
churches is the nature and application of justifying righteousness. Hooker 
introduces the problem with a succinct summary of his own views:  
'There is a glorifyinge righteousnes of men in the Worlde to comme, and there 
is a justefying and a sanctefyinge righteousnes here. The righteousnes 
wherewith we shalbe clothed in the world to comme, is both perfecte but not 
inherente, that whereby we are sanctified, inherent but not perfecte. This 
openeth a way to the plaine understanding of that graund question, which 
hangeth yet in controversie betwene us and the churche of Rome, aboute the 
matter of justefying righteousnes.' (Justification 3 V.109.6-14)  
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The Roman teaching pivots on the view that justification is a communication of a 
perfect righteousness to a person such that they possess it as an inherent quality.144  
The problem with this view, for Hooker, is that it undoes the right relationship 
between God and creature by making that relationship, in some sense, dependent 
upon the competent work of the creature. The relationship is manipulatable rather 
than appropriately asymmetrical; by making use of the medieval penitential system 
alongside good works, the sinner can change God's view of them.  
The repeated attack on the grace of justification as the communication of 
an inherent righteousness, which Hooker fully grants as a description of the 
righteousness of sanctification, could be evidence of a preference for a stress on 
alien righteousness, but is better taken as an insistence on Christ's mediating 
function. The asymmetrical relationship between Creator and creature is intensified 
in the relationship between Christ and the believer so that believers are more 
dependent on Christ for their justification than they are on God for their souls. The 
justifying action has a definite direction and historical referent that cannot be 
reversed or done away with. Christ has incorporated Christian believers into his 
person by taking their sin into his person perfectly fulfilling the law. '[W]e care for 
no knowledge in the worlde but this, that man hath synned and god hath suffred, 
that god hath made hym self the synne of men, and that men are made the 
rightuousnes of god. (Justification 6 V.113.9-12) God's suffering, a point I will 
return to in depth later, of man's sin is the basis for the justification of men, not the 
communication of an inherent quality. Teaching to the contrary perverts 'the truth 
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Despite these differences, they disagree about the way in which the application of Christ's merits 




of Christe.' (Justification 6 V.113.13-14)145 Again and again, in his insistence on 
the primacy of the New Testament narrative, the emphasis on God's historical 
action in Christ, the recitation of Christ's personal history in the evangelists, 
Hooker returns to the primacy of Christian dependence on God's historical action 
in Christ as unique in Christian salvation. Justification cannot be detached from its 
historic reference. As imputed righteousness, Christ's righteousness never 
completely fits with the developing inherent righteousness of the Christian believer 
including the believer's way of making sense of the world. Although the larger 
theories or speculations are not done away with, Hooker will develop them at 
length in the Lawes, they do not broker or constitute what happens in the Christian 
believer.  
Justification, Christian union with God-in-Christ, and knowledge of God, 
which are the same thing, do not allow for a human scheme of knowledge to 
determine them; they determine any such scheme. The specific, historical 
confession of Christ as Lord is the distinctive Christian confession that must be 
acknowledged in express terms, and this is in contrast to those who stress the 
necessity of acknowledging God's providence, power, judgment, etc.. If those are 
the requirements, Hooker reasons, Gentiles and ploughman are Christians without 
knowing the name of Christ.146  
The implication of this last point is that to require an elaborate speculative 
theory, which will be an elite theory, instead of the confession of Christ as Lord is 
to make pagans better Christians than many faithful lay believers. The doctrinal 
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edifice employed by those like Travers and Cartwright to support the larger project 
of practical reform in the church is relativised by Hooker's insistence that such 
schemes of belief are not necessary because they are speculative. What is necessary 
for Hooker is the explicit confession of Jesus Christ maintained throughout the 
history of the church. Not only can the corrupt Roman church, the most 
compromised body for the Puritans, still manage to lead people to salvation in 
Christ, it can do so without maintaining the doctrinal distinctions insisted on by the 
Puritans.  
Nevertheless, Hooker does maintain, despite the overlap between the 
churches already noted, that the Roman church denies the foundation of the faith, 
but only by consequent.147 Denial by consequent does not directly overthrow the 
foundation of the church; it indirectly denies it by holding 'any one assertion 
whatsoever, whereupon the directe deniall thereof maie be necessarily concluded.' 
(Justification 25 V.135.20) When this is not a purposeful denial of Christ or when 
the person denying by consequent has not been called to repentance, such a denial 
does not give grounds for supposing that person to be damned. Other examples of 
those who deny by consequent are Lutherans,148 'those fathers in the greek 
church...in the errour of freewill', and those Galatians who required circumcision. 
(Justification 26 V.143.18-19) The final example is given to show how someone 
could require a certain kind of work once mandated by God, circumcision, beyond 
confession of Christ without therefore denying the foundation of faith. Paul's way 
of dealing with the Galatians was to declare them gravely mistaken rather than 
apostate: 'Yet he which condempneth theire errour confesseth notwithstandinge 
that they knew god and were knowne of him, he taketh not the honour from them 
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to be termed sonnes begotten by the ymortall seed of the gospell.' (Justification 26 
V.144.22-145.1) By linking the Catholic and the Puritan error to the Galatians' 
error, Hooker is arguing for a similar approach in handling the Roman church. 
Laypeople in the Catholic church ignorant of the intricate doctrinal system within 
the church, who knew of Jesus and trusted in him for salvation, whatever additional 
errors they committed, must be reckoned as possibly saved if justification by faith 
is to be maintained. Once Hooker historicises this point, and justification itself, the 
oddly 'egalitarian' move against the elite creation of doctrine, Roman and Puritan, 
comes about through placing the development of doctrine within the realm of 
sanctification. 
In reference to the discussion of the nature of justification above, the 
confession of the foundation maps onto justification, perfect and not inherent, 
while further development of Christian belief belongs to sanctification, inherent 
but imperfect, including the works of the mind. To require a perfect conception of 
doctrine beyond the confession of Christ as the author of salvation, is to require a 
work to bring about righteousness in the person just as the Galatians did with 
circumcision. One can, therefore, read from Hooker's sermon not a defence of 
Catholicism but a critique of the Puritan insistence of requiring the 'work' of the 
Calvinist theological system.  When Puritans, such as Travers, make the doctrinal 
system necessary for regular Christians they intellectually repeat the error of the 
circumcising Galatians.  As will become clear in a closer reading of Hooker's 
theology, he is arguing against the idea of taking developed doctrinal systems as 






In the next section, I will turn to Hooker's major work along the lines of the 
trajectory given in these sermons. The fundamental nature of the disagreement 
between Hooker and his Puritan opponents, or the depth of their error perhaps, 
demanded the systematic reply essayed by Hooker. Hooker's teaching on 
justification and sanctification, given above, led him to formulate this fundamental 
reply pragmatically in the broad terms I developed in my introduction. Rowan 
Williams attributes a pragmatism to Hooker that  
'embraces a fair degree of clarity about the final goal of human beings and the 
theological conditions for getting there, but allows room for a good deal of 
reticence and scepticism as to claims that we have found comprehensive 
formulation.'149  
 
The accumulated wisdom and knowledge of received over-beliefs possess a real 
authority in this situation but only as they enlighten and clarify human experience.  
  
                                                            






Chapter 3. Hooker on Laws 
 
  
In the larger plan of the thesis this chapter sets out Hooker's account of the 
initial position of human agents in the formative dynamic of piety apart from the 
Christian religion. They relate to God in an insufficient way while, at the same 
time, receiving the drive or habitual centre basic to them as agents. 
This chapter will concern itself with Hooker's conception of humanity's 
place in the world in relation to God as creator, a conception setting the parameters 
of Christ's work and consequent church life. My plan going forward will attend to 
this foundation or root of his subsequent theology in three movements. First, I will 
briefly define what Hooker means by 'law' as a generic concept capable of being 
used in multiple contexts, i.e. analogously. Second, following Hooker's own order 
of explanation, the interactions between the various laws will be laid out beginning 
with the eternal laws before progressing to the laws of creation. Third, I will treat 
the unique aspects of the law at work in humanity as it engages its world as a 
rational, voluntary, and learning agent. Human beings engage with the laws by 
learning to receive them through a complex interaction of their senses, cultured 
reason, and appropriate moral commitment. The process of learning, however, fails 
to reveal the law of God's being until Christ performs his work. Natural human 
being in Hooker's scheme ineluctably need a supernatural grace: creation points to 
incarnation. 
While speaking of the supernatural, Hooker maintains the close 




need of grace, [1 Cor. ii.14] whereunto I hope, we are not opposite, by holding that 
grace hath use of nature.' (Lawes III.8.6 I.223.28-29) The basic features of human 
nature and created reality persist throughout the entire drama of redemption such 
that the means of that redemption cannot be in complete contradiction to those 
basic features of natural life. Thus, human experience of God as creator is 
fundamental to his entire account and to any thinking human life: 'The wise and 
learned among the verie Heathens themselves, have all acknowledged some first 
cause whereupon originallie the being of all things dependeth.' (Lawes I.2.3 
I.59.33-60.2)  
As a prelude to his defence of the Church of England's liturgical, 
theological, and political life, he expounds this relationship of dependence through 
the concept of law for the first four books of the Lawes in order to establish a basis 
for his disagreement with the Puritans, who have neglected to attend to these 
difficult but basic matters.150  
  
I. Laws, Eternal and Created 
 
A. 'Law' Defined 
 
Hooker establishes early in his work that, while the particular laws ordering 
the worship, life, and piety of the church are the presenting object of dispute 
                                                            
150. 'And if any complaine of obscuritie, they must consider, that in these matters it commeth 
no otherwise to passe then in sundry the workes both of art and also of nature, where that which 
hath greatest force in the very thing we see is notwithstanding it selfe oftentimes not seene. The 
statelinesse of houses, the goodliness of trees when we behold them delighteth the eye; but that 
foundation which beareth up the one, that root which ministereth unto the other nourishment and 
life, is in the bosome of the earth concealed... In like maner, the use and benefite of good lawes 
all that live under them may enjoy with delight and comfort, albeit the groundes and first 
originall causes from whence they have sprong be unknowne, as to the greatest part of men they 




between the various parties in the Church of England, the actual root of the 
antagonism is a basic disagreement about the very concept of law, the ordering of 
life and action. As a result of this disagreement, he assumes the Puritan error 
manifests a 'central epistemological lapse' about the proper relationship between 
reason, scripture, and church polity.151 He, therefore, begins his defence with a 
definition of law itself: 'A law therfore generally taken, is a directive rule unto 
goodnes of operation.' (Lawes I.VIII.4 I.84.16-17) Goodness of operation here 
means that all things possess a way of being in the world that is not capricious, 
accidental, or violently imposed upon them enabling movement from possibility to 
act. These various aspects of creation are formed to their appropriate given end 
according to 'some canon, rule, or lawe' so that 'that which doth assigne unto each 
thing the kinde, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth 
appoint the forme and measure, of working, the same we tearme a Lawe.' (Lawes 
I.2.1 I.58.26-29) They 'have their beginning and being by a voluntarie purpose, 
wherewith God hath eternally decreed when and howe they should be.' (Lawes I.2.2 
I.59.10-11) 
A law is the necessary formative regimen for some specific act to be 
obtained in a given situation as a means whereby some desired or decreed end is 
accomplished. God, for instance, is not just a first cause but an agent 'which 
knowing what and why it worketh, observeth in working a most exact order or 
lawe.' (Lawes I.II.3 I.60.3-4) Laws allow actions, the transition from or reduction 
possibility to act, to carry out some specific intention. The suitableness of a law 
has to do with its ability to accomplish the desired end in a given situation. Good 
laws are supremely fitting or appropriate to their end and their context.152 
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While he will go on to differentiate between divine and created law, Hooker 
unites the two laws in their basic generic features: voluntary, chosen for some given 
purpose, and non-arbitrary, appropriate to a context and fitting to the nature of the 
actor.153  As voluntary and non-arbitrary, a law fulfils some desire in one who lives 
according to it while at the same time, with one very important exception, being 
given by another. So everything is involved in certain relations of dependence in 
the world as receivers of a law, with the exception of God, upon whom everything 
depends in some manner.154 Defined in this way, law requires that all created things 
relate in some way to other created things to be and to become; all things possess 
an appetite to move from potentiality to act—their desire of goodness—only 
capable of being fulfilled according to some directive related to other beings 
desirous of their fulfilment. The divinely appointed and entirely given end works 
itself out through the interdependent web of creation. A basic relation of interaction 
and interdependence exists among all created beings who accomplish their end 
through their negotiation of that relationship with others. It is the particularities of 
the communication and reception of this law in Hooker's scheme that allow this 
directing movement to be a fulfilment rather than an imposition.  
Hooker classifies laws into two major categories: eternal and created. Each 
of these categories are divided further as Hooker elaborates the interlocking laws 
at work in human life.155 Two eternal laws bring about the created laws, of natural 
                                                            
153. 'They erre therefore who thinke that of the will of God to do this or that there is no reason 
besides his will.' (Lawes II.2.5 I.61.18-19) 
154. '[All things work] according to a lawe, whereof some superiours, unto whome they are 
subject, is author; only the workes and operations of God have him both for their worker, and 
for the lawe whereby they are wrought.' (Lawes I.2.2 I.59.2-4) 
155. The best overview of these various laws, which I have made use of in the following 
discussion, is still Francis Paget's Introduction to the Fifth Book of Hooker's Treatise of the 
Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899). See especially Paget's chart on 
page 100. More recent often genealogical accounts of the laws with special attention to 'natural 
law' are W.J. Torrance Kirby 'The Neo-Platonic Logic of Richard Hooker's Generic Division of 




agents, of angels, of men, which spread out into the various laws ordering human 
society as men and women find themselves in the middle of worldly forces, and 
the supernatural law. As will be seen below, the created laws depend on the eternal 
laws in an entirely asymmetrical fashion wherein God, as an agent, sets down the 
order of working for his creatures in their various conditions and contexts. I turn 
now to these two eternal laws. 
  
B. The Law of God 
 
i. The First Eternal Law 
  
The first eternal law is the law of God's being: ‘[t]he being of God is a kinde 
of lawe to his working; for that perfection which God is, geveth perfection to that 
he doth.’ (Lawes I.II.2) The being of God operates according to a law 'natural, 
necessary, and internal' consisting of the generation of the Son, and the proceeding 
of the Spirit. Before treating Christology in book V of the Lawes, Hooker avoids 
handling this law of God's operation at length. He focusses, instead, on those 
operations that 'have their beginning and being by a voluntarie purpose, wherewith 
God hath eternally decreed when and howe they should be.' (Lawes I.2.2 I.59.10-
11) The first eternal law is voluntary in a certain way, but not in another: the 
Trinitarian relations making up God's internal, necessary, and natural being, are 
voluntary in not being imposed or received, but are not an expression of God's 
voluntary purpose for the world in the same way that the second eternal law will 
be.   
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The first eternal law does become an object of a dark human knowledge 
through the second law but that dark knowledge will only become clear on the far 
side of the incarnation.156 The law of God's being differs from the laws of other 
beings in that the worker, God, does not receive the law from some superior. 
Accustomed to speaking about received laws, human words need to be 'wary and 
few' because God exists as a wholly self-contained unity, 'very Oneness', unlike 
other beings who are necessarily composite.157 While Hooker will use law to 
describe the operations and actions of God and humanity, the simplicity and un-
received character of the law of God's being sets up a fundamental difference and 
constitutive asymmetry between God and creation. 
Nevertheless, even non-Christian people, and especially pagan 
philosophers, are aware of God as first cause and as an agent through an observance 
and speculation about the world around them.158 Such an awareness is possible 
because knowledge of God as first cause follows from the human experience of 
dependent relations.159 The disposition of natural forces in the world receives order 
from a superior cause, God. All law, all observed order in the world, inherently 
entails some form of dependence, some receptivity in its possessor in relation to 
some desired task and author. So God, as one who works according to his eternal 
                                                            
156. 'Dangerous it were for the feeble braine of man to wade farre into the doings of the most 
High; whome although to knowe be life, and joy to make mention of his name; yet our soundest 
knowledge is to know that we know him not as indeed he is, neither can we know him: and our 
safest eloquence concerning him is our silence, when we confesse without confession that his 
glory is inexplicable, his greatnes above our capacitie and reach. He is above, and we upon 
earth; therefore it behoveth our wordes to be warie and fewe.' (Lawes I.2.2 I.59.12-20) 
157. Despite being 'one, or rather verie Onenesse, and meere unitie having nothing but it selfe in 
it selfe, and not consisting (as all things do besides God) of many things. In which essentiall 
unitie of God a Trinitie personall neverthelesse subsisteth, after a manner far exceeding the 
possibilitie of mans conceipt.' (Lawes I.2.2. I.59.20-24) 
158. 'The wise and learned among the verie Heathens themselves have all acknowledged some 
first cause whereupon originallie the being of all things dependeth. Neither have they otherwise 
spoken of that cause than as an Agent, which knowing what and why it worketh, observeth in 
working a most exact order or lawe.' (Lawes I.2.3 I.59.33-60.4) 





law, is not only a first cause, but he is an agent who uses 'Counsel,' follows 'Reason,' 
observes a 'way,' keeps 'order;' God is an 'intellectual worker.' (Lawes I.2.3 I.60.8-
9) Still, the 'manner of this divine efficiencie' eludes the grasp of the human 
intellect that can only acknowledge that 'the naturall generation and processe of all 
things receyveth order of proceeding from the setled stability of divine 
understanding.' (Lawes I.3.4 I.68.6-8) The reason for specific occurrences may 
remain a secret for human beings who possess only a dark apprehension of God's 
eternal law, but all events go forward according to some reasonable counsel. The 
will of God does not operate 'with no reason besides his will' but with the reason 
appropriate to a certain end. The law of God, while voluntarily imposed by God on 
himself, is not for that reason arbitrary or capricious. He works according to a set 
purpose appropriate to the end he desires to accomplish.  
God's law, therefore, is non-arbitrary and voluntary as other laws despite 
being self-imposed and immutable.160 The purpose of this external working is 'the 
exercise of his most glorious and most abundant vertue.' (Lawes I.II.4 I.61.6-7) 
God creates, observes a directive law, for the purpose of expressing his virtue in 
the riches of variety and abundance in the second eternal law.  
 
 
ii. The Second Eternal Law  
 
The second eternal law is the law 'which with himself [God] hath set downe 
as expedient to be kept by all his creatures, according to the severall condition 
wherwith he hath endued them.' (Lawes I.3.1 I.63.8-10) While the first law 
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concerns God's own working, the second law, while purposed by God and, 
therefore, eternal in some sense, concerns the operations of creatures. Depending 
on who is subject to it, this eternal ordering can be described under a number of 
names: nature's law, the law celestial, the law of reason, divine law, and human 
law. Angels, plants, stars, humans, and human society require different rules or 
canons for them to accomplish their various intended ends, and so the single law 
ordering creation takes different though coherent form as it leads them to their 
appointed end. This is the law imposed by a superior, God, upon a subject, creation, 
so that creation can attain its intended end. 'All things therfore, which are as they 
ought to be, are conformed unto this second law eternall...' (Lawes I.3.1 I.63.26-
27) The various creatures within creation are conformed to this law in different 
ways appropriate to their place in creation. Leaving to the side celestial law of 
angels, Hooker's primary distinction is between natural agents, which keep the law 
'unwittingly,' and voluntary agents, which keep a law through their use of reason. 
(Lawes I.3.2 I.64.5-10)  
Natural agents follow the second eternal law 'unwittingly' in their regular 
processes and generation, and yet, these processes and generations—seasons, plant 
life, animal reproduction, weather—do operate according to an intelligently 
ordered law. Nature has no independent intelligence set upon 'certain exemplary 
draughts or patternes... subsisting in the bosome of the Highest,' but the appearance 
of a directing intelligence in the regularity of the natural world follows from 'the 
guide of nature...the only God of nature...In Him wee live, move, and are.'(Lawes 
I.3.4 I.66.33-67.1,67.15-17 ) The natural world follows the second eternal law 
under the direction of the divine efficiency or causality tied up with the first eternal 




conceive by our reason than creatures unreasonable by their sense are able to 
apprehend after what manner we dispose and order the course of our affaires.' 
(Lawes I.3.4 I.68.3-6) Nature manifests the work of an intelligence or 
understanding without becoming straightforwardly clear.161 When considered as 
the result of this divine intelligence, God's use of the natural world as a means for 
the accomplishment of his external working is termed Providence.162   
Providential use of this creation, however, does not usually come about 
through an overriding intervention of the processes occurring in creation, rather 
created beings receive their character, through inferior or secondary causes. 
Hooker envisions this relationship between divine efficiency and natural causality 
as a dynamic relationship where God makes use of both regular and contingent 
secondary causes: providence 'works with not against free will'.163 Basic to this 
dynamic relationship is Hooker's understanding of created beings as existing 
'somewhat in possibilitie' on their way to being 'in act.' (Lawes I.5.I I.72.29-30) 
The tension between possibility and act results in an 'appetite or desire' in all things 
for a greater degree of actuality and goodness. To fulfil this desire, to move from 
potentiality to act, all things ought to adopt a way of operating appropriate to their 
desired end and this way of operating should be the second eternal law, which 
Hooker glosses as 'the participation of God himselfe.' (Lawes I.5.2 I.73.10) Natural 
or unwitting agents keep this eternal law, act in accordance with it, in reaction to 
their given contexts without the intervention of reason. It is the means of 
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that the naturall generation and processe of all things receyveth order of proceeding from the 
settled stabilitie of divine understanding.' (Lawes I.3.4 I.68.6-8) 
162. Hooker gives this citation from Thomas Aquinas: 'Vide Thom. in Compend. Theol. cap. 3: 
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(Lawes I.3.4 I.68.18) 




communicating this law to the various natural agents that Hooker finds elusive in 
the working of providence rather than the observance of it. For reasoning agents, 
i.e. humans, this way of operating is impossible apart from Christ making real their 
participation in God by revealing God as a certain agent with a certain goal.  
If the communication of law and the exact relationship between divine 
efficiency and inferior causes is opaque for Hooker, he still draws certain 
distinctions between the various ways God deals with creation in these 
relationships. God's intelligent direction of nature takes on different forms in order 
to maintain the coherence of God's character as an actor depending on the subject 
or patient of those causes and that patient's context in the relationship between 
creator and creature. So deviations from the second eternal law  
'are notwithstanding in some sort ordered by the first eternall lawe.  For what 
good or evill is there under the sunne, what action correspondent or repugnant 
unto the law which God hath imposed upon his creatures, but in or upon it God 
doth worke according to the law which himselfe hath eternally purposed to 
keep; that is to say, the first law eternall? ' (Lawes I.3.1 I.63.28-64.1)  
 
The integrity of the first eternal law, its immutability as a canon for action, allows 
God to engage dynamically with creation without compromising God's character 
in a negotiated or symmetrical relationship. Hooker describes the moments of this 
asymmetrical relationship as 'creation' and 'governance.' (Dublin Fragments 27 
IV.134.13) Creation names God's determination to attain his desired end, 'that 
natural desire which his goodness hath to shew and impart itself', and governance 
designates his guidance of creation to that end, including 'mercie and wrath... 
mercie of his owne accord, and wrath by occasion offered.' (DF 27 IV.134.20-21) 
God adheres to his own eternal law precisely by responding in various ways to each 




response to certain situations given the character of God inherent in the canon of 
the first eternal law. 
The natural world, then, possesses a density independent of human reason 
or understanding that, nevertheless, human life depends on in order to survive.164 
The presence of the second eternal law in the natural processes of creation is 
important for Hooker's larger theological project because it will provide the 
appropriate means for God to communicate his law to voluntary human agents in 
dynamic engagement. As with natural agents, God will govern voluntary or 
reasonable agents according to his original purpose in creation, but he will 
accomplish his original desire in a way appropriate to the particular characteristics 
of those agents, especially their free and reasonable will. The communication of 
God's will to human agents does not occur through a direct or bare divine command 
but through the practical reason appropriate to a voluntary agent. In this way the 
fixed and eternal nature of God's being gives shape to the relative and temporal life 
voluntary human agents. I turn now to the nature God's communication of his law 
to human beings, rational agents.  
  
C. The Law of Human Agents 
 
Voluntary human agents differ from other terrestrial agents by acquiring 
their law wittingly.165  The basic structure for the human reception, propagation, 
and activation of human laws recapitulates the scheme of the two eternal laws:  
'[a human agent] made according to the likenes of his maker resembleth him 
also in the maner of working: so that whatsoever we worke as men, the same 
                                                            
164. 'But in as much as righteous life presupposeth life; inasmuch as to live virtuously it is 
impossible except we live, therefore the first impediment, which naturally we endevor to 
remove, is penurie and want of things without which we cannot live.' (Lawes I.10.2 I.97.17-20) 





we doe wittingly worke and freely... The good which either is gotten by doing, 
or which consisteth in the very doing it selfe, causeth not action, unlesse 
apprehending it as good we so like and desire it... Goodnesse is seen with the 
eye of the understanding. And the light of that eye, is reason. So that two 
principall fountaines there are of humaine action, Knowledge and Will...' (Lawes 
I.7.2 I.77.20-78.5)  
 
Like God, human agents work intelligently, freely, and asymmetrically in 
relation to their contexts. Human agents work out their purposes as intellectual 
agents who produce a law for their work according to a kind of practical reason.  A 
human agent chooses to act in a certain way through a diverse though holistic 
operation responding to various pressures, desires, and goals at work in his or her 
concrete context.166 The resultant positive laws expressing this practical reasoning 
parallels the second eternal law in the natural world.  
While, unlike God, human agents receive the law of their working from a 
superior, human action goes into motion through an exercise of the will as a free 
choice uncompelled by another. The choice will not be arbitrary, unformed, or 
blank, but will respond to a situation. Thus voluntary agents can choose to leave 
things undone: '[t]here is in the will of man naturally that freedome, whereby it is 
apt to take or refuse any particular object whatsoever being presented unto it.' 
(Lawes I.VII.6 I.79.27-30)167  
Human agents, whatever their situation, are necessarily morally responsible 
for their choices even if those choices are limited or given by some authority 
inasmuch as they act wittingly. So when the will does turn itself to some particular 
end it makes a choice, but, Hooker maintains, the freedom of the will requires that 
the will be separated by reason from the appetite, an 'inferior naturall desire.' 
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167. Voak, rightly, sees this parallel between divine and human freedom as evidence of 




(Lawes I.7.3 I.78.13) The free, rational, and intentional movement of the will, its 
character as a voluntary act, depends upon its orientation to 'things unsensible' 
through the use of reason.168 While human agents develop human laws in response 
to the push and pull of their concrete lives, and they judge these laws through 
application to that life and critical reflection on that application. This interaction 
between appetite, will, and reason provides the context of human action according 




'The object of Appetite is whatsoever sensible good may be wished for.' 
(Lawes I.7.3 I.78.14-15) Human appetite, like every animal desire or appetite, 
directs an agent to specific end in response to the concrete, sensible environment 
of the agent. Physical, sensible, and natural needs such as thirst, hunger, and fatigue 
are not voluntary and their satisfaction, at least initially, is not voluntary in human 
agents. The range of appetite extends to the affections, 'joy, and griefe, and feare, 
and anger, with such like', whose presence in the human agent is beyond his or her 
control. (Lawes I.7.3 I.78.16-17) Appetite in the human agent, then, mirrors the 
desires of non-voluntary agents in the world who live according to the second 
eternal law at work in nature. These human and animal desires respond to a 
'sensible goodness' apart from the intervening direction of reason, which is 
concerned with unsensible goodness. While these sensible states can short-circuit 
human reason calling forth an immediate response, appetite's correlation with 
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sensible goodness does not necessarily put it at odds with the will's correlation with 
unsensible goodness:  
'Goodness doth not moove by being, but by being apparent; ... [s]ensible 
goodnesse is most apparent, neere, and present; which causeth the appetite to 
be therewith strongly provoked...pursuit and refusal in the will do follow [when 
the] understanding apprehendeth, grounding it selfe upon sense, unlesse some 
higher reason do chance to teach the contrary.' (Lawes I.7.6 I.80.3-11)  
 
Sensible goodness for Hooker can be present in the physical context giving rise to 
the reasonable action of the will or can overrun reason leading to sin. The common 
structure of appetite in human and animals runs parallel up to the point where 
human beings naturally begin to use their reason, when they become witting agents. 
This witting use of reason depends on discourse, the use of language, arising 
naturally in communal human life.  
 
ii. Reason  
 
 Whatever law, principle, or axiom reasonably directs the will, 'it was at the 
first found out by discourse, and drawne from out of the very bowels of heaven and 
earth.' (Lawes I.8.5 I.86.10-11) Discourse, including the laws and statutes making 
up society, comes about as a result of both the human desire to seek the fellowship 
of other human beings for communion and a need to band together to supply basic 
material needs. Societies of discourse began in this original attempt to regiment the 
various activities of human life to provide for the common good of the society.169 
'For this cause, after men began to grow to a number: the first thing we reade they 
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ourselves, we are naturally induced to seeke communion and fellowship with others. This was 
the cause of men's uniting themselves at the first in politique Societies, which societies could 
not be without Government, nor Government without a distinct kind of Law from that which 




gave themselves unto was the tilling of the earth and the feeding of cattle.' (Lawes 
I.10.2 I.97.11-13)170 In this need for material provision, human life is no different 
from animal life in its exercise of 'sensible knowledge,' but it differs from animal 
life in its ability to make use of reason to supply these material wants—e.g. tilling 
the earth, feeding the cattle, storing the grain—in the context of communal life. A 
long-term end can be a catalyst for the development of plan that requires a directing 
and binding law. The desire for the continuance of life initially produces these 
positive laws. 
'The chiefest instrument of humaine communion therefore is speech, 
because thereby we impart mutuallie one to another the conceiptes of our 
reasonable understanding.' (Lawes I.10.12 I.107.6-9) For voluntary agents, then, 
their reason comes about through the use of conceipts. Conceipts, synonymous 
with 'notions', are interpretive categories primarily worked out by individuals 
through reflection on their own experience or communicated through language in 
a society.171 These conceipts originate in the 'painful'172 search for knowledge 
through attention to causes by means of their effects, signs, and tokens. Human 
reason regularly observes the operations of the natural world according to the 
second eternal law to develop a range of proper responses to these recognised 
effects. The causality of the created world, its regular observance of the second 
eternal law, can be abstracted from by reasoning human agents to gain knowledge. 
This kind of knowledge does not follow from innate ideas but through the senses 
                                                            
170. The good or virtuous life requires natural life: 'righteous life presupposeth life.(Lawes 
I.10.2 I.97.17-20) 
171. Hooker can, for instance, speak of his private conceipt (Lawes Preface.5.3 I.29.15) and the 
misdirection of believers by Puritans who teach them an erroneous preconceipt. (Lawes 
Preface.3.9 I.16.18) 




and language that make available certain ways of handling the world.173 Growth in 
knowledge is possible because 'every effect doth after a sort conteine, at least wise 
resemble, the cause from which it proceedeth.' (Lawes I.5.2 I.73.7-8) Knowledge 
drawn from these effects, which is inferior to knowledge of causes themselves, 
makes up the 'generall perswasion' and 'universal consent' of human beings. (Lawes 
I.8.3 I.83)174  
These framing categories develop through their use in time by the 
individual person in parallel to the progression of society among multiple persons. 
Initially these conceipts simply work to supply the material needs of the human 
person and community, more or less equal with other animals, but  
'once [the soul] comprehendeth any thing above this, as the differences of time, 
affirmations, negations, and contradictions in speech; we then count it to have 
some use of naturall reason.' (Lawes I.6.3 I.75.24-27)  
 
Natural reason, which can be aided and developed through 'the right helps of true 
art and learning', reaches beyond sensible things to a knowledge of things 
unsensible capable of directing human action by responding in and to its context 
through language. An agent becomes reasonable through obedience and receptivity 
to a community that directs the agent in the use of certain conceipts. As part of the 
law adopted by the agent, these acquired conceipts furnish the desired ends of the 
agent, or do not, and allow the agent to understand his or her context in a certain 
way by elucidating the meaning of certain effects. A society's conceipts, therefore, 
are historical, contextual, and human while responding and approximating to the 
                                                            
173. Olivier Loyer L'Anglicanisme p. 229. 
174. Hooker does occasionally speak of an intuitive kind of knowledge. Lacking material or 
bodily senses, angels, ghostly natures, and spirits know intuitively. (Lawes I.8.4 I.84.27) Christ 
revealed himself to the Apostle 'even by intuitive revelation.' (Lawes Preface.6.3 I.31.12) The 
most assured knowledge is that which people have by 'plaine aspect and intuitive beholding.' 
(Lawes II.7.5 I.179.11-12) The intuitive vision of God, however, comes only 'in the world to 
come' (Lawes I.11.6 I.119.5-6) and to 'Angels and glorified Sainctes' presently (Lawes V.42.7 
II.172.14).  At the present time, however, we lack even this intuitive knowledge of ourselves. 




reality of the second eternal law. Their historicity does not undermine their realism 
because they continue to work in relation to various contexts conditioned by the 
second eternal law; they are appropriate to certain situations. By comprehending 
its context in light of speech, discourse, or language, as Hooker variously describes 
the medium, the human agent becomes a voluntary agent choosing to respond to 
various sensual stimuli—effects, signs, tokens—in a purposive manner; it chooses 
a law, a canon of action. Reason allows for human beings to receive a law at odds 
with simple appetite and to be responsible for that choice. Their chosen law, in 
turn, will provide the means for their own morally significant approximation of the 
second eternal law.  
To give Hooker's example of this process, a person may naturally desire 
pleasure over pain, and yet, when confronted with the principle that  
'small difficulties, when exceeding great good is sure to ensue; and on the other 
side momentanie benefites, when the hurt which they drawe after them is 
unspeakable, are not at all to be respected.' (Lawes I.8.5 I.85.22-25)  
 
Reason, understanding the need for temporary suffering in the pursuit of future 
reward, can direct the will to endure appetitively repugnant suffering as the price 
of a future reward. Such an understanding of a unsensible good arises through a 
consideration of sensible life on the basis of inherited societal conceipts leading to 
altered behaviour for which an agent is personally and morally responsible. This 
basic axiom of human life provides the ground for specifically Christian teachings 
on the need to suffer presently in hope of future eternal reward taught by Christ 
(Matthew 16.26) and Paul (2 Corinthians 4.17): 'Christianitie to be embraced, 





Hooker's account of reason's operation can be summed up in this way. The 
human use of reason arises out of humanity's natural desire to continue existing in 
and as a community through the accumulated historical wisdom of that 
community. A reasonable or intelligent will becomes possible through the direction 
of the agent in his or her act of judgment by these socially communicated laws, 
customs, and axioms. The 'rule of voluntary agents on earth' is the judgment that 
reason gives 'concerning the goodnes' of things to be done. (Lawes I.8.4 I.85.2-3) 
Reason judges according to basic principles fundamental to human knowledge as 
these are grasped when they are proposed to the mind.175 These general axioms 
ground or direct reason as it takes up the task of judgment. While reason can grasp 
these basic axioms, it, nevertheless, does not necessarily occur to every human 
agent to immediately know these axioms, only to grasp them when they are 
proposed.176 Right reason, when trying to accomplish a given task in a given 
situation, frames a canon of human action as closely as possible to the second 
eternal law by bringing the accumulated historical wisdom of a society to a 
contemporary context so that human action corresponds to God's intention. It 
accomplishes this task when it properly relates appetite and will.  
 
                                                            
175. 'The maine principles of reason are in themselves apparent. For to make nothing evident of 
it selfe unto mans understanding were to take away al possibility of knowing any thing. And 
herein that of Theophrastus is true, They that seeke a reason of all things do utterly overthrow 
Reason. In every kind of knowledge some such grounds there are, as that being proposed the 
mind doth presently embrace them as free from all possibilitie of error, clear and manifest 
without proofe.' (Lawes I.8.5 I.85.6-13) 
176. 'If here it be demaunded howe it cometh to passe that this being common unto all lawes 
which are made, there should be found even in good lawes so great varietie as there is; wee must 
note the reason hereof to bee the sundry particular endes, whereunto the different disposition of 
that subject or matter, for which lawes are provided, causeth them to have especiall respect in 
making laws.' (Lawes I.10.9 I.103.27-32) 
According to Paul Avis, for Hooker, in the world governed by a law given by God, '[the] 
vocation of reason is to bring human existence into conformity with the order and harmony in 
the nature of things.' Paul Avis Search of Authority: Anglican Theological Method from the 






Hooker differentiates the will from the appetite through their respective 
objects:  
'But of one thing we must have speciall care, as being a matter of no small 
moment; and that is, how the will, properly and strictly taken, as it is of things 
which are referred unto the ende that man desireth, differeth greatly from that 
inferior naturall desire which we call appetite. The object of appetite is 
whatsoever sensible good may be wished for; the object of wil is that good 
which reason doth lead us to seek.' (Lawes I.7.3 I.78.10-17)  
 
Will mirrors appetite as a form of desire, but differs from appetite by being oriented 
through reason. It is intellectual or reasonable desire of goodness.177 The objects of 
the will are those unsensible things discerned by reason as something to be done or 
as rules of action in a material context. The operation of the human will, therefore, 
is a complex process holistically related to the rational and material life of the 
human being as it begins to imitate its creator. Will's relation to appetite and to 
reason enables it to adopt a positive law of working, parallel to the second eternal 
law, non-arbitrarily and voluntarily in pursuit of some given end. 
The will chooses non-arbitrarily because its choosing occurs within and in 
reaction to a concrete context. 'Appetite,' rooted in responsive affections and 
always tied to the physical senses, 'is the wills solicitor, and the will is appetites 
controller.' (Lawes I.7.3 I.78.22-23) 'Sensible goodness' provokes the appetite 
through the senses, and this provocation comes to the will in such a way that it can 
either follow the appetite or refuse it. (Lawes I.7.6 I.80.6) Although not always a 
topic of great reflection, even the basic activities of eating, drinking, and sleeping 
pass through the reasonable control of the will in response to a concrete situation. 
The material desires and bodily senses shared with natural agents ground a human 
                                                            




agent's act of judgment as the material about which reasonable decisions must be 
made. Ideally, the will freely responds to these situations through the mediation of 
reason to choose what is good and right in some situation: to pursue a law in 
correlation to a desired end in a given context. Sense data and a material context 
are, for human agents, necessary but not sufficient conditions for a judgment to be 
made according to a law. 
Human beings adopt a law of working voluntarily, for Hooker, precisely 
because they choose it. To make a choice is 'is to will one thing before another' and 
'[choice] there is not unlesse the thing which we take be so in our power that we 
might have refused and left it.' (Lawes I.7.2 I.77.29-30) Hooker understands human 
freedom as liberty of spontaneity and indifference.178 The human will is 
spontaneously free when it chooses to act in such a way without coercion or 
compulsion. The will desires to choose what is good, but it is not compelled to 
choose the good in such a way that it becomes passive like the appetite. The human 
is indifferently free when the agent could have chosen otherwise.179 The will, then, 
can refuse when it is presented with some good: 'if reason have taught [the mind] 
rightly to be good, yet not so apparently that the mind receiveth it with utter 
impossibility of being otherwise, still there is place left for the will to take or leave.' 
(Lawes I.8.6 I.80.11-14) The will can choose to 'negate' some perceived goodness 
in an act of judgment involving will, reason, and appetite.  
This understanding of the voluntary character of human action is important 
in two ways. First, as will become clearer later on, the problem of sinful human 
action is not simply the result of insufficient knowledge. A solution to the problem 
of sin cannot be worked out solely through the communication of knowledge even 
                                                            
178. Voak Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology ch. 1. 




if it requires some such communication. Second, the freedom of voluntary agents 
to choose their actions through the mediation of reason allows them to be held 
responsible for those actions: 'rewards and punishments do alwaies presuppose 
something willingly done well or ill...Take away the will, and all actes are equall: 
That which we doe not, and would doe, is commonly accepted as done.' (Lawes 
I.9.1 I.94.30-95.3) Individual agents bear responsibility for their own actions as 
agents answerable for those means they use to accomplish their desired ends. The 
use of culturally disseminated axioms, customs, and conceipts do not allow human 
agents to excuse themselves from meriting some reward or punishment for their 
actions in pursuit of some end. Human agents naturally pursue 'blessedness' 
through works, which they are responsible for, that nevertheless fail to merit the 
desired reward.180  
 
II. A Holistic Operation: Critical Reason 
 
To sum up, the human agent mirrors the divine agent in his 'maner of 
working: so that whatsoever we worke as men, the same we doe wittingly worke 
and freely.' (Lawes I.7.2 I.77.21-23) As voluntary agents, human beings act in the 
material world in response to the pressures of their concrete context. Their action, 
then, is non-arbitrary by being rooted in the senses as they navigate the world 
around them. Human action is, in turn, voluntary in two ways. First, the action goes 
forward according to a definite desired plan confected in the interaction of natural 
                                                            
180. 'Rewards doe alwaies presuppose such duties performed as are rewardable. Our naturall 
meanes therefore unto blessednes are our workes; nor is it possible that nature should ever finde 
any other way to salvation than onely this. But examine the workes which we do, and since the 
firste foundation of the world what one can say, My wayes are pure? Seing then all flesh is 
guiltie of that for which God hath threatened eternallie to punish, what possibilitie is there this 




appetite and historically positioned reason. Reason directs human desire in a 
unique way producing intelligent desire, the will. Second, this rational or intelligent 
desire can choose to refrain from action or to overcome the appetite thus decisively 
separating human agents from natural agents, e.g. other animals or plants, who lack 
this ability. The communally formed reason in human agents creates the possibility 
of their relative freedom from the sensitive appetite. This freedom, however, 
demands human agents be responsible for their actions in a unique way. The 
natural, for humans, progression of appetite into reason and will irrevocably binds 
responsibility and freedom in the non-arbitrary and voluntary adoption of law by 
human agents. 
Following this line of thinking, however inadvertently he may have done 
it, Hooker's defence of reason within Christian understanding sets up a historicised 
view of doctrine parallel to later Modern positions.181 Hooker understood the 
natural order to be present to the human intellect such that it could be engaged with 
as a critical pressure upon humanly developed ideas. By making reason publicly 
available, Hooker's theology kept open the ability of all people to know whatever 
is 'absolutely unto all men's salvation necessarie.' (Lawes Preface.3.2 I.13.8)182 
Average lay people possess an adequate grasp of reason to handle the foundation 
of the faith. A refusal to heed the findings of human reason leads to heresy:  
                                                            
181. Beiser Sovereignty p. 46. cf. ‘In one sense, a very important sense from the point of view 
of theological method, Calvin is medieval where Hooker shows the beginnings of something 
different.’ H.R. McAdoo The Spirit of Anglicanism 25. 'Yet, and this is the important point, 
Hooker can hardly be described as medieval any more than he can be called Thomist, though 
these are his sources and inspiration: doctrine is not copied and added to Anglican spirituality 
but absorbed into it.' Martin Thornton English Spirituality 233, cf. 224-226. On this point see 
Nigel Voak Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology. 
Brad Gregory describes the continuity of the Medieval, Reformation, and Modern periods as the 
continual inheritance of a set of problems and questions in The Unintended Reformation: How a 
Religious Revolution Secularised Society (Harvard: HUP, 2012). See especially the introduction 
pp. 1-24. 




'In a word, the Catholique Fathers did good unto all by that knowledge, whereby 
heretiques hindering the truth in many, might have furthered therwith 
themselves, but that obstinatlie following their owne ambitious or otherwise 
corrupted affections, in stead of framing their wills to maynteyne that which 
reason taught, they bent their wits to finde how reason might seem to teach that 
which their wills were set to maynteyne. (Lawes III.8.8 I.225.21-28) '183  
 
The correction of corrupted ambitions required an effective means of reform 
according to reason, a canon of judgment not dependent on the desires of human 
subjects.  
Reason, then, requires individual labour, investment, and expression. As in 
the above discussion of the discernment of assurance in the Christian life, 
contingent occurrences in human life provide the material out of which the will of 
God is discerned in corrigible and fallible interpretations. Yielding to this reason 
by the individual is not compliance with a set of revealed dictates, that would be to 
turn again to the law, but is a response to an obscurely understood wisdom at work 
in the specific, historical, and changing world of each individual. Reason's personal 
character discourages Christian thought from assuming a false permanence or 
untoward insight: 
'But consider I beseech you first as touching the Apostle, how that wherein he 
was so resolute and peremptorie, our Lord Jesus Christ made manifest unto him 
even by intuitive revelation, wherein there was no possibilitie of error. That 
which you are perswaded of, ye have it no otherwise than by your own only 
probable collection, and therfore such bold asseverations as in him were 
admirable, should in your mouthes but argue rashnes.' (Lawes Preface.6.3 
I.31.10-16)  
 
Criticism, even or especially self-criticism, was necessary for the Christian life as 
long as righteousness remained partial and human knowledge of God incomplete. 
Criticism played a major role in the Reformation and the rise of Humanism, 
a fact endorsed by Hooker's associate Edwin Sandys who, after having made a tour 
                                                            
183. See the helpful discussion of this point in S.L. Bethell The Cultural Revolution of the 




of Europe, described the Protestant task as opening up 'the streames of the evidence 
of reason.'184 The public presence of reason, though, opens up the space for the 
patient work of criticism to frame church laws. While all may be able to grasp the 
basics of Christian belief, elite thinkers skilled in logic and sufficiently erudite 
possess the proper means of discerning the proper judgements in various cases and 
situations.185 The critical vocation does not, however, result in the total destruction 
of Christian belief. It responds to developments placed upon it so that divine 
wisdom can be maintained precisely through changes in polity.186 '[M]en doe not 
presume to chaunge Gods ordinance, but they yeelde thereunto requiring it selfe to 
be changed.' (Lawes III.10.5 I.243.30-32) The reform of church laws begins with 
asking about the suitability of a law to accomplish the desired end in this given 
context. The end remains the same but the means is open to pragmatic questioning. 
Hooker sums up this interaction in a description of making religious laws: 
'The most naturall and religious course in making of lawes is that the matter of 
them be taken from the judgment of the wisest in those thinges which they are 
to concerne... Howbeit when all which the wisedome of all sortes can doe is 
done for devising of lawes in the Church it is the generall consent of all that 
giveth them the forme and vigor of lawes without which they could be no more 
unto us then the Counseles of Physitions to the sick. ' (Lawes VIII.6.11 
III.403.10-22)  
 
Responsibility to the church, or political society more broadly, means reform 
cannot be simply imposed by the elite upon those below them. All believers are 
bound or constrained by a responsibility to maintain the means for perpetuating 
their identities as God’s adopted children. Rowan Williams sets out Hooker's view 
                                                            
184. Quoted in Shuger 'Societe Supernaturall' p. 313. 
185. See Hooker's scathing remark at (Lawes II.7.6 I.183.14-19) '...a man whose capacitie will 
scarce serve him to utter five wordes in sensible maner, blusheth not in any doubt concerning 
matter of scripture to thinke his own bare Yea, as good as the Nay of all the wise, grave, and 
learned judgements that are in the whole world. Which insolency must be represt, or it will be 
the verie bane of Christian religion.' 




of this responsibility: 'Thus the eternal, non-negotiable constraint put upon us by 
Christ and Scripture has to do with how we are made ... participants in Christ's 
everlasting filiation.'187 The positive material shape of this relationship, Jesus of 
Nazareth, provides a canon for responsible action by the Christian believer, and a 
way of personally navigating his or her own reasoned exploration of the self. 
The ramifications of this move for Christian knowledge are made clear by 
Egil Grislis: 
'...truth is available and can be recorded with an impressive measure of 
accuracy, yet it is never possessed in such a way that the process of the search 
could be prematurely ended and the partial insights of age absolutized. The 
failure to take such a stand is the weakness of both the Puritans and Rome.'188  
 
The ideal basis for Christian knowledge developed by elite theologians is not their 
own insights, but their ability to represent how the actual belief of Christians is 
constrained by the figure of Jesus Christ.189 
If reason, and the human will, are responsible to reality in this way for 
Hooker, nevertheless the simple correction of mistaken ideas will not cure 
humanity of its sin. The will, the habitual centre of human action, still chooses, 
despite knowing better, what is wrong. The nature of this failure sets the stage for 






                                                            
187. Rowan Williams Anglican Identities p. 47. 
188. Egil Grislis 'The Hermeneutical Problem in Richard Hooker' in Studies in Richard Hooker: 
Essays Preliminary to an Edition of his Work, ed. W. S. Hill (Cleveland, 1972 ) p. 170. 
189. This is why in order to have a productive debate with Travers and Cartwright, Hooker sees 
a need to begin with an account of reality and the nature of humanity's relation to God. He 
writes the Lawes to give this larger picture of humanity's place within the world, to show the 
dynamics human action in history and society that can be grasped by reason as the necessary 




Even if human reason, in its experience of the density of the natural world, 
should be able to orient human acts towards the fulfilment of its natural desire 
through a law similar to the second eternal law, Hooker is well aware humanity 
fails to actualise the goodness inherent in its natural desires, to operate as it should, 
denying it the attainment of its perfections. Humanity naturally desires a triple 
perfection:  
'first, a sensuall, consisting in those things which very life it selfe requireth 
either as necessary supplementes, or as beauties and ornaments thereof;' 
intellectual, consisting in the acquisition of knowledge through the use of 
reason; 'lastly a spirituall and divine, consisting in those things whereunto we 
tend by supernatural meanes here, but cannot here attaine unto them.' (Lawes 
I.11.4 I.114.19-25)  
 
Apart from Christ's work, the final perfection cannot be actualised at all and the 
first two only in part. The identity of the First Cause, the point of providential order, 
remains obscure to humanity. 
 
A. The First Failure  
 
Human beings fail to actualise the first two perfections, sensual and 
intellectual, through the misdirection and sinful cultivation communicated by the 
laws of evil societies.  
'[L]ewde and wicked custome, beginning perhaps at the first amongst few, 
afterwards spreading into greater multitudes,' inures 'the mind by long practise, 
and so leaving there a sensible impression, prevaileth more than reasonable 
perswasion what way so ever.' (Lawes I.8.11; Lawes I.7.6 I.91.30-31;I.80.18-
20)  
 
The conceipts and customs of a particular society deprive their users from making 
proper use of their 'natural understanding.' Misguided reason does not direct or 
restrain the appetite, but, instead, the sensual desire of the appetite overthrows the 




in this overtaking of the will by the appetite could excuse the sinner from 
responsibility. Voluntary agents remain responsible, however, because this 
malfunction evidences a desire for a lesser goodness present in the good order of 
nature chosen by an indolent reason.190 The lack of adequate conceipts closes down 
the possibility of an agent possessing the law appropriate to a given situation. A 
way of being in and reacting to the world does not appear because of the conceptual 
range available to the believer, even if he or she were properly predisposed. 
The painful nature of seeking out knowledge prevents those casually 
making use of inherited knowledge from critical reflection at odds with the 
interpretive conceipts they have grown quite literally comfortable using. The 
source of this indolence is 'divine malediction' creating an 'originall weaknes in the 
instruments [of reason], without which the understanding part is not able in this 
world by discourse to worke...' (Lawes I.7.7 I.81.12-19) The malformed conceipts 
of a sinful society continue to propagate in its members who—as members—are 
responsible for their use of those sinful conceipts. In this process, the freedom 
present in the use of reason, its witting and unsensible direction of the will, is 
subverted by being bound to the sensuous, local, and short-term goodness desired 
by the appetite. Ideally, of course, the process operates in the other direction: reason 
rightly chooses the most appropriate, fitting, and apt means of accomplishing its 
desired end. The fittingness of reasonable goodness is its beauty, '[in] which 
consideration the Græcians most divinely have given to the active perfection of 
men a name expressing both beautie and goodnes: [Καλοκαγαθία.]' (Lawes I.8.1 
I.82.23-25) The subversion of reason by the appetite denies the agent the freedom 
                                                            




it should find in the accuracy of discourse; reason fails to see the goodness actually 
present to it in its context leading to inappropriate judgments. 
 
B. The Second Failure 
 
Human beings, if they fail to obtain this perfection of beauty and goodness, 
are further frustrated in their desire and unable to actualise their spiritual perfection. 
According to Hooker, the natural object of human desire is a non-instrumental 
infinite goodness: 'No good is infinite but only God; therefore he our felicitie and 
blisse.' (Lawes I.11.2 I.112.11-12) The desire for God is natural in human beings 
once they begin to use language, to reason, to reflect for non-instrumental means 
on what might be beyond sense. The freedom from the dictates of appetitive desire 
reaches completion in the satiation of rational desire in a goodness standing above 
reason as unsensible goods stand above sense.191 In the present time, however, 
humanity remains incapable of reaching this ultimate goodness because of sin. Sin 
prevents humanity from obtaining the righteousness associated with this goodness 
as a reward. The only way to reach this goodness, then, is  
'surely a way which is supernaturall, a way which could never have entered into 
the heart of man as much as once to conceive or imagine, if God him selfe had 
not revealed it extraordinarilie.' (Lawes I.11.5 I.116.5-7)   
 
God's desire to communicate this supernatural way is located in the first 
eternal law setting down how God will handle the creation emerging through the 
second law. The communication of this supernatural way depending solely on 
                                                            
191. '[Man does not remain content with worldly things] but doth further covet, yea oftentimes 
manifestly pursue with great sedulitie and earnestness, that which cannot stand him in any stead 
for vitall use; that which exceedeth the reach of sense; yea, somewhat above capacitie of reason, 
somewhat divine and heavenly, which with hidden exultation it rather surmiseth than 
conceyveth; somewhat it seeketh, and what that is directly it knoweth not, yet very intentive 
desire thereof doth so incite it, that all other knowne delights and pleasures are layde aside, they 




God's will to communicate to it humanity is not a response to any created activity. 
'Predestination to life' is 'infinitlie ancienter then the actuall worke of creation' even 
if it presupposes the work of creation. (DF 2 IV.102.26-27)192 The accomplishment 
of this predestination requires, given the state of human nature, the removal of 
impediments to this life in order to communicate this bliss, but the proper operation 
of this communication, its law of activity given the nature of its recipient, requires 
that it be given to humanity. As active, human agents, were it not for the present 
imperfections of body and mind, are capable of God by understanding, 'as He is 
that sovereign Truth which comprehendeth the rich treasures of all wisdom,' and 
will, 'as He is that sea of Goodness whereof whoso tasteth shall thirst no more;' 
reason and will, however, receive their orientation through the person's receptive 
appetite and affection, 'as it is receptive, [the soul shall] be also perfected with those 
supernaturall passions of joye peace and delight.' (Lawes I.11.3 I.113.22-23) The 
eternally predestined supernatural re-orientation, the communication of and union 
with God's life, makes contact with sinful beings at the point of their dependence, 
the communally formed appetite and its affections, in order to begin the 
progression from appetite to reason to will once more. Any other means of 
accomplishing this redemption would make its recipients less than human in the 
end. The sensual, material, and affective point of contact between God and human 
desire capable of reforming and completing the movement from appetite to will is 
Jesus of Nazareth. 
                                                            
192. See also: ''God hath revealed a way mysticall and supernaturall, a way directing unto the 
same ende of life by a course which groundeth it selfe upon the guiltiness of sinne, and through 
sinne desert of condemnation and death. For in this waye the first thing is the tender compassion 
of God respecting us drowned and swallowed up in myserie; the next is redemption out of the 
same by the pretious death and merit of a mightie Saviour, which hath witnessed of himself 
saying, I am the way, the way that leadeth us from miserie into blisse. This supernatural way 







The project of Re-Christianisation, for Hooker, could not be pursued simply 
through a doctrinal or intellectual creation especially when this doctrine turned so 
much Christian experience into a meaningless blank. The solution of this problem 
required a deeper change in the nature of the agent, his or her law. The law of 
Christian agents needs to be non-arbitrary, appropriate to a situation, and voluntary, 
freely chosen by the agent. The law, then, has to respond to the concrete push and 
pull of a given situation such that it accords with or corrects the historically 
mediated conceptual resources available to the agent in his or her life. The 
conceptual resources available outside of the Christian church, however, fail to 
provide the adequate resources for agents to direct their desire properly to God, to 
provide an over-arching direction to human life. The dynamics of the formation of 
human piety move from a basic pre-reflective dependence on God, which is 
available to all creatures, through the reflective acquisition of and expression in 
language—a historical process for Hooker—to a frustration in the vagaries of sin. 
The basic existential situation of human life apart from Christ points towards this 
need for redemption in Christ and that this redemption occurs through both a 
reorientation of the agent's contextually delimited habitual centre and the 
communication of concepts appropriate to that centre. The verification of these 
new concepts as human concepts could then come about through their use and 
communication in a society of human agents. A new law for action would emerge 
in a way appropriate to voluntary agents continually approximating the second 




Hooker's earlier definition of the dynamics of justification pushes towards 
this pragmatic dynamic:  
'There is a glorifyinge righteousnes of men in the Worlde to comme, and there 
is a justefying and a sanctefyinge righteousnes here. The righteousnes 
wherewith we shalbe clothed in the world to comme, is both perfecte but not 
inherente, that whereby we are sanctified, inherent but not perfecte. 
(Justification 3 V.109.6-11)  
 
Justification provides a given determinative context of action, a situation wherein 
Christian law will be non-arbitrary, while sanctification is the voluntary personal 
adoption of the law appropriate to such a context. For this to occur apart from an 
arbitrary divine command, God would need to establish a context able to transmit 
this way of life and a human will to adopt it: an instantiation of human law at one 
with the first eternal law. God would need to be once again the author of a human 
law so that human agents could work as he does. This work is what God does when 
he acts in Jesus Christ. God's acting in Christ to complete this dynamic of formation 






Chapter 4. Hooker on the Effect of Christ 
 
While the last chapter showed the setting and the difficulty of human life, 
this chapter shows the way in which the solution begins to be worked out in Jesus 
of Nazareth. The formative touch of God in Christ begins to make a difference and 
specifically Christian learning becomes possible as the pragmatic evaluation of 
inherited traditions and personal desires under the specific influence of Christ's life. 
It is a doctrine of justification worked out along the lines given at the end 
of the last chapter, a historical imputation of Christ's life as the productive cause of 
an evolving inherent righteousness, that sets up Hooker's larger vision of the sequel 
of the incarnation in the church. A key textual source in the sermons on justification 
precipitating the Lawes was Paul's letter to the Galatians, especially the argument 
that Christian believers are set free from the requirement of an external law in 
matters pertaining to salvation. Hooker sums up his point with a composite 
quotation from chapter four  
'seeing yee knowe god, or rather are knowne of god, howe turn you againe to 
ympotente rudymentes? The lawe ingendreth servauntes, her children are in 
bondage, they which are begotten by the gospell are free. Bretheren, we are not 
children of the servaunte, but of the free woman, and will yee yett be under the 
lawe?' (Justification 26 V.144.14-19)193  
 
Because believers are known by God they have been set free from the impotent 
rudiments of arbitrary laws.  The vertical relationship with God enables horizontal 
                                                            
193. At this point Hooker is making his case for the possibility of Roman Catholic believers 
being saved. To deny this, as his Puritan opponents do, is to give up on justification by faith, as 





relationships of a certain kind within the church. The order, as Deborah Shuger has 
shown, is important as union with God in Christ comes with the unity of the church:  
'[c]ompassion, fellowship and mutual love seem possible only when relations 
among persons are mediated by a 'ghostly fellowship with God and Christ and 
Saincts' (VIII.IV.6) [and so Hooker] consistently politicizes and demystifies 
horizontal relationship.’194  
 
 At the moment of determination before God, popular and elite piety elide into 
each other through their common source in Jesus Christ.195 Within the church the 
popular beliefs of members do not stand apart from those of the elite, well trained 
theologian. Hooker will not allow theoretical problems to get in the way of 
conformation to Christ:  
'let curious and sharp witted men beat theire heades about what questions them 
selves will, the verie letter of the worde of Christ giveth plaine securitie that 
these mysteries doe as nailes fasten us to his verie crosse...with touching it 
sanctifieth, it enlighteneth with beliefe, it trulie conformeth us unto the image 
of Jesus Christ. (Lawes V.67.12 II.343.5-21)  
 
The priority of God, Christ's vertical action, makes possible the community of 
piety, but this community does not solidify into a fixed horizontal set of 
relationships. Christ's vertical action takes place in the soul through the material 
and historical mediation of Word and sacrament from which it proceeds to effect 
the corporeal and the mental. Historical contact with Christ makes a difference.  
The nature of the church, what it does, follows from its grounding in 
Christ's act. The formative work of Christ occurs  
'because [Christ] is in us as a movinge and workinge cause, from which manie 
blessed effects are reallie found to ensue, and that in sundrie both kindes and 
degrees all tendinge to eternall happiness. (Lawes V.56.10 II.242.8-11)  
 
Christ is a cause at work in the Christian life leading to the final end of eternal 
happiness. The communion of God with humanity in Christ is practical and 
                                                            
194. Debora Shuger "Societie Supernaturall" in Richard Hooker and the Construction of 
Christian Community pp. 322-323. 




transformative of human beings. God's work, as a work on humanity, in Christ is a 
historical one: 
'It is too cold an interpretation, whereby some men expounde our beinge in 
Christ to importe nothinge els, but onlie that the selfe same nature, which maketh 
us to be men, is in him, and maketh him man as wee are. For what man in the world 
is there which hath not so farre forth communion with Jesus Christ? It is not this 
that can sustaine the waight of such sentenses as speake the mysterie of our 
coherence with Jesus Christ.... And his Church he frameth out the verie flesh, the 
verie wounded and bleedinge side of the Sonne of man...So that in him even 
accordinge to his manhood wee accordinge to our heavinlie beinge are as branches 
in that roote out of  which they growe.' (Lawes V.56.7 II.239.13-31) 
 Coherence with Christ follows from the humanity of Christ re-constituting the 
habitual centre of human life in a human and divine act. I will now turn to Hooker's 
account of how God is in Christ as a cause or force leading human agents to 




For Hooker, the importance of the incarnation, like the Creator's presence 
to creation more generally, does not make it an obvious matter and the manner of 
its working continues to test human understanding. The divine mystery of the 
incarnation is 'more true than plaine.' (Lawes V.52.1 II.211.29-30) Hooker's 
primary interest is the fact of the incarnation—its Christological problems—as the 
base and guide of religious practice rather than any speculative or detached account 
of the incarnation.196 Hooker's Christological treatise, in fact, serves to introduce 
Hooker's discussion of Christ's presence in the eucharist and in the church:  
'Sacraments are the powerfull instrumentes of God to eternall life. For as our 
naturall life consisteth in the union of the bodie with the soule; so our life 
                                                            
196. 'Mais ce qui l'intéresse, c'est davantage le problème christologique: l'incarnation dans la 
personne même du Christ, puis l'incarnation du Christ poursuivie dans son Eglise. Et quand il 
traite des personnes, ce qui le retient, c'est moins leur distinction dans l'unité d'une même 
substance, ou les propriétés de chacune, que leur participation réciproque. Bref la divinisation de 
notre nature, notre filiation, notre inclusion à Dieu par le Christ, tel est le point qu'il veut traiter 




supernaturall in the union of the soule with God. And for as much as there is no 
union of God with man without that meane between both which is both, it 
seemeth requisite that we first consider how God is in Christ, then how Christ 
is in us, and how the sacramentes do serve to make us pertakers of Christ.' 
(Lawes V.50.3 II.208.19-209.1)  
 
God is in Christ in a unique way so that Christ can, in turn, be in the church in a 
certain way through its celebration of the sacraments. The sacraments are an 
experiential base for this Christology and the historical site of the experience of the 
transmission of grace. 
Hooker sets up his Christology in a general way:  
‘there are but fower things which concurre to make compleate the whole state 
of our Lord Jesus Christ: his deitie, his manhood, the conjunction of both, and 
the distinction of the one from the other being joyned in one.' (Lawes V.54.10 
II.226.23-26)  
 
Beyond these rough contours, Hooker does not give an exhaustive account of the 
incarnation. Rather, the Lawes set up the boundaries within which a responsible 
Christology will operate through an examination of what the incarnation 
accomplishes.197 The incarnation, for Hooker, has a point, a goal. Working 
according to the law of his being—the first eternal law—God acts in the incarnation 
voluntarily with a purpose in light of the context given in the world, i.e. non-
                                                            
197. Compare the historical summary from Lawes V.52.1-4 II.211-216 with the final paragraph 
of his Justification sermon: 'Now to you, beloved, which have heard these thinges, I will use no 
other wordes of admonition, then those which are offred me by St James: My brethren, have not 
the faithe of our glorious Lord Jhesus Christe in repsect of persons: Yea are not nowe to learne 
that as of it self yt is not hurtfull, so neither shoudl yt be to any man scandalous and offensive in 
doubtfull cases to heare the different judgments of men, be yt that Caephas hath on 
interpretation, and Apollos hath an other: that Paule is of this mynde, and Barnabas of that. If 
this offend you, the faulte is yours. Carrye peaceable mynds, and ye may have comforte by this 
varietye. Nowe the God of peace give you peaceable myndes, and turne yt to your everlasting 
comforte.' (Justification 40 V.169.10-20) The summary shows that Hooker envisions the 
ecumenical councils as expressing agreement 'throughout the world' (Lawes V.52.2 II.212.23-
24) while still being able to chart the drift from Cyril's orthodox position to that of Eutyches. An 
orthodox description of Christ could lead to a heretical position when pressed or interpreted in a 
certain way: 'For as Nestorius teaching rightlie that God and man are distinct natures, did 
thereupon misinferre that in Christ those natures can by no conjunction make one person; so 
Eutyches, of sound beliefe as touching theire true personall copulation, became unsound by 
denyinge the difference which still continueth betwene the one and the other Nature. Wee must 
therefore keepe warilie a middle corse, shunninge both that distraction of persons wherein 
Nestorius went awrie, and also this later confusion of Natures which deceived Eutyches.' (Lawes 




arbitrarily. The goal of this 'incomprehensible mystery' is the salvation of humanity 
from sin, a task appropriate to the Creator, through humanity itself, convenient as 
the result is a righteous humanity, such that 'there is cause sufficient why divine 
nature should assume humane, that so God might be in Christ reconcilinge to him 
selfe the world.' (Lawes V.51.3 II.210.25-211.1) The taking on of human nature 
allows God to bring about human salvation and Christ's humanity is, in some sense, 
instrumental to that accomplishment.198 The burden of Hooker's treatise on the 
incarnation, which forms the centrepiece of most substantial book in the Lawes, 
will be to show how God exists in Jesus Christ and why the specifics of his life 
begin the propagation of a new law directing human life through this man, Jesus of 
Nazareth. He describes how the incarnation happens through a rehearsal of 
historical Christological controversies leading to the measured inexactness of 
Chalcedonian doctrine.199 He sets out why God became this man through an 
account of Christ's achievement of a perfect and communicable human 
righteousness. To see how and why the incarnation takes place according to 
Hooker, I will now turn to his understanding of Christ's person and work. 
 
A. The Person of Christ200 
 
 
                                                            
198. And as Christ tooke manhood that by it he might be capable of death whereunto hee 
humbled him selfe, so because manhood is the proper subject of compassion and feeling pittie, 
which maketh the sceptre of Christes regencie even in the kingdom of heaven amiable, he which 
without our nature could not on earth suffer for the synnes of the world, doth now also by 
meanes thereof both make intercession to God for synners and exercise dominion over all men 
with a true, a naturall, and a sensible touch of mercie Lawes V.51.3. II.211.15-23 
199. On Hooker's debts to Augustine, John of Damascus, Cyril of Alexandria, and Thomas 
Aquinas see David Neelands 'Christology and the Sacraments.' in A Companion to Richard 
Hooker ed. Torrance Kirby (Leiden: Brill, 2008) pp. 369-370. 
200. Hooker himself does not use this division explicitly. The division, however, allows for a 





The point of union between deity and manhood in the incarnation is the 
second person of the Trinity: the particular personal subsistence that takes on 
human nature in Jesus of Nazareth.201 Without denying the integrity of Christ's 
human nature, Hooker makes the divine person primary and determinative of 
human nature possessed by that person: ‘both divine and humane, [Christ has] no 
other personall subsistence then divine, because the Sonne of God took not to him 
selfe a mans person, but the nature only of a man.’ (Lawes V.52.3 II.214.25-27) To 
see how Hooker understands the divine person's possession of human nature, I will 
begin with the divine person and then move on to the way in which this person 
possesses the natures. 
i. The Second Person of the Trinity 
 
Two attributes of the first eternal law, God's being, require the second 
person of the Trinity to be the basis of Christ's humanity.  
First, God remains indissolubly One for Hooker. God 'very Oneness,' is a 
unique and singular unity of substance without composition. (Lawes I.2.2. I.59.20) 
The unity of substance, however, does not preclude the three divine persons from 
possessing the single divine substance in a manner peculiar, particular, and 
appropriate to their subsistence. A personal subsistence is a certain manner of being 
unique to itself that, nevertheless, is constituted through its relation to others who 
possess the same substance or essence. The person is the common substance plus 
whatever particular accidents constitute its individual characteristics.202 In God a 
divine person subsists in a way completely unlike the other persons of the Trinity 
                                                            
201. David Neelands summarises Hooker's Cyrilline Christology: 'Christ is divine; Christ has 
human nature.'p. 371. 
202. Hooker's stated source for this account of the Trinity is John of Damascus Orthodox Faith 




and this difference is an entirely different relation.203 The Father subsists as the 
origin, 'altogether of himself...of none;' the Son subsists as one from the Father; the 
Spirit subsists as  one from the Father and the Son. (Lawes V.LI.1) A personal 
subsistence, in the Trinity at least, is the way in which the entire substance of the 
Trinity, its singular unchanging essence, possesses certain characteristic properties 
constituted by the Trinitarian relations. 
 In this way. the description of a person 'as a substance plus accidents' holds 
as a description of the Trinitarian persons204: '[I]n everie person there is implyed 
both the substance of God which is one, and also that propertie which causeth the 
same person reallie and trulie to differ from the other two.' (Lawes V.51.1 
II.209.20-22) Like other substances, the divine substance of the One God does not 
exist independently of its instantiation in and possession by actual personal 
subsistences since substance is not a quasi-material something existing apart from 
particular persons.205 The Trinitarian persons, Father, Son and Spirit, are their 
relations: the difference of relation is their subsistence and the relation is the 
pesonal 'accident' possessing the substance. The Triune God is the single substance 
instantiated in the relations of these subsistences: it exists in no other way 
Second, In the incarnation God does not change into a person, but the 
second person of the Trinity takes up flesh; this divine person becomes a person in 
time.206 The personal subsistence of the Son is the divine substance ‘with this 
                                                            
203. ‘By the guift of eternall generation Christ hath receaved of the father one and in number 
self same substance which the father hath of himself unreceived from anie other. For everie 
beginninge is a father unto that which cometh of it; and every ofspringe is a Sonne unto that out 
of which it groweth... it followeth hereupon that whatsoever Christ hath common unto him with 
his heavenly father, the same of necessitie must be given him, but naturallie and eternallie 
given...’ Lawes V.54.2 II.220.29-221.9 
204. John of Damascus An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith III.6 in Saint John of 
Damascus: Writings trans. Frederic H. Chase, Jr. (New York: Fathers of the Church, 1958) p. 
279. 
205. John of Damascus Exact Exposition p. 279. 




propertie to be of the father’ and this divine person truly and actually possesses 
human nature in Jesus of Nazareth. (Lawes V.51.1 II.209.17) The second person 
can possess human nature in this way because its personal subsistence already has 
a certain character within the Godhead: the second person of the Trinity is a 
'receyver' who receives the gift of divinity from the Father. (Lawes V.54.1 
II.220.23)207 The Father gives the Son the gift of eternal generation establishing 
through that gift part of the eternal taxis of relationships within the Godhead. The 
gift communicates 'the selfe same substance which the father hath of him self 
unreceived from anie other.' (Lawes V.54.2 II.221.1-2) The Son, the Second 
Person, is 'God by beinge of God, light by issuinge out of light' as the divine 
substance plus the accident or personal characteristic of receptivity or dependence. 
(Lawes V.54.2 II.221.6-7)208    
Christ's earthly life is a repetition of the gift he eternally receives from the 
Father. Furthermore, the relationship of the second person to the Father and the 
Spirit cannot cease to exist or be altered in the incarnation without destroying the 
nature of God, who just is this set of relations.209 At the same time, the fact that the 
second person, whose nature it is to be given, comes into time as Jesus Christ will 
determine the shape of that earthly life by uniting the divine and human natures 
asymmetrically. 
ii. The Possession of Natures 
 
                                                            
207. Actually Christ is 'by three degrees a receyver' First, he is the Son of God; second, his 
human nature receives union with God; third, the nature has received graces through this union. 
Christ receives the gifts of generation, union, and unction. (Lawes V.54.1 II.220.23 ) 
208. Hooker here quotes Tertullian: ‘Pater tota substantia est, Filius vero derivatio totius et 
propagatio.’ Tertull. contra Prax. 
209. ‘Our God is one, or rather verie Onenesse, and meere unitie, having nothing but it selfe in 
it selfe, and not consisting (as all things do besides God) of many things. In which essentiall 




The conjunction of natures ‘is no abolishment of naturall properties 
apperteininge to either substance’ but simply the second person of the Trinity 
subsisting in human nature. (Lawes V.53.1 II.215.23-24) Jesus' human nature lacks 
a personal existence alongside of or in addition to the personal subsistence of the 
second person of the Trinity. Hooker makes it clear that the incarnation is not the 
union of two persons 'in amitie but of two natures humaine and divine conjoyned 
in one and the same person.' (Lawes V.52.2 II.213.6-8) The personal subsistence 
constituted in the divine according to the first eternal law is the person who exists 
in this human nature: 
 'The flesh and the conjunction of the flesh with God began both at one instant, his 
makinge and takinge to him selfe our flesh was but one act, so that in Christ there 
is no personall subsistence but one, and that from everlastinge. By  taking only 
the nature of man he still continueth one person, and changeth but the maner of his 
subsistinge, which was before in the meere glorie of the Son of God, and is now in 
the habit of our flesh.' (Lawes V.52.3 II.214.1-8)  
 
The divine and human natures exist together such that the human nature 
relies radically on the divine person of the Son; the union is asymmetrical.210 In 
Christ, the distinguishing characteristics constitutive of a personal subsistence—
the defining relations making a person who he or she is—are not those of a human 
person. The concrete context giving shape to a human life, the overlapping forces 
of causal laws in nature and society, do not constitute the person possessing the 
human nature in the case of Jesus of Nazareth. The asymmetry of the incarnation 
does not render the human nature assumed inconsequential. Instead, the humanity 
of Christ is part of the one person, the Son of God, who just is this person in 
                                                            
210. ‘Christ is a person both divine and humaine, howbeit not therefore two persons in one, 
neither both these in one sense, but a person divine, because he is personallie the Sonne of God, 
humane, because he hath reallie the nature of the children of men.’ Lawes V.52.3. II.214.27-31 




eternity. The Word really lives his life in human nature as the subject of birth, 
baptism, judgment, execution and resurrection211:  
'And as Christ tooke manhood that by it he might be capable of death whereunto 
hee humbled him selfe, so because manhood is the proper subject of compassion 
and feelinge pitie... he which without our nature could not on earth suffer for the 
synnes of the world, doth now also by meanes thereof both make intercession [and] 
exercise dominion over all men with a true, a naturall, and a sensible touch of 
mercie' (Lawes V.51.3 II.211.15-23)  
 
In other words, assuming that a person is 'a substance plus accidents,' the 
incarnation transposes the personal subsistence of the Son—the eternal accident 
characteristic of the Word—into the substance of human nature as the subject of 
birth, death, and resurrection.212  
 For this reason, Hooker does not take the incarnation to effect a new general 
divine immanence to creation. God remains an infinite substance necessarily 
present to all things.(Lawes V.55.4 II.228.30-229.2) The natures of deity and 
humanity are maintained such that the obscurity of the relationship between God 
and the world remains even after Christ's earthly life. The operations of human and 
divine nature are not fundamentally altered or changed in the incarnation: 
'whatsoever is naturall to deitie the same remayneth in Christ uncommunicated 
unto his manhood, and whatsoever naturall to manhood his deitie thereof is 
                                                            
211. For as much therefore as Christ hath no personall subsistence but one whereby wee 
acknowledge him to have bene eternallie the Sonne of God, wee must of necessitie applie to the 
person of the Sonne of God even that which is spoken of Christ accordinge to his humane 
nature. For example, according to the flesh he was borne of the Virgin Marie, baptised of John 
in the river Jordan, by Pilate adjudged to die, and executed by the Jewes. We cannot saie 
properly that the Virgin bore, or John did baptize, or Pilat condemn, or the Jewes crucifie the 
nature of man, because these all are personall attributes; his person is the subject which 
receaveth them, his nature that which maketh his person capable or apt to receive. Lawes 
V.52.3. II.214.8-19 
212. By subject Hooker does not mean something with a certain degree of psychological 
density. He uses subject, more or less, as a synonym for substance, what is 'under' the accidents 
of individuals. OED gives a definition of subject as 'The underlying substance or essence of a 
thing, as distinguished from its non-essential properties; an individual thing, as opposed to its 
properties. Freq. contrasted with accident' as possible instead of subject in terms of 'thinker', e.g. 
Cartesian. Thomas Wilson gives this metaphysical definition in 1590 and it shows up in the 




uncapable.' (Lawes V.53.1 II.216.27-29) As substances, God and humanity 
maintain their limits, but a new way of subsisting does enter into human life; a new 
agential law becomes possible. The communication of a new law, a new way of 
existing at one with God's will, is, after all, the point of the incarnation. The union 
is instrumental to that task. 
  
B. The Work of Christ 
 
The work of Christ is a complex operation not only dealing with sin, making 
satisfaction, but also communicating Christ's merit, working repentance, to bring 
about union with God in the believer. Christ accomplishes his 'bare and naked 
worke' of human salvation and provides for the 'conveyance of this emmynente 
blessing' to the redeemed preparing to leave 'the world, to be receyved into glory.' 
(Justification 32 V.152.16-22) As was shown at the end of the previous chapter, 
sin affects human agents in a misdirection of the will effected by an unsound desire 
and an ineffective social law. The human agent fails to make actual its sensual and 
intellectual perfection vitiating any chance of spiritual perfection. The incarnation 
should allow for the reworking of the voluntary human agent at the sensual and 
intellectual levels in such a way as to make spiritual perfection possible. To effect 
human salvation Christ must provide a new habitual centre of action and the means 
for its communication to a society of agents in time. The work of salvation can, 











'Satisfaction is a worcke which Justice requireth to be done for contentment 
of persons injuried.'213 (Lawes VI.5.2 III.53.24) The satisfaction of any wrong 
must, according to Hooker, be at least equal to the injury caused in the wrongdoing. 
Voluntary agents, however, have procured for themselves and infinite debt by 
choosing to sin against an eternal and infinite God. As voluntary agents, human 
beings have chosen, truly freely chosen as was shown above, to go against the will 
of God, and the acts of free wills merit 'rewards and punishments.' (Lawes I.9.1 
I.94.30) Given the situation created by human sin, human agents, dissenting from 
the second eternal law, are required to make infinite recompense to God or to 
endure an infinite punishment. Following Anselm quite closely, Hooker explicitly 
sets up the possibility of making satisfaction for the injury of sin through either 'an 
infinite recompense' or 'infinite punishment' but not both.214 The situation requires 
one or the other: either an atoning act of recompense to God or an infinite 
punishment by God. God's love and desire to save humanity required that God 
'ordeyned in our behalfe a mediator, to doe that which had beene for any other 
                                                            
213. Hooker's understanding here is clearly Anselmian. See Needlands 'Crime, Guilt, and the 
Punishment of Christ: Traveling another Way with Anselm of Canterbury and Richard Hooker' 
Anglican Theological Review vol. LXXXIII no. 2 (2006) pp. 197-213 and John MacIntyre Saint 
Anselm and his Critics: A Re-interpretation of the Cur Deus Homo (London: Oliver and Boyd, 
1954) p. 127. 
214. See Anselm Cur Deus Homo I.13 'It is a necessary consequence, therefore, that either the 
honour which has been taken away should be repaid, or punishment should follow.' Anselm of 




impossible.' (Lawes VI.5.2 III.54.5-6) The satisfaction, the perfect act of 
recompense, was made by Christ in his passion.215  
The sequence of obedience-death-life in Christ's work replicates within the 
created realm of the second eternal law the first eternal law of God's life.216 The 
pattern constitutive and indicative of the person—the Word, Jesus of Nazareth—
by existing in human nature repeats that pattern in the obedience of death and 
resurrection. The unique personality of the second person is his receptivity from 
and dependence on the first person, Christ's obedience to the Father. He is, 
therefore according to Hooker 'three degrees a receyver,' each degree repeating the 
pattern:  
'first, in that he is the Sonne of God; secondlie, in that his humaine nature hath 
had the honour of union with deitie bestowed upon it; thirdlie, in that by meanes 
thereof sundrie eminent graces have flowed as effectes from deitie in to that 
nature which is coupled with it.' (Lawes V.LIV.1 II.220.23-27)  
 
The asymmetrical relationship between the Father and the Son, wherein the second 
person receives the substance of deity from the first person, enables the repetition 
of properly asymmetrical relationship between Creator and creature to be achieved 
in Christ's human obedience.  
By allowing his personal subsistence to occur in human nature, the second 
person of the Trinity, Jesus of Nazareth, accomplishes a human act of satisfaction 
meriting the reward of eternal life. The complex interaction between the givenness 
of the Son in relation to the Father, the events of Christ's crucifixion and 
resurrection, and the Son's offering of humanity back to the Father come together 
in order to establish the righteousness of a life obedient to God and communicable 
                                                            
215. 'Wherefore all sinne is remitted in the only faith of Christs passion, and noe man without 
beleefe thereof justifyed. Faith alone maketh Christs satisfaction ours; howbeit that faith alone 
which after sinne maketh us by conversion his.' (Lawes VI.5.2 III.54.7-10) 
216. The phrase 'the sequence obedience-death-life' is from Edwyn Hoskyns The Fourth Gospel 




to human beings as a gift. The Son's relation to the Father finds its analogue in 
creatures dependence on a creator; the crucifixion and resurrection are a creature's 
perfect submission to God's will; Jesus' offering of his human nature to the Father 
in the place of sin clears the space for properly human life.217 Jesus lives a truly 
human life because he does so in line with the eternal law of God responsible for 
the way of the world, a law normally outside human reach but intrinsic to his 
person. Hooker does not turn away from the merit and reward structure of human 
action, but follows it through by having Christ act so as to receive the perfect 
reward due to his meritorious obedience: 'Wherefore taking to him selfe our flesh, 
and by his incarnation makinge it his own flesh, he had now of his owne although 
from us what to offer unto God for us.' ( Lawes V.51.3 II.211.13-15)  
Thus Christ's passion can make recompense as an act of perfect obedience. 
The second person of the Trinity humbled himself initially by taking flesh, he 
humbled himself even further 'and became accordinge to the flesh obedient so farre 
as to suffer death, even the death of the crosse, for all men, because such was his 
fathers will.'(Lawes V.55.8 II.232.24-26; see also Lawes V.51.3 II.210-211) The 
personal subsistence of the second person takes on human nature for the purpose 
of rendering God perfect obedience through choosing to follow the will of the 
Father to the point of his execution as a human being. The sufferings of the 
crucifixion, therefore, do not atone as suffering; they atone as an act of obedience. 
Christ is capable of this perfect obedience because of the receptive and, in some 
sense, subordinate character of his personal subsistence. Constituted in his 
relationship to the Father, whose will he receives even within the Godhead, the Son 
                                                            
217. '[God] is for Christs sake contented upon our submission to pardon our rebellion against 
him; and when that little which his law appointeth is faithfully executed, it pleaseth him in 




maintains the integrity of his subsistence in the nature of humanity effecting 
himself as a voluntary agent capable of this obedience.  
The incarnation creates the possibility in time of God's saving efficacy 
among voluntary agents as a voluntary agent. Just as creation comes to being 
through God's action according to God's eternal law, and this law is the cause of 
all things, so those called into the fellowship of God eternally are actually made to 
exist in God's love in the present. 
Wee are therefore in God through Christ eternallie accordinge to that intent and 
purpose whereby wee were chosen to be made his in this present world before the 
world its selfe was made, wee are in God through the knowledge which is had of 
us, and the love which is borne towards us from everlastinge.  (Lawes V.56.7 
II.238.18-23) 
 
 Christ creates redeemed humanity in time with the power of a divine person 
through the material of an embodied life.218 The obedience of the Son on the cross 
constitutes the knowledge God has of believers, how they sit in the first eternal 
law, as well as the effective actualisation of that knowledge as the directing force 
in their lives, how they act in act in accordance with the second eternal law. With 
the incarnation, the first eternal laws acts on and in the second eternal law to 
achieve the salvation, the predestination to life, of believers, 'infinitely ancienter 
than the actual work of creation,' as a voluntary act of God. (DF 2 IV.102.26-27) 
The act, like all free acts, is voluntary, for the purpose of salvation, and non-
arbitrary, appropriate to the context of sinful humanity, as an act done in 
accordance with the law of its possessor.219  In this way, the dynamic character of 
                                                            
218. Herbert McCabe gives a contemporary account of Christ's work very similar to Hooker's: 
'As I see it, we are saved because of the sanctity, the grace, of the man Jesus of Nazareth. I 
follow Thomas Aquinas in thinking that it is not precisely because Jesus is divine that we are 
saved but because he was a saint. It was because he was full of grace, a human being who was 
utterly obedient to the will of the Father, that he earned, merited, our redemption.' Herbert 
McCabe God Still Matters (London: Continuum, 2002) p. 62. 
219. The obedience of the second person to the first person of the Trinity is the appropriate 




God's engagement with creation in the incarnation retains the asymmetry of the 
Creator-creature relationship without annulling the specifics of the creaturely 
context of its accomplishment. Since this salvation will be the proper working of 
creatures it will be effective as the communication of a new law to voluntary 
agents.  
Thus, Christ's satisfaction becomes effective, leads to repentance, through 
its appropriation in faith by Christians as the law of a historical community. The 
'spirit of adoption' given in Christ's satisfaction on behalf of the believer, 'worketh 
faith' in the believer who apprehends 'the things which we believe...not only as true, 
but also good, and that to us.' (Justification 26 V.137.4-6) Through Christ's work 
the voluntary agent, as a still voluntary agent, can begin to desire and to act in 
accordance with the will of God; the agent follows a right law. Faith thus becomes 
central for the Christian who lives in Christ without the divine knowledge 
possessed by Christ: 'Faith alone maketh Christs satisfaction ours; howbeit that 
faith alone which after sinne, maketh us by conversion his.' (Lawes VI.5.2 III.54.8-





So, for Hooker, the formative work of Christ occurs  
'because [Christ] is in us as a movinge and workinge cause, from which manie 
blessed effects are reallie found to ensue, and that in sundrie both kindes and 
degrees all tendinge to eternall happiness.' (Lawes V.56.10 II.242.8-11)  
 
Christ is a cause at work in the Christian life leading to the final end of eternal 
happiness. The contingent nature of the life Christ lived on earth accounts for the 




man, causes the existence of the church in the world, redemption is similar as an 
act to creation but differs in range as an act within creation itself.  
'To all thinges he is life, and to men light as the Sonne of God; to the Church 
both life and light eternall by beinge made the Sonne of man for us, and by 
beinge in us a savior whether wee respect him as God or as man.' (Lawes V.56.7 
II.239.31-240.3)  
 
The society of the church is the place where the work of Christ effects salvation. 
Salvation, the human negotiation of creation in accordance with the first eternal 
law, centres on the merit of Jesus of Nazareth as its source. While Christ's work 
may be conceptualised in diverse ways, all of these descriptions will point back to 
what Jesus has accomplished.220  
The entrance of human beings into loving fellowship with God is not a 
hidden occurrence for Hooker but one that happens openly and visibly in the realm 
of human relations by means of human relations. The human community brought 
about through Christ's redemptive work in the world, the church, structures itself 
around the gospel announced in Christ's incarnation: it will follow the form of the 
human life radically dependent upon God lived out in crucifixion and 
resurrection.221  The new way of relating to God, as opposed to the previous sinful 
way of relating, follows the form of the previous process of human law creation 
with a new habitual centre in place. The communication of the new habitual centre 
is the justification of the believer through the imputation of Christ's righteousness. 
The necessary particulars of this justification were handled in the previous chapter 
so I will not treat them in depth here. Hooker's basic scheme is that: 'That 
                                                            
220. ‘Salvation only by Christe is the true foundacion whereupon indeed Christianitye 
standeth... There may be an additamente of explication, which overthroweth not, but proveth 
and concludeth the proposition whereunto it is annexed.’ Justification 29 V.149.20-27 
221. ‘His bodie crucified and his blood shed for the life of the world, are the true elementes of 





[righteousness] whereby here we are justefied is perfecte, but not inherente, that 
whereby we are sanctified, inherent, but not perfecte.' (Justification 3 V.109.9-11) 
Christ is, of course, the source of this perfect righteousness that continues to effect 
an inherent, but imperfect, righteousness in its recipient.  
 Justification or imputation does not occur in an ineffective communication 
of information but in the actual, historical, and material work of a life lived in a 
lawful human society. As has been previously shown, a key textual motif for 
Hooker at this point is the letter to the Galatians, especially the argument that 
Christian believers are set free from the imposition of an arbitrary law as necessary 
for salvation in light of the creative and causative indwelling of Christ. Per Deborah 
Shuger, the vertical relationship with God comes with certain horizontal 
relationships within the church: ‘in the Lawes, ritual acts do not 'declare' (i.e., 
signify) gemeinschaft but create it...As in...Holy Communion, egalitarian 
community forms at the sites of transcendence.’222 At the moment of determination 
by Christ popular and elite piety elide into each other through their common source 
in Jesus Christ.223 Whereas contact with God in creation had led to sinful society—
an unloving community formed at this site of transcendence—through the distorted 
advance of human living from the sensual appetite through misguided to a 
malformed will, now a new habitual centre begins to properly move from sense 
through reason to the will in righteous acts. 
Union with Christ involves the humanity of Christ constraining the shape 
of the Christian life. Hooker's explanation of how Christ can be a moving and 
working cause in the individual does not initially make use of either material or 
mental causality, but begins its work in the soul. The cause, Christ, is in the 
                                                            
222. Debora Shuger "Societie Supernaturall pp.322-323. 




Christian 'not carnally nor corporally inhabitinge, but dwelling in the soule of man 
as a thinge.' (Justification 26 V.137.27-29) Hooker names this process, this ritual 
creation of ghostly fellowship, in his accounts of the sacraments, baptism and 
eucharist, and the reading of Scripture. 
 I will now turn to those accounts to show the recalibration of sensual 
appetite in the sacraments and reason in the reading of Scripture. 
  
II. Ecclesial Life 
 
Hooker's description of the working out of human salvation through the 
work of Christ makes use of a basic interpretive principle given in book three of 
the Lawes in reference to Scriptural interpretation: 'the same Apostle [Paul] 
teacheth, namely, that nature hath need of grace, whereunto I hope we are not 
opposite, by holding that grace hath use of nature.' (Lawes III.8.6 I.223.27-29) 
Citing 1 Corinthians 2.14, Hooker reverses the fact that in order to know certain 
things in a saving way human agents must receive God's grace in order to say that 
grace, as a gift to human agents, works according to the ways of its recipient, 
naturally. Parallel to the continued distinction of natures in the person of Christ, 
the salvation of human beings does not do away with their humanity, but, instead, 
completes their humanity without doing violence to the particularities of the law of 
their being. Human beings, in the course of their communal life, naturally desire 
union with God:  
'[We are] happie therfore when fully we injoy God, as an object wherein the 
powers of our soules are satisfied even with everlasting delight; so that although 
we be men, yet by being unto God united we live as it were the life of God.' 





All human beings, possessing this desire for enjoyment of and union with God, are, 
as human beings, capable of potentially experiencing this union, 'as it were'.224 
Justification, imputation, and sanctification, therefore, affect the human agent at all 
three levels of his or her life (appetite, reason, and will) to bring about this 
salvation.225 The new community of the church begins to reverse the misfiring of 
these aspects of human life in order to bring about voluntary agents capable of good 
actions. It works, more or less, as other communities do by forming agents in light 





The sacraments are not, for Hooker,  
'bare resemblances or memorialls of thinges absent' or 'naked signes and 
testimonies' of previous grace, but 'meanes effectual' for the actual deliverance 
of grace, 'which grace the sacramentes represent or signifie.' (Lawes V.57.5 
II.247.17-20)226  
 
                                                            
224. 'Now if men had not naturally this desire to be happie, how were it possible that all men 
shoulde have it? All men have. Therefore this desire in man is naturall. It is not in our power not 
to do the same; how should it then be in our power to doe it coldly or remisly? So that our desire 
being naturall is also in that degree of earnestnes whereunto nothing can be added. And is it 
probable that God should frame the hartes of all men so desirous of that which no man may 
obtaine? It is an axiome of nature that naturall desire cannot utterly be frustrate.' (Lawes I.11.4 
I.114.8-17) 
225. Complete union with him must be according unto every power and facultie of our minds 
apt to receave so glorious an object. Capable we are of God both by understanding and will: by 
understanding, as hee is that soveraigne truth which comprehendeth the rich treasures of all 
wisdom; by will, as He is that sea of goodnes whereof whoso tasteth shall thirst no more. As the 
will doth now worke upon that object by desire, which is as it were a motion towards the end as 
yet unobtained; so likewise upon the same hereafter received it shall work also by love. 
Appetitus inhiantis fit amor fruentis, saith St. Augustine. The longing disposition of them that 
thirst is changed into the sweete affection of them that tast and are replenished. (Lawes I.XI.3 
I.113.9-17) 
226. Loyer describes Hooker's position: 'Selon l'augustinisme, le signe et la chose, sacramentum 
et res, sont à la fois liés et distincts. Le sacrement est donc le signe d'une réalité présente, non le 




As shown above, the human will comes to be through the interaction of the sensible 
appetite and the use of reason or discourse. Although the brevity and occasional 
obscurity of Hooker's writing on these sacraments leaves much to be desired, it is 
possible to see in his treatment of baptism and eucharist an account of human 
transformation through sensible goodness and human discourse.227  They both give 
an object of desire to the human appetite, Jesus Christ, as well as provide those 
conceipts, framing categories, necessary for a right approach to that object by 
means of the practices of those rituals. Before looking at the specific aspects of 
these sacraments, I will now look at how Christ is present in them and their 
historical source in him.228 
Although something new has been made possible through the incarnate 
work of Jesus, Hooker does not view this change as an alteration of the eternal-
temporal and infinite-finite structure of the relationship between God and creation. 
The division of natures in the earthly incarnation, despite their occasional 
cooperation, is maintained even when Christ is ascended, and salvation does not 
represent the overcoming of this division.229 Everything can be divided, according 
to Hooker, ‘into finite and infinite, that no one substance, nature, or qualitie, can 
be possiblie capable of both.' (Lawes V.55.2 II.227.33-228.2) All created things are 
limited, 'stinted', and this limitation of their substance 'is both the perfection and 
also the preservation thereof.' (Lawes V.55.2 II.228.3-7) This 'measure' gives 
                                                            
227. On the problems stemming from the brevity of Hooker's treatments of the sacraments see 
Miller p. 140. 
228. Hooker himself treats the question of Christ's presence as a necessary prelude to an 
accurate account of the sacraments. 'wee are briefly to consider how Christ is present, to the 
ende it may thereby better appeare howe wee are made partakers of Christ both otherwise and in 
the sacramentes themselves. (Lawes  V.55.1. II.227.30-33) 
229. Lett us therefore sett it down for a rule or principle so necessarie as nothinge more to the 
plaine decidinge of all doubtes and questions about the union of natures in Christ, that of both 
natures there is a cooperation often, an association always, but never any mutual participation, 




character and shape to created things, allows them to be this or that for this or that 
purpose, without in anyway being an imperfection, something to be overcome in 
salvation. The substance of God, however, is infinite. According to his nature, God 
is present  
'because his substance is immateriall, pure, and of us in this world so 
incomprehensible, that albeit no parte of us be ever absent from him who is 
present whole unto everie particular thing, yeat his presence with us wee no way 
discerne farther than only that God is present...' (Lawes V.55.3 II.228.25-29)  
 
God is uniquely and immaterially present to all things as infinite and uncreated. 
Sacramental presence, 'the sequele of an infinite and incomprehensible substance,' 
(Lawes V.55.4 II.228.31-229.1) comes about as a natural property of Christ's deity 
rather than an expansion of his human nature, which would in the process undo the 
'measure' of that nature. Those attributes basic to his human nature, his soul and 
his body, cannot be and are not universally present.  
'Wherefore Christ is essentiallie present with all thinges, in that he is verie God, 
but not present with all thinges as man, because manhood and the partes thereof 
can neither be the cause nor the true subject of such presence.' (Lawes V.55.4 
II.229.20-23)230  
 
Nevertheless, Christ is present personally. The person of Christ, existing in two 
complete natures, God and creature, is present to all things in his divine nature, that 
is nevertheless always united to his human nature. This presence of the human 
nature united to the divine nature in the person is 'preasence by waie of conjunction 
[and] is in some sorte presence.' (Lawes V.55.7 II.232.7-8) Personal presence of 
                                                            
230. See also: 'The substance of the bodie of Christ hath no presence, neither can have, but onlie 
locall. It was not therefore everie where seene, nor did it everie where suffer death, everie where 
it could not be intombed, it is not everie where now beinge exalted into heaven. There is no 
proofe in the world stronge enough to inforce that Christ had a true bodie but by the true and 
naturall properties of his body. Amongst which properties, definite or locall presence is chief.’ 
(Lawes V.55.6 II.230.29-231.1) That which excludeth him therefore as man from so greate 
largenes of presence, is only his beinge man, a creature of this particular kinde, whereunto the 
God of nature hath sett those boundes of restraint and limitation, beyonde which to attribute 
unto it anie thing more then a creature of that sorte can admit, were to give it another nature, to 




this kind allows Christ, without transgressing the limits of a human body, to convey 
the obedience made available to him personally in his incarnation to others:  
'there is no stint which can be sett to the value or merite of the sacrificed bodie of 
Christ, it hath no measured certaintie of limites, bounds of efficacie unto life it 
knoweth none, but is also it selfe infinite in possibilitie of application.' (Lawes 
V.55.9 II.234.17-20)231  
 
Making use of his Anselmian account of atonement, Hooker makes the infinite 
merit of Christ's human obedience what he communicates through his infinite 
divine presence. Whereas before God's presence failed to effect its cause, salvation, 
now, through this humanly achieved obedience, the causal relationship can lead to 
salvation. This presence in the sacraments mirrors the earlier divine presence 
leading to human appetite and desire. 
At the same time, the framing categories or conceits constituting the 
Christian community come from Jesus of Nazareth. Sacraments, generally, are 'a 
perpetuall dutie in religion,' and a Christian sacrament one that is 'proper to 
Christian Religion.' (DF 14 IV.115.13-14) The general religious practice of 
sacraments—keeping in mind that only Christian sacraments are true sacraments—
is made an inherent part of Christian piety because 'Christ be the author thereof.' 
(DF 14 IV.115.15) Jesus Christ institutes the sacraments of baptism and eucharist 
for the specific purpose of bringing about grace in the receiver of those sacraments 
according to divine promise. His institution of these particular sacraments is in 
accordance with the earlier institution of Jewish religious rites for specific purposes 
that have now passed away.232 They were given at various times and in various 
                                                            
231. 'Par voie d'efficacité: il n'y a point de limite aux mérites du corps sacrifié du Christ.' Olivier 
Loyer L'Anglicanisme 484. 
232. See the discussion of the mutability of divinely established laws at Lawes III.10.1-3 I.239-
242, especially 'Whether God bee the author of lawes by authorizing that power of men whereby 
they are made, or by delivering them made immediately from him selfe, by word onely, or in 
writing also, or howsoever; notwithstanding the authoritie of their maker, the mutabilitie of that 




forms in order to make Israel holy within the specific situation it found itself in. 
The sacraments were given in a specific context in order to accomplish a specific 
purpose and so exhibit the voluntary and non-arbitrary character of a law. They are 
given by Christ as 'the powerfull instrumentes of God to eternall life' for use 'only 
in this life.' (Lawes V.50.3 II.208.17-20)233 The source of this eternal life being, of 
course, 'the death of our Saviour Christ, to us the fountaine of all grace.' (DF 14 
V.115.19-20) They work appropriately, non-arbitrarily, when they effectively 
communicate this death.  
'Grace intended by sacramentes was a cause of the choice, and is a reason of the 
fitnes of the [outward] elements them selves... it was of necessitie that wordes of 
expresse declaration taken from the verie mouth of our Lord him selfe should be 
added unto visible elementes, that the one might infalliblie teach what the other 
doe most assuredlie bring to passe.' (Lawes V.58.1 II.248.23-31)  
Christ is responsible, then, for the three elements making up the Christian 
sacraments: the grace given in it, the appropriate material element of the sacrament, 
and the conceit expressing the work of the sacrament.234 Christian sacraments, 
when properly celebrated, affect, therefore, the habitual centre of a voluntary agent 
through grace, the sensual appetite of the agent through material elements, and the 
reason of the agent through discourse. The celebration of the sacraments allows the 
voluntary agent following Christ to execute an act of judgment as whole person 
according to the first eternal law manifested in Christ's life. The execution of this 
law, as a law, will continue to be voluntary and non-arbitrary as various Christians 
approximate it by repeating it.  
 
                                                            
233. See also: Sacramentes serve as... morall instrumentes, the use whereof is in our handes, the 
effect in [God's]; for the use wee have his express commandment, for the effect his conditionall 
promisee: so that without our obedience to the one, there is of the other no apparent assurance, 
as contrariwise where the signes and sacramentes of his grace are not either through contempt 
unreceyved, or receyved with contempt, wee are not to doubt but that they reallie give what they 
promise, and are what they signifie. Lawes V.57.5 II.247.8-16 






As an act of the human society of the church, baptism is the moment when 
those chosen by God in eternity come to have God in them as a directing force.235 
The previously established causal relationship between the first eternal law, the law 
of God's own being, and the second eternal law, the law of creation, changes such 
that the voluntary agent begins to act in accord with the first eternal law. The 
potential relationship between God and creation becomes actual in baptism as an 
entrance into a particular community:  
'Predestination bringeth not to life, without the grace of externall vocation, wherein 
our baptisme is implied. For as wee are not naturallie men without birth, so neither 
are wee Christian men in the ey of the Church of God but by new birth, nor 
accordinge to the manifest ordinarie course of divine dispensation new borne, but 
by  that baptisme which both declareth and maketh us Christians.' (Lawes V.60.3 
II.256.16-22)236  
 
This actualisation of eternal predestination is not, for Hooker, a virtual 
pronouncement but a real change in the recipient of the sacrament.  
Baptism effects a real change in its recipient according to two paradigms 
already established in Hooker's thought.  
First, the justification paradigm of imputed perfect righteousness leading to 
actual imperfect righteousness: ''That [righteousness] whereby here we are 
justefied is perfecte, but not inherente, that whereby we are sanctified, inherent, but 
not perfecte.' (Justification 3 V.109.9-11) Baptism does not work instantaneously 
on the Christian believer, but, instead is the 'inchoation of those graces' in one who 
is a 'first beginner.' (Lawes V.57.6 II.248.2-5) The inchoate grace given in baptism, 
                                                            
235. Lawes V.55.7 II.231-232 
236. See also Wee are therefore in God through Christ eternallie accordinge to that intent and 
purpose whereby wee were chosen to be made his in this present world before the world its elfe 
was made, wee are in God through the knowledge which is had of us, and the love which is 




like the sensitive appetite, passes into the reason as a formative factor in the 
development of the habitual tendencies of the voluntary agent. Whereas before sin 
had influenced the appetite, now sin has been washed away allowing the agent to 
act in a way appropriate to his or her intentions and context through an imputation 
of the righteousness achieved by Christ.237 The sort of obedience Christ was 
capable of throughout his life becomes possible to a degree for the Christian under 
the influence of this imputed righteousness. Under the influence of sin, as shown 
in the previous chapter, human agents can choose to act against their own intentions 
and understanding to choose a lesser good when sensible goodness compels the 
appetite to override reason in a domination of the will. Christ's obedience to the 
will of God as the endurance pain, suffering, and death in order to bring about the 
salvation of the world reverses this compulsion. Christ's voluntary intention to save 
the world took the appropriate form of an obedient death instrumental to God's own 
intention.238 Christ was able to override his normal, and actually felt, desire to 
continue in his bodily life, which Hooker names as one of the most basic human 
attributes, in order to accomplish the will of God.239 The gift of unction to the 
receptive human nature of Christ elevated his knowledge to an awareness of the 
divine plan, 'though not with infinite knowledg peculiar to deitie it selfe', instilling 
his reason with the fortitude to maintain his will to the point of death. (Lawes 
                                                            
237. '[B]aptisme is a sacrament which God hath instituted in his Church, to the ende that they 
which receave the same might thereby be incorporated into Christ, and so through his most 
pretious merit obteine as well that savinge grace of imputation which taketh away all former 
guiltines, as also that infused divine vertue of the holie Ghost, which giveth to the powers of the 
soule their first disposition towards future newnes of life.Lawes V.60.2 II.255.6-11 
238. The death of Christ in it selfe therefore God willeth not, which yeat to the ende we might 
thereby obteine life he both alloweth and appointeth. In like manner the Sonne of man indureth 
willinglie to that purpose those grevous paines, which simplie not to have shunned had bene 
against nature, and by consequent against God. V.48.10 II.198.17-22 
239. Whereas therefore wee finde in God a will resolved that Christ shall suffer; and in the 
humane will of Christ two actuall desires, the one avoyding, and the other acceptinge death; is 
that desire which first declareth it selfe by prayer against that wherewith he concludeth prayer, 





V.54.7 II.225.12) Baptism replicates this process by imputing not simply the 
righteousness but the 'infused divine vertue of the holie Ghost, which giveth to the 
powers of the soule theire first disposition towardes future newnes of life. (Lawes 
V.60.2 II.255.11-13) The asymmetrical dependence of the creature on the creator 
becomes obedience through the 'necessary inward cause' of the Spirit.' (Lawes 
V.LIX.3) 
Second, God works human salvation out through regular human means: 
'grace hath use of nature.' (Lawes III.8.6 I.223.29) As an action commanded by 
God in Christ, the baptising of believers is itself a moral act done in obedience to 
God's will. Obedience to God's will is a basic characteristic of the church as the 
human society formed according to the person and work of Christ, who is receptive 
obedience. The obedience to Christ's command to baptise, then, is the properly 
ecclesiastical, i.e. in accordance with established ecclesial laws, element of the 
sacrament. Adhering to these two outward elements of the sacrament in the act of 
baptising necessarily leads to the third most important element of sacrament: its 
mystical character.240  
'[The] secret reference which this action hath to life and remission of synnes by 
vertue of Christes own compact solemnely made with his Church, to accomplish 
fullie the sacrament of baptism, there is not any thinge more required.' (Lawes 
V.62.15 II.281.25-28)  
 
Baptism, then, accords with the human intention of Christ in instituting the 
sacrament as well as the society, the church, that continues to follow this intention 
in various places. By learning the wisdom of the community, the baptised are 
schooled in the wisdom of the society and rely on it for its conceipts. Voluntary 
agents become Christian agents by learning to respond to sensual stimuli through 
                                                            




the medium of the church's discourse so as to act in agreement with the same canon 




The inchoate graces of baptism come to fruition in the eucharist.241 Hooker 
assumes that all Christians will understand the eucharist as a 'reall participation of 
Christ,' the person of Christ communicating in this participation  
'his holie spirit to sanctifie them as it sanctifieth him,' the force and virtue of the 
eucharist to be derivative of 'sacrificed bodie and blood,' and 'the effect thereof... 
is a real transmutation of our soules and boodies from sinne to righteousnes.' 
(Lawes V.67.7 II.335.33-336.8)  
 
A real participation in Christ's sacrificed body and blood communicates his 
obedient life enabling the Holy Spirit to work in the recipient, as in Christ, an 
obedience to God. While Hooker clearly had the tools to develop a larger 
metaphysical or cosmological account of the mechanism whereby Christ is present 
in the eucharist, he, instead, places it in the human life as something that can be 
known by its effects. Knowledge from effects is not necessarily as full as 
knowledge of causes but does give an acquaintance of a sort with the cause.  
Christ's active presence in the eucharist, unlike the presence in baptism, 
involves the use by the voluntary agent of the church's conceits, its framing 
discourse, to bring about this real change in the receiver.242 The bread and cup of 
the eucharist are 'causes instrumentall' for the participation of the receptive believer 
                                                            
241. Wee receive Christ Jesus in baptisme once as the first beginner, in the eucharist often as 
being by continewall degrees the finisher of our life. Lawes V.57.6. II.248.4-6 
242. Hooker's receptionist eucharistic theology does not deny the real presence of Christ in the 
elements. It is, however, agnostic about the overarching theory for this presence. On this point 
see: W.R. Crockett Eucharist: Symbol of Transformation, (New York: Pueblo, 1989) p. 190, 
H.R. Mcadoo and Kenneth Stevenson What Happens at Holy Communion?  The Mystery of the 




in Christ's body and blood. (Lawes V.67.5 II.334.18) The acknowledgement of the 
causal presence of Christ's body and blood in the bread and cup by the believer 
comes about through a degree of moral renovation. While faith is 'an intellectuall 
habit of the minde, and [has] hir seate in the understandinge,' an evil orientation, 
'the streame of corrupt affection,' can prevent the mind from seeing what God 
reveals to the believer. (Lawes V.63.2 II.291.20-27) Proper reception of the 
eucharist requires this alteration in affection and a change in understanding. This 
change is not the acquisition of a large speculative apparatus but the presence of 
something eliciting motion and delight in the receiver.243 In a mirror image of the 
way in which original sin was transmitted through corrupt discourse of worldly 
societies, the discourse of the church in the intensity of its ritual communicates 
something capable of eliciting an affective response that dominates the 
understanding: '[t]he minde therefore feelinge present joy is allwaies mervelous 
unwillinge to admitt anie other cogitation.' (Lawes V.67.3 II.332.23-24) The 
eucharistic ritual of the church requires this interpretive activity for its reception in 
imitation of the initial interpretive activity of Christ who instituted the sacrament. 
In the place of the Passover ritual, Christ consecrates the bread and wine for the 
purpose of communicating his coming sacrifice to subsequent generations of 
Christian believers. The disciples, although they  
'understood not perfectlie to what effect or issue the same would come,' 
knowing, without possessing a clear knowledge of why, that the body and blood 
of Christ lead to eternal life, received the bread and wine as his body and blood 
by his command and promise. (Lawes V.67.4 II.333.19-20)  
 
                                                            
243. Curious and intricate speculations doe hinder, they abate, they quench such inflamed 
motions of delight and joy as divine graces use to raise when extraordinarily they are present. 
The minde therefore feelinge present joy is allwaies mervellous unwillinge to admitt anie other 
cogitation, and in that case casteth off those disputes whereunto the intellectual parte at other 




Christ interprets and reframes bread and wine as his body and in so doing 
constitutes a definitive conceipt for the church going forward. Those who apply 
these conceipts to the bread and wine for the same purpose of conveying 
participation in Christ's body and blood, 'doinge what was required and beleivinge 
what was promised,' are affected by the same effect as the disciples. (Lawes V.67.4 
II.334.2-3)244     
The effect of the eucharist is clear: 'soules and boodies quickned to eternall 
life are effectes the cause whereof is the person of Christ, his bodie and his bloode 
are the true wellspringe out of which this life floweth.' (Lawes V.67.5 II.334.22-
25) Causal influence of the soul in the eucharist is similar to Hooker's explanation 
of causality in justification. God can be an inward working cause in the individual 
without making use of either material or mental causality, but working in the soul. 
The soul can be the site of this change in the human person as what organises the 
body and gives 'substance quantitie and shape' to its members. (Lawes V.58.1 
II.248.20) The cause, Christ, is in the Christian 'not carnally or corporally 
inhabiting, but dwelling in the soul of man.' By dwelling in and working on the 
soul, Christ reshapes the whole person as a voluntary agent in his or her appetite, 
reason, and will. Even when the saving truth does come into the believer's mental 
awareness, God must be acting to make it effective:  
'As the lighte of nature doth cawse the mind to apprehend those truthes which 
are meerely reationall so that saving truth which is far above the reache of 
humayne reason cannott otherwise then by the spirite of the almighty be 
conceyved.' (Justification 26 V.137.31-138.4) 
 
                                                            
244. Our imitation of him consisteth not in tyinge scrupulouslie ourselves unto his syllables, but 
rather in speakinge by the heavenlie direction of that inspired divine wisdom which teacheth 
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The soul, then, rather than the understanding as such, is the point of contact 
where the crucified Christ becomes present to the believer. When Hooker refers 
repeatedly to the body and blood of Christ, he is invoking a general presence of 
Jesus' body to the believer, but specifically the body of Christ as the obedient 
sacrifice: the meritorious man now indwelling the believer, 'a kind of 
transubstantiation in us.' (Lawes V.67.11 II.339.7-8) The virtue and efficacy of the 
sacrament depends on whatsoever grace 'there is in his sacrificed bodie and blood.' 
(Lawes V.67.7 II.336.5-6) The interpretive conceipt framing the eucharist is the 
sacrificed body and blood of Jesus on the cross, not any speculative or 
philosophical theory of presence, such that when applied to the bread and cup these 
conceipts, unlike those framed by sinful societies, allow for the crucified Christ to 
be present as a forceful and dominating object of delight, like those physical 
pleasures capable of short-circuiting reason in voluntary agents, restoring 
voluntary agents to their place in the interaction of the eternal laws. The use of 
these conceipts begins with the simplicity of faith rather than the travails of the 
understanding that can make warm affection run cold. Hooker himself sums up his 
position at the end of his treatise on the eucharist:  
Let it therefore be sufficient for me presenting my selfe at the Lordes table to know 
what there I receive from him, without searchinge or inquiringe of the maner of 
how Christ performeth his promise; let disputes and questions, enimies to pietie, 
abatementes of true devotion and hitherto in this cause but over patientlie heard, 
let them take theire rest; let curious and sharp witted men beat theire heades about 
what questions them selves will, the verie letter of the worde of Christ giveth plaine 
securitie that these mysteries doe as nailes fasten us to his verie cross, that by them 
wee draw out, as touching efficacie force and vertue, even the blood of his goared 
side, in the woundes of our redemer wee there dip our tongues, wee are died redd 
both within and without, our hunger is satisfied and our thirst for ever quenched, 
they are thinges wonderfull which he feeleth, greate which hee seeth and unhard of 
which he utterethwhose soule is possest of this pascall lamb and made joyfull in 
the strength of this new eine, this bread hath in it more then the substance which 
our eyes behold, this cup hallowed with sollemne benediction availeth to the endles 
life and wellfare both of our soule and bodie, in that it serveth as well for a medicine 




touching it sanctifieth, it enlighneth with beliefe, it trulie conformeth us unto the 
image of Jesus Christ; what these elements are in them selves it skilleth not, it is 
enough that to me which take them they are the bodie and blood of Christ, his 
promise in witnes hereof sufficeth, his word be knoweth which way to accomplish, 
why should any cogitation possesse the minde of a faithfull communicant but this. 
O my God thou art true, O my soule thou art happie?' (Lawes V.67.12 II.342.31-
343.26) 
 
In the eucharist, for Hooker, things are felt that banish any cogitation other 
than the body and blood of Christ and this is what satisfies Christian desires. While 
Hooker's doctrine of the eucharist does other things, his teaching shows how in the 
sacrament the appetite and reason of a voluntary agent function properly in line 
with the eternal laws. What the voluntary agent desires in the appetite is known 
and found by the reason in taking the body and blood of Christ. The natural desire 
for God finds a level of satiety in bread and cup. The voluntary agent, though, still 
has to act non-arbitrarily in its context and to do so reasonably. The imputation of 
perfect righteousness must manifest itself in inherent imperfect righteousness. I 





If in the sacraments of the church, baptism and eucharist, God exerts a 
causal influence as an inward working cause, then in the reading of the Scriptures 
the habitual centre reconstituted through that causal influence manifests in 
redeemed, though imperfect, abstractive reasoning. The appetite changed through 
the imputation of Christ's righteousness, 'perfect, but not inherent,' effects a 
transformed reason directing a sanctified will, 'inherent, but not perfect,' in 
accordance with God's eternal laws. (Justification 3 V.109.9-11) This reconstituted 




in how individuals learn to read Scripture alone and in the community of the 
church. No longer clouded in the same way, or the same degree, reason can learn 
to see the second eternal law in creation and in Scripture in order to direct the will. 
The 'doctrinal instrument' of Scripture serves a means of educating the reason and 
the will such that in whatever situation an agent must act in, it will be able to act 
as a free agent: voluntarily and non-arbitrarily. Scripture has this function, for 
Hooker, because it enables those who hear it or read it—even if only in public 
worship—to be acquainted with the cause and end of the created world, God, and 
to learn those laws, natural and supernatural, appropriate to human beings as 
voluntary agents. God communicates these matters to believers in Scripture 
through his Word, Jesus Christ, who unites the first and second eternal laws in his 
person and is, therefore, the subject of Scripture:  
'These wordes [‘the folishness of preachinge’] declare how admerable force 
those mysteries have which the world doth deride as follies; they showe that the 
foolishness of the crosse of Christ is the wisdome of true believers; they 
concerne the object of our faith, the matter preached of and believede in by 
Christian men [‘the cross of Christ’].' (Lawes V.22.9 II.96.9-14)  
 
Scripture's operation, in Hooker's terms, can be seen, then, in the Christian 
apprehension of Christ and in the Christian assent to the laws in it.245  
 




                                                            
245. L'Ecriture est suffisante parce qu'elle est parfaite; mais elle est parafite parce qu'elle réalise 
sa fin propre; or, cette fin propre, c'est le message évangélique du salut. Saint Thomas et Luther 
s'accordent donc chez Hooker: en définitive l'objet irréductible de la foi, le noyau 
spécifiquement surnaturel de l'Ecriture, qui est comme le centre de toute une constellation de 




As was shown at the end of the last chapter, sin, as Hooker sees it, comes 
about as human agents fail to recognise properly the principle of creation, God, on 
account of their misdirected appetite and reason. They fail to actualise their sensual 
and intellectual perfections, which make it impossible to actualise their spiritual 
perfection. The lewd and wicked customs of societies prevent human agents from 
being reasonable, and this reason proves incapable of reaching the infinite good 
that God is. As this chapter has maintained, the sacraments of the church, however, 
begin to recalibrate the appetite and the reason through sensual acquaintance with 
God. As important as this acquaintance is, it does not bring about the satiation of 
the rational desire for an infinite and unsensible goodness. What is needed for the 
satisfaction of the desired perfections of human nature is some knowledge of the 
end of creation, God, who has been unknown apart from Christ.  This non-
instrumental knowledge of God, the good news of his self-communication in Jesus 
Christ, is the Gospel witnessed to by Scripture.246 
As W. Speed Hill has pointed out, the Apostles knew God through 
revelation, that is through the most assured and desirable form of knowledge, 'by 
plaine aspect and intuitive beholding,' but the best that can now be hoped for is 
truth known through 'strong and invincible demonstration' while most will need to 
settle for the 'way greatest probability leadeth.' (Lawes II.VII.5 I.179.11-17)247 
Apprehension of God through the Scripture, then, follows the basic pattern of 
learning the conceits of a community, worked out through a long process of 
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Bonne Nouvelle, la Promesse que nous sommes sauvés par le Christ et dans le Christ.' Olivier 
Loyer L'Anglicanisme p. 397 
247. W. Speed Hill 'Scripture as Text, Text as Scripture: The Case of Richard Hooker.' TEXT: 




discernment, in order to turn to the cause of that knowledge. Probability encoded 
in the received tradition can be overturned by clear reasoning; clear reasoning 
overruled by intuitive knowledge of a cause. Scripture, for Hooker, does not stand 
above this process of acquiring, transmitting, and criticising the conceits of 
communal knowledge. Like Moses, the Prophets, and Christ himself, the Apostles 
witness to 'Gods truth' (Lawes V.19.1 II.67.15-16) by giving testimony and setting 
down a relation of what God had revealed to them, their intuitive knowledge. 
Apostolic writing and preaching, as language and speech, conveys the revelations 
made to the Apostles to those who read and hear those writings 'without addition 
or diminution, which scripture hath derived from the holie Ghost.' (Lawes V.22.6 
II.92.10-11) Subsequent Christians acquire these very same conceits not through a 
special revelation, i.e. intuitive knowledge, but through the normal processes of 
coming to an understanding of a new conceit.   
The process of the communication of revelation, of the knowledge of God 
in the crucified Christ, follows the justification-sanctification structure of an initial 
supernatural imputation that causes a change in the natural character of its recipient 
such that he or she begins to approximate to the initial imputation. Supernatural 
grace 'hath use of nature.' (Lawes III.8.6 I.223.29) As shown in the last chapter, 
owing to the effects of sin, human agents lack knowledge of God. It is simply not 
historically available to them in their situation. A supernatural way is appropriate 
to the given situation of humanity, 'a course which groundeth it selfe upon the 
guiltines of sinne, and through sinne desert of condemnation and death,' grounded 
in the historical, but eternally chosen, work of Jesus Christ. (Lawes I.XI.6 I.118.16-
18) As one sent by God for his specific work, Jesus of Nazareth, in his specific 




the apostolic preaching, the cause to be grasped by means of the church's conceits, 
is, therefore, Christ crucified. 'That which must save beleivers is the knowledg of 
the crosse of Christ, the onlie subject of all our preachinge.' (Lawes V.22.9 II.96.7-
8) This intuitive apostolic knowledge, as knowledge corrective of an earlier 
misunderstanding, is demonstrated in the interpretive amendment of the Old 
Testament by the writers of the New Testament, by '[going] from the books of 
scripture to the sense and meaning thereof.' (Lawes III.8.16 I.233.9-10)248 Hooker 
documents this movement to sense and meaning in the reinterpretation of the Old 
Testament by the Apostles in their preaching. Peter, in Acts 2.31, and Paul, in Acts 
13.35-36, interpret Psalm 16, written, so Hooker thinks, by David about himself to 
be about Christ.249 Apart from Christ natural reason would interpret these passages 
to be about David, but Peter and Paul, enjoying an intuitive grasp of revelation, can 
interpret these passages to be about Christ. The new interpretation offered by Peter 
and Paul, however, will be communicated to Christians by the normal means of 
discourse with its trial and error: 'But as everie thinge of price, so this doth require 
travaile. We bringe not the knowledg of God with us into the world.' (Lawes V.21.3 
II.85.24-26) Knowledge of God has to be found out through discourse, and 
discourse develops non-arbitrarily in response to a context.250 
As the human attempt to transmit this intuitive revelation of God in Christ 
to previous generations by the usual natural means of communication, Scripture 
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represents God through a diverse range of material: 'holie scripture doth take out 
of all kinds of truth, naturall, historicall, forreine, supernaturall, so much as the 
matter handled requireth.' (Lawes I.14.3 I.127.25-27) These different kinds of truth 
demonstrate the use of natural reason to move from simple sensual awareness to a 
knowledge of unsensible things through reflection on a context.251 Knowledge of 
God in Christ through the Scripture involves deploying reason in such a way that 
sinful appetitive reason does not dictate a person's approach to their context, 
reading or hearing Scripture. Instead, the conceits of the church community enable 
a person to understand their context, reading or hearing Scripture, in terms of an 
infinite and unsensible good. This hermeneutic process mirrors the process wherein 
a person can reasonably choose to forgo a temporary difficulty in light of a future 
reward. The obvious meaning, David's self-understanding in the Psalms, is 
foregone in pursuit of a superior meaning, the resurrected Christ, through an 
overcoming of the natural appetite or way of reading.252 This process is necessary 
precisely because reason, at least non-apostolic reason, naturally does not grasp 
God. The natural use of reason in reading the texts of the Scripture, 
'[comprehending] differences of time, affirmations, negations, and contradictions 
in speech,' by sinful human agents on the way to demonstrations or probabilities of 
the sense of the text is the approximation of the intuitive apostolic knowledge of 
God by the church in its preaching. 'Howbeit still we must here remember, that the 
Church by hir publique reading of the booke of God preacheth onlie as a witnesse. 
Now the principall thinge required in a witnesse is fidelitie.' (Lawes V.XIX.2 
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II.68.7-9) Fidelity, according to Hooker, involves 'explication' in the formative 





The formative regime of the church does not consist in the assumption of 
the interpretive task by the church community for the reader. If that were the case 
then—not only would sermons be necessary in the Puritan style—individual 
believers would not come to an understanding of the text themselves. Unlike the 
preaching audience in the New Testament, Hooker's contemporary reader of 
Scripture does so from within the society already constituted by the framing 
conceipts of the sacraments established by Jesus Christ. 'it is our custome of simple 
readinge not for conversion of infidels estranged from the howse of God, but for 
instruction of men baptised, bredd and brought up in the bosome of the Church.' 
(Lawes V.22.4 II.91.15-18)  
While the revelation contained in Scripture requires its potential recipients 
to work through the conceits, the conceptual content, of the Scriptures for 
themselves, Hooker maintains the necessity of Christian readers working out the 
sense of Scripture in an existing Christian society. When read properly, Scripture 
points to, witnesses to, the end of the created world, God, so that various agents in 
diverse places can act in accordance with that end. Acting in accordance with God 
as the chosen end, i.e. voluntarily, in light of a given context,i.e. non-arbitrarily, 
requires changes in language and in practice if that end is to condition the action 
of a voluntary agent. The Scriptures, especially those of the New Testament, were 




Christians to act in their situation in accordance with the end intuitively known by 
the Apostles. ( Lawes IV.2.2 I.277.19-20) The Apostles, therefore, did not set down 
the entirety of their teaching or their church orders in the writings that come down 
in the New Testament, but only the end of those actions through their remaining 
teaching.253 Hooker puts the matter forthrightly:  
'Our ende ought alwaies to bee the same; our waies and meanes thereunto not so. 
The glorie of God and the good of His Church was the thing which the Apostles 
aymed at, and therefore ought to bee the marke whereat we also levell.' (Lawes 
IV.2.3 I.278.14-17)  
 
Assent to the revelation of God contained in the New Testament, then, is the 
commitment to the explication of its end in the present time. The goal of this 
formation or explication is the reasonable transformation of the appetite into a will 
reasonably and voluntarily desiring its end, the glory of God, by choosing to act in 
accordance with a law approximating the second eternal law. This voluntary 
choosing of a law of action in light of a final end is how one gives assent to what 




Hooker was clearly committed to the task of Re-Christianisation in England 
during his lifetime. This commitment, however, did not lead him, like his Puritan 
interlocutors, to endorse a rigid confessionalisation or abstract dis-embodied 
theoretical system. He did not attempt to institute a narrow world-picture, but, 
instead, attempted to work out a more comprehensive, flexible, and open 
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worldview through a combination of inherited world-pictures and the force of 
God's activity at the most basic level of the person. The person's formative 
surrender to God, occurring in the most basic drive of the appetite through to the 
reasonably formed will, makes possible the personal appropriation of these 
inherited Christian ways of being so that they allow for apprehension of their life, 
but not necessarily the comprehension of a solving name. The touch of God leads 
to the revision of over-beliefs. 
The process of this revision, personal and communal, is not, however, a 
generic one occurring in all places. It is linked to the specific historical life of Jesus 
of Nazareth. He sets the dynamic of transformation to work. The incarnation and 
its effects in the church begins the process of correcting the dislocation and 
adulteration of human agents by sin. The graceful resetting of the human agent 
takes place through a supernatural intervention in Christ that runs parallel to the 
initial creative act of God while, nevertheless, making use of the natural tendencies, 
character, and processes of the created world. God acts in creation to resolve, by 
created means, the impasse of sin. God resolves sin by re-running the original 
dynamic of human experience in a new way. Whereas originally, human beings in 
response to the pressing needs of their appetite developed their reason which, in 
turn, lead them to desire an unsensible good, a higher end of personal and 
communal orientation, now, under the reign of God, human beings in response to 
their appetitive contact with Christ in the sacraments develop a reasonable 
discourse which gives shape to their will, their reasonable desire. This holistic 
movement of appetite, reason, and will is the orientation—the law or canon of 




union between the eternal laws: a supernatural intervention in history progressively 
reforming human nature. 
Learning to read the Bible, to take the world, to receive the sacraments, 
with this set of people in this place produces the possibility of a full fact responsible 
to God. A full fact becomes possible because the human agent learns a sense of 
self, being a redeemed creature, in light of a felt object, Jesus of Nazareth, whom 
she knows in an attitude of gracious receptivity. The formative dynamic of piety, 
then, is present in Hooker's account of the laws of the church and of the world. The 
character of that piety, moreover, pushes toward, without perhaps fully committing 
to, a sense of the Christian life as an endless approximation of God's wisdom in the 
world: the continual approach of the temporal law of the witting voluntary agent to 
the eternal law of God's being. 
 
The same formative dynamic of piety creating a full fact in the 
apprehension of Jesus Christ will now be seen in Friedrich Schleiermacher’s work. 
Although he held quite different philosophical, metaphysical, and cultural views, 
Schleiermacher will give an account of the formation of Christian piety parallel to 
Hooker in terms of an universal problem of human life whose solution hinges on 
Jesus of Nazareth. The specific constraints imposed by Jesus of Nazareth on those 
who begin to understand him, the hard lines created by his specific historical 
density, begin to create a form of free human life wherein a degree of blessedness 
is possible in the present time. The problem of sin—the inapplicability of human 
language, conceipts, and forms of life to their context—is resolved by Jesus of 
Nazareth through his transposition of God into creation in the form of a sinless life. 




to God in creation to a right relation with God in Jesus Christ that creates a form 
of ecclesial life continually approximating to God’s own life in creation. The 
dynamic will be worked by God on God’s creatures without destroying their 
normal way of being: grace will make use of nature. Grace’s use of nature in the 
church created by Jesus Christ does not, however, settle the redeemed into a set 
pattern, but, instead, leads them into a continuous circling around or growing 
approximation of the life of Jesus Christ; the contemporary movement of 
sanctification towards the sinlessness of Jesus of Nazareth. All of this will be 
possible only through the continued causative activity of God on believers below 























Richard R. Niebuhr describes the difficulty of approaching 
Schleiermacher's theology on the far side of post-liberalism and Neo-orthodoxy:  
'much of the impatience with Schleiermacher that one meets today is due to the 
fact that  he wrestles with issues that are no longer regarded as issues, and, on 
the other hand, he appears to be oblivious to the self-evident character of much 
that is now taken as absolutely self-evident.'254  
 
Niebuhr has in mind the self-evident truth of the 'infinite abyss between God and 
man' with its accompanying metaphysical dualisms and the intrinsic 
communicability of the gospel across cultures.255 Without these anxieties but with 
evangelical intentions, Schleiermacher begins his dogmatics with the doctrine of 
creation, its divine government, and human dependence on the divine governor. 
These doctrines appear in the course of his reflection on the basic Christian 
experience of divine ordering in the course of everyday life. The experience of this 
ordering points to the feeling of absolute dependence, or it sometimes frustrates 
human desires. Confidently, and perhaps obliviously, Schleiermacher does not 
argue for the existence of the feeling of absolute dependence, but, instead, he 
assumes it as a given of the Christian experience he 'isolates, describes, and 
clarifies.'256   
                                                            
254. Richard R. Niebuhr Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1964) p. 13. 
255. Niebuhr Schleiermacher p. 13. 
256. Niebuhr Schleiermacher p. 182. References to The Christian Faith/Der christliche Glaube 
in English are to The Christian Faith eds. H.R. Mackintosh & J.S. Stewart (London: T&T Clark, 
1999) and in German are to Der Christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen 
Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt Zweite Auflage (1830/31) ed. Rolf Schäfer (Berlin: 





The purpose of this chapter and the next is to serve as an orientation to the 
doctrine of God and the human sense of self that emerges in Schleiermacher's initial 
discussion of the doctrine of God in the Glaubenslehre as the relationship between 
knowledge of God and self structures the method and content of Schleiermacher's 
dogmatics as a reflection on already existing human faith. These two chapters, 
therefore, show the initial stage of the formative dynamic wherein a person has a 
sense of God, or of the unity of the world, but is unable to bring this into alignment 
with the rest of their lives. I will begin by working out two aspects of this 
experiential knowledge of God for Schleiermacher. First, the realistic and historical 
knowledge of God in Schleiermacher's account of faith comes from the historical 
location of his theology within the evangelical church. The evangelical character 
of his theology draws upon the Reformation spirit of Protestantism as a movement 
of Re-Christianisation manifesting itself positively in its ability to be 
transformatively communicated to others as the basis of actual sanctification. 
Evangelical commitments, which he views as the spirit of Protestant thought 
embodied in its confessional documents, play a materially important role in his 
doctrine of God, which has often been neglected, but must be grasped to understand 
what is at stake in his revisionary doctrinal constructions.257 Second, the structures 
of experience, although they come first in the Glaubenslehre, inherent in the 
experience of redemption will be drawn out as what must be the case for the feeling 
                                                            
proposition, paragraph, and the page and CG followed by proposition number, paragraph, page, 
and line number. '...to feel oneself absolutely dependent and to be conscious of being in relation 
with God are one and the same thing...' (CF 4.4.17) On the same page Schleiermacher relates 
the feeling of absolute dependence to our awareness of being unable to exercise any influence 
on God, which is a way speaking about God's omnipotence as Creator. The points and doctrines 
are constantly interweaving and implying each other making it difficult to pick them apart 
without releasing the tension.  




of absolute dependence to take place. Christian experience is related to the basic 
structures of human acting, knowing, and feeling as a determination of human life 
by God, rather than the communication of a conceptual idea about God, and are 
oriented to the coming of the Redeemer. Once these structures have been described, 
I will turn to his conception of piety as a way of being in relation to God so that 
God is present to consciousness.   
These methodological and ecclesial decisions will be put to work in 
Schleiermacher's positive consideration of the attributes of God. On the basis of 
pious experience, Schleiermacher will develop a non-speculative doctrine of God's 
omnipotence as the root of God's other attributes and as the basis of human 
knowledge of God as creator. These abstractions from the facts of Christian 
experience will be filled in by concrete doctrines of redemption, but they will, in 
turn, influence the way those doctrines present themselves. I will, therefore, finally, 
take up the frustration of the desire for the feeling of absolute dependence, a 
frustration relieved by the coming of the Redeemer, in Schleiermacher's discussion 
of sin and the coordinate divine attributes of holiness and justice. Schleiermacher's 
piety is an evangelical one rooted in a Protestant understanding of the experience 
of redemption from sin through grace.   
  
  
II. The Kind of Piety Schleiermacher Has in Mind 
 
From the very beginning of The Christian Faith Schleiermacher relates 




Christians.258 He works towards this understanding of evangelical piety by 
beginning with more general considerations of religion as a prelude to his own 
historical circumstances as a Protestant theologian. The account he gives of piety, 
or religion in general, is not, however, a disinterested or empirical account, but, 
instead, has its origin in the Christian church and its ethics:259 
 'From this it follows that [The Christian Faith] entirely disclaims the task of 
establishing on a foundation of general principles a Doctrine of God, or an 
Anthropology or Eschatology either, which should be used in the Christian 
Church though it did not really originate there, or which should prove the 
propositions of the Christian faith to be consonant with reason.' (CF 2.1.3)  
 
Schleiermacher's definition of religion does not try to be universally valid, only to 
give enough guidance to orient one to the distinctiveness of Christian piety. 
Christian dogmatics is pursued within historical theology for the purpose of 
practical church guidance.260 
The restrictions imposed by the historical circumstances of Christian belief 
are, for Schleiermacher, threefold: first, the general communicability of the 
                                                            
258. 'That a Church is nothing but a communion or association relating to religion or piety, is 
beyond all doubt for us Evangelical (Protestant) Christians, since we regard it as equivalent to 
degeneration in a Church when it begins to occupy itself with other matters as well' (CF 3.1.5) 
259. 'The peculiarity of the Christian Church can neither be comprehended and deduced by 
purely scientific methods nor can be grasped by mere empirical methods.' (CF 2.2.3) 'Insofar as 
one tries to make do with a merely empirical method of interpreting Christianity, he cannot 
achieve a genuine knowledge of it. One's task is rather to endeavour both to understand the 
essence of Christianity in contradistinction to other churches and other kinds of faith, and to 
understand the nature of piety and of religious communities in relation to all the other activities 
of the human spirit.' Friedrich Schleiermacher Brief Outline of Theology as a Field of Study 
trans. Terrence N. Tice (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2011)  § 21 
260. 'Theology is a positive science, whose parts join into a cohesive whole only through their 
common relation to a particular mode of faith, i.e., a particular way of being conscious of God. 
Thus, the various parts of Christian theology belong together only by virtue of their relation to 
'Christianity.' This is the sense in which the word 'theology' will always be used here.'Brief 
Outline on the Study of Theology §1. Compare with: ‘When this same knowledge [reflection on 
Christian history] is acquired and possessed without relation to the 'government' of the Church, 
it ceases to be theological and devolves to those sciences to which it belongs according to its 
varied contents.’ §6 'Insofar as one tries to make do with a merely empirical method of 
interpreting Christianity, he cannot achieve a genuine knowledge of it. One's task is rather to 
endeavour both to understand the essence of Christianity in contradistinction to other churches 
and other kinds of faith, and to understand the nature of piety and of religious communities in 
relation to all the other activities of the human spirit.' § 21 
'Accordingly, historical theology is the actual corpus of theological study, which is connected 
with science, as such, by means of philosophical theology and with the active Christian life by 




Christian faith; second, the general constraints of any form of Christian piety; third, 
the doctrinal system a theologian inherits in his or her specific communion. The 
first constraint insists on the evangelical nature of belief; the second relates to the 
decisive influence of the founder of Christian piety, Jesus Christ; the third to the 




Christian faith, as the fulfilment of human existence, is capable of being 
communicated to all people in a relatively straightforward way, namely preaching. 
'The whole work of the Redeemer Himself was conditioned by the 
communicability of His self-consciousness by means of speech, and similarly 
Christianity has always and everywhere spread itself solely by preaching.' (CF 
15.2.77) The communication of the Redeemer's influence through his speech was 
effective for both Jews and Gentiles, and, did not, therefore presuppose a shared 
speculative worldview. The presence of the Redeemer purifies non-Christian 
religious consciousness rather than destroying or abolishing it.  
'With this agrees what the apostle says when he represents even Polytheism as a 
perversion of the original consciousness of God which underlies it, and when, in 
this evidence of the longing which all these fancies have failed to satisfy, he finds 
an obscure presentiment of the true God.' (CF 7.3.33-34)  
 
Evangelical faith may lead one to the way of life shared in the church, including its 
doctrines and, perhaps, its speculative tendencies, but faith begins in the individual 
experience of Jesus Christ.262  
                                                            
261. ‘When this [theological] knowledge is acquired and possessed without relation to the 
'government' of the Church, it ceases to be theological and devolves to those sciences to which it 
belongs according to its varied contents.’ Brief Outline §6. 
262. Describing the origins of different religious communions, Schleiermacher attacks the 
notion that one could move from one communion to another 'simply by dissolving the one 





Second, Jesus Christ, then, provides the basis for all Christian piety. As will 
be shown more fully below, the distinctive feature of piety is the feeling of absolute 
dependence. The feeling of absolute dependence centres human life, as one part of 
finite existence, on a single principle undergirding all of finite existence. 
Schleiermacher's account of religion mirrors his description of the development of 
the feeling of absolute dependence as it comes to be understood in mediated 
consciousness related to all finite existence. The self-consciousness's inability to 
relate all of the religious affections, or states of mind, to one 'Most High and 
Infinite' in preference to a local or partial aspect of finite existence is the root of 
both Polytheism and idol worship. The gods and idols of this form of belief are 
gods of some thing or place, which is to say they relate to a specific concept 
produced by the reflective consciousness.  Such concepts are, by their nature, 
limited to certain aspects of the self-consciousness.263 The different, historical, and 
integral religious communions, therefore, relate to each other 'as different stages of 
development, and as different kinds.'(CF 7.31) They are bound by their restriction 
of the feeling of absolute dependence to some particular determination of the self-
consciousness. The removal of this constraint is what Schleiermacher means by 
redemption.264  
The relationship between the human incapacity for the feeling of absolute 
dependence and the redemption are not 'one particular religious element among 
others, but all other pious emotions [fromme Erregungen] are related to it' in 
                                                            
263. 'Idol-worship proper is based upon a confused state of the self-consciousness  which marks 
the lowest condition of man, since in it the higher and the lower are so little distinguished that 
even the feeling of absolute dependence is reflected as arising from a particular object to be 
apprehended by the senses. So, too, with Polytheism...' (CF 8.2.35) 
264. 'Under these conditions [the alternation between sensible and higher self-consciousness] no 
satisfaction of the impulse towards the God-consciousness will be possible; and so, if such a 
satisfaction is to be attained, a redemption is necessary, since this condition is nothing but a kind 




Christian religion (CF 11.3.55)265 'And secondly, redemption is posited as a thing 
which has been universally and completely accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth.' 
(CF 11.3.56) Schleiermacher does not treat the specifics of Christian redemption 
at this point in his Glaubenslehre, but points to the constitutive role Christ plays in 
the founding of the Christian church or communion. Christ's foundation of the 
Christian communion, the religious communion wherein the feeling of absolute 
dependence becomes possible, as the Redeemer follows from his redemptive 
influence rather than the communication of specifically religious doctrine.266 
Judaism and Islam, for instance, could be the same even if their law or revelation 
were given by some other person.  
'But Christ is distinguished from all others as Redeemer alone and for all, and 
is in no wise regarded as having been at any time in need of redemption Himself; 
and is therefore separated from the beginning from all other men, and endowed 
with redeeming power from His birth.' (CF 11.4.58)  
 
In a wholly singular way for Schleiermacher, Christ is the cause and redemption 
the effect. An evangelical—and so Reformation—insistence on the project of 




The third constraint on Christian belief is ecclesial doctrine taken as the 
expression of Christian religious consciousness.267 The concrete historical 
circumstances of Schleiermacher's theology is the Protestant church in Europe, and 
                                                            
265. The translation is altered. The standard English translation renders both religiöses and 
fromme as 'religious.' 'Emotions' does not seem to be a completely adequate translation of 
Erregungen either, but it makes sense if the receptive aspect of the word is kept in mind. 
266. Other non-Christian religions' 'main business is the founding of the communion upon 
definite doctrine and in definite form.' (CF 11.4.57) 
267. 'For there is only one source from which all Christian doctrine is derived,namely, the self-
proclamation of Christ; and there is only one type of doctrine, for, whether more perfect or less 





more specifically the union of Lutheran and Reformed churches in Prussia. 
Protestantism, although 'the Reformers and their first adherents were conscious 
only of the wish to purify,' comes to be a distinctive form of Christian communion 
in opposition to Catholicism. (CF 24.103)268 The distinctive spirit of Protestant 
piety 'makes the individual's relation to the Church dependent on his relation to 
Christ, while [Catholicism] contrariwise makes the individual's relation to Christ 
dependent on his relation to the Church.' (CF 24.103) The implicit criticism of 
Catholicism, 'in ascribing everything to the Church and tracing everything to the 
Church, it deprives Christ of the honour due to Him, and puts Him in the 
background, and even in a measure subordinates Him to the Church,' is that it 
represents something like the incomplete forms of Monotheism that invest 
something within the world that is not Jesus Christ with the ability to call forth the 
feeling of absolute dependence. (CF 24.3.106) This way of believing would make 
Christ simply the communicator of doctrine, e.g. church teaching, not the decisive 
source of redeeming influence. 
As far as doctrine is concerned, there are two practical consequences of this 
Protestant context: first, the non-speculative character of evangelical theology; 
second, the relative authority of the Protestant confessions.   
Protestant theology does not possess an independent existence apart from 
its role in the government of the Christian church. Dogmatic work responds to the 
desires of the immediate self-consciousness 'solely through the means ordained by 
Christ, in their genuine and uncorrupted form.' (CF 16.PS.83) The intellectual 
desire satisfied in Christian doctrine, the immediate self-consciousness's desire for 
                                                            
268 On Schleiermacher's general milieu see Martin Redeker Schleiermacher: Life and Thought 
trans. John Wallhausser (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1973), B.A. Gerrish Schleiermacher: 
Prince of the Church,(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1988) , and Kurt Nowak 




clarity in reflection, arises only in reference to the historically limited self-
proclamation of Jesus Christ, and, therefore, it does not overlap with other desires 
to speculatively arrive at an Absolute.269 Christian theology responds to a historical 
given, Jesus Christ, that cannot be deduced from universal or rational principles, 
nor are its theologians as theologians concerned with elaborating such 
principles.270 Thus, 'the various parts of Christian theology belong together only by 
virtue of their relation to 'Christianity.''271 
Schleiermacher locates the defining mark of evangelical theology in the 
spirit embodied in the evangelical confessions. In the Glaubenslehre 
Schleiermacher admits it is strange that 'the confessional documents of the 
Evangelical Church...are...given a prior place to the New Testament Scriptures 
themselves.' (CF 27.1.112) Scriptural warrant alone is not sufficient to establish 
the evangelical character of a doctrine 'since the appeal to Scripture can directly 
prove only that a proposition... is Christian, while its distinctively Protestant 
content is not decided upon.' (CF 27.1.113) The distinctiveness of the Protestant 
communion has been transmitted in these documents as they have been corrected 
in light of Scripture. 
In addition to the general comments on Protestant theology in The Christian 
Faith, Schleiermacher handled the proper use of the confessional documents more 
                                                            
269. 'The purely scientific activity, whose task is the contemplation of existence, must, if it is to 
come to anything, either begin or end with the Supreme Being; and so there may be forms of 
philosophy containing propositions of speculative import about the Supreme Being which, in 
spite of the fact that they arose out of the purely scientific interest, are, when taken individually, 
difficult to distinguish from the corresponding propositions which arose purely out of reflection 
upon the religious emotions, but have been worked out dialectically. But when they are 
considered in their connexions, these two indubitably show differences of the most definite 
kind.' (CF 16.PS.81-82) 
270. 'In one respect all Christian dogmas are supra-rational, in another they are all rational. 
They are are supra-rational in the respect in which everything experiential is supra-rational. For 
there is an inner experience to which they may all be traced: they rest upon a given; and apart 
from this they could not have arisen, by deduction or synthesis, from universally recognised and 
communicable propositions.' (CF 13.PS.67) 




specifically  in a series of sermons on the Augsburg Confession in the middle of 
the same year, 1830, the second edition of the Glaubenslehre was published.272 The 
Protestant distinctives in the spirit of the confession coincide with his 
understanding of the progress of monotheism away from idolatry. The 300th 
anniversary of the Augusburg Confession occasioned a renewal of the conflicts, 
which Schleiermacher had been involved in, dormant since the 1817 union of 
Lutheran and Reformed churches in Prussia.273 At this time  
'[p]arties predictably re-formed along similar lines with 
confessionalist/supernaturalist theologians and clergy on one extreme and 
Enlightenment rationalists on the other, the one committed to stringent 
confessional adherence and uniformity of doctrine, the other to a calculated 
policy of sola ratio in all matters theological and religious.'274  
 
As the epistolary conflict gained steam, a royal order to the ministers in the 
Evangelical church to celebrate the Confession intensified the conflict between the 
two parties, by causing worry among the Reformed that the character of the church 
union would be tipped in a Lutheran direction.275  
Schleiermacher's response was to reject both of these options. Instead, the 
confessions should be taken up in a 'respectful but constructively critical 
                                                            
272. I am concentrating here on the sermons given in 1830, but Schleiermacher also treated the 
confessions in a series of writings at different stages of his career. The exchange of letters, and a 
helpful contextualisation of the conflicts around the anniversary of the Augsburg Confession, 
can be found in Friedrich Schleiermacher on Creeds, Confessions, and Church Unions. tr. Iain 
Nichol (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2004). An analysis of the influence of the 
confessions on The Christian Faith in relation to these writings is in Walter E. Wyman Jr 'The 
Role of the Protestant Confessions in Schleiermacher's The Christian Faith' The Journal of 
Religion 2007 355-385. Although he focusses on an earlier edition of the Glaubenslehre the 
most thorough investigation of the influence is Martin Ohst, Schleiermacher und die 
Bekenntnisschriften Eine Untersuchung zu seiner Reformations- und Protestantismusdeutung 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1989),. 
273. Reformed but Ever Reforming: Sermons in Relation to the Celebration of the Handing 
Over of the Augsburg Confession (1830) trans. Ian G. Nicol (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen 
Press, 1997) p. iix. 
274. Reformed but Ever Reforming pp. iix-ix. 
275. Reformed but Ever Reforming pp. xi-xii. Schleiermacher was not entirely above traditional 
rivalry. He wrote his tract 'On Election' to convince Lutherans to adopt the Reformed, or 




attitude.'276 In these sermons he argues for a continuation of the agenda, or spirit, 
of the Reformation without taking up the confessional documents in their entirety 
through an appeal to Pauline description of evangelical freedom in Galatians.  
For Schleiermacher, reform became necessary at the time of Augsburg 
Confession as response to  
'a serious corruption of Christianity by a captivity to regulations similar to that 
opposed by the apostle had increasingly crept in over several centuries and that 
elders of the church...had led the flocks in their charge back to that time of 
immature dependence.'277  
 
The Reformation was an attack upon 'a whole multitude of external actions' 
standing in the way of living faith, an attack formally similar, if not identical, to 
Paul's attack on the requirement for Gentile Christians to observe Mosaic law.278 
Trust was put in something other than Christ to sustain the believer, and as a result 
Christ was no longer alive in believers. The goal of the reform was two-fold: first, 
that Christ live in believers in the present, in the flesh; second, believers rely upon 
                                                            
276. Reformed but Ever Reforming pp. xv. cf. 'From this it follows that, in going back to the 
Symbols, if we are to avoid making that procedure a hindrance to the further development of 
doctrine, we must, in the first place rather have regard to the spirit than cling to the letter, and, in 
the second place, we must apply the exegetical art to the letter itself, in order to make a right use 
of it.' (CF 27.2.115) Schleiermacher was trying to extend the Reformation in the present, not to 
initiate a second more thorough Reformation. ‘With Schleiermacher . . . a period in the history 
of Protestant theology begins which is essentially defined by the striving for an interpretation 
and reception of Reformation theology that would be fruitful for the modern world.’  Martin 
Ohst Schleiermacher und die Bekenntnisschriften, 267. ''Die Eruptionen, unter denen der Boden 
Europas erzitterte, führten Novalis zu der Vision diner zweiten Reformation, deren Konturen in 
allumgreifender Totalität gedacht waren.' Kurt Nowak Schleiermacher und die Frühromantik: 
eine literaturgeschichtliche Studie zum romantischen Religionsverständnis und Menschenbild 
am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck + Ruprecht GM, 1986) 
p. 45. 
277. Reformed but Ever Reforming p. 55. 
278. 'Now, at the time of our church reform this could no longer have been the issue. Rather, 
when our predecessors would not hear of having any works of the law on a par with a living 
faith they were declaiming against a whole multitude of external actions such as prayers and 
pilgrimages, fastings and penances, alms for the poor and precious for the honour of God, all of 
which had to be imposed by the consecrated servants of the church upon those souls given into 
their charge so that they might make satisfaction and so be justified before God. It was against 
these precepts and against the false trust nourished by them that those Christian teachers who 
established the foundations of our church reform fought so ardently. Still, the offerings and 
gifts, rites and prayers ordained in the law of Moses and even moreso in the precepts of the early 
fathers, and these prescriptions of the law of the ancient church and of the fullness of priestly 





this life alone and are, therefore, 'completely exempt from the law.'279 This faith 
does not only consist in knowing or in doing, although those are necessary results 
of faith, but consists in surrender to his influence.280 Christ's living influence is the 
source of faithful Christian action and thought, and this power retains its potency 
up through the present day so that believers have no need to supplement his 
influence.281 The confessionalists, then, despite their avowed closeness to the 
Reformers, would return the church to the servitude left behind at the 
Reformation.282 The rationalists, however, are just as mistaken in their desire to 
leave behind any historic norms, to dissociate themselves from Christ in order to 
live in their own power: '[I]f you think you can proceed in the Spirit without him 
and ascend from one clear insight to another, you will suddenly notice that you are 
simply at the point ending in the flesh.'283 Either way, both parties return to a 
version of works righteousness with its 'immature dependence on human 
precepts.'284  
Schleiermacher succinctly sums up the goal of church reform begun in the 
Augsburg Confession: 'to demolish all false supports on which misdirected 
Christians had still relied and to re-establish this righteousness based on faith 
alone.'285 The only way to pursue this goal was to return to the living influence of 
                                                            
279. Reformed but Ever Reforming p. 67. 
280. Reformed but Ever Reforming p. 68-69. 
281. Reformed but Ever Reforming p. 74. 
282. 'All the moreso because we have already just seen how we prove ourselves transgressors 
when we re-establish the law beside faith and now that we are persuaded that this applies not 
only to every law of works but also to every law of words and doctrine.' Reformed but Ever 
Reforming p. 73. 
283. Reformed but Ever Reforming  p. 75. compare with Kurt Nowak's point on the 
dehistoricising tendency among Schleiermacher's contemporaries. 'Unter ideengeschichtlichem 
Aspekt ordnete sich die ästhetische Revolution der Frühromantik in einen Prozeß der 
Dematerialisierung der Geschichte ein. Ein wichtiger Grund dafür war die Bewertung der 
französischen Revolution als ein vor allen geistig-moralisches Ereignis.' Schliermacher und die 
Frühromantik p. 56. 
284. Reformed but Ever Reforming., p. 75. 




Christ in whom everything is fulfilled and from whom everything develops. If 
knowing and doing are insufficient—if both the confessionalists and rationalists 
are wrong—in leaning on the law of works, then the only way open is the 
determination of the believer in a way other than knowing or doing. Schleiermacher 
locates this determination in feeling:  
'Thus both hypotheses lead to the same point: that there are both a Knowing and a 
Doing which pertain to piety, but neither of these constitutes the essence of piety: 
they only pertain to inasmuch as the stirred-up Feeling sometimes comes to rest in 
a thinking which fixes it, sometimes discharges itself in an action which expresses 
it.'(CF 3.4.10-11)  
 
Schleiermacher, working from his historical  religious commitments, 
develops his theological system by locating the continuing work of Christ in the 
person at the most basic level, immediate self-consciousness or feeling, which is 
'prior' to knowing and doing, while nevertheless maintaining the historical, 
concrete ground of the determination of feeling in the Christian community.286  
 
C. Piety and Feeling 
 
The piety which forms the basis of all ecclesiastical communions is, 
considered purely in itself, neither a Knowing nor a Doing, but a modification of 
Feeling [Gefühl], or of immediate self-consciousness.(CF 3.5/CG 3.20.2) Piety, at 
least actually existing piety in various churches, exists as a modification of feeling, 
the persistent subject uniting knowing and doing, in relation to the world it finds 
                                                            
286. 'But the truth is that the new life of each individual springs from that of the community, 
while the life of the community springs from no other individual life that that of the Redeemer.' 
(CF 113.1.525) 
'For if it be allowed that there are divine workings of converting grace in no actual historical 
relation to the personal efficacy of Christ (even though it is as workings of Christ that they come 
to consciousness), there would be no security that this inward mystic Christ was identical with 




itself in, which is also patient of human influence.287 The common feeling behind 
these various expressions of piety is 'the consciousness of being absolutely 
dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with God. (CF 4.12) It 
is the consciousness that all of human activity, its free and spontaneous expression, 
has a source outside the human self, a 'whence' of human existence.288 Absolute 
dependence on God cannot be fixed on an object under creaturely influence, and, 
yet, it always goes along with a definite experience in the world.289 Christian piety 
is a  
'monotheistic faith, belonging to the teleological type of religion [i.e. the moral 
task predominates the religious affections], and is essentially distinguished from 
other such faiths by the fact that in it everything is related to the redemption 
accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth.' (CF 11.52) 
 
Schleiermacher divides the self-consciousness into mediate and immediate 
states accompanying each other in the human life. The division of the self-
consciousness is fundamental for Schleiermacher in the Glaubenslehre:  
'[I]n every self-consciousness there are two elements, which we might call 
respectively a self-caused element [ein Sichselbstsetzen] and a non-self-caused 
element [ein Sichselbstnichtsgesetzthaben]; or a Being and a Having-by-some-
means-come-to-be [ein Sein und ein Irgendwiegewordensein].' (CF 4.1.13/CG 
4.1.15-17)  
 
                                                            
287. 'Feeling is not ethical subjectivity, cognitive-theoretical subjectivity, or emotional 
subjectivity. It is subjectivity as such, consciousness itself, the common generic element present 
in all the more determinate and specific forms. Feeling, or consciousness as such, is the organ of 
receptivity, or man's openness to and immediate union with being.' Robert Williams 
'Schleiermacher and Feuerbach on the Intentionality of Religious Consciousness' The Journal of 
Religion, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Oct., 1973), p. 431 
288. '...it is the consciousness that the whole of our spontaneous activity comes from a source 
outside of us in just the same sense in which anything towards which we should have a  feeling 
of absolute freedom must have proceeded entirely from ourselves.' (CF 4.3.16) 'As regards the 
identification of absolute dependence with 'relation to God' in our proposition: this is to be 
understood in the sense that the Whence of our receptive and active existence, as implied in the 
self-consciousness, is to be designated by the word 'God' and that this is for us the really original 
signification of that word.' (CF 4.4.16) 
289. 'Since the feeling of absolute dependence, even in the realm of redemption, only puts in an 
appearance, i.e. becomes a real self-consciousness in time, in so far as it is aroused by another 
determination of the self-consciousness and unites itself therewith, every formula for that 
feeling is a formula for a definite state of mind; and consequently all proposition of Dogmatics 




The mediated self-consciousness occurs as a coming together of the self-caused 
element, human conceptual reflection, with a non-self-caused element, the 
circumstances or context of the self; the mediation of the latter by the former.290 
The circumstances determine the particularities of the self-consciousness and the 
mediated self-consciousness is the result of the human attempt, which is entirely 
natural, to 'trace the origin of our particular state.' (CF 4.1.13) Put simply, mediate 
self-consciousness is what happens when a human person tries to make sense of 
himself and the world around him by reflecting on these things by making them 
objects of discursive examination. Immediate self-consciousness, however, is the 
human person in her relationship to her circumstances before trying to make sense 
of them in this way; it is her 'immediate existential relation to the world.291  
 Gefühl, as immediate self-consciousness, does not depend on the 
formulation of representations or of the application of concepts, but is modification 
of the subject as it relates itself to the world persisting 'unaltered during a series of 
diverse acts of thinking and willing.'(CF 3.2.7) Feeling does not simply accompany 
the various mental states. It is the aspect of self-consciousness that relates to the 
world immediately present to undivided Being, as non-reflective reception of the 
concrete world of circumstances.292 Gefühl should not be understood in terms of 
unconscious states as these are detached from our concrete circumstances or a 
result of our own reflection. The reciprocal relationship of the self-consciousness 
                                                            
290. '...every consciousness of self is at the same time the consciousness of a variable state of 
being. But in this distinction of the latter from the former, it is implied that the variable does not 
proceed purely from the self-identical, for in that case it could not be distinguished from it' (CF 
4.1.12-13) 
291. ‘What I understand by the pious feeling does not at all proceed from representation 
[Vorstellung]but rather is the original expression of an immediate existential relation [ein 
unmittelbares Existentialverhältnis].' Friedrich Schleiermacher, Sendschreiben an Luecke, hrsg. 
Hermann Mulert, Studien zur Geschichte des neuern Protestantismus (Giessen: Toepelmann, 
1908), p. 13. cited in Williams 'Schleiermacher and Feuerbach' p. 432. 
292. Schleiermacher quotes a contemporary definition as 'closely akin' to his own: 'The 




to the world forms the basis for the specific modification of feeling responsible for 
Christian piety. The nature of this reciprocal relationship as a continuous and 
complementary modification of self-consciousness and circumstances provides the 
strictures for reflective Christian knowledge as expressive of the self and 
dependent on the historical Christian community. The relation of the self to the 
world in terms of feeling, knowing, and doing can be understood in terms of 
freedom and dependence.  
Schleiermacher clarifies how the self-consciousness relates to the world in 
reciprocal terms of freedom and dependence: 'In self-consciousness there are only 
two elements: the one expresses the existence of the subject for itself, the other is 
coexistence with the Other.' (CF 4.1.13) The former element is freedom, the 
expression of 'spontaneous movement and activity', and the latter is dependence, 'a 
receptivity affected from some outside quarter.'(CF 4.2.13-14) The two elements 
express the reciprocity between the subject and the world around it as mutually 
influential. Whatever determines the self-consciousness as it interacts with the 
world is itself patient of some influence from the self-consciousness, and the self-
consciousness never simply expresses itself without some counter-influence from 
the world around it.293 The circumstances the self-consciousness relates to retain 
the stamp of human influence upon them as they in turn affect human feeling.294 
As a feeling, this relative dependence, therefore, relates to certain circumstances in 
varying degrees depending upon the particulars of the situation. Children feel a 
                                                            
293. 'But as we never do exist expect along with an Other, so even in ever outward-tending self-
consciousness the element of receptivity, in some way or other affected, is the primary one; and 
even the self-consciousness which accompanies an action (acts of knowing included), while it 
predominantly expresses spontaneous movement and activity, is always related (though the 
relation is often quite an indefinite one) to a prior movement of affective receptivity, through 
which the original 'agility' received its direction.' (CF 4.1.13) 
294. On this point see Kevin Hector's helpful discussion of Schleiermacher's notion of Gefühl in 
Theology without Metaphysics (Cambridge: CUP, 2011) pp. 77-86. Especially his point that the 




diminishing sense of dependence on their parents, while a citizen feels dependent 
on a state in accordance with the form of government it adopts.295 Self-
consciousness, then, is called reciprocal as that term 'expresses our connexion with 
everything which either appeals to our receptivity or is subjected to our activity.' 
(CF 4.2.14)  
The self-consciousness alternates between a remaining-in-self 
(Insichleiben) and going beyond the self (Aussichheraustreten) in the course of an 
engaged human life. Doing interacts with the material and historical forces, flows, 
and exigencies of the world as it exercises relative influence on other parts of the 
world. Knowing should not be associated with remaining in the self as the 
possession of knowledge requires use to fill in the concept with a concrete 
application of the concept, what Schleiermacher calls a judgment.296  Thus 
knowing becomes an 'endeavour to connect the apprehended truth with other truths 
or to seek out cases for its application'(CF 3.5.11) eventually passing beyond the 
self to engage with the world, and, as a result, becomes a kind of doing.297 The 
distinction between knowing and doing is, therefore, only relative.  
'Feeling' describes an experience Schleiermacher takes as common to 
people in general: the persistence of self-consciousness 'unaltered during a series 
of diverse acts of thinking and willing (verschiedenartiger Akte des Denkens und 
Wollens).' (CF 3.2.7/CG 3.2.23.11-12) Gefühl or feeling, then, is the self's 
                                                            
295. So that 'neither an absolute feeling of dependence, i.e. without any feeling of freedom in 
relation to the co-determinant, nor an absolute feeling of freedom, i.e. without any feeling of 
dependence in relation to the co-determinant, is to be found in the whole realm.'(CF 4.2.15)  
296. Schleiermacher explores this point at length in Dialectic or, The Art of Doing Philosophy: 
A Study Edition of the 1811 Notes. Translated by Terrence N. Tice. (Atlanta; Scholars Press, 
1996).. In Lecture 10 he goes so far as to say even 'a=a' abstracts from an originally organic 
function. Human knowledge cannot escape its origin in the world. 
297. 'An instance of thinking that is formal can never be one of knowing but is only a 
preliminary apparatus for becoming an instance of knowing. It can become an instance of 
knowing only in that what is vacuous is (1) filled in and (2) organic function is also constantly 




orientation in and to the world in general, linking moments of knowing and 
doing.298 The pre-reflective character of feeling does not prevent it from directing 
reflective activity (such as knowing or doing), or from being concrete human 
experience of circumstances. So, to use Schleiermacher's own examples, 
'penitence, contrition, confidence and joy in God' are religious feelings as pre-
reflective ways of relating to one's circumstances before the application of 
concepts, e.g. judgments of self-reproach (CF 3.4.11) Feelings of penitence and 
joy respond to the circumstances surrounding the self and are, in a sense, bound to 
the character of those circumstances.299 On this model Gefühl, as immediate self-
consciousness, 'belongs altogether to the realm of receptivity, it is entirely an 
abiding-in-self' and is in antithesis to knowing and doing, as mediated or objective 
forms of self-consciousness.(CF 3.4.8) Feeling has to do with how a person relates 
to the world—knows and acts in it—so that piety is not one thing a person does, 
but is a way of taking the world as a whole as a response to the concrete world 
around her. As a modification of Gefühl, piety is a relation orienting the self-
consciousness as it knows and acts in its specific circumstances. 
 The non-reflective character of Gefühl does not exempt it from the 
influence of or determination by the world around it. Its being non-self-caused 
means it is affected or caused by its circumstances; it too is never naturally 
                                                            
298. 'For indeed, it is the case in general that the immediate self-consciousness is always the 
mediating link in the transition between moments in which Knowing predominates and those in 
which Doing predominates, so that a different Doing may proceed from the same Knowing in 
different people according as a different determination of self-consciousness enters in.' (CF 
3.4.8-9) 
Since they both go beyond the self, knowing and doing take place within the dialectic of relative 
freedom and dependence. Their location makes them variable factors in the self-consciousness 
and, for Schleiermacher, unsuitable locations for piety. 
299. Kevin Hector summarises Schleiermacher's point: '‘Gefühl’ thus has to do with the 
innumerable ways in which one is affected by, and copes with, various circumstances prior to 
and apart from conscious reflection and judgement—the ways, in other words, that one is 





absolutely free. The relative freedom and dependence of feeling in the self-
consciousness illustrate the limits Schleiermacher places on the self-consciousness, 
'a consciousness of our existence in the world or of our co-existence with the 
world... a series in which the feeling of freedom and the feeling of dependence are 
divided.'(CF 4.2.15) Gefühl, though, is not simply an orientation to the various 
elements of the world, but it is also a way of taking the world as a unity. As a 
member of the reciprocal forces of the world, self-consciousness can also be aware 
of the world's dependence on a source outside itself. The feeling of absolute 
dependence, as immediate or non-conceptual self-consciousness, is consciousness 
'that the whole of our spontaneous activity comes from a source outside of us.'(CF 
4.3.16) The consciousness of absolute dependence is non-conceptual, since 
concepts always relate to the world in some way, constant, since it is not affected 
by a single worldly determinant, and not the result of human exertion, since this 
always looks back to a certain determined receptivity. At the same time, the feeling 
of absolute dependence must be related to some determinate feeling, or else it 
would be a speculative or an original conception forged in an outgoing activity.300 
The determinant, the whence of the feeling of absolute dependence, the 
consciousness of the source of the world's receptivity and activity, is God, and, yet, 
'this 'Whence' is not the world in the sense of the totality of temporal existence, and 
still less is it any single part of the world.' (CF 4.4.16) The basic form here mirrors 
                                                            
300. 'In the next place, we have to note that our proposition is intended to oppose the view that 
this feeling of dependence is itself conditioned by some previous knowledge of God. And this 
may indeed be the more necessary since many people claim to be in the sure possession of a 
concept of God, altogether a matter of conception and original, i.e. independent of any feeling; 
and in the strength of this higher self-consciousness, which indeed may come pretty near to 
being a feeling of absolute freedom, they put far from them, as something almost infra-human, 
that very feeling which for us is the basic type of all piety... So that in the first instance God 
signifies for us simply that which is the co-determinant in this feeling and to which we trace our 
being in such a state; and any further content of the idea must be evolved out of the fundamental 




the Protestant position explicitly endorsed by Schleiermacher: what is most 
fundamental about human beings is given and cannot be reduced to a product of 
human striving.  
 
 
III. The Feeling of Absolute Dependence 
 
The whence of the feeling of absolute dependence is human feeling as it is 
determined by God. Unlike all other feelings, however, the source of this feeling is 
not a perceptible object given in human experience.301 Nor is the determinant one 
picked out through the application of a concept in an act of knowing, since to do 
so would locate within the realm of relative dependence. Schleiermacher puts the 
matter bluntly: 'The transference of the idea of God to any perceptible object, 
unless is all the time conscious that it is a piece of purely arbitrary symbolism, is 
always a corruption...'(CF 4.4.18) In the feeling of absolute dependence, immediate 
self-consciousness takes up the world as such, the entirety of finitude, in its 
dependent relation on God.302 Gefühl does not relate to a determination, but to its 
being determined at all, and does so without the application of a conceptual 
apparatus or variation in time.303 In this case feeling, as explained above, can and 
does pass into knowing and doing, it cannot, however, be reduced to any single 
                                                            
301. '...any possibility of God being in any way given is entirely excluded, because anything that 
is outwardly given must be given as an object of exposed to our counter-influence, however 
slight that may be.' (CF 4.4.18) 
302. '...in so far as we are constituent parts of the world, and therefore in so far as we take up the 
world into our self-consciousness and expand the latter into a general consciousness of finitude, 
we are conscious of ourselves as absolutely dependent... For if we are conscious of ourselves, as 
such and in our finitude, as absolutely dependent, the same holds true of all finite existence, and 
in this connexion we take up the whole world along with ourselves into the unity of self-
consciousness.' (CF 8.2.35) 
303. 'Therefore, in itself it [consciousness of absolute dependence] cannot possible be at one 
moment thus and at another moment otherwise, nor can it by intermission be present at one 




concept or representation. In other words, piety, as an orientation to one's concrete 
circumstances, forms language without itself being language.304  
The reciprocal character of human life, including immediate self-
consciousness, in its relationship with the world, of which it is a part, is the basis 
of Schleiermacher's religious realism.305 Self-consciousness is an experience only 
as it is determined in some specific way by its circumstances. Even creative or 
spontaneous activity must be determined by an object that is given in some sense 
exerting influence on one's prior receptivity. The mutual influence of the world and 
the self, as one within the world, provides the limits for the experience and 
expression of the self. The limits imposed by context, whether cultural, political, 
natural, or whatever, mean that 'there can be no such thing as a feeling of absolute 
                                                            
304. 'Meanwhile, religious men know that it is only in speech that they cannot avoid the 
anthropomorphic: in their immediate consciousness they keep the object separate from its mode 
of representation, and they endeavour to show their opponents that without this integration of 
feeling no certainty is possible even for the strongest forms of objective consciousness or of 
transitive action, and that, to be consistent, they must limit themselves entirely to the lower 
grade of life.' (CF 5.PS.26) In Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other Writings. trans. Andrew 
Bowie. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) p. 15: ''The insistence on historical 
interpretation is only the correct insistence on the connection of the writers of the N.T. with 
their age. (Dangerous expression 'concepts of the time'.) But this insistence becomes mistaken if 
it denies the new concept-forming power of Christianity [die neue begriffsbildende Kraft des 
Christentums] and wants to explain everything from what is already there... The whole issue 
then depends on the relationship of grammatical and psychological interpretation, for the new 
concepts arose from the particular enlivening of the mind [Gemütserregung].' And 
Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts. Translated by James Duke and Jack Forstman. 
Edited by Heinz Kimmerle. Atlanta; Scholars Press, 1977 p. 50 ‘Christianity has created 
language. From its very beginning it has been a potentiating linguistic spirit, and it still is. It is 
providential that it could not annex itself to Hellenistic truth.’ 
305. Hans Frei makes this point well: 'God-consciousness is identical with self-consciousness 
only as the latter is in a specifically qualified or determined state, i.e., as consciousness in which 
God is present; or, to state it another way, God-consciousnes is identical with awareness of 
oneself as absolutely dependent. The content of God-consciousness is given to experience. To 
this extent one may call Schleiermacher a realist rather than a subjectivist. He did not identify 
the ideal and the real, nor did he conceptually identify consciousness and its determinant.' Faith 
and Ethics: The Theology of H. Richard Niebuhr ed. Paul Ramsey (New York: Harper & Row, 
1957) p. 37. I am leaving to the side of this discussion Schleiermacher's own speculative 
philosophy, which may in fact be more Idealist in character. For an argument that 
Schleiermacher's theology and philosophy formally cohere see John E. Thiel God and World in 




freedom,' nor, apart from the experience of God, a feeling of absolute dependence. 
(CF 4.3.15)306  
Knowledge of the feeling of absolute dependence is, therefore, knowledge 
of a relationship expressed in conceptual terms (i.e. brought before the reflective 
self-consciousness) ill-fitted to their object.307 Hans Frei describes the character of 
this odd knowledge:  
'[Schleiermacher] rejected the notion that the mind is capable of concrete 
comprehension of the internal relation between the Absolute (the "transcendent 
ground") and finite mind or ideation. It is precisely at this point, in specifying 
the direct relation between God and the human creature, that one must pass from 
philosophy to theology. Schleiermacher did indeed suggest that such a 
relationship exists, but precisely because it is direct and concretely real it is 
conceptually impure. God is directly present to consciousness, but this presence 
is inseparable from the awareness of oneself as standing in this relationship.'308  
 
The relationship Schleiermacher has in mind is human redemption centred on Jesus 
Christ. The concrete circumstances of the human consciousness of the relationship 
are Christianity, which in The Christian Faith means evangelical Christianity. The 
somewhat abstract discussion of the self-consciousness parallels the more concrete 
discussion of evangelical Reform and piety in the sermons on the Augsburg 
confession. Together, the realist impulse of Schleiermacher's view of piety sets up 
an experiential basis for a Reformed doctrine of God emphasising His 
Omnipotence and the eternal act of election, his purposive action upon the world. 
 
                                                            
306. 'But neither an absolute feeling of dependence, i.e. without any feeling of freedom in 
relation to the co-determinant, nor an absolute feeling of freedom, i.e. without any feeling of 
dependence in relation to the co-determinant, is to be found in this whole realm.' 4.2.15. John E. 
Thiel further explains this connection: 'The order of worldly causality issues from the integrity 
of proper thinking itself and, for this reason, the Naturzusammenhang is Weltbewusstsein or 
mediate self-consciousness considered in its widest possible expanse. So considered, the 
Naturzusammenhang provides pious feeling not only with a legitimate province for its own 
objectification but also with a historical setting whose limits are defined by proper thinking and 
which the dogmatician must respect as he plies his trade.'  God and World in Schleiermacher's 
Dialektik and Glaubenslehre. p. 206. 
307. 'Any proclamation of God which is to be operative upon and within us can only express 
God in his relation to us; and this is not an infra-human ignorance concerning God, but the 
essence of human limitedness in relation to Him.' (CF 10.PS.52) 
























Chapter 6. Schleiermacher on the Doctrine of God 
 
The doctrines associated with creation locate the parameters of Christ's 
work in the Glaubenslehre, even if the doctrines are only completed in the sections 
describing Christ's person and work. They are both ingredient in and mutually 
determinative of Christian piety as the end of human piety, viz. the experience of 
redemption as the completion of creation. For these reasons, and perhaps imitating 
Calvin's Institutes, Schleiermacher splits his doctrinal system into two parts: 
knowledge of God as Creator (§31-61) and as Redeemer (§62-172).309  The two 
divisions both end with treatments of the divine attributes as they relate 
respectively to creation and to redemption after detailing the experiential basis of 
each knowledge, bases constantly implying each other. Both sections depend on a 
common account of human piety and experience developed primarily in the early 
sections of the Glaubenslehre borrowed from various disciplines related to 
theology. A tension between the two moments remains within the Christian life: 
'In the actual life of the Christian... there is no general God-consciousness which 
has not bound up with it a relation to Christ, and no relationship with the Redeemer 
which has no bearing on the general God-consciousness.' (CF 62.3.261)   
The knowledge of God as Creator, though, is not the result of an 'universal 
or so-called natural theology,' but is the Christian element 'coincident in expression 
with those of other faiths.' (CF 29.2.124)310 Schleiermacher conceptually and 
textually links these two aspects of piety, relationship with the Redeemer and 
                                                            
309. B. A. Gerrish The Old Protestantism and the New (London: A & C Black, 2004) p. 198. 
310. 'If, then, this first element in our proposition does thus belong to Christian piety, because it 
necessarily appears in combination with the second, we further venture to assert that the two 




general God-consciousness, through his doctrine of sin, and the divine attributes of 
Holiness and Justice following on the human experience of sin. Natural, universal, 
or speculative theology cannot be treated in Christian doctrine as Christian doctrine 
concerns itself with definite states of mind and these determinations 'belong to the 
realm of the antithesis in which the sensible self-consciousness moves.' (CF 5.PS. 
25)  
 
I. The Creator God and His Attributes 
 
By placing human knowledge of God in the immediate self-consciousness, 
Schleiermacher calls into question some inherited  conceptual strategies for 
speaking about God, namely the modification of a worldly concept by removing 
limitations or negations before applying it to God.311 Instead, Christian talk about 
God begins with the experience of the undivided causality as that which gives birth 
to language, 'absolute causality is experienced and presses for expression in 
diversity of language; [t]he two coincide—the place of experience and the origin 
of effability.'312 The experiential basis of human knowledge of God, the warrant 
for human talk about God, is the feeling of absolute dependence, which remains 
constant in the Christian life, coming into expression in diverse language despite 
its unitary source. Differentiations in the feeling of absolute dependence could only 
have their source in differences within God, who is one.313  
                                                            
311. (CF 50.3.197) 
312. Gerhard Ebeling 'Schleiermacher's Doctrine of the Divine Attributes' Journal for Theology 
and Church no. 7 p. 139. 
313. 'For if differentiations were assumed in God, even the feeling of absolute dependence 
could not be treated as such and as always and everywhere the same. For, in that case, there 
must be differences having their source in something beyond the difference of the life-moments 




Schleiermacher's solution to this problem of plural speech about the one 
God is two-fold and sets up his initial statements concerning the doctrine of God. 
First, Schleiermacher begins by treating God as Creator responsible for the entirety 
of the created world and its causality. The created causality of the world depends 
entirely on God so that no element within the flux of the world can alone be taken 
in isolation as indicative of who God is. Second, God's creation of the worldly 
causality, though, does allow for the different moments, and all moments 
potentially, to express human relations to God. As a result,  
'all attributes which we ascribe to God are to be taken as denoting not 
something special in God, but only something special in the manner in which 
the feeling of absolute dependence is to be related to him.' (CF 50.194) 
 
 Attributes are ways of expressing how human beings are before God; they indicate 
limits.  
In the remainder of this chapter I will turn to an appreciation of 
Schleiermacher's doctrine of God as creator and the attributes associated with 
creation. Beginning with God as creator is important for understanding 
Schleiermacher's entire project in the Glaubenslehre according to Richard 
Niebuhr:  
‘One may translate The Christian Faith into the language of creedal theology by 
saying that the basal knowledge of God afforded by the religious consciousness 
is a knowledge of God as creator of all things visible and invisible, and the finite 
consciousness can never dissolve or abstract from this relationship.'314  
 
The relationship established in creation, as one established by God's eternal decree, 
does not change:  
'In fact, there is only one eternal and universal [allgemeinen] decree 
[Rathschluß] of the justification of men for Christ's sake... [and] the decree that 
sent forth Christ is one with the creation of human generation if in Christ human 
nature is first accomplished.' (CG 109.3.197.31-198.4)  
 
                                                            




As a result, the doctrine of God cannot be given apart from the entire dogmatic 
system describing God's decree as it is enacted in creation and redemption through 
the Christian experience of faith.315  
 
A. The Doctrine of Creation 
 
Schleiermacher's doctrine of creation grows out of two points: the 
origination of all things in God, and the impossibility of placing God 'under those 
terms [Bestimmungen] and antitheses which have arisen in and through the world.' 
(CF 40.149-150/CG 40.231.3-4) The first point covers the traditional doctrines of 
God's creation and preservation of the world. The second treats God's difference 
from the world as the world's sole determinant. The two points belong together in 
Schleiermacher's presentation as ways of articulating the asymmetrical relationship 
between God and the world in appropriately unique terms.  
The world's existence in absolute dependence on God has been divided into 
two related church doctrines: creation and preservation.316 Creation and 
preservation do not, though, denote two different actions undertaken by God, the 
distinction comes down from traditional religious teaching without definite 
dogmatic content. (CF 37.2.143) Schleiermacher points to the original unity of the 
doctrines in the 'Roman Symbol' with its confession, 'πιστεύω εἰς θεὸν 
παντοκράτορα' embodying the claim that 'the totality of finite being exists only in 
dependence upon the Infinite [which] is the complete description of that basis of 
                                                            
315. '...the doctrine of God, as set forth in the totality of the divine attributes, can only be 
completed simultaneously with the whole system: whereas it is usually treated continuously and 
without a break...' (CF 31.2.128) 
316. Der ursprüngliche Ausdrukk dieses Verhältnisses, daß nämlich die Welt nur in der 
schlechthinigen Abhängigkeit von Gott besteht, spaltet sich in der kirchlichen Lehre in die 





every religious feeling which is here to be set forth.'(CF 36.1.142) The division in 
the doctrines comes with the evangelical confessions describing God as 'creator et 
conservator omnium tum visibilium tum invisibilium,' without, however, expanding 
creation or preservation into any definite form. (CF 37.144)317 Schleiermacher 
retains the division such that taken together they will explain the original, primitive 
feeling of God as παντοκράτορα. The doctrine of creation will be explained with 
an eye to clearing out 'alien' elements in the account of absolute dependence, while 
preservation will explain the experience of absolute dependence and divine 
causality. 
Creation out of nothing is not, for Schleiermacher, a definite concept, but a 
negative concept setting boundaries on acceptable ways of speaking about creation. 
Everything that exists must be related to God as its origin so that nothing possesses 
an independent existence. Creation out of nothing is not an explanation of how the 
world has come into existence, which is the domain of natural science318, but a 
restriction on attempts to offer such explanations  
'[N]othing definite is here said about the manner of creation, there is nothing on 
which to remark in this distinction except the intention that nothing, no point of 
space and no point of time, should be exempted from the Divine All-
Sovereignty... For it is only by describing God as the sole original activity that 
the relation of absolute dependence can be expressed.' (CF 37.1.144) 
 
Offering an explanation of Creation, a quasi-physical narrative account like the one 
given in Genesis, would draw God into the antitheses of the created world, and, 
therefore, make the feeling of absolute dependence impossible through an 
adulteration of God's own independence. Since the feeling of absolute dependence 
                                                            
317. The quotation is from the first of the Anglican Articles of Religion. Schleiermacher gives 
references to the Augsburg Confession, Gallican Confession, Scottish Confession, and 
Hungarian Confession. He cites these texts from the Augusti Corpus. 
318. 'Hence the complete separation of these two involves our handing over this subject to 
natural science, which, carrying its researches backward into time, may lead us back to the 




relates to one who has just this sort of sovereignty over the whole world as such. 
Other theories of creation do not come from the explication of Christian piety, but 
the satisfaction of intellectual curiosity through speculation.  
'And [the negative position] is the [one] given the doctrine, both when it occurs 
in the New Testament and in all regular Confessions of Faith. Whereas the Old 
Testament basis of it lies in the beginnings of a history-book which as such 
chiefly satisfies the desire for knowledge.' (CF 39.1.149)  
 
The doctrine of creation follows the negative strictures imposed on doctrine by the 
feeling of absolute dependence, i.e. God's not being a thing in the world (CF 
4.4.16), and the Reformation commitment to the removal of human precepts, i.e. 
human speculations unrelated to Christian piety.  
 
B. The Doctrine of Preservation 
 
The doctrine of Preservation (Erhaltung), on the other hand, is the positive 
expression of the feeling of absolute dependence as the Christian relation to God 
as creator. Schleiermacher gives a positive view of the doctrine:  
'The pious self-consciousness, by means of which we place all that affects or 
influences us in absolute dependence on God, coincides entirely with the view 
that all such things are conditioned and determined by the interdependence of 
Nature.'(CF 46.170)  
 
The positive view of preservation, which Schleiermacher prefers to traditional 
language of providence (Vorsehung), (CF 164.3.726) relates all of the finite 
causality, the internal causes of the world, to the divine causality. (CF 51.200) By 
considering three aspects of this relation the nature of this doctrine will become 
clearer: miracles, evil, and human freedom. 
The finite, or worldly, causality is made up of the reciprocal, related, and 
partial causalities of individuals within the world. The nature system 




causality, and, in fact, the two 'are one and the same thing simply from different 
points of view, the one being neither separated from the other nor limited by it.' 
(CF 46.2.174) The working of the finite causality does not occur apart from the 
determinant causality of God working out 'the fulfilment of divine decrees' through 
the powers and forces within the world. (CF 46.PS.175-178) In making this point 
Schleiermacher jumps ahead somewhat to his conception of the work of the 
Redeemer in restoring creation and bringing about the Kingdom of God. The 
completion of creation in the incarnation does not occur in opposition to the eternal 
decree of God so it cannot be in opposition to the divine causality responsible for 
the system of nature. Nothing can be thought of as somehow independent of the 
divine causality, even free or spontaneous actions, requiring divine intervention in 
the form of miracles or special divine actions. The general preservation of the 
world undertaken by God accounts for all developments within the nature system 
inhabited by free agents. Schleiermacher illustrates this point by placing human 
prayer 'under divine preservation so that prayer and its fulfilment or refusal are 
only part of the original divine plan, and consequently the idea that otherwise 
something else might have happened is wholly meaningless.' (CF 47.1.180)  
If everything is placed under the divine preservation in this way, then the 
question of the origin of evil will necessarily arise. Schleiermacher, however, 
reframes the question around the purpose of evil. Whether personal, what 
Schleiermacher calls 'moral, or social evil,’ evil represents the obstacles one 
encounters in life either through the resistance of nature or the social life. Both of 
these realms, as parts of the finite causality, are determined by God; evil and good 
'are alike rooted in universal dependence on God.' (CF 48.1.185) God is, in a sense, 




has the purpose of bringing about progress in the Christian life. Evil is a condition 
of the emergence of the good in the Christian life by means of the reciprocal 
influence of the finite causality.319 The ordered character of evil, as the resistance 
of humanity to realising the feeling of absolute dependence, is directed to its 
overcoming through the means of the finite causality. It is ordained to the purpose 
of the completion of human nature from within the nature system in restoration or 
redemption. The existence of evil, and its correlate sin, are from the very beginning 
ordered to the coming of the Redeeming, 'set in relation to His appearing.' (CF 
80.2.328)  
Schleiermacher's examination of human freedom also makes use of this 
pattern. He admits a relative distinction between causes in the system of nature and 
the free actions of human beings. The only other option he sees would be a total 
determinism transforming everything into 'appearance' and annihilating the self. 
(CF 49.1.191) At the same time, distinguishing natural forces from those of free 
agents as closer to God's causality would undo the uniformity of relation implied 
in the feeling of absolute dependence.320 He resolves the problem by relating all 
aspects of the finite causality, free, bound, human, natural, etc., to the divine 
casuality, 'which is entirely different from that which belongs to the sphere of 
reciprocal action.'(CF 49.2.192) The pattern relates all finite existence to the divine 
causality in a way totally distinct from any form of relationship within the finite 
realm. The oscillation between total identification and purposive engagement is a 
                                                            
319. 'Nothing remains but on the one hand to attribute the divine co-operation equally to 
everything that happens, and on the other to maintain that evil as such is not ordained by God, 
but only as related to the good and as one condition of it.' (CF 48.3.189) 
320. 'For this feeling [of absolute dependence] would not retains its uniform character if there 
were a sphere, i.e. that of natural causes, in which finite and divine causation met... [and] that of 
mechanical or rather apparent causation where only divine causality reigned and finite causality 
was absent, and that of free causality where only finite cause reigned and divine causality was 




necessary feature of Christian theology and piety as they maintain their tensive 
character.321 The asymmetrical and non-competitive relationship between divine 
and finite causality does have a purpose: redemption in Jesus Christ.  
Behind the doctrine of creation and or preservation stands the doctrine 
election: the ordained purpose of creation and preservation. Schleiermacher makes 
this connection explicit in a polemical work he wrote between the two editions of 
the Glaubenslehre against Lutheran attempts to soften the doctrine of 
predestination:  
'Consequently, on [Schleiermacher's] understanding, namely, that the divine 
Spirit is active through the Word as a power of nature, nothing is included other 
than simply a more precise statement of the Calvinian "according as it pleases 
God" (prout visum est Deo; Inst. 3.12.10). This is indeed the case, for it was 
indeed God's good pleasure from the beginning not to create individual being 
and life but to create a world, and this is also the way in which the Spirit of God 
is active, as a world-forming power, and through the Spirit of God there arises 
not the disorder of individual spiritual life but the spiritual world.'322  
 
The attributes of God draw on the feeling of absolute dependence to describe the 
various experiences of this 'world-forming power' on the pattern that has emerged 
in the discussion of creation and preservation: multiple reciprocal forces within the 
world are, without denying their relative difference, referred to God as equally the 
result of divine causality. The relationship between the terms, however, does not 
result in a conceptual identity, but an experienced unity at the level of feeling.323 
                                                            
321. [as long as there is no generally accepted formula for the God-world relation when] we 
begin to speak not of the origin of the world but of its coexistence with god and its relatedness 
to God, we cannot avoid an oscillation between formulas, on the one hand, which approach to 
the identification of the two, and formulas, on the other, which go near to putting them in 
opposition to one another.' (CF 46.2.174) 
322. On the Doctrine of Election, with Special Reference to the Aphorisms of Dr. Bretschneider 
by F. Schleiermacher  trans. Ian G. Nicol and Allen G. Jorgenson (Louisville, KY: Westminster 
John Knox, 2012)  p. 76. 'Nevertheless, even the most polemical interpreter of Schleiermacher's 
theological thinking cannot overlook the fact that his statement of the religious situation is not 
essentially different from that which the Augustinian-Reformed tradition has long since made 
the Western world familiar.' Niebuhr Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion p. 193. 
323. 'If we were to pursue this observation further, we should discover that a fundamental 
feature of Schleiermacher's thought is the endeavour not to allow speculative dominance to the 




The implied source of this unity of feeling is, as the above quote points to, the 
Spirit's reconciliation of the world to God in Christ. Apart from Christ's historical 
appearance, though, this austere non-salvific experience of the Creator is all that is 
possible 
 
II. Divine Attributes 
  
A. Methodological Constraints on the Doctrine of the Divine Attributes 
 
The unfinished character of human knowledge of God comes into greater 
focus when Schleiermacher turns to the doctrine of the divine attributes. The 
attributes express 'not something peculiar [besonderes] in God, but only something 
peculiar in the manner [Art] in which the feeling of absolute dependence 
corresponds to Him. (CF 50.194/ CG 50.300.7-9) They are the result of the 
inadequacy of simply speaking of a highest or original Being responsible for finite 
existence; they try to express something of the human experience of God. The 
origin of the doctrine of the attributes is the hymnic and lyrical use of descriptions 
of finite existence as analogies trying to 'vivify and establish the simple idea of the 
Supreme Being [höchstens Wesens].' (CF 50.1.194/ CG 50.1.301.7-8) Dogmatic 
theology, therefore, does not try to combine these attributes into knowledge of God, 
but works to make sure the feeling of absolute dependence, our experience of God, 
is the ground of all these various impressions.324 Grounding the attributes in 
                                                            
between God and world, between sin and grace.' Ebeling ‘Schleiermacher’s Doctrine of the 
Divine Attributes’ pp. 158-159. 
324. 'Dogmatic Theology, on the other hand, tried more and more to systematise them 
[representations of attributes], not, if it understood itself rightly, in order to arrive at the 
consciousness that they contained a complete knowledge [Erkenntniß] of God, but only to 
assure itself that the God-consciousness which dwells in us in all its differentiations and as it 





experience in this way places methodological strictures on what can be said about 
God and how it can be said. 
Schleiermacher gives three traditional ways for how we can speak about 
God: the removal of limits, negation, and causality.325 The first two methods, which 
Schleiermacher views as versions of the same method, take a worldly concept, 
something developed in the mediate self-consciousness, perform an operation on 
it, i.e. remove finite limitations or negate the concept, and then apply the concept 
to God.326 Unsurprisingly, Schleiermacher rejects these views as positing 
something apart from God that is in turn attributed to God, which would locate 
some knowledge of God within the flux of finite existence, and made to be the 
basis of a speculative knowledge of God. The way of causality, though, refers to 
the experience of the divine causality and the various modifications of feeling 
coming about as a result.327 By referring the various attributes to the single divine 
causality, the attributes are not taken as descriptions of various things about God 
but as expressions of the diverse human experience of the one divine causality.  
The restriction on theological talk also conditions what can be said of 
God.328 The removal of finite limits and the negation of finite attributes attempt to 
                                                            
325. Schleiermacher gives them as 'der Weg der Entschränkung, der Verneinung oder 
Absprechung und der Ursächlichkeit' with a note, 'via eminentiae negationis et causalitatis.' 
(CG 50.3.304.18-20) 
326. Using the example of infinity Schleiermacher critiques these ways of speaking in (CF 
50.3.196-197) 
327. 'If the divine attributes express modulations of the way in which the feeling of absolute 
dependence is related to God and in which absolute causality comes to consciousness in 
concrete form, then the systematic structure must be subjected to this criterion. To draw up a 
complete list of divine attributes with the intention of thereby making it possible to construct a 
complete knowledge of God from concepts would be at variance with this criterion. The same, 
of course, applies to a mere statistical stringing together of, say, the biblical attributes of God. 
Schleiermacher is certainly interested in completeness where content is concerned, because the 
systematic method exercises an essential function of control over against extraneous 
instructions.' Ebeling 'Divine Attributes' p. 150. 
328. Schleiermacher insists on the maintenance of 'that ineffability of the Divine Being which 





describe God's inner life by speaking of God apart from God's relation to the world 
so 'that those attributes which express God's relation to the world have the 
appearance of mere additions and accidents.'(CF 50.4.200) They separate who God 
is in Himself from who He is in relation to the world, introducing not only 
composition into God but describing God's inner life in inactive or negative 
terms.329 Schleiermacher's procedure does not divide the attributes experienced in 
the feeling of absolute dependence from the inner vitality or activity of God by 
taking each attribute as expressive of the divine essence experienced in the feeling 
of absolute dependence. The attributes do not pick out real differences in God, 'each 
attribute is then only another expression for the whole Being of God, which remains 
always the same.' (CF 50.3.199) The basis of this experiential knowledge of God 
is the comprehensive equality and radical difference of both the divine and finite 
causality.330 On Schleiermacher's model, then, the attributes will describe the 
feeling of absolute dependence, as it is experienced in the finite causality, in such 
a way that the diverse descriptions will describe the active, unique life of God in 
itself and in the world without compromising the asymmetrical character of this 
relationship. The motif of polar, paradoxical identification recurs again in the 
description of the attributes as descriptions of the God-world relationship. 
Schleiermacher sums up this view of God's expressive life as 'absolute vitality' 
[schlechthinige Lebendigkeit], which brings together God's inwardness 
[Innerlichkeit] and vitality [Lebendigkeit]. (CF 51.2.203/CG 51.2.312.13-14) 
                                                            
329. '...the result [of these methods] is always a duality in God--a purely inner life in virtue of 
the inactive attributes, and a life related to the world in virtue of the active attributes.' (CF 
50.3.198) 
330. 'For the divine causality is only equal in compass to the finite in so far as it is opposite to it 
in kind, since if it were like it in kind, as it is often represent as being in anthropomorphic ideas 
of God, it too would belong to the sphere of interaction and thus be a part of the totality of the 




Gerhard Ebeling describes Schleiermacher's motivations in his methodological 
constraints on the discussion of the attributes: ''What Schleiermacher has in view 
in all this is unquestionably the central biblical description of God as the living 
God.'331  
With these constraints in mind, Schleiermacher turns to his positive 
treatment of the divine attributes. As with the doctrines of creation and 
preservation, the traditional view of the attributes is subjected to criticism on the 
basis of the feeling of absolute dependence as the felt ground of the doctrines 
themselves. The revisions, moreover, maintain the same commitment to God's total 
purposive action in the creation and redemption of the world. The attributes treated 
at this point will, for that reason, find their counterparts in the attributes treated in 
relation to sin and redemption: holiness, justice, love, and wisdom. These pairs 
conform to the two-fold structure of God's inwardness and vitality, his self-derived, 
asymmetrical expression of love in the world. Although Schleiermacher lists four 
attributes at this point, eternity, omnipresence, omnipotence, and omniscience, they 
can actually be reduced to two: eternity and omnipotence.332 Eternity, with 
omnipresence as its correlate, emphasises God's distinction from the finite world 
in his presence to it and so falls on the side of God's inwardness. Omnipotence, 
with omniscience as its accompaniment, on the other hand, stresses God's presence 
in the context of the finite causality and so it manifests a sense of God's expressive 
vitality. Taken together they illustrate the tension necessary in any picture of God's 
                                                            
331. Ebeling 'Divine Attributes p. 142 
332. 'The divine causality as equivalent in compass to the sum-total of the natural order is 
expressed in the term, the divine omnipotence; this puts the whole of finite being under the 
divine causality. The divine causality as opposed to the finite and natural is expressed in the 




life in himself and with the world, which is the same life, within the constraints 
imposed by Schleiermacher's vision of evangelical theology. 
 
B. Eternity and Omnipresence333 
 
Attributing eternity and omnipresence to God right away raises the problem 
of conceptualising an attribute on the basis of a negation of some finite property, a 
procedure Schleiermacher has criticised and abandoned. The temptation especially 
arises to ascribe the attributes in this way because the attributes are not usually 
taken as active.334 So, for instance, God's eternity will be thought of in terms of his 
existence before time, but this is to think in the 'sphere of a comparison of more or 
less...made between similars.'(CF 52.1.204) Duration of time and extension in 
space, however, only take place within the created causality that depends entirely 
on God. A more considered view of the attributes would remove them from time 
and space either by removing the limits, by denying a temporal beginning and end 
(CF 52.2.205) or positing an infinite extension (CF 53.2.209), but these views end 
up not affirming anything positive about God at all or equating an attribute with an 
aspect of finite existence. 'We must therefore reject as inadequate all those 
explanations which abrogate for God only the limits of time [and space as well] 
and not time [and space] itself, and would form eternity from time by removal of 
limits, while in fact these are opposites.' (CF 52.2.205) As Schleiermacher has 
pointed out repeatedly up to this point in the Glaubenslehre, God's difference from 
                                                            
333. '...the idea of omnipresence, indeed, is only taken up here because the contrast between the 
divine causality and the finite in the term eternity has been predominantly referred to time. It 
seems unnecessary then to do more than to carry over in the same form everything belonging to 
the former proposition, changing time into space.' (CF 52.1.206-207) 
334. 'If the eternity of God be separated from His omnipotence, which is here confined to its 
special relation to eternity, it becomes only a so-called 'inactive' attribute; and thus is often 




the world is different than any relationship or opposition within the world. 
Uniquely, he differs differently. 
Making a positive move, Schleiermacher links the attributes to God's 
omnipotence and makes them a divine activity: 'in that a divine activity is posited, 
something may be posited, unknown indeed and perhaps not clearly conceivable, 
but by no means simply nothing.' (CF 52.2.205) The not 'simply nothing' of divine 
eternity does not become conceivable, but describes God as the source of our 
experience of time without Himself being in time.335 The human experience of 
time, human feeling as temporally experienced, is finite experience of God's 
creative and preservative act in a temporal modulation. Schleiermacher's non-
speculative method rooted in the feeling of absolute dependence transforms the 
doctrines of God's eternity and omnipresence from negative attributes of God in 
Himself to positive attributes related to God's responsibility for the existence of 
time and space. The attributes are, then, ways of attributing features of the created 
world to God 'as the enduring causal ground relatively to the changing caused' 
without being able to give a definitive account of either the ground or nature of the 
causes. (CF 52.2.206)  
In the case of eternity, Schleiermacher's positive illustration of his point is 
the phenomenon of a subject remaining identical throughout its changing states. 
Feeling, when taken as consciousness as such, endures throughout the different 
physical, mental, and spiritual states of a human life in a way similar to God's 
endurance of the various modulations of the finite causality. The finite being 
                                                            
335. 'Theologically still more profound is the corresponding interpretation of eternity as divine 
causality.[Gl. 52, Thesis (I, 267)] The two misinterpretations of eternity--as boundless time[Gl 
52,2], and as a timelessness that has no relation to time[Gl. 52,2],--are surmounted by 
understanding eternity as once again a modulation of divine causality--namely, as the 
constitutive condition not only of all temporal things but of time itself.' Ebeling 'Divine 




perduring through time is a 'kind of analogical point of contact [analogischen 
Anknüpfungspunkt]' between God and finite being. (CF 52.2.206/CG 52.2.316.24) 
The two poles in this point of contact cannot, however, be equated with each other 
or compared at the structural level beyond this one point because of a deep 
fundamental difference. The relationship between God and finite being comes to 
expression in the radically asymmetrical correlation of absolute causality and 
absolute dependence, structurally determinative aspects of both. God's perdurance 
as eternal and timeless ground negates any need for a separate doctrine of God's 
unchangeability: 'it is already contained in the idea of eternity.'(CF 52.PS.206) 
Schleiermacher preserves it as rule not to interpret any religious emotion as if it 
indicated a change in God.336 
Omnipresence is, also, easily thought in terms of comparison with the finite 
spatial order. 'For when there is space-filling, we cannot get away from the analogy 
with expansive forces, and then the notion of an infinite extension to be predicated 
of God lies too near.' (CF 53.2.209) Descriptions of God as outside of all things, 
besides all things, and including all things in Himself all think spatially parallel to 
talk of eternity as time without beginning or end. God including all things within 
himself might be an improvement, but it fatally tends in an inactive direction. The 
best definition of God's omnipresence, especially when it stresses God's 
inwardness, is 'the formula that God is in Himself;337 but, of course, along with this 
it must be asserted that ‘the effects of His causal being-in-Himself are everywhere.' 
(CF 53.2.209) This Augustinian definition, in himself all together everywhere, 
                                                            
336. Schleiermacher lists Exodus 32:14, Jeremiah 26:13, and Jeremiah 42:10 as examples of 
God changing making clear his willingness to 'correct' the Old Testament when it is in conflict 
with Christian piety. 
337. Schleiermacher cites Augustine as the source of this definition: 'Augustine, Ep. 187, 14: 




follows the pattern of keeping God's inwardness and vitality in tension as a means 
of affirming the omnipresent feeling absolute dependence, the asymmetrical 
dependence of creation on God. 
 
C. Omnipotence and Omniscience 
 
Omnipotence and Omniscience follow more directly from God's vitality 
and to an extent mirror the doctrine of preservation. As has been repeatedly 
established already, omnipotence and omniscience must be constructed so that the 
absolute and finite causality cohere in distinction and are not subject to the 
conditions of finite, reciprocal, and contrasting existence. Within those parameters 
Schleiermacher articulates these doctrines with three positive results: God causes 
everything, knows everything, and does so in a single omnipotent act.  
Every relative cause and effect takes place within the finite causal system, 
a system that depends entirely on God, and God is equally the cause of all these 
things. The experiential basis of this doctrine is the fact that the feeling of absolute 
dependence relates all of finite existence to God in its total receptivity. The 
coherence of the divine and finite causality338 manifests itself in the 
correspondence of the natural order of causes and God's omnipotent ordering of 
those causes.(CF 54.1.212)339 Schleiermacher's revision of the doctrine of 
omnipotence, then, refuses a view of omnipotence as the ability to effect anything 
                                                            
338. 'In the conception of divine Omnipotence two ideas are contained: first, that the entire 
system of Nature, comprehending all times and spaces, is founded upon divine causality, which 
as eternal and omnipresent, is in contrast with all finite causality; and second, that the divine 
causality, as affirmed in our feeling of absolute dependence, is completely presented in the 
totality of finite being, and consequently everything for which there is a causality in God 
happens and becomes real.' (CF 54.211) 
339. 'Rather everything is and becomes altogether by means of the natural order, so that each 
takes place through all and all wholly through the divine omnipotence, so that all in divisibly 




or to intervene within finite causes. Those views of omnipotence would imply 
deliberation in God, and, therefore, both temporal duration as well as reciprocity.  
'[W]e only come to the idea of divine omnipotence through the conception of 
the feeling of absolute dependence, and we lack any point of connexion for 
making demands upon the divine causality which extend beyond the natural 
order embraced by this feeling.' (CF 54.2.212-213)  
 
As the cause of all things, God knows all things in a way appropriate to his relation 
to the finite world. God's knowledge is not, therefore, discursive or reactive, but 
creative and causative: 'it is quite correct to say, as has been said in multifarious 
ways, that everything exists by reason of God speaking or thinking it.'(CF 
55.1.221)340 Divine knowledge, as creative knowledge in creation and 
preservation, works for a purpose totally determined by God who executes this 
wisdom perfectly, without the influence of any alien power.(CF 55.1.221) 
Omnipotence and omniscience come together to affirm reality as the working out 
of God's wisdom, a fact practically learned in the experience of a prayer remaining 
unanswered or disappointed expectations as opportunities for 'true religious 
submission.' (CF 55.2.226)341 Like all the doctrines considered they point to a 
reconciliation of human beings with the world as it is, a real receptivity. 
The doctrines considered so far all circle around the coming doctrine of 
redemption and the person of the Redeemer, Jesus of Nazareth. God's wisdom in 
creating the world includes the coming of Christ as the means of effecting 
Redemption in the world, a determined rather than reactive means. Schleiermacher 
has attempted to adhere to this fact by building his doctrines around the particular 
circumstances of human beings as the place where God is known; the 
                                                            
340. See also 'Therefore, just as the divine will must not be thought of as a faculty of desire, so 
the divine will must no be thought of as a faculty of desire, so the divine omniscience must not 
be considered as a perceiving or experiencing, a thinking together or a viewing together.' (CF 
55.1.220) 




circumstances felt by human beings, the world of their Gefühl, are the result of 
God's causative wisdom that is ordered to the working out of redemption in Jesus 
Christ.342 The principle grounding the finite causality is the one who sends Christ 
into the world, something Christians have experienced in their own lives, and so 
up until this point Schleiermacher has been treating only what is presupposed in 
that experience, but is made known only in Jesus Christ.343 The concrete 
circumstances where the Redeemer is known are the Christian church.344 
Schleiermacher, without attempting a conceptual resolution of these issues, sees 
the relationship between human circumstances, the being of God, and the coming 
of the Redeemer as one:  
'Just as little, however, can we think of God's willing Himself, and God's willing 
the world, as separated the one from the other. For if He wills Himself, He wills 
Himself as Creator and Sustainer, so that in willing Himself willing the world 
is already included; and if He wills the world, in it He wills His eternal and ever-
present omnipotence, wherein willing Himself is included; that is to say, the 





                                                            
342. 'The creative power of God, however, does not merely manifest itself in Christ; it becomes 
productive in him and through him, ramifying outward from him through his communicating 
and imparting of himself to others, in alliance with the Spirit.' Niebuhr Schleiermacher on 
Christ and Religion p. 226. and 'Creation-faith is misconstrued, therefore, if it is interpreted as 
confidence in the principle of order. It is rather an attitude of resignation, assent and confidence 
in the particular order that converges on one's own vein, specifies one's identity before God, 
and gives one a sense of being a part of the original plan of creation.' Niebuhr Schleiermacher 
on Christ and Religion p. 245. 
343. 'The immediate feeling of absolute dependence is presupposed and actually contained in 
every pious Christian self-consciousness as the only way in which, in general, our own being 
and the infinite Being of God can be in one self-consciousness.' (CF 32.131) 
344. 'Our proposition says nothing of any intermediate link between faith and participation in 
the Christian communion, and is accordingly to be taken as directly combining to two, so that 
faith of itself carries with that participation; and not only as depending on the spontaneous 
activity of the man who has become a believer, but also as depending on the spontaneous 
activity of the communion, as the source from which the testimony proceeded for the awakening 




The Christian Faith pivots on this doctrine of sin as it moves from an 
abstracted discussion of human God-consciousness, the feeling of absolute 
dependence, to the more concrete experience of redemption in the Redeemer. The 
Redeemer, Jesus Christ, effects the redemption of the Christian believer prevented 
from enjoying the God-consciousness because of sin. Sin, therefore, provides the 
ground in the believer for his or her vital receptive interaction with Christ as the 
Redeemer, a status Christ possesses at least partially in virtue of his sinlessness. 
Just as the section on dependence began with the human experience of relative 
freedom and dependence, the Christological divisions of the Glaubenslehre begin 
with the human experience of sin in light of the redemption communicated by Jesus 
Christ. The experience of sin grounds the character of redemption in believers, as 
freedom from sin's bondage, as well as provides the descriptive means of 
conceptualising Christ's own life as the one effecting freedom from sin's bondage. 
Christian believers are freed from sin on the basis of Christ's sinlessness. Christ's 
sinlessness, as it is communicated in redemption, in turn leads the believer to 
understand God's real existence in Christ as a specific man. The effects of 
redemption in the human life will supply the warrant for a proper doctrine of 
Christ's person, i.e. God incarnate. Practically speaking I will emphasise 
Schleiermacher's revisionary doctrine of sin as humanity's dominance by its 
'sensual element.' The doctrine of sin will point to increasingly purposive divine 
attributes, holiness and justice, expressing God's intention in creation, which 
remains unrealised until the coming of the Redeemer in Jesus Christ. 
Schleiermacher lays out his doctrine of sin in relation to four foci: personal 
sin, original sin and the original perfection of the world, human suffering, and 




foci as an experience of human ineffectiveness and constraint. The negative picture 
of humanity's lack of God-consciousness, our refusal to be absolutely dependent, 
forms a counter-image to Christ's own sinlessness and perfect God-consciousness. 
Original sin and the original perfection of the world set up the necessity of Christ's 
'supernatural' entrance into the world, a world whose lack stems from the single 
divine decree rather than a Manichaean pollution or spoiling of creation. Human 
suffering in turn explains the visible effects of sin in the world without, again, 
invalidating the completion of the world. Furthermore, it will give Schleiermacher 
a way of explaining Christ's suffering as unconnected with his sin and, yet, allow 
this suffering to be in some sense salvific. Finally, the divine attributes of holiness 
and justice set the constraints on human life Jesus Christ will fulfil on behalf of 
humanity. Together these different foci set up the necessary interpretative material 
for the morally, rather than metaphysically, centred revisionist doctrine of Christ's 
person in Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre. 
  
A. Personal Sin 
 
The God-consciousness comes into human life as the 'actual content of a 
moment of experience only under the general form of self-consciousness, i.e. the 
antithesis of delight and aversion' so that religious consciousness oscillates 
between the different moments of human self-consciousness relatively determined 
by some outside source. (CF 62.259/CG 62.391.6-9)345 The oscillation can be 
described as turning towards or away from God in light of the Redeemer, and any 
description of the feeling of absolute dependence without this antithesis between 
                                                            
345. Translation has been altered here. 'Das bisher beschriebene Gottesbewußtsein kommt als 
wirkliche Erfüllung eines Momentes nur vor unter der allgemeinen Form des Selbstbewußtseins, 
nämlich dem Gegensatz von Lust und Unlust.' The Mackintosh translation gives 'Lust und 




delight and aversion will thus be false.346 By aversion or pain [Unlust], here at least, 
Schleiermacher intends human alienation from God originating from the human 
self, which is sin; by pleasure, fellowship with God, 'which we call Grace.' (CF 
63.262) The feeling of absolute dependence, in other words, remains in a kind of 
bondage as long as we attempt to bring it out through personal exertion rather than 
receiving it from Christ, taking it as grace.347 Christ's continued influence grounded 
in his person must remain active as a vital and inward power turning outward. 
The inability to bring about the God-consciousness in a human self-
consciousness by the human person's own efforts is, for Schleiermacher, conceived 
of as 'a positive antagonism of the flesh against the spirit.' (CF 66.271) The spirit, 
taken as the 'higher' functions of the soul should determine the human 
consciousness allowing the God-consciousness to determine the way the self 
interacts with the world. At this point in the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher does 
not pick up his earlier anthropology of feeling, thinking, and doing, but begins to 
use more and more the language of traditional Christian doctrine. However, his 
explanation of sin as 'an arrestment of the determinative power of the spirit, due to 
the independence of the sensuous functions' can be taken as an inappropriate 
relation of feeling to the world due to the domination of the self by a moment of 
                                                            
346. 'Everything related to the Redeemer in the religious consciousness of the Christian is 
peculiar to the distinctively Christian articulation of the antithesis under discussion. No 
proposition, as we have already said, describing the feeling of absolute dependence apart from 
this antithesis, can be a description of the religious moment in its entire content, for in every 
such moment that feeling occurs only as a relative turning away from God or turning towards 
Him... In the actual life of a Christian, therefore, the two are always found in combination: there 
is no general God-conscioussness which has not bound up with it a relation to Christ, and no 
relationship with the Redeemer which has no bearing on the general God-consciousness.' CF 
62.3 p. 261. 
347. 'The description [of Christian piety] given here, however, is identical with the general 
exposition put forward above [i.e. 11.2-3] For if the feeling of absolute dependence, which was 
previously in bondage, has been set free only by redemption, the facility with which we are able 
to graft the God-consciousness on the various sensuous excitations of our self-consciousness 





self-consciousness, thinking or doing, related to the sensuous world of relative 
dependence and freedom.348 The self does not take whatever moment it is presented 
with as related to and a participant in the larger work of God's creation, i.e. does 
not take itself or the moment as absolutely dependent but asserts its 'absolute' 
freedom or becomes unduly bound and dependent on something other than God. 
Human beings, inasmuch as they are sinful, are not conscious of God's 
determinative role in whatever moment they are faced with, although this 
determination is always in fact the case. 
A breakdown in or lack of the feeling of total dependence comes about, 
then, as a result of actual circumstances and misguided doing and acting. The time 
and place exert an influence on the person who sins, but the person in turn really 
does sin of his or her own volition. So Schleiermacher sees sin as our human 
consciousness of our place in the world when God's determination of that world 
has failed to adequately direct our feeling: 'We are conscious of sin as the force 
[Kraft] and work of a time in which the direction [Richtung] of the God-
consciousness had not yet emerged.'(CF 67.273/ CG 67.409.1-3) A failure at this 
level of feeling, in our immediate consciousness determined by our place in the 
world, will result in compromised thought and action in relation to the reality of 
the world and God.  
Human dependence fails to be truly absolute dependence, is improperly 
bound to some object, because of the ill-formed dependence cultivated in the 
                                                            
348. 'This explanation of sin as an arrestment of the determinative power of the spirit, due to the 
independence of the sensuous functions, is certainly reconcilable with those explanations which 
describe sin as a turning away from the Creator, though less so with those which interpret sin a 
violation of the divine law.' (CF 66.2.273) Compare with 'If, then, it is our primary object to 
ascertain the characteristic element in the consciousness of sinfulness, we ought not, within the 
sphere of Christian piety, to look for it except in the relationship to the God-consciousness, and 
accordingly the only course open to us is to reckon everything as sin that has arrested the free 




person in his or her historical circumstances. Personal sin relates to way feeling 
receives its determination from the world around it in an inadequate way. The 
concrete circumstances leading a human person to be attuned in this way or that 
way to the surroundings can and do inhibit the emergence of the God-
consciousness in the believer. This inadequate attunement comes about from the 
actual lived situation of the believer (another reminder that feeling does proceed 
from meaningful, specific, worldly moments), which is what Schleiermacher 
means by the domination of the higher part of the self, the immediate self-
consciousness or feeling, by the lower or sensuous part of the self. Self-
consciousness, however, cannot work itself out of this historically determined 
circumstance by an act of assertion, but can be free only through a proper 
receptivity at the level of feeling. In more doctrinal terms, sin should not be thought 
of as transgression of a law but 'as a turning away from the Creator,' a denial of 
God's character as creator of this world with its own objective character. At the 
same time this personal denial of the creator comes about through human relation 
to the larger concrete circumstances affecting human attunement to those concrete 
circumstances.349  In sin something other than the creator God becomes the 
attempted object of absolute human dependence and the structuring ground of 
human life. Sinful thoughts and actions are inadequately monotheistic and must be 
righted from without. 
                                                            
349. 'Hence in virtue of this dependence of the specific constitution of the individual life upon a 
larger common type, as also of the later generations upon the earlier, the sin of the individual 
has its source in something beyond and prior to its own existence. hence it is just the same even 
if such differences are held not to be innate, but to be due to education alone, since the type of 
education itself is determined by proclivities and experiences which precede in time of the 




The reason for this inability stems from the historically situated human 
self's dependence on the earlier generation: the sin of the individual has its source 
in something beyond and prior to its own existence.  
'Hence it is just the same even if such differences are held not to be innate, but 
to be due to education alone, since the type of education itself is determined by 
proclivities and experiences which precede in time of the learner.' (CF 69.1.279)  
 
Personal, actual sin must be traced back to something prior to the self-
consciousness, which does not make itself, and so Schleiermacher turns to original 
sin.  
 
B. Original Sin 
 
Schleiermacher takes the exterior determination of the self-consciousness 
away from the God-consciousness to be the meaning of original sin: 
 'the sinfulness that is present in an individual prior to any action of his own, 
and has its ground outside his own being, is in every case a complete incapacity 
for good, which can be removed only by the influence of the Redeemer.' (CF 
70.282)  
 
Original sin is a corollary of the fact that in Christian piety everything having to do 
with redemption relates to the antithesis of pain and pleasure, which 
Schleiermacher now gives—reveals—as sin and grace.350 As above, these states 
come about as a result of human self-consciousness relating to its circumstances in 
feeling as the basis for its outward works of thinking and doing. The relationship 
of the self whereby it receives its possibility for thinking and action is the domain 
of the doctrine of original sin. Two aspects of this relationship are feeling's 
                                                            
350. 'Hence as Christian piety traces everything at all connected with the God-consciousness 
either to sin or to grace, everything in our inner states that is not sin must be attributed to our 
share in redemption, and this redemption must be regarded as the only thing that can removed 




determination by the natural world, i.e. its inherent capacities, and the possibilities 
made available to it in its social life. I take up the latter first. 
Original sin exists in the human person prior to any action or thought he or 
she undertakes.351 The disposition of the God-consciousness in the human person 
has been adulterated to such a degree, even without actual sin coming into play, 
that it 'must be wholly incapable not only of developing, but even of consciously 
aspiring to, such inner states as would harmonise with the proper aim and object of 
the said disposition.'(CF 70.1.282-283) This is so because the self-consciousness 
does not create itself, but brings itself about through a complex negotiation of the 
various communities within which it exists. These social circumstances, though, 
are not geared toward the God-consciousness. They exist to further the self-interest 
of the group's 'own selfish interest or love of honour—and these are again but self-
love.' (CF 70.3.285) Members of a group become attuned to their circumstances in 
the service of this limited view, rather than the more general relation of the God-
consciousness, producing actual sin through mistaken thought and action. Their 
misplaced desire is necessarily related to a 'positive obscuration' of the God-
consciousness among members of the group. 'We cannot separate the two, for the 
one ever evokes the other; thus when in any social group, some definite form of 
appetite breaks out predominantly, it is presently followed by a transformation of 
the God-consciousness as a means of cloaking the discordance.'(CF 74.2.308)352 
While Schleiermacher does engage with the idea of tracing original sin back 
to Adam and Eve, he ultimately dismisses the idea that original sin begins with 
                                                            
351. 'This idea of a sinfulness present from the first in every human being is in perfect accord 
with what was set forth above.' (CF §70 ET p. 282) 
352. Schleiermacher quotes from the Apology for the Augusburg Confession: 'original sin is 
ignorance in mind and covetousness in the flesh. He is actually citing Melanchthon's quotation 
of Hugh of St. Victor: Apol. Conf. i. 'Originale peccatum est ignorantia in mente et 




Adam. Instead, original sin must have been present in Adam from the very 
beginning since he eventually sinned in actuality, which would have been 
impossible if he enjoyed the complete God-consciousness. Adam and Eve were in 
the same situation as present day human beings, 'innate sinfulness was something 
native to the first pair.'(CF 72.5.301) The narrative of the Fall is illustrative of a 
universal process in human life apart from the God-consciousness communicated 
by the Redeemer.353 Sin, original and actual, does not destroy human nature as 
such, but comes about through the incomplete development of human persons in 
light of the historical communities they themselves develop in and in turn hand 
over: 'the collective sin of each generation is in turn originating with respect to the 
sinfulness of the succeeding one...'(CF 72.6.304) The historical nature of sin will 
become very important for Schleiermacher when he turns to God's incarnation in 
Christ where the historical situation of his birth will be insufficient to account for 
his sinless existence.  
The historical nature of original sin also allows Schleiermacher to position 
sin within the single decree structure underlying The Christian Faith. Sin has been 
ordained by God not for itself, but 'on the contrary, the very statement that the 
Redeemer appeared when the fullness of the time was come makes it quite clear 
that from the beginning everything had been set in relation to His appearing.'(CF 
80.2.328) The incarnation will take place as the completion of creation rather than 
the reparation of a breached created order; the system is supralapsarian in the 
highest degree.354 Two related consequences follow from the single decree, 
                                                            
353. 'Without encroaching upon the work of exegesis or criticism, however, we can use the 
story, as the early theologians did, in illustration of the universal process of the rise of sin as 
something always and everywhere the same, and it is in this illustrative quality that, for us, the 
universal significance of the narrative resides.' (CF 72.5.303) 
354. Edwin Chr. van Driel has, therefore, accurately labelled Schleiermacher's Christology and 




supralapsarian structure of Schleiermacher's theological system. First, the 
perfection [Vollkommenheit] of the world is such that it can sufficiently determine 
'the receptivity of man to the awakening and shaping of self-activity,' or, put 
differently, the human body successfully mediates the material world and the 
human spirit to each other. (CF 59.1.238/CG 59.1.364.7-12) The created world is 
the place where humanity is capable of receiving influences and adequately 
expressing itself in the world.355 Second, sin does not vitiate the human person so 
much ‘as would involve the denial of man's capacity to appropriate redemption, for 
that capacity is the very least that be predicated of that disposition to the God-
consciousness which is inherent in man's original perfection.' (CF 70.2.283) Just 
as it is, humanity is capable of receiving grace through the Redeemer without 
acquiring a sixth sense or supra-human form of existence. As will be seen, the 




By impeding the development of the God-consciousness, sin brings about 
a kind of pain opposed to blessedness best thought of, according to Schleiermacher, 
as evil. Evil is 'the corporate suffering of the race' as a result of its corporate act of 
sin. (CF 75.3.317) Certain sorts of evil, though, can be thought of as natural evils 
that do not relate directly to human sinfulness, but operate as 'incentives to bring 
these forces more fully under human control.' (CF 75.3.317) Evil plays a 
                                                            
label, I have serious reservations about much of van Driel's work on Schleiermacher. He follows 
Catherine Kelsey's reading of Christ as example rather than effective agent in Schleiermacher's 
theology in her Thinking about Christ with Schleiermacher. As I will eventually make clear, this 
position does not due justice to the fact that Schleiermacher wants to affirm the divinity of 
Christ even at the cost of breaking the traditional model of the Trinity. 
355. 'So, then, the two together are one: the knowability of existence is the ideal side of the 
original perfection of the world, and the natural subsistence of the human organism is the real 




developmental role in the scheme of redemption by providing the resistance 
necessary for the spirit, or higher part of the self, to gain dominance over the 
sensuous part of the self. One of Schleiermacher's examples of this interpretation 
of evil is human mortality. Human beings cannot avoid death by willing it or not 
willing it. The God-consciousness could, therefore, accept death as part of its 
dependence on God. Death itself is not inherently evil or a source of human 
bondage, but the fear of death is a refusal to see God at work in it. (CF 75.1.316) 
As sinners who lack the God-consciousness, humans encounter death as a 
frustration of their desire to possess the God-consciousness completely and it is 
evil in this way. 
The relationship between sin and evil, however, does not bring about an 
exact correspondence between personal sin and the specific suffering people 
endure, an apparently erroneous and dangerous point of view 'deeply rooted in 
Judaism and Greek heathenism.'(CF 77.2.321) Everyone suffers evil as the result 
of sin without, however, suffering as a result of their specific sins. The obscure 
relationship between sin and suffering sets up Christ's ability, despite his 
sinlessness, to suffer on behalf of others, which bans any proportional relationship 
between sin and suffering.  
'How indeed could such a supposition be squared with the idea—an idea 
pervading the New Testament, and, if rightly understood essential to 
Christianity—that within a common sphere of sin it is possible for one to suffer 
for the rest, so that the evil due to the sin of many may all converge upon one, 
and that penal suffering may fall pre-eminently upon one who is himself most 
free from the common guilt and most resolute in his battle with sin?' (CF 
77.2.322) 
 
D. God's Holiness and Justice 
 
As I noted above, Christian doctrines relate to God's divine causality as it 




refer back to God's worldly activity so as to allow talk of his attributes in a heuristic 
way. 'All attributes which we ascribe to God are to be taken as denoting not 
something special in God, but only something special in the manner in which the 
feeling of absolute dependence is to be related to him.' (CF 50) The feeling of 
absolute dependence modulates in the experience of sin in such a way as to require 
talk of the divine attributes of holiness and justice. The attributes abstract from the 
lived experiences already described above, therefore, they can be treated quickly 
as distillations of those experiences. 
'By holiness of God we understand that divine causality through which in 
all corporate human life conscience [Gewissen] is found conjoined with the need 
of redemption.' (CF 83.341/CG 83.511.16) The holiness of God corresponds to the 
human experience of having a conscience. Every doing that comes about as a result 
of the God-consciousness, i.e. which is conditioned by the feeling of absolute 
dependence, is constrained by moral demands, 'not indeed theoretically, but 
asserting themselves in our self-consciousness in such a way that any deviation...is 
apprehended as a hindrance of life, and therefore as sin.' (CF 83.1.341) Conscience, 
the work of God's holiness, does not conflict with the moral demands of a given 
society, or should not in an Evangelical church, but is the result of the divine 
causality bringing about human action.356 Conscience is not, however, only a 
Christian phenomena but is present in all people inasmuch as the need for 
redemption, the purpose of conscience, is present in all people. Given that 
redemption is social, conscience too pushes into the social realm to establish a 
stable law 'finding outward expression in civil law.' Holiness is God's causality as 
                                                            
356. 'In the Evangelical Church, however, we are not troubled with such conflict, for there it is 
readily admitted that the modes of action emanating from our God-consciousness are identical 




it brings about the laws of human societies constraining evil for the purpose of 
redemption.  
The justice of God is the other side of the same process whereby God brings 
about moral awareness in human beings through their social contexts. Holiness 
points to a positive ordering of human action while 'the justice of God is that divine 
causality through which in the state of universal sinfulness there is ordained a 
connexion between evil and actual sin.' (CF 84.345) To reiterate, the connection is 
not between individual acts of sin and suffering, but between social sin and 
communal suffering of its results. Punishment of human beings for the purpose of 
reform is relative to the 'dispensation of redemption' and requires the appearance 
of redemption to make sense. (CF 84.3.351) At this point in the Glaubenslehre, 
Schleiermacher seems to be alluding to his earlier point concerning the need to 
relate corporate sinfulness and suffering, i.e. so that Christ can bear the penalty on 
behalf of others. Justice in the form of the bearing of suffering for sins as a 
historical phenomena points to the incarnation of God in Jesus of Nazareth. The 
historical, cultural, and political development is providentially ordained by the 























































Chapter 7. Schleiermacher on Christ's Person and Work 
 
This chapter will discuss Schleiermacher's Christology in two parts: 
Christ's person and work. Following Schleiermacher's own division, I will begin 
with Christ's person before moving on to explain the work he does in relation to 
the believer.357 The heuristic division into person and work follows the basic 
structure of the Glaubenslehre by beginning with God's absoluteness before 
moving on to his outward vitality. It also properly privileges the establishment of 
the God-consciousness in Christ before describing its communication in Christ's 
work. This structure tries to maintain God's sovereign priority and asymmetrical 
relationship to creation without compromising the experiential base of Christian 
doctrine. At this point in Schleiermacher's system, he begins to pivot towards the 
saving force of God in Christ, the touch of God on the believer, in order to approach 
the pragmatic reconstruction of the believer and her thought. Because of Christ's 
life, the dislocation of sin preventing the emergence of the God-consciousness in 
human feeling begins to be overturned as she realigns herself with God, surrenders 
her will to his formative power. Here is the moment of change in the dynamic of 
Christian piety. 
 
I. Incarnation and Monotheism 
 
If, in the Christian life, for Schleiermacher,  
                                                            
357. Schleiermacher also makes use of the threefold division of Prophet, Priest, and King to 
describe Christ's work. I have left them out, for the most part, of my discussion here in order to 




'there is no general God-consciousness which has not bound up with it a relation to 
Christ, and no relationship with the Redeemer which has no bearing on the general 
God-consciousness'  
 
then the transition from sin to blessedness will impinge on both as they mutually 
relate to the Christian's self-consciousness. (CF 62.3.261) The relationship with the 
Redeemer imparts a definite and concrete character to Christian piety in continuity 
with the Creator-creature relationship described under the rubric of the feeling of 
absolute dependence. Christian piety's oscillation between these factors forbids any 
account of it privileging one side over the other but links them concretely in the 
continuity of the single decree of creation and redemption. Put differently, the 
monotheistic Christian God-consciousness comes into view with the work of the 
Redeemer, but the work of the Redeemer is precisely to effect the actualisation of 
a monotheistic God-consciousness in the redeemed. If this balance falters one will 
have either, if the Redeemer is ignored, a non-Christian 'meagre and purely 
monotheistic God-consciousness' or, if the God-consciousness falls away, a 
personal relation disconnected from the rest of reality, which 'would not belong to 
the sphere of religion at all.' (CF 62.3.262)  
The monotheistic nature of Christianity and its belief in the divinity of the 
Redeemer and the Spirit lead Schleiermacher to place Christian faith somewhere 
between Judaism and paganism. The reality of the divine being existing in Jesus 
Christ, and not simply visiting him for a time, from its beginning forced Christian 
piety to express its awareness of the being of God in Christ in the poetic language 
of hymns and preaching and to make use of the more abstract language at hand in 
the various contexts where this faith was coming to expression.358 The divine being 
                                                            
358. 'In this way did Christianity take a middle place between Judaism and Paganism; inasmuch 
as the multiplication of gods is appropriately Pagan; while the denial of all distinction or 
difference in the Godhead, and especially of that by which it exists in a peculiar manner in 




in Christ formed the language of Christian piety as it spoke in hymns, sermons, 
sacraments, and reflective doctrines, but this being was not, in fact could not be, a 
function of the language. As with the relationship of creatures to God, the realism 
of the relationship of God to humanity in Christ necessitates its conceptual 
impurity.359 
As the historical source of redemption, Christ undoes the effects of original 
sin from within the sinful world, or, to say the same thing for Schleiermacher, 
Christ completes the act of creation. This experience of redemption mimics the 
determination of feeling by sensual self-consciousness in sin, except feeling is now 
determined by the communication of Christ's blessedness. This will only be 
possible if believers can truly describe Christ as God incarnate in this man.360 The 
single decree of creation and justification for Christ's sake places Christ in an 
utterly unique place in relation to both creation and justification.361 As a human 
person, Christ at all times relates to the world in God's sovereign purposive act to 
bring about its redemption. The union of divine and human activity in Christ 
necessitates a distinctive way of being in the world that he communicates to 
Christians as the principle of their own sanctified action. Christ's act eventually 
passes over into Christian action as the being of God in believers, the Spirit. 
                                                            
Saviour as divine is developed so frequently in the writings of the fathers since the Council of 
Nice, that it would be altogether superfluous to prove it here by the citation of particular 
passages.' ‘On the Discrepancy between the Sabellian and Athanasian Method of Representing 
the Doctrine of the Trinity (1822)’ trans. Moses Stuart, Biblical Repository and Quarterly 
Observer 5 (April 1835):p. 33. 
359. Christianity has created language. From its very beginning it has been a potentiating 
linguistic spirit, and it still is. It is providential that it could not annex itself to Hellenistic truth. 
Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts p. 50. 
360. A helpful view of Schleiermacher similar to mine is Kevin Hector 'Actualism and 
Incarnation: The High Christology of Friedrich Schleiermacher.' International Journal of 
Systematic Theology 8:3 (July 2006) 
361. 'In fact, there is only one eternal and universal [allgemeinen] decree [Rathschluß] of the 
justification of men for Christ's sake... and again the decree that sent forth Christ is one with the 
creation of human generation if first in Christ human nature is accomplished.' (CF 





II. The Person of Christ 
   
Beginning with §95 of the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher pointedly 
criticises traditional ecclesiastical formulas, both Trinitarian and Christological, in 
order to bring them more into line with the Christian's awareness of Christ's divinity 
as it is propounded in the New Testament and experienced in the present day. Just 
as the existence of God in Christ 'is no hyperbolical expression' so the task of 
Christology is 'to define the peculiar being of God in that which is other,' a task 
that can never be finally accomplished since 'we have no formula for the being of 
God in Himself.362' (CF  172.1.747-748) Any constructive account of the being of 
God in Himself apart from his being in the world, i.e. in Christ and the Church, 
will be speculative borrowing unfaithful to theological discipline.363 The proper 
starting point is not Trinitarian doctrine, but Christology 'especially as the original 
faith constituting impression made upon the disciples, even as they grasped it in 
thought and reproduced it, was not connected with any knowledge of a Trinity.' 
(CF 97.2.399) The 'faith constituting impression' can and does lead to a doctrine 
of the Trinity for Schleiermacher, which he develops in relation to a reconstructed 
Sabellianism, but only on the basis of the controlling insights of Christology.364 
                                                            
362. Kevin Hector sums up this impulse: 'As is well known, Schleiermacher resists the 
traditional doctrine of the Trinity--though not, as one might assume, because it is too 
'supernatural', but because he thinks that it fails to do justice to Christ's full divinity. 
Schleiermacher affirms the intent of traditional trinitarianism, 'namely, to make it clear that it is 
no hyperbolical expression of Christ and of the common Spirit of the Church to assert that God 
is in both. ( 172.1, pp. 757-8), but he worries that it fails to do justice to this consciousness.' 
Hector 'Actualism and Incarnation' p. 320. 
363. '...hence we have no formula for the being of God in Himself as distinct from the being of 
God in the world, and should have to borrow any such formula from speculation, and so prove 
ourselves disloyal to the character of the discipline at which we are working.' (CF 172.1.748) 
364. It remains outside of my scope here to ask the question, which is surely relevant, of how 




Schleiermacher divides his treatment of the person of the Redeemer into 
two parts: the initial act of union and the continuing union. Together they account 
for Christ's sinlessness as the completion of creation and effecting of redemption. 
Any doctrinal formulation of this union will need to describe Christ in such a way 
'that in the new corporate life a vital fellowship between us and Him shall be 
possible' and 'the existence of God in Him shall be expressed in the clearest 
possible way.' (CF 96.1.391) The real existence of God in him through his God-
consciousness must be absolutely determining of his existence, but this must be a 
human existence so that 'this is all in Him in such a way that we can lay hold of it.' 
(CF  96.3.397) Christ, as the Redeemer, must be truly divine and in the very same 
way be completely and truly human. Schleiermacher, therefore, agrees with the 
tendency in the creeds and confessions to affirm Christ as truly God and a real 
brother with humanity. He disagrees, however, with almost every point of the 
tradition's execution of this tendency.365 Doctrines of the union, and those related 
to it, will need to maintain these two commitments: a real existence of God and a 
real human life.366 The former commitment is stressed in Schleiermacher's account 
of Christ's dignity, and the latter is his description of Christ's activity in his 
historical life. 
                                                            
365. 'Yet, on the other hand, there is almost nothing in the execution of this aim against which 
protest must not be raised, whether we regard the scientific character of the expression or its 
suitability for ecclesiastical use.' (CF 96.1.391) 
366. 'Judaism maintained the unity of the Supreme Being; but according to this, God in his unity 
remained in a state of separation from man. He did exhibit himself at times; he made his voice 
to be heard; and so the giving of the law and prophecy ensued. But his thoughts and his will 
could thus be made known to men only from without, by means of words and laws...[it could 
only be ephemeral and magical even if it were internal] But this imperfection was to be done 
away. The Most High at length transferred his abode to man, and dwelt in him. This was the 
special object of the Christian dispensation. Real Christian faith was fully persuaded that this 
had been accomplished... The pagan indwelling of the divinity was demoniacal, and its season 
of continuance passed away. The Most High, one and undivided, at last ooh up his abode in 
man; and the Sole Supreme (µοναρχία), by such a union with man, must needs destroy all 
idolatry.' On the Discrepancy between the Sabellian and Athanasian Method of Representing the 





A. The Dignity of the Redeemer 
 
Schleiermacher makes a relative division between the initial act of union, 
the beginning of the incarnation, and the resulting state of union, the developing 
life of Christ:  
'In the uniting of the divine nature with the human, the divine alone was active 
or self-communicating [sich mittheilend], and the human alone passive or in 
process of being assumed; but during the state of union every activity was a 
common activity.' (CF 97.398/CG 97 70.20-25)  
 
The distinction follows the absolute vitality paradigm and mirrors the previous 
section's account of original and actual sin. The initial union in the birth of Christ, 
his incarnation in the flesh, overcomes the determination of the human person by 
original sin.367  By overcoming sin, the 'insuperable impotence of the God-
consciousness,' Christ is 'the beginner and originator of this more perfect human 
life, or the completion of the creation of man.' (CF 89.1.366-7)  
Self-consciousness, as was shown above, for Schleiermacher, is the human 
response to the whole push and pull of a finite causality of an entirely reciprocal 
manner, but human attachment to certain objects—attachments developed in 
human person through her historical location and concrete community—as if they 
were God prevents this relation from actually appearing. A self-consciousness, 
however, properly related to God would be aversive to existing forms of human 
community inasmuch as they transmit original sin and could not, therefore, be a 
production of those communities. Christ, as the Redeemer, 'cannot be explained by 
the content of the human environment to which He belonged, but only as the source 
of spiritual life in virtue of a creative divine act in, as an absolute maximum, the 
                                                            
367. The continuing union, the achievement of blessedness in the course of Christ's life, is the 




conception of man as the subject of God-consciousness comes to completion.' (CF  
93.3.381)368 In the initial uniting of the divine and human, the beginning of the 
incarnation, the human was receptive to an 'an initial divine activity which is 
supernatural.' (CF 89.4.365) Christ enters into the sinful life from outside of it, and 
this is 'a miraculous fact [eine wunderbare Erscheinung],' to work within the 
reciprocal relations of creation to bring them to completion, their right relation of 
dependence on God. (CF  93.3.381/CG 93.46.24)369  
The unity of the decrees of creation and redemption, including the 
ordination of sin for redemption, means, for Schleiermacher, that all of the 
historical finite causality has led to the incarnation, the enfleshment, of the 
redeemer in the person of Christ: 'we can with equal justice say that Christ even as 
a human person was ever coming to be simultaneously with the world itself.' (CF 
97.2.402) The incarnation is the temporal and spatial manifestation of a singular 
decree of God, for whom 'there is no distinction between resolve and activity,' as 
an active aspect of that single decree. (CF 97.2.401) God's activity turned towards 
humanity is world-forming in the various aspects of creation and redemption and 
this is especially the case in the Redeemer through whom the world finally comes 
                                                            
368. Compare with Schleiermacher's earlier description of revelation: '...we might say that the 
idea of revelation signifies the originality of the fact which lies at the foundation of a religious 
communion, in the sense that this fact, as conditioning the individual content of the religious 
emotions which are found in the communion, cannot itself in turn be explained by the historical 
chain which precedes it...Now the fact that in this original element there is a divine causality 
requires no further discussion; nor does the fact that it is an activity which aims at and furthers 
the salvation of man.' (CF 10.PS.49-50) 
369. 'The man who does not admit this uniqueness in the appearance of Christ has one and the 
same task. He must account for all the miracles in light of the laws of nature and by this means 
explain Christ's life.... The whole thing is a sham. In the way the hypothesis is put forward a 
complete confusion reigns, and that is a guarantee of the higher appearances of Christ, which 
represent him as a higher being, as  ens sui generis, which is why all attempts to understand him 
in an inferior way fail and the truth of fact itself is lost. However, that is a task that has not been 
solved and one for which we can only an approximate solution. This we have to admit, but at the 
same time we have to treat every detail in a way that is suitable to something that rests on a 
supernatural foundation but has become something completely natural. So we must regard this 
task as a purely theological one.' The Life of Jesus, translated by S. Maclean Gilmour, edited by 




to be in its sinless receptivity towards God.370 The division between creation and 
redemption should be taken as relatively different ways of viewing the single 
movement of God's action towards the world of which the incarnation forms a part 
of the coherent whole.371  
Schleiermacher's description of the initial uniting of the incarnation follows 
his earlier description of revelation and the founding of a religious communion. 
Revelation does not come into the world as doctrine, i.e. does not operate on 'man 
as a cognitive being,'372 but as something supra-rational given to experience 
capable of bringing forth thought and various conceptions, rather than deduced or 
synthesised from a proposition.373  Jesus Christ, comes into the natural, historical, 
and finite causality determined not by the productive concrete circumstance of 
original sin but by 'the universal source of Spiritual life [der allgemeinen Quelle 
des gesitigen Lebens] through a creative [schöpferischen] divine act [Act].' (CF  
93.3 p. 381/CG 93.46.29-30) The 'supernatural' newness of the incarnation of God 
in Christ—revelation in the Christian sense—brings about a way of life through a 
determination of Christ's person at the most basic level of feeling, which is 
constantly coming to outward expression conditioning those in contact with it. Just 
                                                            
370. 'This is indeed the case, for it was indeed God's good pleasure from the beginning not to 
create individual being and life but to create a world, and this is also the way in which the Spirit 
of God is active, as a world-forming power, and through the Spirit of God there arises not the 
disorder of individual spiritual life but the spiritual world.' On Election p. 76. 
371. The division here is parallel to Schleiermacher's treatment of the divine attributes. They are 
various and plural to us as we encounter them in the world, but are singular for God who is one. 
372. 'Now the fact that in this original element there is a divine causality requires no further 
discussion; nor does the fact that it is an activity which aims at and furthers the salvation of 
man. But I am unwilling to accept the further definition that it operates upon man as a cognitive 
being. For that would make the revelation to be originally and essentially doctrine ; and I do not 
believe that we can adopt this position, whether we consider the whole field covered by the idea, 
or seek to define it in advance with special reference to Christianity.' (CF 10.PS.49-50) 
373. 'In one respect all Christian dogmas are supra-rational, in another they are all rational. 
They are supra-rational in the respect in which everything experiential is supra-rational. For 
there is an inner experience to which they may all be traced: they rest upon a given; and apart 
from this they could not have arisen, by deduction or synthesis, from universally recognised and 




as the divine causality determines the entire finite causality, the non-self-caused 
element of Christ's life is his determination by God for the purpose of the 
completion of creation in the coming to be of the God-consciousness in 
humanity.374 Undetermined by original sin, inherited sinfulness will not pass over 
into actual sin in the course of his life, and, instead, he will begin to take the place 
of the sinful circumstances, the world of original sin, in the life of the believer.   
To attribute a sinless human life to Christ is to ascribe a perfect God-
consciousness to him, and '[t]o ascribe to Christ an absolutely powerful 
[schlechthin kräftiges] God-consciousness, and to ascribe to him a being of God in 
him [ein Sein Gottes in ihm], are exactly the same thing.' (CF  94.2.387/CG 
94.2.55.1-2) To impute a being of God to someone or something within the finite 
causality creates a problem right away. God's being is understood as 'pure activity' 
while every created thing exists within the realm of activity and dependence so 
God cannot be thought to be present to any one thing, 'but only a being of God in 
the world' as a whole is possible in the form of God's omnipresence 
[Allgegenwart].(CF 94.2.387/CG 94.2.55.4)375  God's omnipresence, God's being 
                                                            
374. '...all that it [the anhypostasis of the human nature of Christ] means is that the human 
nature would not have become this personality of Christ, but that that divine influence upon the 
human nature is at one and the same time the incarnation of God in human consciousness and 
the formation of the human nature into personality of Christ.' (CF  97.2.402) 
375.The standard translation has been altered. I have translated the entire relevant passage as 
follows: ‘To ascribe to Christ an absolutely powerful [schlechthin kräftiges] God-consciousness, 
and to attribute [beilegen] a being of God to him [ein Sein Gottes in ihm], are exactly the same 
thing. The expression 'being of God in any other one' can only express the relationship of the 
omnipresence of God to this other. Since God's being can only be understood as pure activity, 
and each isolated being is only an interlocking of activity and suffering, the activity, always 
being found allocated according to the suffering in all other individual beings: therefore, so far, 
there is no being of God in a single thing, but only a being of God in the world. And only if the 
suffering states are not purely suffering but are mediated through a living receptivity and this 
receptivity confronts the entirety of finite existence, i.e., as one can say of the individual as one 
living that he, in virtue of the general reciprocity stands for the world, one can assume a being of 
God in the same... So it is certainly well that the human nature originally, before the Redeemer 
and apart from all connection with him, in the self-consciousness co-given with God-
consciousness, cannot truly be called a being of God in us... but also how it [God-consciousness 
unconnected to Christ] was not made to assert itself as activity, but herein was always 




in the world is 'as the enduring causal ground relatively to the changing caused', is 
God's existence to the world as the ground of the entire finite causality (CF  52.2 
ET p. 206). The only way, then, God can be in the world is to be in relation to the 
entirety of finite existence as the determining ground of that existence.376 The 
determination must be an expression of God's absolute vitality that does not shift 
into a determined register. For God to exist in the world as God, then, Christ must 
be determinative in relation to all creation. In other words, God can exist in the 
world 'only if the world as world were to "appear" somewhere within the 
world[,]'377 if the finite causality could come together in some single nexus of 
forces. As the expression of God's omnipotent omnipresence, the entire finite 
causality would need to be recapitulated in order for God to appear in the world, 
the whole world over again, or, which is to say the same thing, the Redeemer must 
exhibit the same coherent relationship of creation to Creator, the whole finite 
causality dependent on the divine causality from within the world. 
Existing in this way, being God in the world, would necessarily make him 
ontologically unique as a finite creature determinative of creaturely existence as 
the Creator is himself the determinative ground.378 One who determined creation 
in this way would be an appropriate object of humanity's absolute dependence 
precisely by being God:  
'We have fellowship with God only in a living fellowship with the Redeemer, 
such that in it His absolutely sinless perfection and blessedness represent a free 
                                                            
376. 'For this Second Adam [Christ] is altogether like all those who are descended from the 
first, only that from the outset He has an absolutely potent God-consciousness. With this He 
enters the existing historical order of human nature, in virtue of a creative divine causality.' (CF  
89.2.367) 
377. Paul J. DeHart 'Ter Mundus Accipit' Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und 
Religionsphilosophie. Volume 52, Issue 1(July, 2010)  p. 23. 
378. 'hence the indwelling being of God in Him must be related to the whole human nature in 
the same way as that which previously was innermost was related to the whole human 
organism--an analogy which, even if not clearly expressed, runs through the whole foregoing 




spontaneous activity, while the pardoned's need for redemption represents a free 
assimilative receptivity.' (CF 91.370)  
 
All of this is entailed in saying that Jesus Christ is a being of God in the world 
without losing the polarity between finite and infinite.  
The doctrine of Christ's person in the Glaubenslehre once again reproduces 
the recurring pattern of speaking of God in terms of his 'absolute vitality.' The God-
world relationship at work in the doctrine of creation is not undone or altered in the 
incarnation of the Redeemer, but is, instead, brought to its fulfilment and visibility 
in Christ as the completion of creation. As a rational human being, Christ will 
replicate and announce the absolute causality of God in the midst of finite causality. 
As was the case with talk of the Creator, Christ's outward life will be one of 
absolute vitality grounded in the living impulse of his inward life, the unshakeable 
determination of his love for all of creation:  
'What we could lay out above as only possible, namely a sinless development 
of a human individual life, that in the person of the Redeemer must have become 
actual [wirklich] by virtue of this undisturbed identity of relationship.... [that] is 
not the result of a struggle, inasmuch as it does not need to worked out either 
through error or through sin or through a propensity to one of the two. (CG 
93.4.49.27-50.16)'  
 
The interior or absolute vitality of God is one of movement towards the world; it 
is absolute vitality. The uniting of human and divine in the beginning of the 
incarnation, therefore, becomes active in the enduring union of Christ's life. 
 
B. The Activity of the Redeemer: Christ's Sinlessness 
 
With the initial uniting having taken place, the divine and the human in the 
Redeemer act with 'a common activity.' (CF 97.398/CG 97.70.20-25) If the initial 
passivity of the human nature in relation to God mirrors the role of original sin in 




consciousness in Christ parallels the personal attunement of feeling producing 
personal sin. The sinlessness of the Redeemer, the actuality of his perfect God-
consciousness, then, comes about through the interaction of feeling in the higher 
and lower human self-consciousness as they are directed by the God-
consciousness.379 This interaction leads to the way in which the world is present in 
Christ through his determinative receptivity: his 'higher functions' never cease to 
determine his way of being in the concrete historical world. The pious feeling of 
absolute dependence actually directs the thinking and doing of Christ's life in a 
unique way so that he is able to relate to all of creation according to the unchanging 
being of God within him: divine love.380 The activity of the Redeemer is the natural 
extension of his dignity, and is, in fact, only that dignity viewed from a different 
vantage point. Schleiermacher works out how the activity of Christ, the 
recapitulation of the unchanging act of God as love, occurs within the finite 
causality by working out both how the perfect God-consciousness allows Christ to 
be sinless and to communicate this God-consciousness in an unchanging way.  
Schleiermacher compares Christ's sinlessness with the fact that certain 
sinful humans at times avoid sin apart from their own agency. The inward sin of 
human persons may, at times, be 'prevented from becoming actual. But this 
happens in such a way that...[we] are even confirmed in this consciousness [of our 
                                                            
379. 'We are consciousness of sin as the force [Kraft] and work of a time in which the direction 
[Richtung] of the God-consciousness had not yet emerged.'(CF  66.1.271) 
380. 'Now if that were really the case, and Christ could have come to all these actions, and 
therefore strictly speaking to the whole work of redemption, only though an accidental feeling 
[i.e. sympathy], then inevitably our whole idea of the Redeemer would thereby become 
something different from what which up till now we have represented to ourselves. But our 
canon also compels us to think of the human nature of Christ in such feelings, not as moved for 
and through itself, but only as taken up into association with an activity of the divine in Christ. 
Now this 'divine' is the divine love in Christ which, once and for all in every moment--
whichever expression be chosen--gave direction to His feelings for the spiritual conditions of 
men. In virtue of these feelings, and in consequence of them, there then arose the impulse to 




sin] through this very perception, for it implies a recognition that in our case the 
inner ground for the prevention of sin is lacking.' (CF 98.1.413) The inner 
sinfulness remains sin after all, and where it is present in the inner impulse of the 
human being struggle remains. The supernatural aspect of God's being in Christ, 
however, also bars the way to attributing Christ's sinlessness to a providential 
arrangement of his circumstances since doing so would totally account for him 
according to his concrete environment, which is such only because of God's 
governing action. Christ's sinlessness is, then, a function of his inner determination 
by the being of God in him such that he is able to engage with sinful circumstances 
without sinning himself. 
In the state of union between God and human in Jesus Christ, the divine 
and human activities are a common activity.381 Notwithstanding the unity of these 
activities, the proper asymmetrical relationship between human and divine is not 
done away with, but is, instead, made to exist in its proper integrity for the first 
time. The being of God in Christ remains absolutely active in its direction of the 
life of Christ, while the human nature assumes its properly passive role before the 
determination of God.382 The continuation of this relationship between God and 
creation prevents the transposition of features between the two that would do away 
with the integrity of either.383 God is able to determine the reality of all through a 
                                                            
381. 'In the uniting of the divine nature with the human, the divine alone was active or self-
communicating [sich mittheilend], and the human alone passive or in process of being assumed; 
but during the state of union every activity was a common activity.' (CF  97.398/CG 97.70.20-
25) 
382. 'So that, to sum up, we may say that there can have been no active state in Christ which, 
regarded as existing for itself, did not arise from the being of God in Him, and was not perfected 
by the human nature; and similarly no passive state whose transformation into activity--which 
first made it a personal state--did not follow the same course.' (CF  97.3.408) 
383. '[T]he theory of a mutual communication of the attributes of the two natures to one another 
also is to be banished from the system of doctrine, and handed over to the history of doctrine. 
For in so far as we arrive at our ideas of divine attributes only by analogy, the attribution of 
these to human nature, if that nature is not to be destroyed by the infinity of these attributes, is 
merely an assertion of absolute human excellence. But on the other hand, in so far as each 




finite individual precisely because of the receptive factor of the rational human 
self-consciousness relating to all of the finite causality at the pre-reflective level of 
feeling. The human person feels the push and pull of the whole universe through 
Gefühl as it passes over into thinking and doing, but this feeling is limited as it is 
determined by sin. In Christ, however,  
'we posit the God-consciousness in his self-consciousness as continually and 
exclusively determining every moment, and consequently also this perfect 
indwelling of the Supreme Being as His peculiar being and His inmost self.' (CF  
94.3.388)384 
 
The determination of Christ's human self-consciousness by the divine 
Being, what gives him his absolutely powerful God-consciousness, leads to his 
sinlessness precisely by overcoming the previously universal tendency in the 
human higher self-consciousness to be overcome by the sensual self-
consciousness. A major indicator of this relationship of determination is Christ's 
relation to delight and aversion apart from his experience of the antithesis of sin 
and grace.  
 Schleiermacher has already linked delight and aversion [Lust und Unlust] 
to the antithesis between sin and grace, and described piety, the religious self-
consciousness, as an oscillation between these two points. They bring about this 
oscillation in the context of the struggle between flesh and spirit, but if this struggle 
were not to be present then they would take on another character entirely. Delight 
and aversion, pleasure and pain, exist sinlessly in Christ by not being able to 
                                                            
together as one that they can represent the Divine Essence, it is impossible to predicate of 
human nature even the individual features of this collective view.' (CF  97.5.411) 
384. 'What did Christ actually understand by the statement that he had been sent by God? Here 
we find that he often introduced two points concerning himself that we have to regard as 
essential correlates. (1) He declares that he had received his teaching from God. This involves 
the claim that he alone was able to put men in possession of the truth, to them the consciousness 
of God, for he claims that his consciousness of God was exclusive. (2) The correlate of this is 
that he says that he could do nothing  of himself. He attributes everything to the constancy of his 





determine his appropriation of any specific moment, because 'in Christ every 
moment must be determined by the God-consciousness.'(CF 98.1.415/CG 
98.1.91.27-28) The experience of aversion or pain does not serve to lead Christ 
away from God, as it does with other human beings, but maintains precisely the 
same relation to the God-consciousness as every experience of delight or pleasure 
does.  
The pain associated with sin, as was shown above, does not follow directly 
from the sin itself but includes suffering following other sins. Christ's ability to 
sinlessly suffer is essential to Christian piety:  
'within a common sphere of sin it is possible for one to suffer for the rest, so 
that the evil due to the sin of many may all converge upon one, and that penal 
suffering may fall pre-eminently upon one who is himself most free from the 
common guilt and most resolute in his battle with sin.' (CF 77.2.322)  
 
What was a turning away from God, sin, now comes into a relationship with God 
in Christ who, by being God, overcomes sin by establishing the God-relatedness of 
all to himself. Even death, the suffering most natural to human beings, does not 
cause Christ any fear or turn away from the presence of the God-consciousness.385 
As a human person, he is able to meet with death, evil, and pain without sin since 
these contexts do not dictate his identity in relation to God, which is secured for all 
time through the direction of his senses [die Richtung auf die Wahrnehmungen].386 
The higher consciousness, at last, does not succumb to the sensuous self-
consciousness, but directs its interaction with the world. As a human like any other, 
                                                            
385. 'All the more that mortality and the capacity for physical suffering are so closely connected 
that such a natural immortality in Christ would make the capacity of human nature in His Person 
for suffering a mere empty phrase, and no great worth could be attached to his physical 
sufferings without self-contradiction.' (CF  98.1.416) 
386. 'Dieses nun ist die göttliche Liebe in Christo, welche der menschlichen Natur einmal für 
immer oder in jedem Moment, gleichviel wie man es ausdrükke, die Richtung auf die 




Christ takes and feels the whole world differently, and this difference makes all the 
difference.  
The divine love totally conditions the person of Jesus Christ so that it is 
constantly expressing itself in particular acts; 'in this interrelation every original 
activity belongs solely to the divine, and everything passive solely to the human.' 
(CF  97.3 407-408) The sufferings, then,  
'are not purely suffering but are mediated through a living receptivity [durch 
lebendige Empfänglichkeit vermittelt] and this confronts the entirety of finite 
existence, i.e., as one can say of the individual as one living that he, in virtue of 
the general reciprocity, stands for the world...' (CG 94.2.55.9-14/ CF  94.2.387)  
 
To put it in more traditional doctrinal terms, Christ lives a sinless life for the sake 
of the world by suffering the sins of the world—the human aversiveness to God—
in order to communicate this sinless existence, his blessedness, to others. Christ 
establishes the life of Christian piety, and all of the ideal features of the human 
God-consciousness given earlier in the Glaubenslehre begin to reappear in 
descriptions of his self-consciousness, so he can give, impute, it to others. The inner 
vitality of God's life in Christ expresses itself by communicating Christ's 
blessedness as a form of piety, a persistent way of being in the world through a 
relation to certain concrete circumstances. 
 
  
III. The Work of Christ 
 
Christ's redemptive activity assumes 'believers into the power of His God-
consciousness.' (CF 100.425/ CG 100.104.6-7) Christ's fellowship, parallel to 
original sin, forms the believer's self-consciousness to enable the increasing 
presence of God-consciousness to all of life. '[I]n the Christian fellowship... there 




a thing which is inward, and yet, since faith can rest upon nothing except an 
impression received, capable of being experienced.' (CF  88.3.364) The experience 
of fellowship is the meeting of the Christian's receptive need for redemption due to 
the misery of sin and Christ's perfection and blessedness as determinative outgoing 
power.387 The proper relationship between creature and Creator is effected in 
Christian fellowship. The influence of the Redeemer becomes the exterior 
determination, non-self-caused element, of the human self-consciousness turning 
the believer towards the God-consciousness.388  
 The single decree structure of the creative-redemptive act establishes the 
divine-human relationship in the incarnation as unique, abiding, and purposive.  
The permanent reality of this existence of God in Christ is fundamental for 
Schleiermacher:  
'The Most High at length transferred his abode to man, and dwelt in him. This 
was the special object of the Christian dispensation. Real Christian faith was 
fully persuaded that this had been accomplished... The pagan indwelling of the 
divinity was demoniacal, and its season of continuance passed away. The Most 
High, one and undivided, at last took up his abode in man; and the Sole Supreme 
(µοναρχία), by such a union with man, must needs destroy all idolatry.'389  
 
The unique union, the specificities of Christ's person, are for the purpose of his 
work of redemption. Any other account of God's existence in a man would be a 
polytheistic retreat from both genuine monotheism and redemption as the feeling 
of absolute dependence. A genuinely monotheistic account of God's existence in 
Christ can maintain the identity of Christ's human nature by supposing some form 
                                                            
387. 'We have fellowship with God only in a living fellowship with the Redeemer, wherein his 
plainly sinless perfection and blessedness [Seligket] represent [darstellt] the free-of-itself 
outgoing activity, but the need for redemption of the pardoned the free-in-itself assimilative 
receptivity [aufnehmende Empfänglichkeit]' (CF 91.370/CG 91.33.4-9) 
388. 'The sinfulness that is present in an individual prior to any action of his own, and has its 
ground outside his own being, is in every case a complete incapacity for good, which can be 
removed only by the influence of Redemption.' (CF 70.282) 




of pure activity in the human life. Schleiermacher has located this pure activity in 
Christ's own God-consciousness.390 Christ's God-consciousness acts as all human 
God- and self-consciousness act by expressing itself to others who come under its 
influence, except Christ's influence is total.  
'[I]n truth [Christ] alone mediates all existence of God in the world and all 
revelation of God through the world, in so far as He bears within Himself the 
whole new creation which contains and develops the potency of the God-
consciousness.' (CF 94.2.388)  
 
Christ's self-expression communicates his God-consciousness to a redeemed 
community by becoming a source of human feeling and Christian piety. 
  
 
A. The Archetype of New Life 
 
In Christ, 'the archetypal [das urbildiche] must have become perfectly 
historical [vollkommen geschtlich werden] and each historical moment thereof 
bears within it the archetype at the same time.' (CF  93.377/CG 93.41.14-15)391 
Christ's archetypal existence is contrasted with those who claim for Christ an 
                                                            
390. '...to ascribe to Christ an absolutely powerful God-consciousness and to attribute to Him an 
existence of God in Him, are exactly the same thing.' (CF   94.2.387) 
391. I have significantly altered the standard translation at this point. The Mackintosh 
translation gives 'ideal' for urbildliche and related words. Archetype seems better suited to 
Schleiermacher's purpose here especially given the contrast with vorbild in the same section. A 
parallel use of Urbild is in Goethe: 'In this sense [Goethe] views his own work, its wide 
spectrum of different forms, as ultimately rooted in that one and same force of formation, in 
‘Bildungstrieb.’ All forms, even the most unusual ones, are ultimately related to their primordial 
entities--Goethe's term is ‘Urphänomene.’ These entities have their own encoded law of being 
and development, the blue-print of their evolution. This view is at the heart of the poem on the 
evolution of plants, ‘Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen’ (1798). 
Alle Glieder bilden sich aus nach ew'gen Gesetzen 
Und die seltenste Form bewahrt I'm geheimen das Urbild 
A similar notion applies to the human being: each one represents indivisible and unique 
individuality, with its own law, its inborn destiny, entelechy.' Martin and Erika Swales Reading 
Goethe: A Critical Introduction to the Literary Work (Rochester, NY: Camden House) pp. 22-
23. See also Carlo Salzani Constellations of Reading: Walter Benjamin in Figures of Actuality 
(Oxford: Peter Lang, 2009) p. 32, where Benjamin, in reference to Goethe and German 
Romanticism, takes up the notion of any timeless arche or Ur-anything only to reject it, and 




exemplary [vorbildliche] existence for the Christian community. Examples are 
produced by the community to embody their communal understanding, and, so, 
Schleiermacher claims some will see the constant approximation to, rather than 
arrival at, Christ's God-consciousness in the community as a reason to attribute 
exemplary dignity to Christ. Christ mirrors the community's own sinful 
imperfections as the bearer of whatever communal spirit has taken root in the 
community at that time; 'and this exaggeration continually perpetuates itself in the 
same manner, since believers in all ages read into Jesus whatever they are able to 
conceive as ideal in this sphere.' (CF  93.2.378)392 Schleiermacher strongly objects 
to this tendency, and especially its enshrinement in theology, contrasting it with 
theology that understands Christ as properly archetypal, and, therefore, as 
productive.393  
Especially in the case of Jesus of Nazareth, the Urbild is productive as the 
inner self coming to various forms of expression in the push and pull of reciprocal 
history—as what gives form to whatever is attempting to understand it. 'The life of 
every individual, as it appears to others, suggests at one time his essential, ideal 
self [seinem Urbild], and at another his distorted self [seinem Zerrbild].'394 The 
essential, ideal self is the proper matter of communication, is what one tries to 
communicate in speech, gestures, etc., rather than the distorted self, and this ideal 
                                                            
392. Members of formative groups become attuned to their circumstances in the service of a 
sinful view with an accompanying errant God-consciousness: 'when in any social group, some 
definite form of appetite breaks out predominantly, it is presently followed by a transformation 
of the God-consciousness as a means of cloaking the discordance.'(CF  74.2.308) 
393. '...da ja schon die Productivität nur in dem Begriff des Urbildes liegt und nicht in dem des 
Vorbildes: so ergiebt sich wol, daß nur die Urbildlichkeit der angemessene Ausdrukk ist für die 
ausschließliche persönliche Würde Christ.' (CG 93.2.44.33-35) 
394. This is the altered translation Richard Crouter gives of Soliloquies (trans. Friess) p. 72 
Crouter, Richard. Friedrich Schleiermacher: Between Enlightenment and Romanticism. 





self 'comes to expression self-reflectively as personal history.'395 The archetypal 
produces mediated, reflective thought as the immediate source of that reflection, 
what human persons are working from when they try to explain their state. 
Formally, Christ as archetypal mirrors the non self-caused element in the human 
consciousness Schleiermacher has handled at length in his dissection of human 
self-consciousness. Just as the self remains the self throughout the various acts of 
knowing, willing, making sense, and interacting with the world, so the Redeemer 
remains the same throughout the various historical stages of Christ's life in such a 
way that he cannot be overcome or left behind by the Christian religion:  
'[there are those] of the opinion that Christ is no more even in His inner being 
than could be manifested of it, while the fellowship of doctrine and life which 
takes its origin from Christ, with the testimonies to Him which it preserves, has 
in virtue of special divine guidance so fortunate an organisation that both 
doctrine and life can easily be remodelled in accordance with any more perfect 
ideal which later generations might conceive, without the fellowship needing to 
lose its historical identity.' The logical outcome of this position will remove 'the 
first presuppositions of the Christian faith' and so Schleiermacher rejects it. (CF 
93.2 379-380) 
 
 Instead, Christian faith 'knows no other way to a pure conception of the 
ideal than an ever-deepening understanding of Christ. (CF 93.2 378) The 
Redeemer, the Urbild, is always passing over into thought, language, and action 
without ever collapsing into or being captured by these individual moments such 
that each moment of historical thinking and doing bears the archetype within it. 
With Christ the 'innermost fundamental power' of his person is the existence of 
God within him as it directs his thoughts, words, actions, i.e. he is determined at 
the level of feeling. This feeling, however, always becomes an outward expression 
through 'facial expression, gesture, tones, and (indirectly) words; and so becomes 
to other people a revelation of the inward.' (CF  6.2.27) The inward existence 
                                                            




coordinating the expressions of Christ is the existence God in Christ as it comes to 
communication in the form of historical, concrete, and organic human life.396 The 
communication happens just as human communication happens generally in 
language, gesture, music, touch, and wordless looks, with the exception that in 
living fellowship with the Redeemer  
'his plainly sinless perfection and blessedness [Seligket] represent [darstellt] the 
free-of-itself outgoing activity, but the need for redemption of the pardoned the 
free-in-itself assimilative receptivity [aufnehmende Empfänglichkeit].' (CF  
91.371/ CG  91.35.6-9)  
 
Christ's communication of his innermost self, the real existence of God in him, is 
entirely spontaneous while Christian reception of it is entirely receptive.  
Absolute dependence can only be the result of a receptive activity in the 
person whose determinant lies outside of their control, and this determinant must 
be an object worthy of this radical dependence: a historical determinant capable of 
calling forth the total and complete dependence due to God without ceasing to be 
historical. The communication of Christ's inner self, then, is the feeling of absolute 
dependence made possible within the vicissitudes of reciprocal human life by the 
being of God in Christ. Christ determines believers for absolute dependence as a 
coherent concrete given in human experience affecting the believer at the level of 
Gefühl; Christ works on the believer in the immediate self-consciousness through 
the normal avenues of human development.  Christ's preaching or self-presentation 
is the activity of God as Word, 'the activity of God expressed in the form of 
consciousness,' in the flesh, 'a general expression for the organic.' (CF  96.3.397) 
Christ is God's self-expression within the world--God's self or activity coming into 
the form of consciousness—precisely by communicating this being of God within 
                                                            
396. Just as the Athanasian creed has it: Nam sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo, ita et 





him through the medium of his historical, fleshly, and human existence in an 
exclusive and final way.397 By describing Christ as the archetype become historical, 
Schleiermacher is attempting to explicate the Pauline phrase 'God was in Christ' 
and the Johannine phrase 'the Word became flesh.'(CF  96.3.397)  
Schleiermacher has established the normative significance of the New 
Testament for the entire Biblical canon so that only those doctrines attested to in 
the New Testament are 'genuinely Christian doctrine' (CF 27.3.115) capable of 
providing an alternate base for Evangelical theology the revision of the claims of 
Protestant confessional documents.  Nevertheless he does not think that a historical 
reconstruction of New Testament belief would be normative for current Christian 
belief in a straightforward way, but would only prove 'that this [reconstruction] is 
the original form of the Christian faith.' (CF  88.2.362) Instead the experience of 
blessedness communicated to the believer from Christ 'so widespread and so long 
current in the Christian Church, that it must be regarded as the general faith of 
Christians' (CF 99.PS.421) guides the openly and purposefully revisionary work 
Schleiermacher will undertake on the confessional documents. His positive 
doctrines will only need to fall within the range of opinions allowed by Scripture 
without supposing that his accounts are exclusively related to Scripture. (See the 
parallel discussion of the use of Scripture by Protestant theologians at (CF  
27.3.115.) The revision will remain within the stated intentions of the confessional 
documents while disagreeing substantially with their positive articulations as 
                                                            
397. 'In so far as all human activity of the Redeemer depends, as a connected whole, upon this 
existence of God in Him and represents it, the expression (that in the Redeemer God became 
man) is justified as true exclusively of Him; and similarly every moment of His existence, so far 
as it can be isolated, presents just such a new incarnation and incarnatedness of God, because 




inadequate with regard to 'the scientific character of the expression [and their] 
suitability for ecclesiastical use.' (CF 96.1.391)  
His criticism of the language of the ecclesial tradition is a fairly 
straightforward and compact discussion occurring mostly in 96.1 of The Christian 
Faith on the grounds that the established language does not allow for God to truly 
exist in Christ. Schleiermacher especially attacks the formulation of two natures in 
one person. His criticisms are twofold and stem from a single error. First, nature—
φύσις—would need to indicate two comparable elements capable of being brought 
into some sort of conceptual relationship, i.e. would need to be used univocally in 
some sense. To coordinate natures within a single concept, person, would be to 
undo the Creator-creature distinction by finding something in common between 
them. Second, person and nature both indicate the unity of something across time 
and are, therefore, functionally synonyms. One of these, person or nature, would 
need to give way or to come into a single system.  
'The attempt to make clear this unity along with the duality naturally but seldom 
results in anything else than a demonstration of the possibility of a formula 
made up by combining indications out of which it is impossible to construct a 
figure.' (CF 96.1.393)  
 
The difficulty comes from an attempt to harmonise person and nature language in 
Christological and Trinitarian doctrine:  
'the original faith-constituting impression made upon the disciples, even as they 
grasped it in thought and reproduced it, was not connected with any knowledge 
of the Trinity. But the worst is, that the human nature [of Christ] in this way 
cannot become a Person in the sense in which this is true of a Person in the 
Trinity, so that we are confronted with the dilemma, that either the three Persons 
must, like human persons, be individuals existing independently by themselves, 
or Christ as man was not such an independent individual--an assertion which 
gives us a completely docetic picture of Him. It is, therefore, much safer (as it 
is analogous to the origin and development of faith) to establish the doctrine of 





B. Mystical Communication 
 
The communication of Christ's blessedness, his determination of the 
believer's life by the being of God in this way, takes place in the organic, historical, 
human society of the church. The ability of Jesus Christ, as a historical human 
person, to communicate the being of God through his historical mediation of the 
archetype continues within the community Christ founded for this purpose.398 
Christ's original influence during his earthly life was 'purely spiritual' as something 
mediated through his bodily presence without being bound by the peculiarities of 
any material formation. (CF 105.1.467) Schleiermacher means by this that Christ's 
redemptive communication did not come and go or depend on some single moment 
of his life. The being of God in Christ was not achieved by some finite or reciprocal 
act. It was always in Christ as God's act.399 Within the church, the communion of 
blessedness dependent on his blessedness,  
'even now His spiritual presence is mediated through the written Word and the 
picture it contains of His being and influence—so that even now His directive 
control is not simply a mediate and a derived one.' (CF 105.1.467)  
 
                                                            
398. 'So that, in attributing a kingly dignity to Chirst, we are eo ipso declaring ourselves 
definitely opposed to the contention that Christ did not intend to found an organic community, 
but that the society of believers came into being, or was formed, later, without his injunction. 
But since, at the same time, no one enters this community except by submitting himself to 
Christ's lordship, it follows that Christ Himself initiated this Kingdom, and is thus without any 
predecessor in His kingly dignity.' (CF 105.1.467) 
399. Hence he maintains in  99 of The Christian Faith: 'The facts of the Resurrection and the 
Ascension of Christ, and the prediction of His Return to Judgment, cannot be laid down as 
properly constituent parts of the doctrine of His Person...'For if the redeeming efficacy of Christ 
depends upon the being of God in Him, and faith in Him is grounded upon the impression that 
such a being of God indwells Him, then it is impossible to prove any immediate connexion 
between these facts...[e.g. His Resurrection] does not show a peculiar Being of God in 
Christ...Belief in these facts, accordingly, is no independent element in the original faith in 
Christ, of such a kind that we could not// accept Him as Redeemer or recognise the being of God 
in Him, if we did not know that He had risen from the dead and ascended to heaven, or if He 
had not promised that He would return for judgment...Rather they [these doctrines] are accepted 
only because they are found in the Scriptures; and all that can be required of an Protestant 
Christian is that he shall believe them in so far as they seem to him to be adequately attested... 
Yet an indirect connexion with that doctrine [Person of Christ] is not to be denied to such belief, 
in so far, that is, as our judgment about the disciples as original reporters reacts upon our 




Salvation, for Schleiermacher, occurs because of the particular way the historical 
person of Jesus Christ communicates a formative power to other historical human 
persons as members of a society where his spiritual power persists.400  
Schleiermacher places this view of Christ's saving work between magical 
and empirical models of salvation. The magical approach attributes salvation 'to an 
influence not mediated by anything natural, yet attributed to a person.' (CF 
100.3.430) The historical appearance of the Redeemer or a continued historical 
mediation of the Redeemer's influence are ultimately immaterial to this approach 
as the supernatural thing—the Kingdom of God—does not became natural or 
expressive in human life. (CF 100.2.430) The corporate life produced by the effects 
of Christ's influence is 'purely accidental' so that Christ can communicate his 
blessedness to anyone at any time without any discernible change or alteration in 
the redeemed.401 Apart from the docetic character of the Christology attendant to 
this view of salvation, the piety inculcated by a magical view of salvation would 
not result in the moral improvement of the redeemed and, therefore, contradicts 
Schleiermacher's account of Christianity as a teleological religion. While magical 
views of salvation do link salvation with a minimal mediation wherein Christ can 
be tempted to exert his influence, 'their efficacy is exactly like that attributed to 
magic spells.' (CF 100.2.430) 
                                                            
400. 'And just as creation is not concerned simply with individuals (as if each creation of an 
individual had to be a special act), but it is the world that was created and every individual as 
such was created only in and with the whole, for the rest not less than for itself, in the same way 
the activity of the Redeemer too is world-forming, and its object is human nature, in the totality 
of which the powerful God-consciousness is to be implanted as a new vital principle.' (CF 
100.2.427) 
401. '...this view is completely separatist in type, for it  makes the corporate life a purely 
accidental thing; and it comes very near to being docetic as well. For if Christ exerted influence 
in any such way as this--as a person, it is true, but only as a heavily person without earthly 
presence, though in a truly personal way--then it would have been possible for Him to work in 
just the same way at any time, and His real personal appearance in history was only a 




 The empirical approach, on the other hand, 'admits a redemptive activity 
on the part of Christ, but one which is held to consist only in bringing about an 
increasing perfection in us.' (CF 100.3 430) Existing only as a teacher and example, 
an empirical view of Christ has no mechanism for the removal of sin and the 
communication of blessedness that are basic to any Christian piety. If the magical 
view of salvation failed to understand Christ as a supernatural cause of redemption, 
the empirical fails to understand Christ as a supernatural cause of redemption. 
Christ might be an exceptional teacher or example, but he would still produce only 
relative improvements in believers without removing the inner power of sin from 
the believer. As above with an exemplary view of the Redeemer, Christ would only 
correspond to the highest achievements of sinful societies without taking on the 
properly receptive character of the redeemed before the Redeemer. The empirical 
model denies a consciousness of grace by denying this receptive moment in the 
Christian life, or it attempts to compensate by relating the teaching to an 
understanding of God's compassionate overlooking of human sin. A general appeal 
to divine compassion to excuse the imperfect improvements is not, for 
Schleiermacher, a sufficiently Christian model of salvation. For the Christian 
consciousness of redemption, however, grace  
'is traced to the Redeemer as its cause, and therefore it must always be a different 
thing in His case from what it is in the case of others—naturally, since it is 
bound up with something else, namely, the peculiar redemptive activity of 
Christ.' (CF 100.3.431)  
 
Between these two poles, Schleiermacher describes the proper Christian 
conception of Christ's communicative work as mystical. The communication is not 
mystical in the sense of being arbitrary or purposefully vague. But, rather, the 
communication is mystical because it pertains to those doctrines—assuming 




experiences'—shared by a few while remaining mysteries to others. (CF 
100.3.429) Christ, as the founder of the redeemed community, speaks to the 
experience of sin and frustration in human life through 'effective speech' to form in 
his hearers 'the idea [Idee] which is the innermost principle of his own life, and [to 
assume] them into the fellowship of that life.' (CF 100.3.429/CG 100.3.110.2-3)402  
As a natural, historical community, the church was founded by Christ through his 
historical self-presentation of the innermost principle of his life—the being of God 
in him—analogously to the founding of other civic or political communities by an 
inspirational founder. The concepts and language of Christian faith proceed out 
from the pre-reflective consciousness of Christ's feeling to the receptive 
community of believers, who now are subject to the same person forming power 
of the being of God in Christ through these expressions. Christ communicates the 
life given to Him by the one he calls Father, and his mission or work is just to 
communicate this life, through 'an organic complex and could so be assured to the 
whole of human history.'403  
The activity of Christ communicates his way of being in the world, his 
powerful God-consciousness, to the redeemed so that all  
'his activities are differently determined through the working of Christ in him, 
and even all impressions are differently received—which means that the 
personal self-consciousness too becomes altogether different.' (CF 100.2.427)  
 
The communication of this 'mystical' experience is the communication of the God-
consciousness to the believers through the formative community of the church and, 
as the formation of a society, equivalent to God's creative act wherein the unity of 
                                                            
402. 'The general rubric sums it all up: Christ did what he did to found the kingdom of God, and 
we can represent his teaching activity only as a specific form in which he endeavoured to carry 
out his mission.' Life of Jesus p. 234. 
403. Life of Jesus p. 287. See also: 'Teaching concerning Christ's mission. This is connected in 
the first place with the point that Christ makes in his theology that the Father has granted him to 




the world comes to be. Taken together, the reception of a new way of being in the 
world by the redeemed corresponds to the being of God in Christ, which 
corresponds to the creative act, passing over into the activity of reconciliation and 
redemption.404 What makes the difference in Christian piety, the result of Christ's 
work, is not his example or an ineffective scheme of reconciliation, but is 'Christ 
in us,' an internal relationship. (CF 101.4.438)405  The mystery revealed in Christ's 
mystical communication is the formative power of Christ within the Christian 
believer, a power made known in his preaching and his presentation of his sinless 
and powerful God-consciousness to the believer frustrated by sin's obscuration of 







Early in the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher defines Christian piety as a 
''monotheistic faith, belonging to the teleological type of religion, and is essentially 
distinguished from other such faiths by the fact that in it everything is related to 
                                                            
404. 'The assumption into the vital fellowship with Christ, therefore, dissolves the connexion 
between sin and evil, since morally the two are no longer related to each other, even if from the 
merely natural point of view the one is the consequence of the other. Morally, however, each of 
them by itself is regarded solely in relation to the task of the new life. Hence, just as the 
redemptive activity of Christ brings about for all believers a corporate activity corresponding to 
the being of God in Christ, so the reconciling element, that is, the blessedness of the being of 
God in Him, brings about for all believers, as for each separately, a corporate feeling of 
blessedness.' (CF 101.2.433) 
405. Schleiermacher's view of salvation follows Colossians 1.27-29 nicely: To them God chose 
to make known how great among the Gentiles are the riches of the glory of this mystery, which 
is Christ in you, the hope of glory. It is he whom we proclaim, warning everyone and teaching 
everyone in all wisdom, so that we may present everyone mature in Christ. For this I toil and 




the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth.' (CF 11.52) By teleological, he 
means that the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth leads to a form of 
piety where the moral task directs the pious person towards some specific goal. 
The goal of this moral task is the Kingdom of God where Christ  
'exercises His lordship through ordinances which He Himself established, and 
has Himself declared these to be sufficient, so that nothing is now necessary but 
the right application of these; and to apply them is the common task of those 
who are ruled by Christ, just because they are his subjects.' (CF 105.1.468)  
 
The moral development or direction inherent in Christian faith comes about 
through the modulation of feeling brought on by the reception of Christ's 
determinative influence coming to expression in the communal formation of the 
church. As God's being relates to Christ, uniquely determines it at the level of 
feeling, so Christ relates to the believer through her attempt to metabolise him as 
he communicates himself in word and sacrament. The specific historical density of 
his person creates a living fellowship where 'the natural powers of the regenerate 
are put at [Christ's] disposal' (CF 110 505) to create 'a system of mutual interaction 
and co-operation.'(CF 115.532) 
The reception of Christ's work, however, comes about only through the 
believer taking on the moral personality of the church community founded by 
Christ by becoming receptive to the attunement it embodies.  
'Taking everything together, we are thus able to say [...]that after Christ's departure 
the disciples' common apprehension of Christ changed into a spontaneous 
prolongation of his fellowship forming activity, and how it was only through this 
activity so related to the fixed apprehension of Christ becoming the imperishable 
common spirit, that the Christian Church arose.' (CF 122.3.568-9)  
 
The Holy Spirit is the union of the divine Being with the common human spirit of 
the church animating believers. The presence of the divine being in believers, as 
with Christ, will be at the person-forming level of affective processing, the visceral 




the world-forming act of God, but this formation will differ by referring itself to 
Christ's communicated blessedness and perfection.406 
As a being of God in the world, the Spirit, just as Christ, cannot be 
dependent on the interior workings of the created order. Such dependence would 
place God within the relative passivity and activity of the world undoing his 
omnipotence, omnipresence, eternity, and omniscience, 'then the feeling 
expressing this [absolute] dependence likewise could not be true[.]' (CF 40.3.152) 
Within the world, then, and unlike all other individual existences, God can only 
exist in Christ when this existence is 'apprehended as pure activity.' (CF  94.2 ET 
p. 387) As a divinely instituted relationship, the asymmetrical and nonreactive 
nature of the redeeming relation will be at one with the single, eternal act of God 
in the single decree. The feeling of election is the feeling of the Spirit's work known 
in the life of church. Christ's work was to found this community of the Spirit, the 
kingdom of God. 
Being the man that he was, Jesus of Nazareth communicated and 
communicates the being of God to the members of the fellowship he founded 
through their living receptivity towards him. The historical particulars of his life 
constitute the fellowship where 'the natural powers of the regenerate are put at 
[Christ's] disposal.' (CF 110 505) For Schleiermacher, Christ began to form a 
fellowship during his earthly life through his influence on his initial circle of 
followers. This historical fellowship continues the formative activity of Christ such 
                                                            
406. 'After what has been said, the expression 'Holy Spirit' must be understood to mean the vital 
unity of the Christian fellowship as a moral personality; and this, since everything strictly legal 
has already been excluded, we might denote by the phrase common spirit... in the Christian 
church, as individual influences no longer proceed directly [unmittelbar] from Christ, something 
divine must exist, which we equally can call the being of God in it, and it is this which continues 
in the church the communication [Mittheilung] of the perfect and blessedness of Christ.' (CF 




that the 'assumption into living fellowship with Christ [comes] to each only from 
this corporate life, and as the sanctification of each depends on the effective 
influence upon him of the whole [community].' (CF 106.2.477) Communal 
regeneration and extension, however, only comes to pass as the renewal of 
individuals who in turn maintain, extend, and constitute the limits of the redeemed 
fellowship.407 Individual regeneration, then, comes about through the believer's 
appropriation and creative extension of the spirit of the fellowship, which is 'the 
fixed apprehension of Christ.' (CF 122.3.568-9) The next chapter will be devoted 
to developing an understanding of the believer's appropriation of the communal 
spirit of the fellowship in her unique way, how the spirit forms her moral 

























                                                            
407. 'For, the entrance of Christ into humanity being its second creation, humanity thus becomes 
a new creature, and one may regard this entrance as also the regeneration of the human race, 
which to be sure only actually comes to pass in the form of regeneration of individuals. And as 
the community of believers in its true essence consists only of the totality of the sanctified 
elements of all who are assumed into living fellowship with Christ, so again the sanctification of 
the individual includes everything by which the fellowship is constituted and maintained and 




Chapter 8: Schleiermacher on Church and Spirit 
 
So far in my reading of Schleiermacher, the Christian consciousness has 
been charted as it has moved from the experience of God under sin through the 
coming of the Redeemer. Under sin, the feeling of absolute dependence could not 
come into consciousness in such a way as to determine either doing or thinking in 
a definitive or regulative way. The active God-consciousness was desired without 
being appropriated by the potential Christian believer under the influence of 
original sin. Communities formed by original sin were responsible for the moral 
personality of the individual who was, therefore, formed by short term sensual 
concerns. The feeling of absolute dependence, in the pre-reflective relation of 
Gefühl, made clear certain attributes of God despite the partial nature of the God-
consciousness providing an abstract and negative view of God's attributes. With 
the coming of the Redeemer, however, the God-consciousness was made complete 
and powerful in an individual who was the being of God in the world. Christ's 
moral personality was not constituted by the communal and historical structures of 
original sin but the being of God in its existence in him. Christ possessed the perfect 
God-consciousness, blessedness, and the ability to communicate it to others. He 
was able to do all of these things by repeating in the world the divine causality in 
its absolute vitality. The analogical point of contact between God and humanity in 
divine activity and human receptivity was actualised in the Redeemer so that by 
concentrating on a historical point, Jesus Christ, the right relationship between God 
and humanity might be actual in his followers. 
This chapter will go forward in three main parts. First, the already 
mentioned feeling of need will be briefly re-described, as Schleiermacher himself 




God's gracious preservation.  Second, I will turn to the entrance of the believer into 
the formative fellowship of the church through her assumption of the blessedness 
of Jesus Christ, what Schleiermacher describes as regeneration. This longer section 
will focus on three aspects of this entrance: the communication of consciousness 
in Schleiermacher; the constitutive role Christ's consciousness continues to play in 
the community founded by the Apostles and maintained through Scripture; the 
entrance of the believer as the mutual recognition of believer and community in 
baptism. Schleiermacher's understanding of how intention, consciousness, and 
personality are communicated through text or speech, what Günter Bader has 
described as the 'palindrome of thought' 'Spirit and Letter—Letter and Spirit' in 
Schleiermacher, leads him to think of Christ's communication of the being of God 
as the appropriation of his consciousness and personality through his words.408 The 
powerful words of Christ remain, for Schleiermacher, in the church charged with 
the ministry of the Word, preaching on the basis of Christ's preaching. The whole 
way of life present in the Apostolic church as the reflection of Christ's teaching 
becomes, then, the primary site of inspiration and Scripture shares in this Apostolic 
inspiration. Christ's personality is rendered in the reading of Scripture within the 
fellowship attuned to his person. Entrance into this community involves reading 
Scripture with attention to his way of being in the world, which includes certain 
existential commitments and a fundamental personal attunement. Properly reading 
Christ's words, contained in the New Testament, in the church comes about through 
a change at the level of Gefühl. The change occurs in the believer's baptism into 
the church community. Third, life lived in the church under the influence of Christ's 
                                                            
408 Günter Bader ‘Spirit and Letter—Letter and Spirit in Schleiermacher’s Speeches ‘On 





blessedness primarily forms the believer through compassion towards others on the 
basis of Christ's presentation of his will. The result of this transformed life will be 
human life lived in submission to the will of God, the single unified and formative 
force behind the world and Christ, known in God's love and wisdom, rather than 
the imposition of any law. The will of God increasingly will operate in the person 
through her way of taking the world, i.e. at the level of Gefühl, rather than through 
the imposition of an external authority. 
 
I. The Need for the Church 
 
 Schleiermacher has already presented sin as 'a positive antagonism of 
the flesh against the spirit' (CF 66.271) within human experience as that experience 
oscillates between delight and aversion [Lust und Unlust] in its movement towards 
fellowship with God.409 This antagonism prevents the feeling of absolute 
dependence from directing the human consciousness in its acts of doing and 
thinking, 'evinced only casually in isolated flashes, never kindling to a steady 
flame.' (CF 106.1.476) A person under sin, then, can desire the superiority of the 
spirit over the flesh, and, yet, will be unable to produce this changed disposition. 
Even strict adherence to the law will not allow for 'a new and opposite movement 
of life [to] develop' in the person desiring to delight in the fellowship of God. (CF 
108.2.484) When Schleiermacher turns to describe Christian conversion he 
                                                            
409. 'Das bisher beschriebene Gottesbewußtsein kommt als wirkliche Erfüllung eines Momentes 
nur vor unter der allgemeinen Form des Selbstbewußtseins, nämlich dem Gegensatz von Lust 
und Unlust.' (CG 62.391.6-9) Wenn wir nun im allgemeinen die Art, wie sich das 
Gottesbewußtseins an und mit dem erregten Selbstbewußtsein gestaltet, nur auf die That des 
Einzelnen zurükführen können; so besteht das eigentümliche der christlichen Frömmigkeit 
darin, daß wir uns dessen, was in unsern Zuständen Abwendung von Gott is, als unserer 
ursprünglichen That bewußt sind, welche wir Sünde nennen, dessen aber was darin 
Gemeinschaft mit Gott ist, als auf einer Mittheilung des Erlösers beruhend, welche wir Gnade 




intensifies his description of the human failure to adequately grasp the difficulty 
posed by sin: 'The law, after its wont, goes into particulars, and the regret evoked 
by it is only regret for particular motions and affections and not for the general 
condition and its deepest cause.' (CF 108.2.484) The root problem, the deepest 
cause of sin, only becomes visible in light of Christ:  
However large the previous experience of this regret may have been the true 
conversion-regret must always eventually arise out of the vision of the 
perfection of Christ... Christ awakens a wholly perfect regret just in so far as 
His self-imparting perfection meets us in all truth, which is what happens at 
the dawn of faith. And Christ can, in fact, lay hold of us in His receiving 
activity only if and when His soul-stirring exhibition of Himself to us leads us 
to abjure utterly our previous condition. (CF 108.2 484)  
 
Sin is only known as sin in light of the regret brought on by the figure of 
Jesus Christ. The forces of the divine causality encountered within the life of sin, 
i.e. life previous to conversion, are now understood as the workings of God's 
preparatory grace working to make the believer ready for Christian regret and 
repentance.410  
  
In light of Christ's self-presentation, the potential believer approaches 
Christian faith  as she regrets her previous sins in 'continual abjuration of the 
fellowship of the sinful, and there is also the desire to receive the impulses that 
come from Christ.' (CF 108.2.485) The formative fellowship of original sin must 
be renounced in favour of the formative fellowship of blessedness, the church, as 
the place where the need for redemption can be met. This transition, however, is 
not a general anthropological or religious fact, but, instead, arises only from the 
                                                            
410. 'All such stimulations [of regret by Christ] arriving as they do from the influence of the 
common Christian life, even though they are only an unconnected and casually-appearing 
mixture of elements, are to be regarded as divinely caused, and indeed involved in the divine 
ordinance which places all men in relation to the Redeemer; and in this sense such a condition is 




historical appearance of the Redeemer, Jesus of Nazareth.411 Christ remains active 
in communicating his blessedness in the present time through those who continue 
to preach him in the fellowship of the church.412 The dual call to repentance and 
forgiveness must be mediated by the Word in the appearance of Jesus Christ, and 
yet the simple historical mediation does not entirely account for the arrival of a 
living faith. As was shown above, Schleiermacher tries to position his own view of 
salvation between magical, i.e. immediate and inward, and empirical, i.e. simply 
historical, models by maintaining the power of the Word to communicate 
supernatural blessedness in the historical life of Christ.  
The supernatural becoming natural paradigm at work in the uniting and the 
unity of the divine and human in Christ holds for the communication of blessedness 
to the believer: the initial passivity of the believer right away begins to produce the 
spontaneous activity of sanctification.413 The process of Christian conversion 
parallels the incarnation of Christ by requiring a necessary but ultimately 
insufficient historical formation to serve as the new birth of a being of God in the 
world.414 The necessary but not sufficient historical location of Christian 
                                                            
411. 'Regret that lies outside Christianity and has no reference to the consciousness of God is 
beyond the scope of our discussion. But within the sphere of Christian piety, if we carry our 
examination further back into the common life of sinfulness, we find many sorts of regret. Such 
regrets, too, can be traced back more or less directly to the vision of Christ, and are not always 
limited to some particular, but may show genuine pain at the general human state of sinfulness 
as illustrated in one's own person; but they do not develop into a continuous inward movement 
amounting to the dawn of living faith.' (CF 108.2.485) 
412. 'The constant factor is above all the divine power of the Word--taking the expression in its 
widest sense--by which conversion is still effected and faith still arises. The difference is simply 
that the self-revelation of Christ is now mediated by those who preach Him; but they being 
appropriated by him as instruments, the activity really proceeds from Him and is essentially his 
own.' (CF 108.4.490-491) 'Our proposition, therefore, depends upon the assumption that this 
influence of the fellowship in producing a like faith is none other than the influence of the 
personal perfection of Jesus Himself.' (CF 88.2.363) 
413. 'It seems obvious, then, that here no causal agency can be attributed to the person who is 
being taken up into fellowship, for the higher form cannot be in any way derived from lower 
stages of life as present either in a group of people yet to be converted.' (CF 108.6.493) 
414. '...the incarnation of Christ is analogous to the regeneration of the whole race considered as 




conversion is the actually existing Christian church apart from which blessedness 
is not possible.415 Entrance into blessedness requires membership in the church that 
continues the self-presentation of the Word of God in Jesus Christ reversing the 
dynamic of original sin. Where common original sin was responsible for individual 
actual sins, in the church sin remains in individuals while '[r]edemption is possibly 
only in the form of a common life.' (CF 111.3.515) 
 Like the incarnation, though, conversion cannot be made into a punctiliar 
intervention by God in the world but comes about as part of God's single eternal 
decree: redemption is the completion of creation. Conversion  
'cannot be distinguished either in and for itself, or by any particular mark, from 
the effects of preparatory grace... [t]he idea that every Christian must be able to 
point to the very time and place of his conversion is accordingly an arbitrary 
and presumptuous restriction of divine grace, and can only cause confusion.' 
(CF 108.2-3.486-487)  
 
Entrance into the Christian community, especially when infant baptism is 
practiced, cannot entirely be equated with the apprehension of blessedness by the 
believer.416 The only possible sign of conversion is the manifestation of 
sanctification through the believer's extension of the Kingdom of God in her 
personal transformation through, in, and for the church. The change effected in 
conversion, as the communication of Christ's God-consciousness and the being of 
God, occurs at the level of piety and Gefühl, the Christian's attunement in the world, 
through the operation of the finite causality upon her in her concrete situation. The 
specific change in Gefühl occurring in the Christian church follows from the 
                                                            
415. 'No one, therefore, can be surprised to find at this point the proposition that salvation or 
blessedness is in the Church alone, and that, since blessedness cannot enter from without, but 
can be found within the Church only by being brought into existence there, the Church alone 
saves.' (CF 113.3.527) 
416. ‘...as has been shown, it [viz. the equivalence of baptism and regeneration] is only true as 
describing a certain ideal perfection of the Church, which is not at any single point really given, 




operation of the Word of God in the church on the believer through her natural 
means of knowing and doing, her way of being a subject in the midst of the forces 
of the world. 
  
II. Regeneration (Wiedergeburt) 1: Approaching the Church 
  
As was mentioned above, the believer's movement into faith makes use of 
the absolutely vitality paradigm Schleiermacher has deployed throughout the 
Glaubenslehre, and especially its historical form in the incarnation of the 
Redeemer as the supernatural becoming natural. In the believer, this paradigm 
presents itself in the interrelated moments of regeneration and sanctification. 
Regeneration mirrors the initial act of union in the incarnation as the believer 
undergoes conversion and justification.417 In order for regeneration to function as 
the analogue of God's act of uniting with humanity, the regenerate believer must 
deal with Christ such that 'no causal agency can be attributed to the person who is 
being taken up into fellowship for the higher form cannot be in any way derived 
from the lower stages of life...' (CF 108.6.493)  
 
A. Conversion 
The receptivity of the believer consists in her repentance, which is her 
turning away from the previously existing fellowship of sinful life formative of her 
                                                            
417. 'If now in this connexion we recall what was said before, namely, that the relation of Christ 
to the rest of his humanity is exactly the same as the relation within His personality of its divine 
to its human element, we may add that these two conceptions, regeneration and sanctification, 
set forth just the same distinction as between the act of uniting and the state of union; except 
that in that instance first of all one Person originated intact, and so the state of union too was an 
unbroken continuity, and an uninterrupted diffusion through the human nature; which would, 
accordingly happen in this instance too were it not that, through the identity of the subject with 





person.418 The consciousness formed by the sinful fellowship, with its 
consciousness of deserved punishment and distance from God, has prevented the 
believer from possessing an active God-consciousness; has obstructed the feeling 
of absolute dependence, the believer's right relationship with God. The believer, 
however, when she apprehends Christ's blessedness and God-consciousness, 
begins to approximate a way of taking the world so free that the finite causality of 
forces does not lead to the domination of her life by her sensual self-consciousness, 
wherein even suffering and pain do not diminish the God-consciousness, as 
directive of her feeling. 'That co-operation of the mental organism in the reception 
of the Word implies a consent of the will; and this is just a surrender to the operation 
of Christ or giving rein to a lively susceptibility thereto.' (CF 108.6.494.) The 
change in the will, 'the self-consciousness [...] viewed as passing into action', 




The other aspect of regeneration is justification. Justification is the result of 
God's justifying act in the 'forgiving of [the believer's] sins, and the recognising of 
him as a child of God.' (CF 109.496) For the believer, the connection between sin 
and suffering, related to God's holiness and justice, ceases to be active for whom 
'the consciousness of guilt is thus abolished.' (CF 109.2.498) The remaining effects 
                                                            
418. 'Christ awakens a wholly perfect regret just in so far as His self-imparting perfection meets 
us in all its truth, which is what happens at the dawn of faith. And Christ can, in fact, lay hold of 
us in His receiving activity only if  and when His soul-stirring exhibition of Himself to us leads 
us to abjure utterly our previous condition.' (CF 108.2.484) 
'There remains over from regret the continual abjuration of the fellowship of the sinful life, and 
there is also the desire to receive the impulses that come from Christ. This desire, acting in two 
directions, is the change of heart effected by Christ which binds regret and faith together and 




of sin are simply the 'after-effect' of the old fellowship of sin persisting in an 
increasingly lessening way in the regenerate life. (CF 109.2.498) The connection 
between the two no longer obtains for the believer in just the same way as they 
never were connected for Christ, and the believer can endure suffering with the 
same joy as Christ did.419  
The change of self-consciousness in justification changes the believer's 
relationship to God but does not however signal a change in God or a particular 
justifying act of God directed to an individual. God acts in the single, eternal, and 
universal decree of creation and redemption to justify the world as world, and the 
gracious act of justification does not belong to Christ alone.420 An individual act or 
punctiliar  decree of forgiveness disconnected from God's singular act of Creation-
Redemption would subject God to 'the antithesis of abstract and concrete, or 
universal and particular' invalidating God as the object of absolute dependence. 
The alteration of the believer's relationship to God is the result 'of one divine act.' 
(CF 109.3.501) The single divine act of creation and redemption realises itself in 
time as the goal of God's decree of justification and adoption.421 In Christ, the 
believer does not become the object of divine love for the first time, but in him 'the 
consciousness of the relation [arises] in the individual' as a historic possibility. (CF 
109.3.502; CF 109.4.503) The change in self-consciousness made historically 
                                                            
419. '...while for the rest, there lies in living fellowship with Christ, immediately and not just as 
a vague something in the future, a readiness for and right to fellowship with the sufferings of 
Christ, which make it impossible for him to keep regarded social and still less natural evils as 
punishment, or to go on fearing future punishment--impossible, for he is at the same time 
received into the fellowship of the kingly office of Christ.' (CF 109.2.499) 
420. CF 109.3.501 contains Schleiermacher's pivotal discussion of the single decree of God 
worked out in creation and incarnation. 
421. it is already implied in the divine decree of redemption or of new creation of human nature 
that God is gracious to the human race in His Son; hence and individual act making the 
individual an object of the divine love is not necessary. All that is needful is that the 
consciousness of this relation should arise in the individual; and this happens in the way already 
described. Thus we have to posit only one universal justifying divine act bearing on redemption, 




available in Christ and his preaching, because it is a means for the individual 
believer to relate to the forces of the flux of the world, changes the relationship of 
the believer to God by communicating the victory of the higher self-consciousness 
of God over the sensual, sinful, historically prevalent self-consciousness, by 
allowing absolute dependence to overcome the idolatrous elevation of relative 
dependence. 
To understand how, according to Schleiermacher, the immediate self-
consciousness of the believer is changed through appropriation of Christ's 
absolutely potent God-consciousness and to take the world in a new way, I will 
now take up Schleiermacher's account of how the particular social life of the church 
forms the believer through its production of an understanding of the believer's 
relationship to God through Jesus Christ in the believer.  
As was shown above, this transition from sin to blessedness in the church 
does not override or undo the perfection [Vollkommenheit] of the material world as 
the place where 'the receptivity of man to the awakening and shaping of self-
activity' can take place as that 'would involve the denial of man's capacity to 
appropriate redemption' inherent in 'humanity's disposition to the 'God-
consciousness.' (CF 59.1.238; CF 70.2.283) The appropriation of redemption by 
the believer will be a movement in the historical material world modulating her 
shaping self-activity as the recipient of divine grace.  
'For the Word through which the influence of Christ is mediated can mediate 
only by making an impression on men, and for this the activity of his sense-
faculties as well as of the inner functions of his consciousness is required... the 
capacity of apprehension must therefore be allowed to exist in his natural 
condition...[t]hat cooperation of the  mental organism in the reception of the 
Word implies a consent of the will; and this is just a surrender to the operation 





The felt need to receive the Word at work in the church, and to receive it through 
normal human communication, will, when apprehended and grasped, manifest 
itself in active transformation appropriate to a teleological religion. I will now, 
therefore, turn to Schleiermacher's understanding of linguistic communication.  
  
III. An Understanding of Understanding 
 
For Schleiermacher, understanding or knowing comes about through a 
relation between subject and object wherein an abstract concept is applied to a 
material or sensual element the positive congruence of which ought to possess a 
general validity communicable to others.422 Subjects grapple with the objects of 
their sensual experience by means of language and concepts in order for this 
understanding to pass to other subjects and their thought in speech. As a result,  
'every utterance [Rede] has a dual relationship, to the totality of language 
[Sprache] and to the whole of thought of its originator, then all understanding 
[Verstehen] also consists of the two moments, of understanding the utterance as 
derived from language, and as a fact [Tatsache] in the thinker.'423  
 
These two moments position human understanding in the middle of the 
relationships present in a given language and the particular experiences of human 
persons of the flux of forces in the universe as they make use of that language. The 
process remains dialectical throughout as language limits and guides self-
consciousness, while experience brings to light aspects of the unity of the world 
                                                            
422. Every instance of thinking arises from two elements, a formal element and a material 
element.' Dialectic 19. 'An instance of thinking that is formal can never be one of knowing but 
is only a preliminary apparatus for becoming an instance of knowing. It can become an instance 
of knowing only in that what is vacuous is (1) filled in and (2) organic function is also 
constantly present within it, even if in a minimal way.' p. 20. When a piece of thinking is posited 
as knowing we posit the general validity of this knowing for everything the action of which is 
comprised of that thinking. Whatever lacks this general validity we do not consider knowing. 
We have much within us regarding which we are conscious of never being able to think 
otherwise but without having the pretension that other too ought to think this way.' p. 14. 




unaccounted for in a given language. In his lectures on Dialectic, Schleiermacher's 
example of the unity of this dialectic through which concepts gain clarity through 
personal criticism and communication is Socratic dialogue:  
'In the Socratic school dialogue took the place of the arbitrary diatribes of the 
sophists; hence for them the principles for dialogue and for construction of 
knowledge overall were the same. Thereby the general validity of the principles 
applying to each was set forth at the same time.'424  
 
Knowledge comes about through and as the dialogue of subjects attempting to 
express their own way of taking the world. Keeping in mind the intrinsic 
relationship between these two moments, I will now take them in turn.425 
 
A. Taking the World 
Personal knowledge comes about for the individual through a combination 
of her felt sense of the world's unity, the language available to her, and the sensuous 
stimuli she encounters in the course of her life.  
The whole finite causality comes to human persons who relate to this 
causality in Gefühl. Personal feeling entails an intuition or sense of the whole 
causality where 'the universe manifests itself as totality, as unity in multiplicity, as 
system and thus for the first time deserves its name.'426 The unity or totality of the 
universe contained in feeling will be presupposed by all subsequent knowing, and, 
in fact, subsequent knowledge will simply be the attempt to bring this intuition of 
the 'unity in multiplicity' into self-consciousness. As I have already shown, for 
Schleiermacher feeling comes before knowing and gives birth to it as the self's 
                                                            
424. Dialectic p. 6. 
425. The primary source of my arguments here will be two texts unpublished in 
Schleiermacher's own time dealing with various aspects of understanding. His lectures on 
Hermeneutics have been combined with his own handwritten notes in a text focussed on texts in 
general and the New Testament in particular. His lectures on Dialectic, or the Art of Doing 
Philosophy come from primarily from notes taken at his lectures focussing on knowing and 
understanding in a more general context. 




attempt to reflect on its own immediate self-consciousness, but the unity always 
already exists independent of the self's reflective recognition of the unity.427 All 
mediate or reflective knowledge begins with this felt unity of the world, with the 
reality of the universe, or it will be speculative in a bad sense. Knowledge 
beginning with this feeling of existence moves into knowing through language and 
sense perception. 
Expression of an individual's sense of the unity of the universe can only 
occur in language:  
'The individual is determined in his thought by the (common) language and can 
think only the thoughts which already have their designation in his 
language...This is based on the fact that thinking is an inner speaking. But from 
this one can also positively conclude that language determines the progress of 
the individual in thought.'428  
 
Language provides the concepts available for the individual to make sense of and 
express to others and herself the relationship between the specific—a particular 
object or range of objects—and the unity of the universe. Concepts 'become an 
instance of knowing only in that what is vacuous is (1) filled in and (2) organic 
function is also constantly present within it, even if in a minimal way.'429 Language 
attempts to show the relationships present in the flux of the finite causality as they 
cohere in certain objects capable of fixed perceptions.430 The origin of language for 
Schleiermacher comes from the attempt of the reflective consciousness to bring 
concrete beings,  rather than abstract ideas, into thought.431 Concrete beings, 
                                                            
427. ‘We rather presuppose [supreme knowing] as existing already and want simply to attain 
consciousness of it; it exists in all our knowing but previously in an unconscious way and only 
under the form of activity; it is indeed something actually at work, but it is not also taken up into 
consciousness.’ Dialectic 9. 
428. Hermeneutics p. 9. 
429. Dialectic p. 20. 
430. 'For language is not just a complex of single representations, but also a system of the 
relatedness of representations.' Hermeneutics p. 9. 
431. 'Living, naturally growing language begins with perceptions and fixes them. Therein lies 
the material for the difference of manners of use, because there are always many relationships in 




however, possess their character as a result of their place within the relationship of 
forces at work in the world.  
Personal use of language comes about when individuals attempt to express 
the relationships constituting various objects they perceive in concrete living as 
those objects come to their consciousness. Personal consciousness of the organic 
function of the human consciousness, the use of the senses to encounter material 
force, directs the use of the language in communication and innovates by 
establishing new connections within the language.432 New connections within 
language follow the introduction of new elements previous speakers did not 
recognise leading to new uses of existing language rather than the creation of new 
languages. These new connections name relationships already existing in 
immediate self-consciousness, but hitherto unacknowledged in mediate self-
consciousness, through innovative use of already existing language. The sense of 
the self in the world, what Schleiermacher elsewhere describes as the Urbild of the 
self, attempts to express itself with the concepts at hand in its life, and its 
transformation of those concepts in its use of them opens up aspects of its own 
experience to others.  
 
B. Talking about the World 
To understand another's speech one attempts to reconstruct the relationship 
between the meaning of the language and the consciousness of the speaker. In his 
                                                            
abstract via inner perception, then this is one-sided, for all original perception is inner 
perception. But it is true that nothing abstract [abstrakt] is originally in language, but it is rather 
the concrete which is originally in language.' Hermeneutics  p. 37. 
432. 'By recognising the author in this way I recognise him as he collaborates in the language: 
for in part he produces something new in it, because every connection of a subject and a 
predicate which has not yet been made is something new, in part he preserves what he repeats 
and reproduces. In the same way, by knowing the language area, I know the language to the 
extent that the author is its product and is in its power. Both are therefore the same, only looked 




lectures and notebooks on hermeneutics, which focus primarily on understanding 
the New Testament texts, Schleiermacher divides understanding into the 
grammatical and psychological aspects of interpretation. The grammatical attempts 
to reconstruct the use of language contemporary to the speaker; the psychological 
the intended unity or theme of the use of the language. Grammatical explication 
charts out the 'language area' and the basic genre of the text.433 This part of the 
process takes place at a minimal level when the speaker is contemporary with the 
hearer, but can require a good deal of work when the speaker or writer worked at a 
historically distant time. Historical interpretation does not suffice, however, where 
intuitive concept formation has occurred:  
'The insistence on historical interpretation...becomes mistaken if it denies the 
new concept-forming power of Christianity [die neue begriffsbildende Kraft des 
Christentums] and wants to explain everything from what is already there... The 
whole issue then depends on the relationship of grammatical and psychological 
interpretation, for the new concepts arose from the particular enlivening of the 
mind [Gemütserregung].'434  
 
The enlivened mind forms new concepts by bringing previously unconnected 
elements of experience into a relationship in the reflective self-consciousness on 
the basis of their already existing connection in the interconnected system of the 
universe felt in the pre-reflective self-consciousness. Connecting these elements as 
subject and predicate in language, the speaking or writing reflective self-
consciousness presents new concepts through the use of established language in 
light of its personal experience of the push and pull of the system of the universe. 
Interpretation is the attempt to understand the state of self-consciousness 
responsible for bringing this previously unacknowledged connection into language 
and thought. 
                                                            
433. Hermeneutics p. 90. 




The historical language area of a time, the grammar, combines with the 
'psychological' [psychologische] aspect of interpretation concerned with 
individual's intuitive sense, the intuitions and intentions of personal consciousness, 
to bring about an understanding of a text or speech. No rules, however, exist for 
precisely how grammatical and psychological interpretation ought to take place435, 
only an acknowledgment that 'understanding [das Verstehen] is only a being-in-
one-another of these two moments.'436 One attempts to understand the 
psychological aspect either through a comparison with other uses of language or 
the divinatory [divinatorische] method wherein one 'so to speak, transforms oneself 
into the other person and tries to understand the individual element immediately 
[das Individuelle unmittelbar aufzufassen sucht].'437 The oscillation between these 
elements, the grammatical and the psychological, can bring about, in the reading 
of a text, at most a harmonisation or approximation [Annäherung] between speaker 
and hearer or author and reader: 'Individual intuition [Anschauung] is not only 
never exhausted but also always capable of correction.'438 The particular individual 
intuition of the world in each person, dependent on her specific place in the system 
of the universe, cannot completely pass over to someone else, who is in turn in her 
specific place in the system, but a degree of harmonisation can take place such that 
understanding does occur. 
Nevertheless, Schleiermacher does not set out a general theory of 
interpretation or understanding because a general theory cannot exist apart from 
                                                            
435. 'For the grammatical side to be completed on its own there would have to be a complete 
knowledge of the language, in the other case [the psychological] a complete knowledge of the 
person As there can never be either of these, one must move from one to the other, and no rules 
can be given for how this is to be done.' Hermeneutics p. 11. 
436. Hermeneutics p. 9 / Hermeneutik p. 79. 
437. Hermeneutics p. 92/Hermeneutik p. 169. I have altered Crouter's translation so that 
unmittelbar reads immediately rather than directly. 




total reflective knowledge of the system of the universe, and contemporary 
knowing is only at the beginning of that venture.439 In the absence of a total 
knowledge of the world, the sense of unity of the world responsible for 
understanding now comes from the pre-reflective relationship of dependence on 
God, who remains incomprehensible, or some understanding of the absolute.440 
The principle of unity presupposed in our understanding of the universe, our 
reflective account of felt totality of relationships, indicates the sort of unity we feel 
in the connected set of judgments, concepts, and practices of our language.441 For 
instance,  Christians at least want to say something about God who has 
communicated his being to them by making the world a certain sort of place.442 
Appropriating a way of taking the world, blessedness, will involve understanding 
God through a reconstruction of Christ's sense of the world handed down through 
                                                            
439. 'Hermeneutics as the art of understanding [Kunst des Verstehens] does not yet exist in a 
general manner, there instead only several forms of specific hermeneutics.' Hermeneutics p.  5 / 
Hermeneutik p. 75. 'What has been set forth [in these lectures] is knowing in its completion, 
except that it is present only as something that is becoming.' Dialectic p. 31. 
440. 'The deity is just as surely incomprehensible as the knowledge of it is the basis of all 
knowledge. Exactly the same is true also on the side of feeling.' Dialectic p. 31. 
441. 'The goal of dialectics is 'knowledge', i.e. bringing the theory to a state of 'unchangeability 
and universality' (Hermeneutik p. 414). There must be consensus between the partners in a 
discourse as to the orientation to this goal; for without the 'presupposition' of an ideal 
knowledge (however unattainable) there would be, given the insoluble differences between the 
opinions confronting one another and the inadequacy of a 'truth' controlling the conversation 
from above, no guarantee of the intersubjectivity of agreements reaching in any discourse. 
A further presupposition of dialectics implied int he postulate of the ideal unity of knowledge is 
the sameness of the object to which divergent practices are ascribed. This alone makes possible 
the clash between 'contradictions' which are to be resolved by dialectics (Hermeneutik pp. 
426ff.)' Manfred Frank The Subject and the Text ed. Andrew Bowie, trans. Helen Atkins 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1997) pp. 8-9. 
442. 'In der bewußteinstheoretischen Gestalt der Theorie der Frömmigkeit finden dabei die 
folgenden wesentlichen Konstitutionselemente der Frömmigkeit als Konstitutionselemente des 
Selbstbewußtseins Aufnahme: Der Anlaß des frommen Selbstbewußtseins im Bezogenes des 
Menschen auf die Welt, also im Weltbewußtsein; der Inhalt des frommen Selbstbewußtseins als 
Bewußtsein der Bezogenheit von Subjektivät auf etwas außerhalb ihrer selbst und außerhalb der 
Welt Liegendes; die relational bestimmte Struktur des frommen Selbstbewußtseins als die in der 
Weise ihrer Gegenstandsbezogenheit vorgegebene notwendige Gestalt; und die Notwendigkeit 
der Artikulation des Inhaltes des frommen Selbstbewußtseins im Ausdruck 'Gott.'' Christian 
Albrecht, Schleiermachers Theorie der Frömmigkeit: Ihr wissenschaftlicher Ort und ihr 
systematischer Gehalt in den Reden, in der Glaubenslehre und in der Dialektik (Berlin: De 




his formation of language in his preaching, an approximation to what he presents 
in his life, that remains powerfully in the church.  
  
IV. Regeneration (Wiedergeburt) 2: The Ministry of the Church 
 
A. The Ministry of the Word 
 
The process outlined above in terms of how understanding passes between 
different persons must be applied, for Schleiermacher, to the development of the 
New Testament within the church as the work of the Spirit. Possessing a felt need 
for redemption, and faced with the figure of Jesus Christ, the potential believer 
stands in the same position as those Apostles who first encountered Christ.443 The 
Apostolic faith did not, though, arise from their understanding of Scripture, but 
came from Christ's own work of self-presentation: 'their faith sprang from Christ's 
preaching of Himself, so in the case of others faith sprang from the preaching of 
Christ by the Apostles and many more.' (CF 128.2.593) The need for redemption, 
awakened in the Apostles by the preaching of John the Baptist, did not combine 
with faith in, or an understanding of, the Scriptures or the prophets. Instead, it was 
met by the 'direct impression which awakened faith' in their souls leading them to 
'express their faith communicatively by recurring to Jesus' words and deeds.' (CF 
128.2.592)  
Since, as far as the grounds of faith are concerned, contemporary believers 
remain in the same situation as the Apostles, Christian faith cannot arise from or 
depend on any special doctrine about Scripture or from any already established 
                                                            
443. 'With respect to the grounds of faith, then, we can admit no distinction between different 
classes. And no more can we admit a distinction between periods of time; the grounds of faith 




conceptual consensus. This must especially be the case if the blessedness 
communicated by Christ, i.e. redemption, affects the believer's subjectivity at that 
level where she is not responsible for her determination, Gefühl. The 
'uncontrollable determinedness' of the self in feeling in relation to the flux of the 
world, Gefühl, subsequently determines her self-reflection and -mediation in 
knowing and doing.444 The communication of blessedness occurs through a 
modulation of Gefühl on the basis of a commitment to an orientation, a goal, and a 
common object capable of reconciling differences in understanding and practices.    
Understanding Christ's preaching in the New Testament, therefore, does not 
follow from simply gaining a critical or scientific understanding of the texts only a 
few are capable of, as if 'faith, given a certain degree of culture, could be implanted 
by argument,' but comes about as the recognition of Christ's spiritual power to 
communicate blessedness through the 'applied presentation of Christ and invitation 
in His name' present in the ministry of the church. (CF 127.3.590) This caveat is 
necessary because if a proper understanding of the blessedness communicated in 
Christ depended on an ability to read the Scriptures with a critical or scientific eye, 
then the majority of Christian believers, who do not possess the requisite training 
to read in that way, would be unable to come to faith, which is 'incongruous with 
that equality of all Christians which the Evangelical Church proclaims,' and faith 
would be detached from repentance. (CF 128.1.591) The New Testament writings, 
as writings, do not require a peculiar hermeneutic different from the normal rules 
for understanding a text.445 The Apostolic writings of the New Testament, then, are 
not marked out for how they communicate but for what they communicate. 
                                                            
444. Frank The Subject and the Text p. 7. 
445. '[W]e must reject the suggestion that in virtue of their divine inspiration the sacred books 
demand a hermeneutical and critical treatment different from one guided by the rules which 




Scripture retains its place in the church because the New Testament writings are 
Christ's preaching—transmitted to and through the fellowship—capable of 
arousing faith in believers.446  
The Holy Scriptures are 'the permanent reflection of [Christ's] prophetic 
activity, inasmuch as in their composition and preservation, regarded as the work 
of the Church, they form the most direct exhibition of Christ' (CF 127.3.590) and 
were 'inspired by the Holy Spirit, and the collection of them took place under the 
guidance of the Holy Spirit.' (CF 130.597) The authors of the New Testament, 
however, were not given particular content to write by the Holy Spirit. They 
received, from Christ, a 'single individual bestowal of knowledge out of which the 
particulars evolved organically.' (CF 130.1.598) Christ's preaching communicated 
something of his way of being in the world to the Apostles, or at least the Apostolic 
age of the church fellowship, who in turn began to approximate Christ's way of 
being in the world in relation to God, his God-consciousness. Christ's earthly work 
of self-presentation modulated the feeling of the Apostles so as to bring them into 
living fellowship with himself.447 The spontaneous activity of the Apostles after 
this modulation had begun to occur expressed itself as a common spirit that became 
fixed after Christ's departure and circulated through a recounting of his words and 
deeds.  
Following Christ's departure, the Apostles became active in forming the 
fellowship of believers through the establishment of Kingdom of God, what had 
                                                            
446. 'The New Testament writings are such a preaching [of Christ by the Apostles] come down 
to us, hence faith springs from them too; but in no sense conditionally on the acceptance of a 
special doctrine about these writings, as having had their origin in special divine revelation or 
inspiration.' (CF 128.2.593) 
447. '... we shall state the parallel between the first disciples and ourselves equally well if we 
say that already, even when Christ was with them, and just because they were taken up into 
living fellowship with Him, they had the principle of new life, and had it not merely as 




previously been Christ's sole ability, and this approximation to the being of God in 
Christ in the community is the Holy Spirit.448 Works written in the Apostolic age, 
then, were not as texts inspired, but the 'books only share in [the peculiar inspiration 
of the Apostles].' (CF 130.2.599) Their function is simply to 'exhibit the Redeemer 
in His habit as He lived' by reproducing his God-consciousness well enough to 
allow subsequent generations to approximate it in turn. (CF 130.3.601) The 
subsequent preservation of these writings in the Christian community is 'the work 
of the Spirit of God acknowledging His own products' in their faithful 
representation of Christ's God-consciousness. (CF 130.4.602) The attempt to 
understand the writings of the Apostles in the Christian community leads readers 
to the concept-forming power at work in Christ that the Apostles reproduced in 
recounting his words, deeds, and in their orientation of early Christian 
communities.  
The fellowship-forming activity of Christ continues into the present day 
through the attempt by the various members of the fellowship to communicate 
'whatever of Christ lives in him.' (CF 133.1.612) The given concrete circumstances 
of the fellowship provide the opportunity for the self-presentation of certain 
members of the fellowship, preachers, as an 'organ of Scripture' wherein 'the 
imitatively received movement of the self-presented person becomes in the 
receptively stimulated person a force that evokes the same movement.' (CF 
133.1.613, 612) The imitation of this self-presentation leads to the development of 
Christ's God-consciousness in the receptive believer as she processes or 
metabolises the meaning of Christian preaching. The self-consciousness of the 
believer begins to harmonise with Christ's own self-consciousness, communicated 
                                                            
448. 'The Holy Spirit is the union of the Divine Essence with human nature in the form of the 




through the community, as it expresses itself in thought and speech, and 'true 
expressions of Christian piety take shape.' (CF 131.2.606) 
Christianity remains a language forming force bringing forth concepts 
capable of being filled out in knowing and doing through attention to Christ in his 
preaching preserved in Holy Scripture. So,  
'[s]cripture now stands by itself, for its preservation unchanged guarantees in a 
special manner the identity of our witness to Christ with that originally 
given...And this witness alone, taken universally as the duty and calling of every 
member of the Church—and viewed provisionally apart from definite forms of 
any kind—is what is understood here by the phrase 'the Ministry of the Word 
of God.'' (CF 127.2.588)  
 
Christ, then, is the common object of Christian concern and the Kingdom of God, 
established in Christ's person, the orientation of Christian piety. Believers attend to 
the modulation of feeling and formation of concepts in Christ, which is analogous 
if not equivalent to the formation of concepts by the flux of the universe, presented 
in the apostolic writings in order to recognise the relationships brought into 
reflective self-consciousness and to develop whatever new concepts are necessary 
in their present situation, i.e. to make judgments. The interpretation of Christian 
faith provoked by Scripture 'is the development, suited to that moment, of the 
genuine original interpretation of Christ and His work, and constitutes the common 
Christian orthodoxy for that time and place.' (CF 131.2.606) The whole orientation 
of piety, of Christian Gefühl, is the proper index and condition of the believer's 




                                                            
449. Schleiermacher also treats 'the sacrament of the altar' [dem Sakrament des Altars], the 
Lord's Supper at length. (CG 139.1.378) The Lord's Supper works to fortify the community 
against the influence of the world by uniting personal devotion to Christ in the public act of the 
supper. In it 'the redeeming and fellowship-forming love of Christ is not only represented but 




The formative power flowing from Christ to make believers adopted and 
forgiven children of God 'includes the guarantee of sanctification.' (CF 109.2 499) 
Sanctification makes use of 'the natural powers of the regenerate [to produce] a life 
akin to [Christ's] perfection and blessedness' for the creation of a 'new common 
life.' (CF 110.1 505) 'Hence the man in whom faith develops also has the desire to 
enter the fellowship.' (CF 137.3 631) Entrance into the fellowship is the reception 
of the believer into the church community through baptism as a 'seal of the divine 
grace.' (CF 137.3 631)450 The outward sign of baptism, though, for Schleiermacher, 
is not sufficient for it to function as a seal or channel of divine grace.451 The 
intention of the believer, conditioned by the need for redemption made known in 
Christ, must reciprocally relate to the outward sign of baptism.452 The union of the 
                                                            
performed.' (CF 139.2.640-641) The supper, therefore, represents a moment wherein the various 
members of the fellowship receive Christ's formative love and know others are receiving the 
same thing. The union with Christ leads to closer union with others through the definite form of 
the sacramental action, which frees it from 'dependence on changing personal moods and 
circumstances.' (CF 139.2.641) 'The one benefit of this participation [in the sacrament] is stated 
as being the confirming of our fellowship with Christ; and this includes the confirming of 
Christians in their union with each other, for the latter rests so entirely on their union with Christ 
that the union of an individual with Christ is unthinkable apart from his union with believers.' 
(CF 141.1.651) With regard to Christ's presence, he weighs the Zwinglian, Lutheran, and 
Calvinist views: the Lutheran: 'with the bread and wine Christ conjoined for participation the 
real presence of His body and blood, but only for the action of bodily partaking in both 
elements'; the Zwinglian: 'that Christ conjoined nothing with the bread and wine in themselves 
[but] merely spiritual participation in His flesh and blood with the action of partaking in the 
bread and wine'; the Calvinist: 'that while it is true that Christ conjoined something exclusively 
with the action of eating and drinking, this was not merely spiritual participation, available quite 
apart from the sacrament [but] was a real presence of HIs body and blood not to be had 
elsewhere.' (CF 140.4.649) The Zwinglian view is the clearest to understand but it has difficult 
accounting for why Christ chose this method. The Lutheran and Calvinist can account for the 
use of bread and wine, but the former comes to close to the Catholic while the latter opens up 
too much symbolism or external fascination. All affirm the strengthening of faith in Christ, 
which is the point, and Schleiermacher expects the development of a new view to develop in the 
Evangelical Church as the common doctrine. 
450. Schleiermacher is here alluding to the Heidelberg Catechism qq. 69-72. 
451. 'The meaning [of the creedal passages] is not that the outward performance works even in 
the faintest degree ex opere operato, whether by itself or in conjunction with the utterance of 
certain words... [baptism] works solely in union with the Word which ordains baptism for the 
Church and long with the Church, and which is uninterruptedly active in the Church through its 
whole extent.' (CF 137.3.632) 
452. 'Here we may first of all distinguish between the action itself and the intention with which 
it is performed: the first by itself alone is only the external side of baptism, the second the 
internal; and since the alleged effect is something purely spiritual and inward, this means that 
the external action simply by itself cannot produce the effect, and the connexion between the 




outward sign of baptism, the church's ordinance established by Christ, and the 
inward desire of the potential believer is 'just that the Word must be known to the 
baptised person and acknowledged by Him.' (CF 137.1.629) Hence, infant baptism 
is only 'a complete baptism' when a further confession of faith is made in light of 
confirmation. (CF 138.1-2.635-637) The understanding of Christ in the believer is 
homogenous with the Scriptures, as 'the first member of a series,' as the individual 
element expressive of the common spirit of the Church.(CF 129.1.594-595) Full 
membership in the church and the regeneration of the individual are one and the 
same act so that a believer, once accepted in baptism, becomes a spontaneously 
active member of the church as the historical concepts of the community give 
direction to her own way of taking the world. (CF 114.2 531) 
Belonging to the church, then, follows from the historical location of the 
believer, her concrete place in the flux of time, which is an expression of the single 
decree of creation, incarnation, and redemption. For the baptised and regenerate 
believer, the divine government of the world, previously experienced as 
omnipotence, holiness, and divine justice, now appears as election, God's 
separation of the church and believer from the world, and the communication of 
the Holy Spirit, 'the basis of the continuity of the Church's co-operation and 
interaction' in the individual. (CF 116.1.533) In his Christian Ethics, 
Schleiermacher puts it this way:  
'[If] we consider the entry of the divine Spirit into this person, the entry of the 
Christian disposition, the Spirit is the analogue to the way of thought in the 
whole Christian church; as the individual recognises this way of thought, it is 
also in him, but only from the side of his communal consciousness, and then to 
begin it must always become personal in him before he can cease to be purely 
receptive in the church and begin to be productive in it.'453 
                                                            
action does not depend on the intention being pure and unmixed, or on its always being 
definitely present to the mind of the person by whom baptism is administered.' (CF 137.1.627) 
453. Selections from Schleiermacher's Christian Ethics ed. and trans. James M. Brandt 





Blessedness begins in the believer as she takes on the language of the church as the 
inculcation of a way of being in the world, a disposition or attunement, historically 
available in the church's teaching—its form of life [Lebensform]—and begins to 
communicate it to others.454 
 
  
V. Sanctification (Heiligung)  
 
A. The Work of Love 
 
The God-consciousness, the piety appropriate to blessedness, 
communicated to the believer, however, does not magically dominate the self-
consciousness of the believer in an instant. It is not punctiliar. The union with 
Christ in the believer is an active obedience to Christ  
'as His life was an active obedience of the human nature to the indwelling being 
of God within Him' developing through the believer's pursuit of her vocation 
through 'real discipline and enhancement of power.' (CF 112.1 519; CF 112.4 
522) 
  
The process of sanctification in the believer mirrors the propagation of actual sin 
in the believer by means of original sin. A believer in the midst of sanctification 
turns away from the form of life in the sinful community, the world apart from the 
church, towards the common life of the church community. Therefore, 'acts will 
occur within the state of sanctification similar to those common before 
regeneration, where what emerges is the power of the sinful common life, whereas 
                                                            
454  'Unter der Lebensform ist heir nichts anderes zu verstehen, als die Art und Weise, wie die 
enzelnen Zeittheile des Lebens werden und sich aneinander reihen; und Selbtsbewußtsein wird 
also betrachtet in seinem Uebergang in Thätigkeit, das heißt als Grund des Willens.' (CF 




the traces of preparatory grace lie deeply hidden.' (CF 110.2.507) Original sin 
becoming actual differs from sanctification passing into the believer in that sin was 
not allotted to individuals, 'each has his share in the common guilt and nothing is 
separately forgiven him', but in redemption sin has nothing to do with the common 
life, 'sin has its basis... only in the individual in so far as he still has something in 
him of the old common life of sin.' (CF 111.3.515) As an active being of God in 
human existence, the Spirit of the common life influences without itself being 
influenced and sanctification is 'a surrender which through the entire sphere of 
spontaneous activity has consolidated itself as a steadfast willingness to be 
controlled by [Christ].' (CF 110.2.507) 
Unlike Christ, who developed perfectly in accordance with the being of 
God in him, the regenerate believer must struggle against the sinful habits, 
disposition, and language she has accrued in her lifetime.455 The new form of life, 
the arrangement of the parts of time [Zeittheile] in the believer's self-consciousness, 
operates as the basis of the will turning away from the old way of being.456 The 
Gefühl of the believer has developed over time as she has attended to her own 
concrete situation in her knowing and doing. A change in her feeling will, then, 
require a reconstruction of her feeling in time through precisely the same means of 
attention to her concrete situation.457 The amount of reconstruction will depend 
                                                            
455. 'From the beginning of His incarnation onwards Christ developed in every way naturally 
yet constantly and uninterruptedly in organic union with the indwelling principle of His life, and 
in its service. To no other who brings with him a personality that has shared the common life of 
sinfulness is this vouchsafed.' (CF 110.3.508) 
456. (CF 107.478 / CG 107.168.11-15) See also '...in sanctification growth does not take place 
without a preliminary struggle between the old man and the new, this struggle cannot at any 
point in its whole course be viewed as an even advance to increase in the power of  the one and 
decrease in the power of the other.' (CF 110.2.507-508) 
457. 'That strength of the God-consciousness is not original; it is a gift which becomes ours only 
after sin has developed its power; and what has emerged in time can be removed in time only by 




upon the degree to which her sensual consciousness has dominated her self-
consciousness up unto this point:  
'[I]f language develops in a person before he can take Christian disposition into 
himself in a living way, there must be a reconstruction of language and thought 
in him. This is so, for before this ensues, what is distinctively Christian in 
language is nonexistent in the individual, that is, in terms of content; and the 
church cannot do anything other than to assimilate the individual into the 
content of the church's language in order to elevate Christian disposition as a 
way of thought in him.'458  
 
The disposition in the Christian will be the same as in Christ, a will for the 
Kingdom of God, and will be worked out in the same way, 'the actual pursuit of 
one's vocation,' as the achievement of the Kingdom of God. (CF 112.4.522)  
The goal of sanctification, therefore, will be a change of disposition [der 
Gesinnung Wandel]; a holiness rooted in love not law: 'for love always is, and does, 
much more than law can be or do.' (CF 112.5 523/ CG 112.5..226.32-227.2) While 
Schleiermacher does not deny the need for the Evangelical Church to legislate 'in 
order to guide those who lack insight,' nevertheless, he denies the third use of the 
law, opposing the Formula of Concord's claim that good works 'conform to the law 
of God... which word [law] here has only one sense: the immutable will of God, 
according to which men ought to make the rule of their lives,' with a compound 
citation from Ephesians:  
'[Christ] has abolished the law with its commandments and ordinances, that he 
might create in himself one new humanity in the place of two, thus making 
peace...until all of us come to the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the 
Son of God, to maturity, to the measure of the full stature of Christ.'459  
 
                                                            
458. Ethics 121. 
459. The Formula of Concord text Schleiermacher quotes in a footnote runs: '...observandum 
est, quando de bonis operibus agitur, quae legi Dei sun conformia...quod hoc loco vocabulum 
legis unam tantum rem significat: immutabilem scilicet voluntatam Dei, secundum quam 
homines omnes vitae suae rationes instituere debeant.' The Ephesians text is cited in reverse 
order in the same sentence (2.15 and 4.13) with a quotation from 2.15: νόµος ἐντολῶν ἐν 




The evangelical commitment to a faith communicated through preaching without 
the imposition of an exterior law manifests itself again at this point in the 
Glaubenslehre. At no point does he re-establish a law over against the priority of 
God's being in humanity. The 'Christian self-consciousness [christliche 
Selbstbewußtsein]... determined through our faith in Christ is the general form 
[allgemeine Form] of our compassion [Mitgefühl]  with human affairs and 
conditions.' (CG 113.3.232.7-10) Sanctification as compassion is the stature of 
Christ coming about in Christian believers as they receive their will from Christ: 
'We find one passive condition [leidentlichen Zustand] posited as necessary, almost 
constant, in Christ, so that, in a sense, all his actions depend [abhängen] on it, 
namely compassion [Mitgefühl] with the condition of men.' (CG 97.3.82.16-20)460 
This compassion, as feeling with others, is Christ's way of taking the world, his 
way of reflecting on it in his own consciousness, so that when he communicates it 
to believers the feeling these human beings possess of the world, their Gefühl, 
comes into and directs their reflective self-consciousness as love, and love alone 
                                                            
460. 'Insofar as Jesus expresses the divine, his self- consciousness is fully active in relation to 
the world, that is, he imparts his God- consciousness to others and thereby quickens the whole 
race. The perfect passivity of his self- consciousness in relation to God implies its perfect 
activity in relation to the world. 
How is it possible that the divine love can be imparted perfectly to the self- consciousness of 
Jesus? How can his entire spontaneity and receptivity be so completely conditioned by the 
divine love? Schleiermacher's discussion in the Dialectic, explored above, provides the answer. 
The God- consciousness results from consciousness traversing a gap, a reflexive rift, as 
consciousness flickers from the pole of spontaneity to receptivity and back again. Insofar as 
consciousness comes to the recognition that it must traverse this gap, it recognizes that it is not 
itself the source of its own existence, but that it depends on something other than itself for its 
very being. In order for there to be a genuine divine influence on consciousness, however, it 
must occur at the moment that consciousness flickers from one pole to the other. It is in 
traversing the reflective rift that consciousness receives the divine influence, indeed, becomes 
one with it.'  
Jacqueline Mariña Transformation of the Self in the Thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher 




can be equated with the being or essence of God [Sein oder Wesen Gottes]. (CG 
167.1.504.9)461 They, then, suffer like Christ because they love like him. 
  
B. Prayer 
The work of redemption accomplished in Christ reveals the attributes of 
God, known non-speculatively through reflection on the content of feeling 
[Gefühlsgehalt], to be preparatory manifestations of God's essence: love. (CG 
167.2.505.5) Omnipotence, omnipresence, eternity, omniscience, holiness, and 
justice function as concepts allowing for an increasingly accurate understanding of 
God until the movement into Christian faith where these attributes give way to the 
essence of God. 'Love and wisdom alone... can claim to be not mere attributes but 
also expressions of the very essence of God...' (CF 167.2.731-732) Only love, 
however, comes in the self-consciousness of regenerate individual. Wisdom 
follows from the extension of the God-consciousness of the individual as she 
attempts to relate the elements of the world to each other and herself. The full 
expression of the being of God in the world is wisdom as the perfection of love.462 
Schleiermacher demonstrates this dynamic in his understanding of prayer. 
                                                            
461. The version of thesis 164 in the first edition of the Glaubenslehre, where it is thesis 180, 
makes this connection between the restored fellowship of man with God in the feeling of 
absolute dependence and the extension of that fellowship to others more explicit: 'When we 
trace to the divine causality our consciousness of fellowship with God as the feeling of absolute 
dependence through the efficacy of redemption so its content is the same as that the planting and 
expansion of the the Christian Church is the purpose of the divine world government.' [Wenn 
wir unser Bewußtsein von der durch die Wirksamkeit der Erlösung wiederhergestellten 
Gemeinschaft mit Gott als Abhängigkeitsgefühl auf die göttliche Ursächlichkeit zurükführen: so 
ist der Inhalt desselben der, daß die Pflanzung und Verbeitrung der christlichen Kirche der 
Gegenstand der göttlichen Weltregierung ist.] Compare with the second edition: 'When we trace 
our consciousness of restored fellowship with God through the efficacy of redemption to the 
divine causality so we set the planting and extension of the Christian Church as the purpose  of 
the divine world government.' [Wenn wir unser Bewußtsein von der durch die Wirksamkeit der 
Erlösung wiederhergestellten Gemeinschaft mit Gott auf die göttliche Ursächlichkeit 
zurükkführen: so sezen wir die Pflanzung und Verbreitung der christlichen Kirche als 
Gegenstand der göttlichen Weltregierung.] Both texts are from CG 584-585. 
462. '...we do not say God is wisdom precisely as we do God is love; and the point is one which 
we can elucidate as follows...we have the sense of divine love directly in the consciousness of 




The church remains an imperfect community wherein individuals have not 
reached the full stature of Christ. The imperfection of the church community 
consists in the remaining influence of the world on it, this occurs through the sin 
of its individual members, and its lack of progress in 'absorbing the world into 
itself.' (CF 146.1.668) The consciousness of this defective state, however, feeds 
into the desire of the church community to attain the end of Christ's own life, the 
kingdom of God, through the extension of the church. The desire for this execution 
of Christ's own desire manifests itself as prayer. In the Glaubenslehre 
Schleiermacher describes the dynamic of Christian prayer: the 'right anticipation 
[Vorgefühl] which the church ought to have for what in its being together 
[Zusammensein] is salutary [heilsam] naturally becomes prayer.' (CG 146.417.118-
20)463  
The impulse for the correction and expansion of the church community in 
the present in relation to its future task is 'an effect of the divine Spirit.' (CF 
146.1.669) Prayer in and for the church community does exist as personal prayer, 
but  provides the place where the individual moves away from individual concerns 
or anticipations to find, instead, her work and purpose within the church 
community.464 The communal activity of prayer in the church concerns the whole 
                                                            
of course represents to us the essence of God. But the divine wisdom does not enter 
consciousness thus directly, but only as we extend our self-consciousness (as personal, but even 
more as species consciousness [Gattungsbewußtsein]) to cover the relation of all the elements of 
reality to each other.' (CF 167.2.732 / CG 167.2.506.1-14) 
463. The Mackintosh translation inserts the word 'world' into the thesis giving: 'The right 
prevision which it befits the Church to have of what will be salutary for it in its coexistence with 
the world naturally becomes prayer.' (CF 146.668) The second edition of the Glaubenslehre, 
however, reads: 'Das richtige Vorgefühl, welches der Christlichen Kirche zu haben gebührt, von 
dem was ihr in ihrem Zusammensein heilsam ist, wird natürlich zum Gebet.' The Mackintosh 
translation, perhaps, follows the first edition where this sentence appears in thesis 162 as 'Es 
gebührt der christlichen Kirche ein richtiges Vorgefühl zu haben von dem, was in ihrem 
Zusammensein mit der Welt heilsam ist, und dieses wird natürlich zum Gebet.' The changes are 
compared in CG 578-579. I have followed the German of the second edition more closely in my 
own translation given in the text. 
464. '...these things are done through the gathering together of individuals for common prayer; 




condition of the church coming 'from the self-consciousness of the Church as a 
whole.' (CF 147.1.672) On this model, rightly offered prayer will be the attempt 
by the church to discern its practical activity in light of its circumstances insofar as 
the practical activity expresses Christ's ruling activity in the church. At no point 
does Schleiermacher countenance the possibility that prayer could 'exert an 
influence on God, His will and purpose being thereby deflected.' (CF 147.2.673) 
Any magical theory of prayer, where the creature could exert influence on the 
Creator, would conflict with Schleiermacher's basic presupposition 
[Grundvoraussezung] 'that there can be no relation of reciprocal action between 
creature and Creator.' (CG 147.2.423.4-5) Not only would this destroy any 
possibility of absolute dependence in the creature, as well as the absolute vitality 
paradigm undergirding much of the Glaubenslehre, but it would render the 
'imperishable and supreme value of the Kingdom of God' empty. (CF 147.2.673) 
The being of God at work in Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit, the union of the being 
of God 'in the common Spirit of the Church', is absolutely and unalterably a love 
that cannot in the end be opposed.  
As the divine love, the sense of love in the feeling of absolute dependence, 
the human God-consciousness, demands to be expressed. The divine being as love, 
like the human self-consciousness, expresses itself in its presentation and 
communication of itself. The plan or intention of this self-communication and self-
presentation is divine wisdom: 'the divine wisdom is nothing but the highest being 
[höchste Wesen] viewed in this absolute, not composite but single and originally 
perfect [ursprünglich vollkommen], self-presentation and communication.' (CG 
                                                            
from what is more personal in origin to that which could be same in all, and is guided by the 





168.1.508.1-4) The dynamics of human experience previously encountered as 
God's restrictive activity, e.g. holiness and justice, are increasingly known by the 
regenerate believer as God's wise ordering of creation. Schleiermacher compares 
the order of the world in time and space with the idea underlying a work of art 
[Kunstwerk] or self-presentation. The world appears to 'our God-consciousness' as 
an 'absolutely harmonious work of art' perfectly expressing the being of God. (CF 
168.1.733) The human awareness of the temporal events in the self-presentation 
develops as they are included not simply with resignation but with thankfulness in 
the communal consciousness of the church.465 Understanding the way in which 
divine love is working in and on the world will mirror the attempt to understand 
the idea or wisdom behind any other work of art. The application of the self to the 
understanding of the world is the spread of the church as the place where God's 
love for the world has been historically expressed. '[T]he proper work of divine 
wisdom is precisely the spread of redemption' through the expansion of Christian 
piety into every aspect of human experience as 'the order in which election is 
carried out, and the regeneration of individuals as well as whole masses of 
humanity effected.' (CF 168.2.735) This expansion of the effect of the single 
decree, creation, incarnation, and redemption, is the goal of the wisdom of God, 
the world-government, that the Christian participates in through her feeling of 
absolute dependence brought about by Jesus Christ.466 Prayer is the 
                                                            
465. (CF 146.1.669) 
466. In the first edition of the Glaubenslehre Schleiermacher makes this connection explicit: 
'Wenn wir unser Bewußtsein von der durch die Wirksamkeit der Erlösung wiederhergestellten 
Gemeinschaft mit Gott als Abhängigkeitsgefühl auf die göttliche Ursächlichkeit zurükführen: so 
ist der Inhalt desselben der, daß die Pflanzung und Verbeitrung der christlichen Kirche der 
Gegenstand der göttlichen Weltregierung ist.' [When we trace our consciousness of fellowship 
with God as the feeling of absolute dependence through the efficacy of redemption to the divine 
causality so its content is the same as that the planting and expansion of the the Christian 
Church is the purpose of the divine world government.] He changes the thesis to the following 
in the second edition: Wenn wir unser Bewußtsein von der durch die Wirksamkeit der Erlösung 










In the course of the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher has progressively 
worked through the Christian self-consciousness by abstracting, applying, and 
moving past various concepts as they apply to the divine being. The goal of this 
conceptual work has been practical throughout:  
'for we are now confronted with the task of more and more securing recognition 
for the world as a good world, as also of forming all things into an organ of the 
divine Spirit in harmony with the divine idea originally underlying the world-
order, thus bringing all into unity with the system of redemption.' (CF 
169.3.736-737)  
 
The world, then, is the 'theatre [Schauplatz] of redemption' as the revelation of God 
in time and space. (CG 169.510.27-511.2) This realisation does not lead the 
Christian believer, for Schleiermacher, to expect any 'greater divine 
communication' than 'has been effected in the human race by means of redemption 
through Christ.' (CF 169.1.735) Instead, on the basis of the human self-
consciousness, the piety or attunement of the self, made available in the life of 
Jesus Christ, the believer attempts to take the world as the revelation of God in line 
with the acutely visible revelation of the being of God in the Redeemer and the 
unfolding display of God's being in the church. The direction of life in the church 
is towards the world as the expression of God's being and good will. In the end, 
                                                            
sezen wir die Pflanzung und Verbreitung der christlichen Kirche als Gegenstand der göttlichen 
Weltregierung. [When we trace our consciousness of restored fellowship with God through the 
efficacy of redemption to the divine causality so we set the planting and extension of the 
Christian Church as the purpose  of the divine world government.]  




'when through us the world is become fully ready for us, it will appear clearly that 
nothing can really be save as it is also an object of divine love.' (CF 169.2.736) 
The world appears as the object of divine love twice: in Jesus Christ and 
the Spirit. The appearance of the world as the object of divine love occurs through 
the union of the divine essence with that part of the world capable of purposively 
relating to the world: human nature. The relation may not yet be known. It is felt 
in Christian piety as unity with God in Christ, and this feeling at the deepest level 
of the self leads to knowing and doing. The real union of the divine essence with 
humanity in the personality of Christ and the common spirt of the Church is, 
therefore, the teaching on which Christian doctrine [kirchlichen Lehre] 'stands and 
falls.' (CG 170.1.515.1-3)  
'Now these exactly are the essential elements in the doctrine of the Trinity, 
which, it is clear, only established itself in defence of the position that in Christ 
there was present nothing less than the Divine Essence, which also indwells the 
Christian Church as its common Spirit, and that we take these expressions in no 
reduced or sheerly artificial sense, and knowing nothing of any special higher 
essence, subordinate deities (as it were) present in Christ and the Holy Spirit. 
The doctrine of the Trinity has no origin but this; and at first it had no other aim 
than to equate as definitely as possible the Divine Essence considered as thus 
united to human nature with the Divine essence itself... [therefore] we rightly 
regard the doctrine of the Trinity, in so far as it is a deposit of these elements, 











The stated goal of this thesis has been to read, investigate, and exegete the 
major theological works of Richard Hooker and Friedrich Schleiermacher to see 
how they attempted to develop responsible Christian speech answerable to their 
present time and the source of Christian piety, God. The motivation for this 
investigation was to see how Christian piety might be able to right itself 
theologically while undergoing major shifts in human understanding and culture. 
These major shifts precipitated by the dissonance between larger speculative 
accounts of reality, Troeltsch's world-picture [Weltbild], and the drive to find a 
liveable unity in a more personal sense of the world, a worldview 
[Weltanschauung]. The interrelation of a world-picture and a worldview, their 
continual criticism, reinterpretation, and re-evaluation, in the adjustment of life and 
thought was described, in the first chapter, as a pragmatic process of Re-
Christianisation. This description was ventured on the basis of a formal similarity 
between the detachment of inherited cultural schemes from everyday life and the 
attempt to reground some inherited religious values in everyday life found in 
James' Pragmatism and the Reformation project of Re-Christianisation.  
James's Pragmatism attempts to bridge the divide between empiricism, 
idealism, and religion through a three-fold practical evaluation of metaphysical 
ideas. An objective or empirical element affects a person who is disposed towards 
it by his or her habitual centre that is reflectively known in certain over-beliefs. 




are evaluated by submitting them to the interaction of the subjective, the habitual 
centre of personal energy, and the objective, sensual consciousness of reality. The 
interpretive agenda or 'rules for action' of over-beliefs do or do not fit into the 
overall habitual centre of a person as he or she navigates objective everyday life, 
and this lack of fit indicates their lack of truthfulness. The truthfulness of a belief 
supplies a full fact by bringing together in relative harmony a person's sense of self, 
a felt object, and understanding or concept of that object. A full fact is religious, 
for James, when it becomes a way of describing the relation to a wider self of 
cosmic relations with objective consequences; it becomes a hypothesis of serious 
scale. 
The Reformation project of Re-Christianisation was shown to make parallel 
moves to the more explicitly Modern pragmatism. The late medieval crisis of 
popular piety can be understood as the increasing distance between the regnant 
over-beliefs of Christian religion and the experience of everyday life, the 
detachment of larger interpretive schemes from the felt sense of self. A renewed 
piety was ventured by adjusting the inherited over-beliefs through a submission to 
the centre of Christian piety: Jesus Christ. By turning to the work of Christ below 
the loquacious level of the self, his affective touch on the believer, the interpretive 
schemes, practices, and rules for action of the existing culture, what Reformers 
described as 'pagan', were judged as insufficiently truthful or Christian when they 
did not fit within the dynamic inherent in Christian piety. The formative dynamic 
initiated by Christ's person and work was the sensible touch making possible the 
pragmatic verification of certain theological schemes. These schemes, having been 
submitted to this judgment, were then codified and handed on to others for their 




movement of Re-Christianisation worked when they fostered 'a synthesis of 
scientia and sapientia' through their appeal to simplicitas and experientia.467 
Confessionalisation, however, raised the possibility that the Re-Christianisation 
process would need to be begun again, or pursued continually, if these new 
schemes detached themselves from a Christocentric piety or everyday life. 
Re-Christianisation, then, is re-attachment of a socially constructed 
community, including its more abstract reflections, to Jesus of Nazareth, a 
historical man occupying a quasi-metaphysical position in relation to creation. The 
attempt to bring these factors together in a critical dialectic is not, however, the 
only option open to a theology faced with the detachment of everyday life from 
Christian piety. The church’s directing doctrine can exempt itself from enduring 
the judgment of the world or unmoor itself from the historical demands of Jesus of 
Nazareth. These twin poles of enclosure or surrender of the reflective doctrinal 
system mirror not just the philosophical conundrums of James, or the theological 
options of Troeltsch, but Helmer’s description of current theological trends. On the 
‘conservative’ side, the epistemic advantage model of theology makes theology’s 
internal coherence to be the only important test of Christian truth: it disconnects 
Christianness and truthfulness. In the ‘liberal’ camp, on the other hand,, a more 
thorough revisionism entirely hands over the doctrinal inheritance to the judgment 
of a contemporary system. Instead, by locating the relationship between God’s 
determinative power and human receptivity of that direction in our pre-reflective 
life, it is possible to maintain the unity of Christian experience while maintaining 
the social construction of doctrine—its historicity—through an appeal to ‘a reality 
beyond itself that social constructions attempt to convey.’468  
                                                            
467. Heiko Oberman Masters of the Reformation p. 46. 




The historical impurity and social construction of the doctrine witnesses 
and testifies to the more basic unbrokered relationship between God and humanity 
that the doctrines seek to convey by locating themselves in the realm of inherent 
but incomplete sanctification. Unlike theologies that emphasise one side of 
classical pragmatism by assuming judgments of interior consistency to be enough, 
the pragmatic option inherent in Re-Christianisation combines a commitment to 
Christianness that takes seriously the judgments entailed by whether or not doctrine 
illuminates a person’s experience and squares with other aspects of her life.469 This 
adjustment will be possible not simply because certain cultural or philosophical 
problems have been overcome but ‘by the will's formative surrender to God, who 
encounters us with his essence...in the revelation-history of the prophets through 
its culmination in Jesus, and from Jesus down to the present. Jesus is thus the centre 
of the redemptive self-revelation of God.'470 God’s causal turning of the will in 
Jesus Christ is ingredient in, presupposed by, and necessary for responsible 
Christian speech, whether newly Christianised or Re-Christianised, and this 
requires some point of contact. Against various conservative and liberal options, 
then, I have described attempts at Re-Christiansiation presupposing, and 
presupposing as evangelically necessary, the fact that we are people capable of 
receiving revelation; we stand in the same position as the Apostles receiving 
Christ’s preaching, in all its expansive power, as interruptive of our normal 
processing and creative of new ways of getting on with life. The indirect point of 
entry for this power is the formative surrender of the will, whatever calculations 
                                                            
469. See David Tracy ‘Lindbeck’s New Program for Theology: A Reflection’ Thomist: A 
Speculative Quarterly Review (July 1, 1985: 49.3) p. 470.  




have gotten us there, to one who speaks with authority in the present time.471 The 
denial of the ability of God to act presently on the believer in a way that makes a 
difference, to act magically in Schleiermacher’s sense, blocks the possibility of 
Christian responsibility in the present. 
The following chapters of the thesis have demonstrated a parallel material 
movement in each theologian's understanding of piety despite their formal, 
terminological, and cultural differences drawing on their commitment to the Re-
Christianisation project through the practical verification or correction of Christian 
doctrine. The equivalent trajectory has been seen to follow on four aspects of their 
projects: a commitment to Reformation; an inadequate and sinful response to God's 
ordering of the world encountered at the pre-reflective level; Christ's re-ordering 
of the human habitual centre through his human life; the continued efficacy of this 
human life through God's agency in the present church. The development of piety, 
then, requires a certain attitude towards the world, the historic Christian 
community, and an attentiveness to everyday existence. All of these have been 
shown to be present in Hooker and Schleiermacher in their own way. 
 
II. The Initial State 
 
                                                            
471. I have in mind here Stanley Cavell’s description of Kierkegaard: ‘What is admirable, 
exemplary, is [Fear and Trembling]’s continuous awareness of the pain, and the danger, of that 
silence—of the fear of the false word, and the deep wish that the right be found for doing what 
one must: what to my mind, Kierkegaard’s portrait of Abraham shows is not the inevitability of 
his silence, but the completeness of his wish for directness, his refusal of anything less. 
Exemplary, because while we are stripped of Abraham’s faith and his clarity, it is still his 
position we find ourselves in. For certainly we cannot see ourselves in Kierkegaard’s 
alternative, we are not Tragic Heroes: our sacrifices will not save the State. Yet we are 
sacrificed, and we sacrifice. Exemplary, because in our age, which not only does not know what 
it needs, but which no longer even demands anything, but takes what it gets, and so perhaps 
deserves it; where every indirectness is dime-a-dozen, and any weirdness can be assembled and 
imitated on demand—the thing we must look for, in each case, is the man who, contrary to 





A. A Reforming Community 
 
As a matter of historical fact Hooker and Schleiermacher were both 
committed leaders of churches whose character was in some sense constituted by 
the European Reformation. The changes endured by the church in Europe, 
however, also necessitated the Reformation of that church into a cohesive body 
around the figure of Jesus Christ. For Hooker, these changes included the 
Reformation itself, the rise of Ramist logic, the new sciences and the unresolved 
heritage of Nominalism.472 Schleiermacher lived in the shadow of political 
turbulence, including the French Revolution and the invasion of Prussia, ecclesial 
innovation, the church union in Prussia, and the theological response to Kant's 
philosophy by pietists, rationalists, and radicals forms. The need to maintain a 
degree of ascertainable order in the universe drove different theologians to either 
substitute a wholly new theology for the previously discredited one or to restrict 
theology in order to locate the source of order somewhere else. During Hooker's 
time, the former tactic could take the form of the Puritan insistence on the Bible 
containing the totality of knowledge or the later Anglican insistence on the use of 
natural theology developed in dialogue with the new sciences.473 Schleiermacher 
contended with similar tactics employed by pietist, confessional, and rationalist 
theologians. 
The responses of Hooker and Schleiermacher resisted these temptations to 
restrict theology to a science detached from the lived world of believers, to become 
                                                            
472. Brad Gregory describes the continuity of the Medieval, Reformation, and Modern periods 
as the continual inheritance of a set of problems and questions in The Unintended Reformation. 
See especially the introduction pp. 1-24. 
473. On the use of Natural Theology see Robert Boyle Some Considerations Touching the 
Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy 1663 in Anglicanism, the Thought and Practice 
of the Church of England: Illustrated from the Religious Literature of the Seventeenth Century 
eds. Frank Leslie Cross and Paul Elmer More (London: SPCK, 1935) no. 89. Boyle responds to 




Idealist or Rationalist in James' terms, or to discard the unity of the theological 
system entirely, to become empirical in James’ terms. The temptation to restriction 
came when the previously regnant form of theology underwent significant changes 
during the Reformation and/or the Enlightenment. Reducing theology to a fixed, 
timeless system provided a means of interior integrity or missionary intelligibility 
when both of these were under serious threat. The existing symbolic systems, with 
their attendant epistemologies and political orders, were coming unhinged from the 
experience of people in Europe as religion was abstracted away from everyday life 
in order to ground itself in a distant sphere.474  
Another option for coming to grips with these various shifts was to use new 
epistemological tools to articulate the universal relevance of Jesus Christ. This 
tactic involved a shift away from exhaustive mappings—Biblical, metaphysical, or 
scientific—in order to cast Christian theology as an interpretive enterprise in 
service of a meaningful project.475 The tradition would be an interpretive enterprise 
within specifically defined historic communities of faith rather than a 'pure' 
finished system to be 'translated' into other arenas.476 Schleiermacher's definition 
                                                            
474. For this reading of the Reformation see Lindberg 49-50. 
475. '[Scientific] knowledge must always have an incomplete character; even though it is 
knowledge of the totality, it is not total or exhaustive knowledge, nor ever could become so. The 
whole can be known only as a mystery which envelops us, into which our minds can reach only 
with an awareness that there are distances and dimensions which elude us.' Oliver O'Donovan 
Resurrection and Moral Order (Grand Rapids: Eedrmans, 1994) p. 79. H.R. McAdoo locates 
this move from systematisation to interpretation as a hallmark of the Anglican tradition 
beginning with Richard Hooker: 'But this criticism of a systematic theology came not only from 
Hooker, and from the Oxford group of rational theologians, from the Cambridge Platonists,and 
later from the Latitudinarians, but from Andrewes and from Laudians like Heylyn and 
Hammond, and from moderate writers like Sanderson. It is a striking demonstration of the self-
awareness of Anglicanism, and it testifies to the widespread nature of the conviction that what 
was required was not theological systematisation but theological interpretation.' Spirit of 
Anglicanism (New York: Scribners, 1965) p. 19. 
476. More and Cross Anglicanismn xx 'What we have to look for in the ecclesiastical literature 
of England is not so much finality as direction.' Compare with,  'A liberal Protestant is one 
whose piety and sensibility join Protestant convictions about Bible, tradition, church, history, 
and truth with sustained attention to critical argument and scientific inquiries, a developed 
historical consciousness, and a commitment to social criticism and reform. This describes the 
stance of theologians such as Friedrich Schleiermacher... [b]ut it does not describe the work of 




of theology in his Brief Outline illustrates the desired connection between it and 
the Christian community:  
‘Theology is a positive science, whose parts join into a cohesive whole only 
through their common relation to a particular mode of faith, i.e., a particular 
way of being conscious of God. Thus, the various parts of Christian theology 
belong together only by virtue of their relation to 'Christianity.' This is the sense 
in which the word 'theology' will always be used here.’477  
 
Theology, reflection on Christian piety, functions properly when it attempts 
to further the project of Christianity understood as the extension of sanctification 
in the Kingdom of God. It reflects on, criticises, and corrects conventions of a 
community in light of a given and fixed project. Hooker and Schleiermacher turned 
their interpretive, that is hermeneutic, theologies to Christology and the doctrine of 
justification rather than speculative metaphysical schemes. As modern thinkers, 
they advanced theologies, which despite being systematic in character, were not 
premised upon a necessary system of thought or the use of prescribed rules, but 
took shape as reflection upon the complex personal and symbolic relationships that 
make up actually existing Christian faith.478  
There were Christological, soteriological, and evangelical reasons for the 
refusal to restrict Christian religion to a certain set of intricate doctrinal 
assumptions: it would not allow Christ to totally determine a human person if some 
                                                            
suspicions about the Enlightenment and also tend to minimise the significance for theology of 
the findings of the natural sciences and some other disciplines.' Douglas F. Ottati Theology for 
Liberal Protestants (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013) p. 14. 
477. Brief Outline on the Study of Theology  §1 
478. Brian Gerrish 'Friedrich Scheleiermacher' in Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the 
West eds. Ninian Smart, John Clayton, Steven Katz, and Patrick Sherry (Cambridge: CUP, 
1985) ‘Christian theology is the sum total of the scientific studies and rules without which 
church leadership would be impossible: it is constituted as a distinct field, not simply by its 
content (although all the parts do have a common relationship to a particular mode of faith), nor 
by a uniform method, but precisely by its practical goal of equipping Christian leaders. Its main 
divisions are philosophical, historical, and practical theology; and dogmatics-surpisingly, at first 
glance-is assigned to the second division along with exegetical theology and church history.’ 
p.128. 'To make salvation conditional upon a full and flawless apprehension or articulation of 
faith is thus to undermine the central Reformation principe itself, the priority of God's active 




aspect of his life was outside of Christ's redemptive work and it would restrict the 
scope of salvation to an intellectual elite. The person of Jesus Christ could provide 
a kind of unity to a modern world 'defined by a plurality of knowledges, which are 
the result not only of an exponential growth in the production of information, but 
also of a multiplication in the ways of knowing.'479 Christ's work—the redemption 
he accomplished—was taken as relevant to all human endeavours and sciences. 
Their accounts of Christocentric piety continued the Reformation agenda of 
Christianising society by bolstering the effectiveness of the church's practices and 
confession in the midst of the large cultural shifts associated with the rise of 
Modernity. Their attempts to maintain the faith of the church were not seen as 
opposed to the developing emphases on reason and criticism, but were the handing 
on of the ecclesially given belief in the present.480  
Hooker was, as Frederick Beiser has argued, the instigator of a theological 
project at the beginning of the English Enlightenment despite having no recourse 
to the founding figures of Enlightenment thought.481 Hooker develops his view of 
the practical import of Christian doctrine through a combination of the agenda of 
the Reformation and a diverse array of traditional Latin theological sources.482 
Schleiermacher, however, operates after the initial birth of the Enlightenment and 
                                                            
479. Oliver Davies A Theology of Compassion (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003)4. 
480. Despite the inventiveness of their thought, neither thinker wants to be a genius. ‘We could 
not at all grant the name of Dogmatics to a presentation composed purely of original doctrines 
peculiar to itself. Even the earliest coherent presentations of the Evangelical Faith could only 
bear that name, in so far as they linked themselves to what went before, and had most of their 
system in common with was ecclesiasltically given.’ (CF 25.1.108) 
481. 'If there is any single point that must be chosen as the beginning of the English 
Enlightenment, as the first glimmering of its dawn, then that would have to be the publication in 
1593 of the first four books of Richard Hooker's Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie.' F. 
Beiser Sovereignty of Reason, p. 46. 
482. 'Yet, and this is the important point, Hooker can hardly be described as medieval any more 
than he can be called Thomist, though these are his sources and inspiration: doctrine is not 
copied and added to Anglican spirituality but absorbed into it.' Martin Thornton English 
Spirituality (Cambridge, MA: Cowley, 1986) p. 233, cf. pp. 224-226. On this point see Nigel 





accounts for faith within the milieu of Kant and the Frühromantik.483 The inherited 
metaphysics and cosmology that Hooker critically availed himself of is gone for 
Schleiermacher, and yet Schleiermacher will defend similar Christological and 
soteriological opinions in order to guard the continued viability of the Christian 
religion regardless of the metaphysics current at the time.  The similarity arises 
because of a commitment to justification by faith that renders speculative 
metaphysical thought corrigible while insisting upon the positive value of human 
meaning making in constructing a 'high' Christology on the basis of the 
relationships constituted by Christ. The goal of their projects, despite significantly 
different appropriations of traditional doctrines, was the service of Re-
Christianising their respective cultures. 
These cultures, in turn, function in a similar way in both Hooker and 
Schleiermacher. Both theologians take understanding as the application of a 
received historically developed concept or conceipt to a given sensual range in act 
of judgment. The application either gratifies or expresses the desire of the person 
making the application of the concept, or using that concept to express themselves 
in some way, leading to a positive or negative judgment. The historical repertoire 
of a community provides each agent with a vector of approach to their sensual 
world, but this repertoire is capable of a degree of adjustment and expansion 
through the creative and spontaneous use of those concepts. The limitation of the 
agent through what is communally available to him or her is, when considered as 
moral failure of the community manifesting itself in the individuals own chosen 
action, the original sin of the community passing over into the actual sin of the 
individual. 
                                                            




The rules or conventions of the Christian community became revisable 
inasmuch as they were understood to be historical products of certain men and 
women getting along in a certain time and place, inasmuch as they became 
historicised. Admitting the cultural nature of these received opinions, even when 
they are 'known' in the gut below the loquacious level, opens them up to revision 
in light of their variance with what is demanded by a certain situation where witting 
agents feel their established repertoire fails. Despite limiting and directing action, 
these concepts or rules become 'merely conventional' to an agent so that, following 
Stanley Cavell,  
'what I require is a convening of my culture's criteria, in order to confront them 
with my words and life as I pursue them and as I may imagine them; and at the 
same time to confront my words and life as I pursue them with the life my 
culture's words may imagine for me: to confront the culture with itself, along 
the lines in which it meets in me.'484  
 
Refusing, or hesitating or questioning, to go along with a conventional rule in light 
of some other demand requires something capable of issuing an imperative 
overriding those conventions.485 We do not like what some word or action says, 
what it leaves out or implies, in our participation in it because of its failure to 
articulate or instantiate the larger concern of some project such as Christian piety.   
 
B. A Plain Sense of God 
 
                                                            
484. Stanley Cavell The Claim of Reason (Oxford: OUP, 1979) p. 125. 
485. See Stanley Cavell 'This would suggest that we may think of the difference between rule 
and imperative as one between those actions (or 'parts' of actions) which are easy (natural, 
normal) for us, and those we have to be encouraged to do... This further suggests that what is 
thought of as ‘alienation’ is something which occurs within moral systems; since these are 
profoundly haphazard accumulations, it is no surprise that we feel part of some regions of the 
system and feel apart form other regions. ' Must We Mean What We Say? (Cambridge: CUP, 




What is required for Hooker and Schleiermacher's projects to function is a 
dual sense of God's ordering power as something present to all people and the role 
of inherited forms of thought. Hooker and Schleiermacher both maintain the 
coherent unity of God's act in creation and incarnation, and the possibility of 
experiencing this act in the present day, of God's act calling for some sort of 
response. The experience is the historical and contingent vagaries of everyday life 
directing the doing and thinking of Christian lives as pious Christians learn to find 
themselves in the world. In both historical contexts, the Christian faith was tasked 
with the recovery of its meaningfulness after a time of increasing meaninglessness 
by interpreting its context as the place where response to God was possible. 
Meeting with this activity, learning to act in coincidence with it, involved turning 
the whole self in response to the world.486 The ground of Christian unity, 
meaningful life together, and, therefore, potentially all human life together was, for 
Hooker and Schleiermacher, the asymmetrical act of God giving rise to the 
concrete attunement of human lives in the midst of the historical process. 
For this monotheism, the One God is not simply 'the one unconditioned 
being,' but 'the one who acts in and through all things, not as the unconditioned by 
the conditioner.'487  Such monotheising does not consist in the simple denial of 
polytheism or henotheism, although it is that, but the pursuit of the 'oneness of God' 
and the affirmation of the 'Integrity (ethical and ontological) of Reality.'488 God's 
integrity and the integrity of reality are whole, complete, and actual regardless of 
their recognition by any denomination or group. God possesses a non-negotiable 
                                                            
486. Their insistence on God's radical priority is the basis of their sapiential understandings of 
human life. 
487. H Richard Niebuhr The Meaning of Revelation (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 
2006) p. 96. 
488. James Sanders From Sacred Story to Sacred Text (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock: 2000) p. 




relationship to all of reality capable of calling forth complete and total trust from 
the one who encounters God. The hermeneutic agenda at work in monotheising is 
the sort of dynamic that should be at work in Christian understanding as it tries to 
forge a unity out of its experiences.  
The unity of human experience is located at pre-reflective levels of the 
experience of the integrity of reality by both Hooker and Schleiermacher. For 
Hooker, the pre-reflective experience of God's ordering of the world, the second 
eternal law, by voluntary agents is the same as the experience of unwitting agents 
of that law. The order of the physical world and the demands of the body unchosen 
by human agents are the result of God's ordering of the world that leads to reflective 
activity by voluntary or witting agents. The propulsive faculty moving through the 
human agent must and does begin in the appetite before it undergoes the 
modulation of the intellect before becoming the directed and articulate will. The 
natural pushes into the conventional with its attendant attempt to know God, who 
is plainly the orderer of all things. Like feeling in Schleiermacher, then, the appetite 
of the created agent is the point of contact with God, at least initially. The creature 
finds him or herself in this or that spatial and temporal location apart from any 
choice with desires, natural reactions and tendencies, given to him or her. The 
experience of order, regardless of cosmological, metaphysical, or explanations of 
that order, is basic to limited human creaturely life. The order possesses a moral 
character, even when that order is not explicitly acknowledged, directing the 




The human agent attempts to make sense, to do and to think, on the basis 
of this feeling as it comes to expression in a community.489 These communities 
form agents into their own natural reactions and understandings as these 
communities feel the weight of God's ordering power in creation, and they enable 
communication through language, gestures, and rituals on the basis of some degree 
of mutual attunement. This mutual attunement with others is the same attunement 
used to reflect on our relation to God and our interpretation of our location. The 
sense of an ordered creation, its objective density indifferent to human aspirations, 
does not require a cosmological explanation, though it may lead to one, but is a 
function of everyday ordinary life and language. A Christian who speaks, as 
Hooker and Schleiermacher both do, of God's holiness, justice, and wrath describes 
the integrity of reality impinging upon human life apart from any theoretical 
justification of that order.  
The limited beginning of interpretation, its relation to specific concrete 
events calling for interpretation, does not require a limited ending: 'to the limited 
point of view of historic Christian faith a reality discloses itself which invites all 
the truth and devotion of finite, temporal men.'490 God is responsible for any and 
everything we encounter including our enemies and evils we experience:  
'[t]he impulse to monotheise must affirm the possibility that the Creator was 
fashioning a new thing, a new heart, a new spirit in his people, indeed was 
transforming his people, by wounding and healing, into a new Israel.'491  
 
A monotheistic interpretation of these events insists on their integrity in light of 
God's oneness as Creator, Judge, and Redeemer without attempting to reduce God 
                                                            
489. 'The unity [of Feeling, Knowing, and Doing] rather is the essence of the subject itself, 
which manifests itself in those severally distinct forms, and is thus, to give it a name which in 
this particular connexion is permissible, their common foundation.' (CF 3.3.8) 
490. H. Richard Niebuhr The Meaning of Revelation. p. 11. 




or God's relationship to the world to some particular occurrence. God has a wider 
cosmic relationship, and is not, therefore, a function of human ideas, systems, or 
conceptual schemes that do not grasp the whole flux of reality. This understanding 
of the relationship between God and the world preserves God's priority and the 
asymmetrical character of movement inherent in that priority. The pre-reflective 
relation to God does not, however, entirely pass over into the speech circulating in 
a given community  
'while thought cannot proceed even inwardly without the use of speech, 
nevertheless there are, so long as it remains merely inward, fugitive elements in 
this procedure, which do indeed in some measure indicate the object, but not in 
such a way that either the formation or the synthesis of concepts (in however 
wide a sense we take the word 'concept') is sufficiently definite for 
communication. It is only when this procedure has reached such a point of 
cultivation as to be able to represent itself outwardly in definite speech, that it 
produces a real doctrine (Glaubenssatz), by means of which the utterances of 
the religious consciousness come into circulation more surely and with a wider 
range than is possible through direct expression.' (CF 15.1.77)  
 
The 'fugitive elements' escaping the grasp of speech, what we 'confesse without 
confession' in silence (Lawes I.2.2 I.59.12-20), indicate the object, God, of this pre-
reflective life to the agent in such a way that God is handled, as it were, without 
being entirely understood. The pressure of the object is not, however, a function of 
language but of causality felt pre-reflectively. 
 
C. The Judgment of the Will 
 
The failure of the reflective knowing and acting agent to understand God, 
to understand what requires a response, is not simply an epistemic failure, but is, 
rather, a moral failure to respond to the will driving the integrity of reality. The 
order in which human agents fit, or ought to fit more seamlessly, is an order given 




the human will to follow on from God's will in a given situation as a refusal of the 
voluntary agent to cooperate with the second eternal law at work in creation. This 
is a refusal to move forward with the canon of action appropriate to the end God 
desires for creation. The motivation for the refusal, though, is a preference for 
short-term goals fixed by the sensual desires of the agent as opposed to his or her 
proper orientation to higher goals learned through discourse. A relationship to God, 
a cooperation with Him in the end he desires to accomplish in creation, is refused 
by an agent who prefers his or her own purposes to a responsible act in a given 
context. The given context is not processed properly by the agent who does not 
have a proper sense of the situation, and so does not take this or that moment as a 
time when God's plan can be furthered. 
'We are conscious of sin as the force [Kraft] and work of a time in which 
the direction [Richtung] of the God-consciousness had not yet emerged.'(CF 
66.1.271/ CG 66.1.406) The direction of the God-consciousness does not occur in 
the agent insofar as he or she demands his or her freedom from responsibility to 
God in order to fulfil the false responsibility to a formative community whose 
sinful nature has not been acknowledged. A sinful community formed by the 
vagaries of human desires with its complementary false god does not, for Christian 
piety, command the total dependence of a Christian agent, but, nevertheless, tends 
to receive it. The inordinate desire of a sensual consciousness twists a higher 
consciousness into deforming the concepts of a community and an individual's 
sense of God:  
'We cannot separate the two, for the one ever evokes the other; thus when in any 
social group, some definite form of appetite breaks out predominantly, it is 
presently followed by a transformation of the God-consciousness as a means of 





Hooker's criticism of the Puritan project connects their desire for a precision of 
doctrine and a mapped out God with their desire to deny the character of their own 
providential location. They refuse to be responsible to their present by denying its 
integrity, and this is the dominance of the higher consciousness by desire. Hooker 
makes this comparison by showing how easy it is to distort a view of God because 
of material changes: 
Yeat if we could reckine up as many evident clear undoubted seales of godes 
reconcyled love towardes us as there ar yeares, yea dayes, yea howevrs past 
over oure heades, all thesse sett together have not such force to confirme oure 
faith as the losse and some tymes the onely feare of lozing a littyll transytory 
goodes creditt honor or favor of men, a smale calamitie, a matter of nothinge to 
brede a conceipt and such a conceipt is not easily againe removed, that we ar 
cleane crost oute of godes booke, that he regards us not, that he looketh upon 
others but passeth by us like a straunger to whom we are not knowne…we ar 
hanged up lyke bottels in the smoke, cast into corners like the sheredes of a 
broken pott, tell not usse of the promises of godes favor, tell such as do reape 
the frute of them, they belonge not us, they ar made to others: The lord be 
mercifull unto our weaknes but thus it ys. (Certaintie V.79.30-80.19) 
 
The proper response to this change in fortune, though, is not a denial of what one 
is confronted with—‘This pain is actually good'—or a denial of God's presence to 
it—‘God has not really willed this'—but the attempt to cooperate with this painful 
work: 'Their thoughts are vain who think that their watching can preserve the city 
which God himself is not willing to keep. And are not theirs as vain, who think that 
God will keep the city, for which they themselves are not careful to watch?' 
(Certaintie V.81.11-15) Whatever happens happens according to God's will such 
that it works for the eventual overcoming of the lack of a sense of God, but this 
lack of sense only ends when voluntary agents become conscious of their absolute 
dependence on God. Becoming conscious of this absolute dependence, and finally 
being free towards creation, in order to respond to God's will in creation requires a 
change in both the habitual centre of a human agent, the propulsive faculty of 




required is a definitive convening of the words and canons of a culture with a 
person who is naturally free from the sin of those conventions, free from the false 
conclusions of what sinfully seems natural. 
 




Jesus of Nazareth is the man who effects the crisis of cultural conventions 
capable of creating discourse appropriate to the human person through his 
obedience to the will of God. The double problem of the moral failure of communal 
life, original sin, and the personal distortion of the will, actual sin, to effect a full 
fact in the human agent requires the double solution of a discourse appropriate to 
human life and a will attuned to God's creative intention. If, following Hooker and 
Schleiermacher, the propulsive faculty of the human person, the habitual centre, 
must be re-ordered for human beings to act, think, and live responsibly in light of 
the integrity of created reality, then the change must occur to them as human beings 
at the level of will. The will must be retuned in the same way that it was tuned to 
begin with in order to allow for a greater approximation to a full fact. The order of 
the formation of discourse, personal and communal, moves from the fumbling and 
hunting of the appetite to the communal searching of language; feeling constantly 
passes over into knowing and doing. So the remaking of this human attunement 
follows the same order: the signal dominance of the will must reform adulterated 
discourse. Christ's work, therefore, takes the form of an often misunderstood 
obedience to the Father that produces a new sort of communal identity in those 




The personal identity of Jesus, as Hans Frei has pointed out, 'is centred on 
his moral action in moving towards a certain goal, rather than on his basic 
constantly unchanging yet constantly renewed self-understanding.'492 Jesus Christ 
acts in the service of a given goal throughout his life that does not fit simply with 
any ready at hand historical options. He obediently enacts a mission given in 
Scripture (Luke 4.18-19) but addressed to him personally, 'The Spirit of the Lord 
is upon me' (Luke 4.18), so that the preaching of the kingdom is the purpose of his 
own mission, 'for I was sent for this purpose.' (Luke 4.43) Although Christ learns 
obedience through suffering, he does so in line with his own basic orientation to 
the world, the intention of his will, in order to express and effect the will of God. 
(Hebrews 5.8) The movement from intention to enactment is the movement from 
appetite or feeling to an outward act, in deed or speech, expressive of that intention 
in a given context. The personal canon of action present in an agent's feeling does 
not reveal itself by simply following a rote script but, instead, by acting 
contextually to reveal itself in this given situation, voluntarily and non-arbitrarily. 
This correlative meeting of situation and action defines the agent and the situation 
through the agent's interpretation of the situation. Jesus, as a human agent, imposes 
a meaning on his situation by bringing it into God's loving intention, by holding it 
there without any wavering. Most especially the circumstances of his execution are 
not a meaningless imposition on or ruination of his work, but the context where he 
willingly effects and expresses the will of God. Christ lays down his own life: ' No 
one takes it from me, but I lay it down of my own accord. I have power to lay it 
down, and I have power to take it up again. I have received this command from my 
Father.' (John 10.18) By taking the world in this way, Christ brings an 
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unacknowledged law, the law of his being, into the clashing laws of human society 
forcing them to acknowledge him even if in ironic reversals. 'Now Jesus stood 
before the governor; and the governor asked him, ‘Are you the King of the Jews?’ 
Jesus said, ‘You say so.’(Matthew 27.11) The inability of even those close to him 
to understand him evinces how deeply he is constraining existing language, 
concepts, and rituals to accommodate the new reality of his own self. (Mark 8.29-
34) The chain of original sin is broken through the spontaneous, voluntary, and 
non-arbitrary character of Christ's will that is 'supernatural' in relation to the 
'natural' prejudices of established discourse. 
The obedient work Christ has been sent to do is the work of the cross. In 
different ways, Hooker and Schleiermacher both place the cross centrally in the 
work of Christ. The cross, however, is not a straightforward sacrifice for either of 
them. It is the final overcoming of sin, the dominance of the higher by the lower 
self-consciousness, in deed and in historical occurrence. Their theories of Christ's 
work on the cross operate within an Anselmian framework wherein the sin of 
human agents demands either 'the honour which has been taken away should be 
repaid, or punishment should follow' from human sin.493 Humanity must act in 
accordance with God's will, which is what human agents owe [debere] to God as 
rational creatures, or else deal with the moral consequences of that failure.494 So a 
human agent who acted in accordance with God's will would not merit the 
consequences of sinful humanity.  
These factors converge on Christ as he sets his face towards Jerusalem and 
his death outside the city: the necessity of obedience to God's will, the suffering 
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cost of humanity's moral failure, and the overcoming of the lower by the higher 
self-consciousness. God's will is love, the will for the salvation of the world more 
ancient than creation. For Christ to act in accordance with this first eternal law is 
for him to love creation as such and as it is. As a sinless man, Jesus of Nazareth 
loves sinful creation to the point of being willing to endure the suffering it has 
created for itself through sinful lives. The fear of death and suffering by human 
agents is the most fundamental sensual appetite in them that can overcome the 
higher consciousness; self-preservation is the basic impulse leading to human 
discourse. The work of Christ, then, is the will to die on behalf of others in 
contradiction of the basic impulse of self-preservation in obedience to the objective 
will of the Father in creation. In this way Christ knows the world for what it is, 
beloved by God, and, therefore, morally experiences the full fact of creation.  
Living and dying for others according to the will of God, then, is both a 
radically obedient act, i.e. to the will of the Father, and a radically asymmetrical 
act, i.e. in contradiction of natural pressures. The asymmetrical character of Christ's 
act in living and dying for others locates his own personal identity, the habitual 
centre of his action, outside the normal push and pull of human character formation. 
The location of the formation of Christ's identity is the eternal life of God. His work 
pushes toward an understanding of his person as eternally or asymmetrically 
constituted in and by the one who constitutes the integrity of reality. He possesses 
the same uncompromising character as the one whose indomitable power is 
responsible for experience: 'absolute causality is experienced and presses for 
expression in diversity of language; [t]he two coincide—the place of experience 
and the origin of effability.'495  
                                                            







Christian theology, as a kind of Christian reasoning, comes about through 
the believer's encounter with Jesus Christ. The saving encounter with Jesus Christ, 
though, does not take place in isolation, but, rather, implies a wide range of human 
experience and activity within the world. The reconciliation brought about by 
Christ, precisely because it is reconciliation, seems to require some understanding 
of creation and God as creator and the world as his creation.  Included within this 
is an interpretive framework made up of conceptual connections between the ideas 
of creation, God, and Christ. Herbert McCabe straightforwardly states the matter: 
the relation of God and creation ‘has to be [worked out] prior to the fullest 
understanding we can have of Jesus. Our use for the word [God] does not begin 
with christology’ so what we mean by calling Jesus the Son of God depends on 
what the word ‘God’ means.496 Christ may be the one who begins the questioning 
central to the Christian experience of salvation, but he does so within a conceptual 
matrix already loaded with numerous conventions for understanding 'God'. An 
exploration of the generative moment of Christian salvation will, therefore, begin 
with these prior uses of 'God' as well as the view of creation implied by this 
definition, before moving on to the results of modifying this definition with 
assertion of Christ's divinity.  
God statements, as monotheistic statements, do not simply place Christ at 
the centre of an available, mapped area of religious concern, but rather place him 
at the centre of all theological concern. The prior use of the word 'God' is not simply 
                                                            




defined by previous Old Testament usage, instead 'the post-Resurrection Christ 
attracts to himself (Jesus Christ) the whole spectrum of religious concerns in 
Mediterranean (and later European) civilisation' since we are 'simultaneously 
activating the Israelite God-tradition and any others we have become acquainted 
with' when we say 'Jesus Christ'.497 Christianity, then, does not involve the creation 
of a new and purified language for Christian concerns, but, instead, focusses and 
at times exacerbates the tensions at work in already existing languages. Cornelius 
Ernst describes the process in this way:  
'the historical event of the genesis of Christianity involves not, in general, a new 
language in the sense of a new vocabulary, but the transformation and recreation 
of languages already in valid use.'498  
 
The prior use of the word God, which shows the possible scope of transformation 
effected by Christ, does not involve a single tradition, e.g. Hebrew religion, but 
consists in the diverse uses of God-talk in various contexts that are condensed in 
Jesus Christ.499 While the Israelite tradition takes the lead in this in this dynamic, 
a monotheistic concept of God critically incorporates the gods of other nations so 
that our experience of salvation, what makes us talk about Jesus Christ as God, 
creates an increasing number of situations where talk about God makes sense by 
pointing to this centre of human concern and meaning making.  
So, as an alternative to a henotheistic view, monotheism is a view where 
God is not contained within a single structure of meaning, but, instead, is free from 
any specific worldly determination. Even, for instance, his presence is a presence-
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in-absence wherein God must hide himself so that he is 'sovereignly free and 
transcendent gift.'500 God cannot be within the world of human meaning as a part 
of the furniture precisely because he is the source of those meanings coming into 
existence at all. In other words, God is Creator and therefore a hidden God. To 
speak of God as Creator in this way is to refer all creation to him in a way 
completely different from the way creatures refer to each other.501 To locate 
creation's unity in the Creator is not to provide an explanation but to refer all things 
to 'an ultimate meaning, the Meaning of meaning, God.'502 From an interpretive 
standpoint, God cannot be assimilated into an agenda, converted into an easily 
available harmony, or posited as human explanation. God cannot be assimilated 
into our meaning making in any uncomplicated way, if at all, so that talk about God 
is necessarily critical talk.  
'[T]he conceptualising of God creates a frontier behind which God is and this 
side of which I am. So my life, which is a complex built-up system of habits, of 
arrangements, of blind-spots, of complacency, of 'resentment', is, in principle, 
shielded from God by the concept that encloses him.'503 
 
Jesus Christ, however, does not stand behind this frontier. The 'real 
existence of God in Him' sets him apart from other human agents as a unique 
relationship, 'in virtue of this difference, there is in Him everything that we need, 
and, in virtue of His likeness to us,  limited only by His utter sinlessness, this is all 
in Him in such a way that we can lay hold of it.' (CF 96.3.397)504 The effects of 
Christ on his followers, what we lay hold of in him, demands that he is included 
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within the identity of the one God responsible for creation. Christ's fixed character 
as one who actively, willingly, and indomitably loves is his transposition into 
history of the active, purposeful, and irresistible love that God is. The one God, 
moreover, possesses this character apart from its historical manifestation or 
actualisation in the created world. For Schleiermacher, the human flesh of Jesus is 
'the organism for this fundamental power, and is related to it as the system which 
both receives and represents it, just as in us all other powers are related to the 
intelligence.' (CF 96.3 397) The human person, with all those faculties requisite 
for a human agent, is the communication of God, his Word, in consciousness by 
means of the flesh. This expression of God in the flesh, even as it is only assimilated 
into other consciousnesses piecemeal, is truly God. The character or content 
expressed in this Word is God's love in the form of suffering. If, then, this is to be 
a true and forceful expression of God's character it will be necessary to find this 
suffering form, or one whose character is appropriate to suffering, in God Himself 
or else it would be constituted by human agents in a symmetrical fashion. The Son, 
as Hooker argues, is a receiver. The receptive character of his person depends on 
his reception of himself from the Father, and it is just this receptive character that 
determines Christ's earthly life as one of obedience. The Word is 'three degrees a 
receyver,' each degree instantiating his character:  
'first, in that he is the Sonne of God; secondlie, in that his humaine nature hath 
had the honour of union with deitie bestowed upon it; thirdlie, in that by meanes 
thereof sundrie eminent graces have flowed as effectes from deitie in to that 
nature which is coupled with it.' (Lawes V.LIV.1 II.220.23-27) 
  
Only this sort of person, one actively sympathetic with all people unto the point of 
death in obedience to the will of God, could have performed the sort of works he 




In his essay on theological methodology, Ernst sets up the central concern 
of Christian theology in this way, the  
‘thesis [of this essay] is that this centre [of concern] is the claim, 'Jesus is the 
Christ'. It is to be noted that this thesis is not merely the statement, p, say, 'Jesus 
is the Christ', is the centre of theological concern, but that this centre is 
constituted by the claim that p is the centre of theological concern.'505 
  
The statement itself involves claims about a specific historic individual, Jesus of 
Nazareth, who is in some sense outside of the normal structures of meaning in the 
world, is Christ or Lord. The generative force of Christianity comes about through 
the creation of tension within certain frames of reference in order to open them to 
a continued questioning expansion on the basis of some foundational event. In the 
case of Christianity, though, this past event is in some sense still accessible in the 
present. Entering into this questioning is how theology learns to speak about God, 
how it finds itself authorised. As the source of an infinite effability, Jesus Christ is 
placed within the identity of God as constitutive of the Godhead. That taxis of 
relations constitutes the one who comes into the world to constrain, break, and 
found the discourse of the world as a source of meaning, a man with a unique will 
always passing over into doing and speaking in a new way. Encountering Christ, 
then, is encountering the one responsible for the integrity of the world within the 
world itself. The divine identity and the human person are coincident in him. 
 
 
IV. The Present Power in the Church 
 
A. The Present Power in the Church 
 
                                                            




Thinking of Christ in this way locates him within two orders. He exists 
within the normal historical order like any other person, but as that historical 
person he 'constitutes a fixed and a vanishing point, to which all other orders of 
meaning have to be referred.'506 Whatever concepts Christians develop must, 
therefore, allow the Christian life to be vulnerable to God's reshaping action.507 If, 
however, God does transform and recreate human beings then any concept 
shielding concrete human life from him is inadequate; it is insufficiently Christian. 
The concept must allow for some of from of transformative testing or verification, 
i.e. its pragmatic truthfullness. Doctrine, what the church teaches, will be those 
concepts, over-beliefs, and rules appropriate to a cultivation of a person's habitual 
centre that are at the same time submitted to continual testing in the experience of 
believers determined by Jesus Christ. Christ takes the place of an almost 
metaphysical principle, to the degree he holds together the wide range of human 
experience grounded in the push and pressure of the cosmos. Taking Christ in this 
way does not simply add a symbolic layer to the world or alter its expression:  
'[the world] must have, over and above the altered expression, a natural 
constitution different at some point from that which a materialistic world would 
have. It must be such that different events can be expected in it, different 
conduct must be required.'508 
  
The unity of a world worked out through this sort of Christian hermeneutic would 
not, then, be the unity of a semantic or symbolic system held in mind but the 
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practical holding together of the diverse range of human experiences in the 
objective personality of Jesus Christ.509  
The practical holding together of this unity throughout diverse cultural, 
political, philosophical, scientific, and religious contexts is the pragmatic 
verification of the fact that Christ  
'is the image of the unseen God, the firstborn of all creation; for in him all things 
in heaven and on earth were created, things visible and invisible, whether 
thrones or dominions or rulers or powers—all things have been created through 
him and for him. He himself is before all things, and in him all things hold 
together. He is the head of the body, the church; he is the beginning, the firstborn 
from the dead, so that he might come to have first place in everything. For in 
him all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell, and through him God was 
pleased to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, by 
making peace through the blood of his cross.' (Col 1.15-20)510  
 
The lifelong verification of this unity in thought, word, and deed is Christian piety 
as the effect of this fact about Jesus Christ. This long-term project of verifying the 
unity of the world in light of God's summons to responsive action is the proper 
location of Christian doctrine as the pragmatic truths of the Christian community.  
Concepts like joy, peace, forgiveness, and repentance assume certain ways 
of relating to the world and to other people. Subjects who lack such a sense of 
relation will need a 'fairly intensive and thoroughgoing education in human 
existence' if they are to explain or even comprehend  the objective claims of 
Christianity, i.e. to judge or think from Christ's effects.511 For instance, an 
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understanding of the claim about human beings that since 'all have sinned and fall 
short of the glory of God; they are now justified by grace as a gift, through the 
redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God put forward as a sacrifice of 
atonement by his blood, effective through faith,'(Romans 3.23-25a) cannot be 
reasonably articulated apart from a sense of self capable of understanding guilt and 
redemption. The Christian develops an inner conscious and attitude towards the 
world through her education in Word and Sacrament and the community they 
found so that the felt object comes to her as a means of knowing God. The basis of 
this acknowledgement, however, comes from a determination of the Christian's 
place in history by God, a process over which the Christian has no control. 
Regardless of whatever historical and existential situation has made these 
concepts available or attractive to the Christian believer, they will still need to be 
applied in the present situation to ascertain their truthfulness. The unity of 
truthfulness and Christianness, when considered pragmatically, requires a 
relationship between the determining or limiting power of the world and of Jesus 
Christ: the felt object. The inability of any human discourse to entirely metabolise 
the person of Jesus Christ is, in Schleiermacher's terms, a function of his archetypal 
[urbildliche] rather than exemplary [vorbildliche] character in the Christian 
community. Jesus does not and cannot simply embody the desires, wishes, and 
hopes of a Christian group—an idol can do that—but constrains their desires, 
wishes, and hopes in approximation to the will of God. The given of God in 
creation and in Jesus Christ is that perfect presence slowly becoming inherent in 
human agents through their increasing approximation of his person: the directing 
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force sanctifying Christian agents. Dealing with Christ as archetype is the same as 
attempting to deal with God in the integrity of reality. The conventional criteria, 
over-beliefs, and ecclesial norms of the Christian community are appropriated 
through an existential education of the believer. They remain because of the fact 
that they work to make sense of the stream of human experience felt in the push 
and pull of the world. The continuity of these over-beliefs with the affective 
experience—what is below the loquacious level—of being determined by Jesus 
Christ in a person's habitual centre judges the Christianness of those over-beliefs.   
 
B. The Spirit Following 
 
Christian piety must, then, be determined below the loquacious level in 
such a way that it can grasp Jesus Christ. The education of the Christian believer 
into the formative regime of Christian piety fluctuates as he or she approximates to 
Christ's habitual centre in the contexts of his or her life. This grasping and releasing 
of Christ is the believer's sanctification in the cultivation of an inherent but 
imperfect righteousness. The Christian life, however, begins with the radically 
asymmetrical act of justification or regeneration wherein the believer turns from 
an old life, its habits, prejudices, desires, etc., to the new life of the church without 
yet being skilled in the discourse of that body. The decision cannot, therefore, 
straightforwardly be an informed decision but a receptive act. This structure of 
acting from a changed feeling mirrors the structure of Christ's own life where his 
God-consciousness determines his actions apart from his contemporary social 
conditioning after the initial act of union. As an act impossible apart from the 
historical life of Jesus Christ, the turning of the human person in conversion is 'the 




grasping of the concept or the story is not enough apart from an accompanying 
change in will. 
Hooker illustrates this point in the Lawes through the story of Festus of in 
Acts 25-26.  
'Festus, a mere naturall man, an infidell, a Romane, one whose eares were 
unacquainted with such matter, heard [Paul], but could not reach unto that 
wherof he spake; the suffering and the rising of Christ from the dead he rejecteth 
as idle susperstitious phancies not worth hearing. The Apostle that knew them 
by the spirit, and spake of them with power of the holie Ghost seemed in his 
eyes but learnedly mad.' (Lawes III.8.6 I.223.20-26)  
 
The Holy Spirit operates by bringing the dead and risen Christ to believers in such 
a way that his will passes over into their lives making them obedient to God.  The 
work of the Spirit, as God's work, is an absolutely vital work effected as an aspect 
of the single act of God: the decree of justification more ancient than creation. As 
part of the decree of justification, the special operation of the Spirit does not differ 
from the singular divine causality responsible for creation. The divine causality 
formative of creation impinges upon the believer, who is part of that causality, at 
the level of feeling. The Spirit conforms the believer to the reality of Christ through 
the entirety of the created causality as it meets within his or her feeling, the 
receptive consciousness passing over into knowing and doing. Just as in the 
moment of union in the incarnation, the created causality combines in such a way 
that something new occurs. The Christian agent becomes free, spontaneously free, 
to act in harmony with his or her context in obedience to God such that any previous 
cultural formation, as with Christ, is providentially necessary but insufficient to 
account for that act. Having changed at this most basic level, the law of the 
Christian agent begins to approximate the second eternal law through the operation 




Talk of the Spirit, therefore, will be as conceptually elusive as talk of 
creation or incarnation insofar as it simply describes a facet of the single act or 
decree of God. This descriptive difficulty does not prevent a serious and 
meaningful acquaintance with the Spirit in its effects. One does not need to be able 
to talk about the Spirit, and excessive talk may be obfuscatory, to relate to that 
Spirit's effects in life: 'every effect doth after a sort conteine, at least wise resemble, 
the cause from which it proceedeth.' (Lawes I.5.2 I.73.7-8) The presence of God, 
made known as love in Jesus Christ, in the church causing the activity of love to 
take place in the church is his essential presence to the church. The coming to be 
in time of that essential presence of God to humanity is, like the incarnation, not 
the constitution of a new identity in God but the expression in time of his self-
constituting decree as the recognition in word and deed of his Word, Christ whose 
glorified body retains 'in it the scars and marks of former mortality.' (Lawes 
V.LIV.6) As a human recognition of this divine and human address, or a divine 
address through this human organism, it is the recognition occasioned in human 
agents by a body, Christ's body, present, vital, and forceful as a causative power, 





V. The Hermeneutic of Piety 
 
How then, to return to Troeltsch and James, can Christian believers, after 
times of great changes, find responsible speech answerable to their present 




and cosmologies in their conflict with their emerging counterparts, Christian 
believers are faced with the possibility and task of producing a new worldview on 
the basis of an encounter with God's essence. A pragmatic attempt to construct, or 
reconstruct as the case may be, a Christian worldview does involve the testing of 
received Christian doctrines, but, more importantly, it begins with an experienced 
touch of encounter that these concepts, teachings, and stories are applied to in order 
to come to grips with the push and pull. The place of Christian reconstruction, then, 
is, as Schleiermacher insisted and Hooker resigned himself to, not the parsing of 
concepts but 'Christian Dogmatics must somehow go back to the divine causality, 
since [doctrines] are only meant to explain the feeling of absolute dependence.' (CF 
50.3.198) The formative surrender of the will to God, resignation of the self to 
God's wisdom, manifests itself in the correlative expressions of knowing and doing 
under the pressure and constraint of this definite will. 
The formative touch of God's will does not appear as a blank but as a 
historically particular, and so particularly constraining, man: Jesus of Nazareth. 
The point of contact between the directive divine will and the creation resultant of 
that will is the body of Jesus Christ. The absolute vitality paradigm of 
Schleiermacher and Hooker's justification paradigm of productive imputed 
righteousness describe this dynamic of God's act in Jesus Christ. The initial union 
or imputation produces, by means of the human will, a temporal and historical 
approximation of the divine will. The density of Christ's life stands over against 
the church community constantly being produced by his presence such that he 
cannot be either entirely metabolised or done away with by the community. 
Specific historical actions taken by Christ, as the actions of this still living man, 




inadequate manifestation of his person. The primary conceptual work of Christian 
formation, then, will be in coming to understand this directing, forceful, and 
constraining presence as the one described by the Christian community in Scripture 
and ritual. Learning to describe, to recognise, this power as Jesus Christ is not 
learning to use a technical, metaphysical, or cosmological apparatus, but an 
ordinary language. The reality and integrity of this given, Christ in his historical 
density, can only be identified by 'following' in the present this inherited ordinary 
language with our own representations while assuming 'they [are] accountable to 
something more than their own inner logic or the convenience of the speaker,' 
something beyond and antecedent to our understanding.512 
When talking about Jesus, Christians want to claim that Christ and his 
activity, his person and work, are the centre of human knowing and doing. He is, 
in James' terms, placed 'into wider cosmic relations' by his followers so that the 
possibility of testing this relation comes into view.513 This testing is the 
evangelically necessary attempt to bring Christ to bear on human lives as the one 
who can enable them to act according to God's will. The presupposition is that the 
ordinary descriptions of Jesus Christ in the Scriptures and the sacraments can be 
understood by other cultures, worldviews, and cosmologies because of their 
applicability to a force at work in all human lives, the hard edge of divinity. The 
recognition of this force as the presence of Jesus Christ, the body from Nazareth, 
will not, then, suddenly bring a new experience but make sense of the ordering 
power always already present in created lives.514 If this is the case, though, the only 
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possible verification of this claim would be 'a total human culture' produced by 
finding 'a single human identity in Christ' in the various attempts to come to grips 
with this ordering power rather than linguistic or conceptual uniformity.515 
 
Writing to the Corinthians, the Apostle Paul admonishes the recipients of 
his letter that they have fallen under the influence of apostles who seem to be 
leading them away from the example set by Apollos and himself. Paul is a true 
apostle as a 'steward of God's mysteries' who is trustworthy in his appointed task 
of handing on those mysteries. (1 Cor 4.1-2) Holding on to these mysteries requires 
Paul to be at odds with the normal ways of human judgments. He, instead, awaits 
the judgment of the Lord who will 'disclose the purposes of the heart' that are 'now 
hidden in darkness.' (1 Cor 4.5) Paul and Apollos have, despite not being aware of 
any judgment against them, applied this restriction on themselves to stay within the 
inherited traditions, 'nothing beyond what is written,' while amongst the 
Corinthians. (1 Cor 4.6) The point of this restriction is to allow the Corinthians to 
have Paul as an example, to follow after him in the same way he has followed after 
Christ, stretching himself to fit the form of Jesus. The Corinthians, however, have 
departed from this in order to glory in their own righteousness, to be wise, strong, 
and honourable through their own accomplishments. Paul, however, has become 
weak, foolish, homeless, poor, and persecuted, 'the rubbish of the world, the dregs 
of all things.' (1 Cor 4.13) He rebukes the Corinthians by calling out, 'For who sees 
anything different in you? What do you have that you did not receive? And if you 
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starting from man, nor is it really proved by any theological argument. And this for the simple 
reason that the possibility of experiencing grace and the possibility of experiencing grace as 
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received it, why do you boast as if it were not a gift?' (1 Cor 4.7) Their attempts to 
stand out through these human judgments deny the basic dependent and receptive 
character of their existence. In choosing to live this way they have departed from 
the imitation of Christ and his ways. When Paul comes to them, then, he will 
confront not the talk of these false apostles but their power. He will come to bring 
the Corinthians back into the Kingdom of God not with speech but with power. 
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